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P R E F A C E
Sine historia caeca est jurisprudentia, a statement made by the 
sixteenth century French humanist Balduinus is a fitting maxim for 
this particular thesis.
Law is an essentially historical discipline and can best be understood 
with a historical perspective. Furthermore Canon law is quite unique 
amongst the legal systems of the world, in terms of its continuity 
from early antiquity and the foundations of ecclesiastical 
organisation, in terms of the influence which it has exerted upon 
other legal systems and in terms of its evident equity and justice.
These twin aspects of historicism and canonism lead one, as a secular 
lawyer to the necessary inquiry, How did Canon law affect one's native 
system and does it still?
This thesis attempts to answer the first part only of this question. 
Given that His Holiness Pope John Paul II promulgated the new Codex 
Juris Canonici on 25 January, 1983 which came into force on the First 
Sunday in Advent 1983, the answer to the second part of that question 
may be ripe for answer only some time in the future.
That the Canon law did exert a considerable formative influence on the 
law of Scotland can hardly be doubted. To examine every branch of law 
where the Canon law may have had or could have had an effect would be 
the work of many lifetimes, hence the restriction on the subject 
matter viz. the law of husband and wife.
Whilst every possible care has been taken to ensure that the study has 
been conducted in as thorough a manner as possible and that all 
relevant sources have been consulted or at least pondered upon, some 
are inaccessible or if accessible only of use with skills which are 
outwith my competence. Accordingly there are errors and omissions 
which remain my responsibility.
Gratitude must be offered to many without whose assistance, 
encouragement and forebearance this work would have remained undone, 
and particularly there must be mentioned His Grace Thomas J. Winning, 
Archbishop of Glasgow, Professor David M. Walker, Sheriff J. Irvine 
Smith, Professor William M. Gordon, Robert Sutherland, W.S., Dr J. 
Durkan, and Mr H.J. Clifford. June Parr must be thanked for her 
painstaking transliteration of my manuscript into a legible form. My 
parents and my brothers, Laurence and Timothy must also be commended 
for their seemingly unending patience which contributed in no small 
part to the completion of this thesis.
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is intended to set out in as concise a manner as possible 
the results of three years research into the law of husband and wife 
as it was before, during and after the Reformation.
During any revolution, the sequence of events becomes disturbed, the 
stories garbled, the sources altered for instantaneous political 
motive and inevitably the historian's task is rendered more difficult. 
Fortunately much material has survived but much more is missing. The 
case records of every Official's court barring the Court of the 
Official of Saint Andrews, the cases of the Court of High Commission, 
and many other fruitful sources have simply, in the mists of time, 
disappeared.
This thesis attempts to draw on several disparate sources and to piece 
together a coherent picture of the substantive and adjective law of 
husband and wife of the period of the Reformation. The time scale 
involved is from 1555 to 1690. The two dates are somewhat arbitary, 
1555 being sufficiently before the Reformation to show what the law 
was during the latter days of the Catholic Ascendancy, 1690 being the 
year in which Presbyterianism was formally fixed by the Confession of 
Faith as the rule of the Scottish Church.
In the Church Courts 1555-1690, I examine the form of the Church
Courts, their structure and Constitution and with regard to the Post 
Reformation Period the origin of the Church Courts and the emergence 
of the secular intrusion on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. I examine 
the extent and content of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
With regard to the adjective Law, I examine the procedure employed in
the Canonical Courts and compare this with the Post Reformation
Courts. I examine the extent of the Canonical survivances into the 
post Reformation era. I examine the emergence of specific rules of 
procedure and evidence.
I examine the appeals system as employed before the Reformation and 
conclude that certain cases of a matrimonial nature were discussed not 
before the Rota but before the Penitentiary. I also examine the legal
profession in Scotland at this time and appraise their function in 
importing canonical practice and law by indirect routes.
In the substantive law of husband and wife 1555-1690, I examine the 
full ambit of effects which the law had upon the domestic 
relationship. I examine engagement, the constitution of marriage, by 
ceremony in facie ecclesiae, by verba de futuro and by verba de 
praesenti. I also include relationship stante matrimonio and examine 
the status of women, the property rights of husbands, the concept of 
communal property, dos, terce, maritagium and tocher, and donationes 
inter virum et uxorem.
Finally, I examine the dissolution of marriage by death, and the 
emergence of true divorce, a vinculo matrimonii by default of the 
secular power in its failure to appreciate ecclesiastical philosophy. 
I conclude that the Reformers did not introduce divorce for adultery 
or for desertion but adhered to the theory of the indissolubility of 
marriage, and that adultery and desertion were introduced in 
conjunction with the legal fiction of the spiritual and civil death of 
excommunicates.
Michael Paul Clancy
Glasgow 
May 1984
CHAPTER I 
THE PRE REFORMATION COURTS
The Pre-Reformation Consistorial Jurisdiction and Procedure 
The Ordinary Jurisdiction
The history of the consistorial jurisdiction is essentially one of 
contest between Royal courts and Ecclesiastical courts, between 
temporal and spiritual power.
The struggle between Church and State is a well known feature of 
European social and legal history and is well documented. In 
particular when discussing the development of the ecclesiastical 
control of consistorial jurisdiction some commentators^ have placed 
the consistorial jurisdiction firmly within the ambit of the Church in 
Italy and France by the 10th Century. In the Byzantine Empire, the 
Bulle d ’Or of Alexis Commenus the First granted to Bishops the 
cognisance of matrimonial causes in 1086. The reasons for this 
assumption of jurisdiction by the Church are difficult to define from
the confusion of the times. However, it is certain that the failure
of Royal power or the inability of the secular arm to exercise power 
lies near to the heart of the answer.
As it was on the Continent, so it was in Scotland. The Scottish
Monarchy of the early medieval period was with some notable
exceptions, notoriously weak. One can imagine that the King in 
assenting to those Acts contained in the Regiam Majestatem which allow 
Bishops to enquire into marriage was probably relieved that a 
competent authority, one which was learned and independent, would take 
over the task. One can suspect that it is from this point that the
Canon law begins its far reaching influence upon the law of Scotland 
and through which the Roman Law or rather Roman Civil Canonical Law 
found its way into and finally became the native system of Scotland.
The author of Regiam Majestatem, the manual of substantive 13th and 
14th Century law, based in great part upon Glanvill's De Legibus et 
Consuetudinibus Angliae (1187) can be said to have introduced much 
Canonical influence into the law of Scotland. However, the present 
work is not concerned with this earlier legal osmosis and the Regiam 
Majestatem is referred to only to show a point of entry of some of the 
particular norms and legalisms presently dealt with.
The law of Husband and Wife whether adjective or substantive was 
deeply influenced by the Canon law. The attitude of the Medieval law 
was such that this important area of human relationship with all its 
spiritual and moral facets could not be left unregulated. There were 
no alternative laws which could fill the breach, with the possible 
exception of customary law. Scotland had been Christian in the main 
part since the reign of Queen Margaret and King Malcolm (1058-1093). 
As such a member of Christendom she had been exposed to canonical 
influence from the 10th Century until the 15th:- what has been called 
"L'age classique du droit canonique”^. There was not the same measure 
of conflict between the secular and spiritual Estates in Scotland as 
had existed in, for example, France2 . For one thing the Feudal system 
was less well developed in Scotland. The doctrine of the Church was 
substantially settled before it had reached Scotland, comparatively 
two centuries later than in France.
The principal consequence of this relatively late arrival in Scotland
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is that virtually all the ’developmental’ problems of the 
ecclesiastical legal system had been smoothed out and that the system 
as applied in Scotland was confident and strong.
The ecclesiastical jurisdiction then covered much not now considered 
to be of interest to the Church. There were five broad categories of 
matter dealt with by ecclesiastical forum.
(a) All matters involving the benefit of Clergy, i.e. all litigations 
in which ecclesiastics were involved.
(b) All matters involving the cura animarum, i.e. in which faith and 
morals were concerned.
(c) All matters involving oaths, which included many contracts.
(d) All matters of status before God, i.e. marriage, legitimacy. 
Questions of wills and succession and their adjuncts, e.g. dos 
and terce.
(e) All matters of a criminal nature involving the Church, e.g. 
witchcraft, simony, heresy, etc.
The Church in Scotland adopted jurisdiction with royal approval at an 
early date in relation to dos and testaments^, and in matters of 
marriage:-
”Et mandabitur episcope loci quod de matrimonio illo cognoscat et quod 
inde judicaverit Domino Regi vel eius justiciarius scire faciat".
"And command shall be given to the Bishop of the diocese to make 
enquiry into the marriage and to notify the King or his justiciars of 
the result"
The case envisaged here was one of the devolution of property and the 
marriage had to be certified as a preliminary question in order that 
the proper heir should inherit. The Church however was not granted 
this jurisdiction by the Crown as some writers have tried to suggest, 
but held this of its own authority.
The judicial system of the Church existed in conjuction with the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy. Thus, superior ecclesiastics whether 
secular or religious, were entitled to hold court by virtue of the 
ordinary authority of their office.
It is necessary to examine the hierarchy as it stood in Scotland on 
the eve of the Reformation in order to comprehend fully the judicial 
framework and the ecclesiastical context in which the canonical judges 
worked. It should be noted that only the secular clergy will be 
examined as regular clergy did not exercise the same function in 
respect of marriage in as many instances.
In 1176, Pope Alexander III, distressed at the attempt made by Henry 
II to subject the Church in Scotland to the See of York commanded the 
Scottish Church "not to obey by metropolitan right any but the Roman 
Pontiff"^.
The Bull Cum Universale of Honorius III published in 1218 and 
reiterating Bulls of Celestine III and Innocent III acknowledged the
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position of the Scottish Church as "Filia Specialis Ecclesiae 
Romanae", 'the special daughter of the Roman Church'. By this 
declaration of Papal Authority the "Scottish Church ... is subject to 
the Apostolic See as a special daughter with no intermediary"g. In 
this way the claims of York and Canterbury to Metropolitan authority 
with the attendant claim of English secular sovereignty over Scotland 
were silenced. In being placed under the direct authority of the Holy 
See, the Scottish Province was unique in Christendom in so far as she 
was without a Metropolitan See. This state of affairs obtained until 
1472 when by a Bull dated 13th August, Sixtus IV erected the See of 
Saint Andrews into a Metropolitan See. The preamble to the Bull 
relates that because of the absence of a Metropolitan See there is 
great inconvenience with regard to appeals due to the great distance 
between Scotland and Rome. The suffragan Sees of Saint Andrews were 
Glasgow, Dunkeld, Aberdeen, Moray, Brechin, Dunblane, Ross, Caithness, 
Whithorn, Lismore (Argyll), Sodor and Orkney. In the Bull, Patrick 
Graham, Bishop of St Andrews was granted "the rights, jurisdictions 
and all and sundry things which Metropolitans can do of right" 
Twenty years later, in 1492, Innocent III erected Glasgow to 
Metropolitan status, its Suffragan Sees being Dunkeld, Dunblane, 
Galloway and Argyll. The other Sees of course remained with Saint 
Andrews with the swift restoration of Dunkeld and Dunblane and thus 
the ecclesiastic framework of the Church in Scotland was settled until 
the Reformation.
The key ecclesiastic in the diocese was the Bishop who was Judex 
Ordinarius or Ordinary Judge in the diocese. He held jurisdiction by 
ordinary authority, his appointment, on a spiritual plane being made 
by virtue of the Epistolae Apostolicae. The Formularium
Instrumentorumg of 1552 lists the principal elements of episcopal 
jurisdiction in the folio "De Casibus Episcopalibus". This details 
the subject matter of the jurisdiction and lists inter alia the 
following as within the competence of the Bishop to decide
The fraudulent deflowering of virgins, i.e. abduction and rape, 
cognatio spiritualis or spiritual relationships, those who incur the 
impediment of cultus disparitas, those cases involving adultery, 
clandestine marriages and incestuous marriages.
Bishops, in Scotland, as far as can be ascertained, rarely judged 
matrimonial cases themselves. The principle of Canon law whereby an 
Ordinary could delegate to an Official was well used in Scotland.
At the fourth Lateran Council (1215) Pope Innocent III decreed that 
any Bishop who was overburdened by the weight of his episcopal duty 
could appoint an ecclesiastic to assist him. So there emerged the 
familiar figure of the Bishop's Official or delegated judge in 
episcopal jurisdiction.
The Bishop in the Transalpine Sees generally delegated his 
jurisdiction to an Official. In Italian Sees, the Official was termed 
Vicarius Generalis. Lyndwood states:
"Qui libet enim Ordinarius potest ea quae ad eius Juridictionem 
spectant alius committere".
"For any Ordinary may commit another to his jurisdiction"
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In such jurisdiction the Official had the same consistory as the
Bishop. Lyndwood again provides some authority
"Ommissis argumentis in contrarium dico quod in Officialem Episcopi et 
eius Vicar in Temporalite et spirituale quorum ultranique constat idem 
consistorium cum Episcopo".
"Omitting the arguments to the contrary I say that in the Official 
Principal of the Bishop and his Vicar in temporal and spiritual
matters in every case there stands the same consistory as the 
Bishop"1Q.
The Official was therefore regarded as the Ordinarius and his Tribunal 
had the same jurisdiction as the Bishop. There could be therefore no 
appeal from the Official to the Bishop. The delegator was responsible 
for all sententiae of the delegated authority. The maxim "Qui facit 
per alium est perinde ac sic faciat per se ipsum"^ "Who does a thing 
through another is the same as he who does it himself" applied as 
fully here as in any area of vicarious liability.
The appropriate forum for appeal, if the Ordinary or Official were 
acting, was the Metropolitan forum, with of course, the possibility of 
appeal to Rome, if necessary.
There is further native indication of the jurisdiction which the
Official exercised on behalf of the Bishop. The appointment of John
Waddell as Official Principal of Saint Andrews (c. 1523) displays the 
jurisdiction which he would be expected to hold:-
7
"Et dignitatis Nostre archepiscopaeis et metropolitans sedis St Andree 
officialem principalem fecisse".
"And to the dignity of our Archiepiscopal and Metropolitan See of 
Saint Andrews he is made Official Principal"^.
"Dantes, concedentes ac committentes prefato nostro officiali 
principali nostram plenam et omnimodam potestatem ac mandatum speciale 
omnes causas, personales, criminales et matrimoniales properes et 
mixtas et alias quas cunque".
"And we give transfer and commit to our foresaid Official Principal 
our full and total power and special mandate in all causes, civil, 
personal, criminal and matrimonial, temporal and mixed and all
others"^•
The Vicar General who in Scotland is the official dealing 
preponderately with spiritual matters also displays the jurisdiction 
in his appointment.
"Omnes causas civilles, criminales et matrimoniales".
"All causes, Civil, Criminal and Matrimonial"^.
The Official was a full time Judge, learned and very often schooled in 
Canon and Civil Laws. For example, John Waddell whose appointment has 
been commented upon was a licentiate of both laws^. John Guillerim, 
Commissary of Saint Andrews during the period 153^-1537 was a 
Licentiate in the Decreta as was John Spittall, Official Principal of
Saint Andrews from 1546 until 1553. This aspect of the Canonical 
Courts, i.e. the qualified Judge, was one of the most attractive for 
the lay litigant and brought much profitable business to the Canonical 
Courts which was strictly speaking not within the Church’s power to 
judge.
In addition to the legal qualification which Officials held at the 
Provincial Synod held in Saint Andrews in 1539 it was ordained that 
all officials should be Priests^.
The Official’s Court was not the only inferior forum which dealt with 
consistorial matters. The Commissary Court also held some function 
although there is some speculation as to its exact function. Lyndwood 
describes a Commissary General as an ’’officialis foranus in certo 
loco”, ”A forane Official in certain places’’^ .  It is to be noted in 
this context that Martin Balfour, Official Principal of Saint Andrews 
1540-1545 is described in the ’’Liber Officialis Sancte Andree” as the 
’’Official Principal of Saint Andrews, Commissary General and Judge"
From such information it is possible to deduce that the Commissary was 
inferior to the Official and possibly that there existed an appeal 
from the Commissary to the Official^g.
It is not speculation however to contend that the Commissary Court 
operated upon specific instructions from the Ordinary whether Bishop 
or Official. The case between the Bishop of Glasgow and the 
Archdeacon of Teviotdale^  (1427) illustrates the point
"Ordinaverunt quod dictus episcopus haberet habere suas commissarios
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de jure eodem per totem archdeconatium ... qui cognoscere possint 
omnes minores causas et eas judicare et terminare".
"It is ordained that a Bishop has his Commissaries by law throughout
the Archdiaconate who can cognosce all minor causes and judge them and
deliver sentences therein"
How then can it be stated that Commissaries had any matrimonial
jurisdiction? The only explanation is by specific Commission. A 
similar situation obtained in other provinces, e.g. England or Ireland 
where Rural Deans, an office roughly analagous in many respects to the 
Commissary, were also prohibited from hearing matrimonial causes
unless at the delegation of the appropriate ecclesiastical superior. 
Lyndwood explains the position thus:-
"In causis statuimus ut Decani rurales nullam causam matrimoniale 
decaetro audire praemat sed cascu examinatio non nisi discretis viris 
committatur quibus affidentibus si commode fiere poterit postmodum 
sententia pronuncientur".
"We ordain that in cases Rural Deans may hear no matrimonial matter 
except with careful examination by only discreet men. This trust can 
be committed to them if it is convenient and thereafter that sentences 
can be pronounced"2Q»
The Appellate Jurisdiction
The appointment of Patrick Graham in 1472 to the newly created 
Archiepiscopal Metropolitan See effected two major changes to the
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Scottish Church. It put the Church in Scotland on a par with each 
other province in Christendom and eventually also led to greater Royal 
control.
Whatever the wider state and political implications which the creation 
of the Metropolitan See had, the immediate legal consequence was to 
have a Court of second instance on Scottish soil. Appeal lay to the 
Metropolitan from the inferior judicatures of the Officials and the 
Commissary Courts. Prior to the erection of the Metropolitan See 
appeals could only be made to the Curia as could petitions for 
dispensations. Such matters were ruled by the Bull Cum Universale.
The creation of this superior jurisdiction did not alter the right of 
litigants to appeal directly to Rome. Mr J.J. Robertson of the 
University of Dundee has under the auspices of the Department of 
History of the University of Glasgow examined the Vatican Archive and 
Library for Scottish Appeals during the period 1464-1560. He has 
discovered that the frequency of appeals is seldom less than three per
year21*
There are however native Scottish indications that certain matters of
a matrimonial nature when taken to Rome did not come before the Rota
0-
but those where non consummation was alleged were adjudicated at the 
Tribunal known as the Sacra Penitentiaria Romana, the Sacred Roman 
Penitentiary. The Sacred Penitentiary granted dispensations and 
adjudicated in matters which contained confessional secrets, therefore 
its records until recently were closed and there can be no direct 
evidence of this proposition. Native evidence however culled from 
disparate sources does shed some light upon the destination of many
appeals from Scotland.
The protocol books of Scottish notaries display many cases which have 
had some stage of procedure dealt with by the Sacred Penitentiary. 
The Formulare Book of Saint Andrews contains at least one process of 
divortium a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of consanguinity which is 
followed by a dispensation to allow marriage which decrees and the 
procedure leading thereto are governed by letters Apostolic "sealed 
with the seal of the sacred Apostolic Penitentiary"^.
However, the protocol books are perhaps the more illustrative of the 
role of the Penitentiary.
On 17th December, 1509, Lord John Fleming and Margaret Stewart who had 
earlier been divorced due to consanguinity were granted a 
dispensation, permitting them to marry anew. Archbishop Beaton, who 
granted the dispensation was instructed in this act by Cardinal 
Ludovic of St Marcellus the Great Penitentiary of Pope Julius H 23 * 
There are three other cases during the period 1509-1510 which are 
directed by Cardinal Ludovic of St Marcellus^ij •
The records of the period from 1510 until 1550 are somewhat
incomplete. However one can tell that in 1523 an unnamed couple from
the diocese of Glasgow obtained letters Apostolic from the
PenitentiaryOI-.
o
In August 1550 William Gordon, Dean of Dunblane, Abbot of Sweetheart 
and Chanter of Glasgow received letters Executorial "granting 
commission to absolve and dispense Herbert Maxwell of Kirkconnell and
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Janet Maxwell for marrying within the fourth degree and to decree that 
the survivor would remain unmarried and that any child should be 
legitimate1^ .
Occasionally, particularly after Cardinal Beaton was appointed Legate 
a Latere, dispensations could be had from the Legate rather than the 
Papal Seat2 .^
There is other evidence of the weight of business going to Rome. Much 
of course related to matters of benefice and the presentment to 
livings but the consistorial matter was considerable. During the 15th 
and 16th centuries the expense of the many actions at the "Court of 
Rome" was beginning to worry the "Secular Authoritie". Lord Fraser
states that "the money lavished in conducting them (the pleas) 
seriously impoverished the nation and alarmed the government"2g.
The complaints of "ingentes labores et expensas’^ g, the prodigious 
works and expenses had been heard at least since 1415 and became so 
loud that Parliament felt forced to legislate upon the matter. In 
1493 Parliament advised the King's subjects who were conducting 
"plegis, persecutions and litigations" at the Court of Rome to return 
home to Scotland and to submit their processes. King James undertook 
to assume that responsibility to have justice done "be thair ordinare 
juge" whom failing, in case unruly ecclesistics would become 
turbulent, the King would appoint a Judge to dispense justice in the 
c a s e ^ Q •
There were of course numerous and substantial litigations in process 
at the Court of Rome. However, it seems that the majority of cases
involved
(a) matters of ecclesiastical discipline, and
(b) matters of benefice and Church property.
There were of course many other heads of action pled at Rome; it had 
for example its own local jurisdiction. Those broad categories 
adumbrated above could all be adjudicated there. However marriage was 
to the Court of Rome a special interest because of its sacramental 
nature 2 <j •
The costly litigation which is condemned by Lord Fraser was the "Great 
Cause" or contest between the Bishops of Saint Andrews and Glasgow. 
It is this anomalous and unique instance of ecclesiastic and legal 
contest of which the Act 1493 complains as being "of which the expens 
is unestimable damnage to the Realme". It is contended that the case 
was not typical for its length or complexity and indeed the fact that 
this case was singled out for attack in the Committee of the Lords of 
the Articles points to its important nature. Certainly litigation in 
Rome was a costly affair. The Formulare Notarium Rotae gives a tariff 
of "Taxae ordinariae Dominorum Notariorum Rotae ab antiquo seratae et 
deinceps observande". The table of ’Standard Charges’ lists the 
charge per item as used in the Curia, e.g. for the Register (process) 
of an Ordinary Cause consisting of 12 folios the charge was one ducat, 
for a Citation with an Inhibition by edict for a Defender outwith the 
curia one ducat, for the noting of a definitive sentence in the first 
instance, five ducats
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The same formulary provides the Notary with a table of exchange rates 
in use within the Camera and Apostolic Chancellary which gives some 
idea of the relative cost of these i t e m s ^  The usual Scots pound was 
equivalent to one ducat whereas the English pound fetched six ducats. 
The scale of these charges can be realised when it is disclosed that 
James Thornton, Advocate was paid £144 at Whitsunday 1558 for 
remaining at the Court of Rome for the Queen’s affairs^* whereas 
Edward Henrison who then was acting as the "Pure Lawyer" in Edinburgh 
received £44 for the same period^.
That these expenses must be multiplied many times to obtain an 
accurate picture of the economic drain which the Court of Rome was 
causing is certainly true. However, when it is realised that at least 
25 advocates, procurators and writers of apostolic letters, many of 
them native Scots, were retained at the Curia and in the Cancellaria 
during the years 1530 to 1558, it is obvious that many were engaged in 
matters of Benefice but a large proportion, as their designations 
betray were involved in Matrimonial and Consistorial work.
Master George Hay was sent to Rome by James V in 1530 who gave him 
"all power and licence ’per se vel suos procuratores ... in Curia 
Romana ... ad levandum omnes bullos executoriales et processus’, 
"through himself or his procurators in the Roman Curia to take up all 
bulls, executions and processes’’^ .
Later, in 1546, Queen Mary, the Regent, appointed Masters James 
Curtesium, Jheroninus de Justinis, Johannes Aulusium de Arogonia and 
Athonius Gabrielus as "Aule consistoriale advocatos", "Advocates 
before the consistory".
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In the same Letter of Appointment, Johannes Lamikin, Alexandrus de 
Urbinis, Nicholaus Ricardus and Nicholaus Cuming all Writers of 
Apostolic letters together with Jacobus Salomond and David Bonar, 
Vicars respectively of Borg and Panbride and expressly stated to be 
"Natione Scotos" are created, "Nostros veros legitimos et indubitatos 
procuratores, actores, factores et negotiorum nostrorum ... gestores".
"Our true legitimate and undoubted Procurators Agents, Factors and 
Agents for our business
In the same year, 1546, Johannes Stevinsoun, Jacobus Salmont and 
Johannes Duncan are appointed Procurators to act "In curia Romana 
coram sanctissimo domino nostro papa eius vel vicecancellario aut 
cancellariam apostolicam regente aliove quocunque ad id a sanctissimo 
domino nostro papa potestatem habente, habent in camera seu 
cancellaria apostolica aut alibi ubi opus fuerit comparendum".
"In the Roman Curia before our Very Holy Master, the Pope himself or 
the Vice Chancellor or a regent of the Apostolic Chancellary or 
whomsoever to whom the Most Holy Master Our Pope has given power in 
Camera or the Apostolic Chancellary or wherever else the work can be 
done"gg.
An entry of the following year, 1547, displays the number of legal 
representatives of Scots nationality acting in the Curia. Nicholaius 
Richardi, Nicholaius Cummyn, Writers of Apostolic letters are 
mentioned and the following are listed as "de presenti Rome agentes", 
"Agents present in Rome", Johannes Bellendon, precentor of Glasgow, 
Johannes Thorton Canon of Moray whose father had also represented in a
legal capacity at Rome, Johannes Stevenstoun prepositor of Biggar, 
Patricius Lyddale, Johannes Spens and Johannes Stonehouse listed as 
"clericos regni nostri nativos", "native clerics of our Kingdom".
In addition to the names given above Jacobus Salmond and David Bonar 
are also retained in the action contemplated, one of presentment to a 
benefice. It is also interesting to note that a certain Sebastianus 
Grullot is also retained to act in this case indicating that Scottish 
work was not exclusively channelled to Scots^g.
The numbers are not essentially important, although with so many 
advocates, procurators and writers it is no surprise to hear at least 
occasionally of complaints of expense.
What must be appreciated is that the volume of business must have been 
great to require so many legal representatives and also probably the 
most important effect, the expertise and knowledge which these men 
acquired, their acquaintance with canonical procedure and their 
learning in law, both Roman and Canon would be amongst the most
important invisible imports to Scotland during the Medieval period. 
Aspects of this reliance on Roman-Civil-Canonical law will be shown 
later. What is almost certain is that during the earlier development 
the process of intellectual osmosis occurred unconsciously. However, 
as the canonical adjective and substantive law became more readily 
available and was recognised as a more effective and efficient system
of law than the poorer Scoto-English system of Regiam Majestatem, it
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would be adopted by the secular authorities and assumed into the
municipal law. Examples of such adoption are, in the field of
procedure, the initial summons or libel and the oath of calumny and in
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the substantive law, the wide use of presumptions and the equity of 
treatment between husband and wife.
Consistorial Process in Scotland
There were many grounds whereby a case dealt with matrimonial matters 
could be brought to the canonical Courts. These grounds relate to the 
substantive law and will be dealt with under that head.
The Ordinary Procedure
The Solennis Ordo or Ordinary Procedure was that generally used 
throughout Europe^. The following summary comes from the "Summa 
Notariae” of Johannes de Bononia^ and whilst this has no direct 
connection with the Scottish Courts, the examples of other Notary 
Protocol Books and Formularies show that similar works must have been 
in use. Of course there were certainly copies of the Corpus Juris 
Canonici, containing the procedure in scattered form^ and the works 
of other canonists, particularly Durandus the Speculator^ were well 
known.
Primo si partes per procuratores comparerent mandatis exhibitis 
utrique parti prefigitur terminus ad dicendum et dandum in scriptis 
tam contra mandata hinc inde exhibita quam contra personas 
procuratorum nec non ipsi reo contra commissionem impetratan sive 
rescriptum quicquid dicere et dare voluerit. Et decernitur eis copia 
exhibitorum facienda infra terminus eis datum, Adveniente termino eis 
dato et comprobatis mandatis si libelli parati non sunt datur terminus 
ad dandum et recipiendum libellum. Si autem libellus paratus est
offertur judici vel notario recipienti pro judice. Et ipse judex vel 
notarius de mandato ipsius dat ipsum libellum reo et prefigitur sibi 
terminus ad deliberandum utrum cedere vel contendere. Partibus 
postmodum in judicio die termini constitutis judex quaerit a reo utrum 
deliberaverit cedere vel contendere scilicet respondere se velle 
cedere vel contendere quod nunquam planum esset. Si vero responderet 
se velle contendere tunc judex, secundum quandam ordinationem et 
mandatum factum auditoribus palacii a domino Nycolao Papa IV quaerit a 
reo si habet aliquam exceptionem dilatoriam vel declinatoriam quam 
velit proponere. Et si responderit non vel etiam sic dummodo non 
nominaverit aliquam efficacem judex compellit cum respondere libello. 
Si autem nominet vel proponat aliquam efficacem tunc datur ei 
peremptorius terminus ad omnes dilatorias et declinatorias 
proponendas. Exhibitis exceptionibus rei datur terminus ad 
replicandum et ex evidenti causa, si negotium arduum est, exhibitis 
replicationibus actores ad reum iterum datur alius actori ad 
replicandum. Sic communiter datis exceptionibus et replicationibus 
judex dat eis terminum ad audiendum interloqui super ipsis. Lata 
interlocutoria pro actore reus litem contestari compellitur et jurare 
de calumnia. Quo facto judex statim utrique parti dat terminum ad 
ponendum et si negotium magnum est iterum post ilium dat alium 
terminum peremptorium ad proponendum. Positionibus hie inde factis 
secundum modum curie Romane datur hinc inde copia ut partes deliberare 
possint super responsionibus faciendis. Bononia vero et in pluribus 
aliis locis, ubi fui non datur copia positionum ab adversa parte 
datarum sed tantum advocate partis per judicem ostenditur ut videat si 
est ibi aliqua contraria implicata vel impertinens cui non debeat 
respondere. Et prefigitur terminus ad respondendum ad positiones. 
Responsionibus subsecutis prefigitur terminus ad dandum articulos
sicut de positionibus dixi. Videlicet si negotium non est magnum unus 
terminus tantum, si negotium magnum est datur primus pro prima 
dilatione secundus postea pro omnibus et peremptorius. Approbatis 
articulis si testes ibi recipi debeant vel si articuli debeant per 
instrumenta probari statim aliquibus testes prefigitur terminus ad 
probandum. Si vero testes remotisunt petitur ut committatur ipsos 
recipiant et examinent et tunc, si partes sint de diversis dyocosibus 
vel locis distantibus fit conventio de loco si ambo partes probare 
volunt et conveniunt etiam inter se-si possunt-de aliquo vel aliquibus 
qui communiter testes ipsos recipiant. Si autem concordare non 
possunt quaelibet pars eligit sibi unum, et judex dat eis tertium et 
assignat eis peremptorium terminum ad probandum coram electis 
judicibus id quod probare volunt. Post haec fiunt commissionis 
littere inter quas articuli et interrogatoria concluduntur. Et datus 
terminus partibus ad dandum interrogatoria si qua dare volunt. Post 
terminum citantur partes vel saltim reus ad videndum quando articuli 
et interrogatoria sic exhibits dictis commissariis litteris 
includuntur. Remissis attestationibus et sigillis quibus vallate sunt 
recognitis vel probatis a partibus, in termino ad ipsas attestationes 
aperiendas et publicandas specialiter assignato aperiuntur et 
publicantur ipse attestationes. Et datur terminus ad recipiendum 
ipsorum copiam et dicendum contra personas et dicta ipsorum testium 
quicquid volunt. Et si contra testes vel eorum testificata quicquam 
non dicitur, sequitur in causa conclusio, cum dicti examinatoris 
testium de mandato specialiter a judice sibi facto - prout moris est, 
quando attestatione remittunt ipsis partibus ad comparendum coram 
dicto judice cum omnibus actis et munimentis suis qualitercumque 
causam ipsam tangentibus peremptorium terminum assignassent. Verum si 
petatur a partibus, nihilominus ad producendum omnia instrumenta acta
et munimenta peremptorius terminus assignatur. Post quern terminum 
sequitur immediate conclusio et postmodum terminus ad sententiam 
audiendam".
First, if the parties are compearing by procurators, a term is fixed 
for both parties exhibiting mandates to decide and to give opportunity 
to lodge objections against the mandates exhibited or against the 
persons of the procurators but not against the commission to judge or 
rescript above that which it is wished to judge and rescript. And it 
is decided that the parties make a copy exhibited to each in the time 
fixed for the term. Upon the arrival of the term given and the 
mandates being proved, if the libels are not prepared a term is set 
for the lodging and receipt of the libels, but if the libel is 
prepared it is offered to the judge or a notary to receive it for 
adjudication and the judge himself or the mandated notary gives the 
libel itself to the defender and a term is fixed to decide whether to
admit or defend the libel. After, on the day fixed for the term the
judge questions the parties on the cause, each decides to admit or to
clearly answer, either to contend or admit because it is never clear.
If indeed he answers that he wishes to contend, the judge immediately 
following the ordinance and instruction made to the auditors of the 
palace, by our Master Pope Nicholas IV, asks of the defender if he has 
any dilatory exceptions or declinatory exceptions, which he wishes to 
propose. The defender can answer or, if not, so long as he has not 
declared any preliminary pleas, the judge can compel him to answer. 
If he declares or proposes any preliminary plea then a peremptory term 
is appointed for the disposal of all dilatory and declinatory pleas. 
The defender’s defences being declared, a term is appointed for
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replication and on cause shown if the matter is difficult, the 
pursuers replication being known the defender is given a term again to 
answer to the replication of the pursuer. Thus both parties having 
given in on the one hand exceptions, on the other replications, the 
judge appoints a term for the parties to hear the interlocutor on the 
exceptions and replications. Having given the interlocutor for the
pursuer, the defender is compelled to join issue and swear the oath of 
calumny. This being done the judge at once appoints to both parties a 
term to propone and if the matter is important he appoints a term to 
propone upon the peremptory. Positiones are then made up, following 
the mode of the Roman Curia, and are lodged with copies in order that 
the defender may deliberate upon the responsae to be made. In Bologna 
and indeed in many other places, copies of the positiones are not 
given by the adversary to the other party but such are shown to the 
party’s advocate by the judge in order that he may see if there is any 
incompetence and irrelevant defence which he need not answer and a 
term is fixed to answer the positiones. Following the responsiones, a 
term is fixed to lodge articles just as has been stated in the case of 
positiones, viz, if the matter is not great, one term only, if it is 
weighty there is given the first term only for the dilatory pleas, the 
second thereafter for all other pleas and peremptory defences. If to 
prove the articles, the Court has to receive witnesses there or if the 
articles have to be proved by instruments, a term is at once fixed for 
proof. If indeed the witnesses are remote it is to be sought that it 
is committed to others that they receive and examine the witnesses and 
so if the parties are of diverse dioceses or of distant places a 
meeting place is fixed. If both parties wish a proof and if they can 
then meet between themselves the one who heard the witnesses can 
receive the parties. If again the parties cannot settle, if one party
adheres to his own case, the judge will appoint a third term and he 
assigns to them a peremptory term to prove before the chosen judges 
that which they wish to prove. After this they make a commission to 
write between which articles and interrogatories are concluded and a 
term is appointed to the parties to give in interrogatories if they 
wish to lodge them. After this term the parties or only the defender 
are cited to view how much of the articles or interrogatories as shown 
are included in the said commissary letters. The evidence being 
returned and the seals thereto being valid and recognised by or proven 
to the parties in a term specially assigned in order that the evidence 
may be discovered and made public, the evidence is discovered and made 
public, and a term is appointed for the reception of the copies and 
that if they wish to say anything against the persons or the evidence 
and if nothing is said against the witnesses or their evidence. The 
conclusion of the cause follows next, the parties compear with the 
examiner of the witnesses, appointed by the judge, before the judge 
with all acts and muniments whatsoever pertaining to the cause itself 
and a peremptory term is assigned. Indeed if sought by the party 
nevertheless a peremptory term is assigned to produce all instruments, 
acts and muniments. After which term there follows immediately the 
conclusion and after that the term to hear the sententia.
The Course of Action under the Solennis Qrdo
It is necessary to examine this continental description of the 
Roman Process and compare it with the process as known and practised 
in Scotland during the middle ages. Fundamental to the Solennis Ordo 
was the designation of parties as actor and reus^* Whilst such a 
delimitation of roles is borrowed from the Civil Law^ certain
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features of the civilian system were not carried into the canonical 
system, e.g. the institution of the Vindex of the formulary system. 
Indeed the cognitio procedure appears as that most drawn upon.
Robertsonu, lists the preparatory acts to an action in the canonical 
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courts as:-
1. The preparation of the petition
2. The citation and certification of service
3. The appointment of procurators and lodging of the libel
4. The reception of dilatory exceptions, and
5. the fixing of a dilatory term ad deliberandum to hear the
exceptions.
The earlier elements of the process, e.g. the preparation of the 
petition was substantially an extrajudicial act. In cases under the 
solemn order, by way of editio actionis, the pursuer issued his 
complaint by way of the petition to the court. This petition was 
lodged in court and a copy was provided to the defender.
The petition contained the essential elements of the pursuer's cause, 
the parties, the judge, the claim made upon the defender, the legal 
basis for the claim and the remedy sought. There are some extant 
libels or petitions^ from the Scottish courts at this time. These 
together with the processes of dispensation sought at Saint Andrews 
following upon Apostolic letters obtained from the Penitentiary can be 
instructive by analogy.
A case in point is KM and occurring in 1523 which is an
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application to the Court of the Official for a divorce and 
dispensation. The parties are given in the instance together with the 
judge to whom the case is presented. Then there follows an intentio 
or condescendence stating the facts of the case; that the parties had 
married within the fourth and third degrees of consanguinity and that 
children had been conceived. The crave or remedy sought is for 
divorce^, dispensation and licence for the parties concerned to 
remarry one another together with a petition for absolution and the 
legitimation of any children concerned.
It was important to formulate the claim in the libel as precisely as 
possible for it was the definitive statement of the right of action 
from which the entire subsequent action flowed. The petition should 
be proposed in terms of the Synodal Statutes of Perth whereby the 
documents are to contain legal contention and specification referring 
to the relevance of the arguments.
The importance of ascertaining the correct ground for action or 
defence is stressed by a Synodal Statutes of the Synod of Saint 
Andrews held in 1549^q where the advocates or procurators are enjoined 
"not to undertake" rashly the prosecution or defence of causes in the 
ecclesiastical courts without "full information as the facts", and 
that unless they can swear to the verity of their information they may 
not appear. The procurators are also instructed to examine with 
discretion "the merits of the case and on what legal ground the action 
or the defence may be based".
If the facts were insufficient to ground an action or defence the 
procurators were required by the Synodal Statute to refuse to take
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instructions in the cause, however great a fee may be offered.
The following stage was the citation or service and certification 
thereof. The judicial summons formed a pivotal point in the 
Roman-Civil-Canonical process. In the development of the process, 
summons by the pursuer had died out at an early date. Instead the 
courts made the order summoning the defender to appear and answer the 
libel. The procedure bears some relation to that of the later period 
of cognitio procedure prior to Justinian,- ^ where a magistrate issued 
the summons on the basis of the libellus conventionis.-0 .
DtL
The duty to obey the summons was as in the Civil Law a duty owned by 
both parties to the Court, the pursuer disobeying could have his case 
dismissed and the defender could be subjected to penalties for 
contumacy. This having been stated the Roman-Civil-Canonical system 
was more lenient than the Civilian to litigants who failed to compear 
at the first calling or indeed subsequent callings. The fault of 
contumacy could incur severe penalties ranging from the paltry to the 
extreme ecclesiastical censure: - excommunication. Where a pursuer 
failed to appear before the issue was joined a hearing was held at 
which only his libel was heard, if the default occurs after issue is 
joined all libel and proofs are heard and the decision unless in grave 
and manifest injustice, was always for the defender.
The defender on the other hand if contumacious is not presumed to have 
admitted the libel; an adverse sentence is granted only if his 
defence is plainly irrelevant or incompetent. There is evidence to 
suggest that the Scots canonical courts were less even tempered than 
their European counterparts in so far as they were inclined to grant a
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decree, in absentia against a defender who was unwilling through 
arrogance to appear. The cause was taken as admitted and having been 
examined publication was made in the Act Book of the Court^* The 
Decretals spoke much on this stage of the action^. If a pursuer was 
suing for a separation ex toro by adultery and, prior to 
litiscontestation, the defender was contumacious it was possible to 
excommunicate the defender but witnesses could not be heard nor could 
the case be decided. Further, the Decretals inform us that if 
witnesses were heard in a matrimonial cause against a contumacious 
party before the issue had been joined, the testimony was null^. 
Obviously the Court was interested in the prosecution of initiated 
causes and could compel appearance but it must be stated that whilst 
it was generally lenient towards the contumacious party, in Scotland 
at least the Court's patience could be short towards the contumacious 
party. In 1549, the Council of the Scottish Church held at Perth laid 
down Statutes for the reformation of the consistorial courts where it 
is found that if the witnesses have not been seen nor have the other 
proofs generally received been judged and admitted and the defender 
was unwilling by arrogance even to appear in the case, the cause is to 
be set out and being admitted and examined at once, publication is to 
be made of the act and the conclusion^. The statement that the 
procedure was not truly contumacial is a shade too emphatic,-^.
The next stage in the process was the appointment of procurators or 
advocates.
That parties were entitled to be represented by canon lawyers is well 
known. These however were not the forespeakers of which we read in 
baronial courts. It is quite plain that by the mid-fifteenth century
in Scotland, a trained body of legal representatives were organised 
and practising in the canonical courts. Whilst every litigant had the 
right to pursue or defend by himself it would be a brave man indeed 
who would venture into the complexities of an action before the 
canonical courts, without some qualified assistance^.
The procurator or advocate was appointed by a formal mandate executed 
before a notary public. The mandate stated before whom the 
procurators were to compear and specified in some detail the subject 
matter of the dispute in which the appointed agent was to act^g. The 
topic of mandates for procurators and advocates is dealt with by 
Stair^Q where it is observed that "advocates are presumed to have 
Warrant from parties for whom they compear, without producing any 
Mandate11. This appears to indicate a different practice from that of 
the canonical courts. However, if the procurator or advocate could 
not produce evidence or special allegations of facts, in inferior 
Courts, the compearance was held to be without warrant and the decree 
could be declared in absence.
Earlier in Scotland, in the civil courts, the position was not that 
stated by Stair. Balfour tells us that "na man may be Procurator in 
ony action or cause bot he quha has ane speciall mandat be writ and 
seill, contenand sufficient powar gevin and grantit to him to win or 
tyne the cause1’^ . Roman Law rules are echoed in the subsequent 
passage given by Balfour,., where a ’’general Procuratorie’’ may be 
repelled unless judicial caution is found and given^.
The offices of both procurator and advocate were in use at the 
canonical courts in Scotland. Lyndwoodg^ describes some of the
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differences between these two branches of the profession. The 
representation was direct representation as a general indication of 
which the phrase "patronus causa” is used by Lyndwood in his 
description of the office of advocate. The advocate is pictured as 
acting in court in controversial matters; where wearing his gown, he 
was termed togatus. No one was admitted advocate unless he had spent 
three years in the study of Civil and Canon Laws. The advocates* 
education could of course be obtained in universities at home or 
abroad.
Glasgow was a Studium Generale which had been established in 1451 for 
the study of Canon and Civil Laws and the Liberal Arts^^. It is even 
the case that a degree of Doctor Juris in Canon Law was granted there.
Aberdeen^ founded at the instance of Bishop William Elphinstone, a 
ob
canonist himself of some note, had an extensive course in Canon Law 
and Theology. The notable canonists Hector Boece and William Hay both 
taught there. Saint Andrews, the oldest Scottish university, was less 
noted for her legal teaching. No formal civil law courses were taught 
there although some Canon Law would appear to have been taught. Canon 
Law teaching in Scotland was somewhat overshadowed by the activities 
of the Law Faculties on the Continent. Bologna of course together 
with Perugia and the other Italian Universities attracted many Scots 
students. Scots names appear in the matriculation albums of the Law 
Schools of Louvain and Douay, where Wellwood read much material for 
his work on Sea Laws. In Paris there was a Natio Scotorum such was 
the large number of Scottish students. Thus one can observe that in 
combination with the practical knowledge gained by the advocates, 
procurators and writers at the Curia, there was also the more direct
29
means of intellectual importation, through the return of those 
students to their homeland who had drunk at the springs of legal 
education in the great continental universities.
Apparently advocates did not have a universal right of appearance 
before the canonical courts and required to register with the court in 
which they desired to practise. For example Sir John Paris registered 
at the Consistorial Court at Glasgow in 1505gy.
Similarly procurators described by Lyndwood as "assistants to the 
Cause"gg legal representatives who had less legal education than 
advocates also had to register with the court wherein they were to 
appear, viz the registration of Magistri George Hay and Archibald 
Crawfordgg. Both advocates and procurators in the consistorial courts 
in Scotland were subject to strict judicial control and discipline.
Procurators, unless described in the Catalogue (law list) were obliged 
to observe the rules of reverence to the judges, both in and out of 
court and if guilty of any failing were to be punished at the 
discretion of the judge and suspended from their office,^. The 
penalties befalling the procurator who advanced a cause without 
investigating the claims of his party have been already described but 
even more so were a procurator to maintain an unjust action or deter a 
party from advancing a just cause, he could be removed from his office 
by the Ordinary,^. A procurator or advocate exhibiting frivolous 
defences or any other party of the process was punished by fines of 
40s and £5 for the first and second offence respectively and for the 
third offence by suspension from practice in that Court forever,^.
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Removal from office, then as today was the supreme sanction operative 
against a legal representative who had failed in his duties to the 
Court and to his client or who had otherwise engaged in unethical 
practices. Thus we find, in 15^9, the penalty of suspension and 
removal from office being ordained for those who bargained with either 
litigant for a proportion of the award or promised their services to 
those who enter into such bargains with them - the pactum de quota 
litis,^ - which Stair tells us "is rejected both the Civil Law and our
own custom ....  which is to prevent the stirring up and too much
eagerness in pleas". The paction is rejected by Stair because of its 
interference with the due process of law. He does not state whether 
there is any penalty of removal from practice attaching to involvement 
in such a pact^.
The behaviour of legal representatives in the court was also strictly
controlled, particularly with regard to order in court. Already
mentioned is the duty of reverence for the judiciary placed upon legal
representatives. Standards of behaviour were maintained by requiring
"Procurators and other members of the Judiciary" to abstain from
shouting and thereby disturbing the judge in judgement™,-. In court orID
in debate all representations were to be made calmly and without
disorder,,^. Silence was ordained for those not involved in oral 
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argument. In presenting an argument the vulgar tongue, whilst frowned 
upon was not outlawed. Witnesses of course very often could not cope 
with the learned tongues,^.
A term would be fixed for the exhibition of mandates and an 
opportunity was given to the parties to object to the mandates and
against the persons involved. However no objection could be heard at
this against the commission to judge, should the case be heard by a 
judge delegate. At this term the mandates were proved whereupon the 
libels or libelli were lodged with the Court. This is the developed 
stage in canonical process based upon the editio actionis. Being 
written it was more formal than the analogous procedure,^ of the Civil 
Law. It was in reality the editio per oblationem libelli, by the 
presentation of the Libel and the requirement of writing signified a 
tremendous advantage in the systematic treatment of actions by the 
canonical courts over their secular counterparts.
Therefore there is no surprise that scribae curiarum or clerks of 
court feature in the Synodal Statutes of Saint Andrews in 1549yg* A 
bureaucracy is a requirement of a system of written pleadings indeed 
perhaps a causa sine qua non. A statute was passed at the Synod 
relating to the presentation of documents and the narration of the 
steps in the process. Registers were ordained to be kept for the 
recording of all the steps in the process and for the recording of all 
documents produced in court. In order to avoid the loss or forgery of 
documents produced in court all original documents were to be received 
by the court and retained there, receipts being given for documents 
lodged. If however, the clerks were found culpable of the loss or 
destruction of documents they were replaced0 Q.
The defender was then formally summoned by service of the libelled 
summons by the judge or a notary appointed by him.
A term was fixed to enable the defender to state whether he admitted 
the claim or wished to defend the action. This term and the statement 
of the defender thereat sets the subsequent procedure. The Synod held
at Perth in 15^9 gave some legislation on the point to the effect that 
if the defender appeared at this first calling, the petition or libel 
qualified at once and the action followed.
If however the defender was unwilling to appear and answer the entire 
petition he could be given three days or a shorter period at the 
judge’s discretion in which to answer the petition. Failure to 
answer within this extended time resulted in the continuation of the 
action without the defender. The judge then sought of the defender 
whether he had any dilatory or declinatory exceptions which he wished 
to propose. If the defender declared any preliminary plea, a
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peremptory diet was fixed in order to dispose of all dilatory and 
declinatory pleas.
The use of the word exception in the last paragraph is perhaps 
unfortunate. Such was the debased knowledge of the civilian procedure 
as possessed by the canonists who were responsible for the canonical 
procedural system that ’exceptio’ simply meant to them ’defence1.
Thus the canonist comprehended matters of fact and matters of law as 
grouped under this head.
In an attempt to bring order to this chaos the following
classification of defences was adopted. On the one hand, those of 
immediate concern, the so called ’exceptiones dilatoriae’ which
obviated the need for litiscontestation and on the other the
’exceptiones peremptoriae' or peremptory defences, which did not 
defeat litiscontestation. ;
Dilatory defences attacked both the foundation in law of the pursuers
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claim and the procedural validity of the action. These 
characteristics caused them to be classified as either "dilatoriae 
solutionis" or "declinatoriae judicii". They could be lodged orally 
by motion before the judge but more commonly they were set forth in 
writing. If there was any peremptory defence a term was then fixed 
for the disposal of all exceptionesg^.
Peremptory exceptions could be lodged only after the all-important 
procedural step of litiscontestation or joinder of issue, such 
defences included res judicata and arbitratio.
If the defender objected to the answering of the argument and libel, 
he was nevertheless upon appearance taken to have defendedg2 . This 
brings the procedure to the trial of the issue, litiscontestation 
takes place, the issue is joined. Whilst in the Civil Law, 
litiscontestation could be considered as a contract between the 
partiesgg or as a quasi-contractg^ the Canon Law cannot be said to 
have followed this theory slavishly. The defender, if contumax, could 
have decree passed against him, the presumption of defence puts the 
pursuer in a powerful position. The theory of contract was known to 
the canonists, as the Synod of Perth stated, the contentious matters 
are narrowed because the law acknowledges the agreement to be a 
compact so that the parties are now agreed and are happy with the 
bills and the law is not hindered by the mala fides defence of the 
other partyg,-. Upon receipt of the libel the defender would join 
issue by declaring to the judge his intention to contest the matter 
before the judgegg. Upon this clear expression of animus litem 
contestandi the parties lost a great deal of control over the process, 
the matter became of public concern.
Indeed a 'procedural relationship'g^, was formed between the parties. 
The substantive and procedural effects of litiscontestation were 
far-reaching. Firstly, it suspended all old obligations pending the 
judicial determination, secondly it preceded the creation of new 
obligations and thirdly, it initiated mora and mala fides: - which 
attempts to delay or disrupt an action where legislated upon in 1549gg 
to the effect that if any one brought forward obstructive arguments or 
exceptions or brought them up and protracted them after they had been 
disallowed or if allowed, had not been proven, then he would be found 
liable to an additional charge in damages, rising on a scale in 
relation to the number of times the fault occurred. The party 
attempting to bring in 'irrelevant' arguments or defences could be 
made to swear that his propositions were not invalid but pertinent and 
relevant.
Mora was particularly frowned upon. It has already been noted how 
this fault featured largely in the criticism of the canonical 
courtSgg. However the Synod at Saint Andrews attempted to check delay 
by legislating to prevent (a) long delays other than those absolutely 
necessary and false excuses for mora, (b) suppression of documents 
aimed at hindering the execution of a decree, or (c) actions from 
failing asleep through collusive agreements between legal 
representatives.
The swearing of the oath of calumny was a procedural act following so 
closely upon the heels of litiscontestation as to be in the mind of 
some commentators almost a part of the joinder of issue. It was "an 
act which by reason of its conspicuousness was easily fixed in the 
mind". The oath of calumny was however a completely separate
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procedural step which signified the desire of the canonists to avoid 
trickery, to prevent vexatious or malicious litigation and to promote 
fairness between the litigants. It clearly represented the link 
between the Civilian and Canonical systems.
The Iusiurandum de Calumnia originated in the Roman Law. As Gaius
recounts, it was in use in the Formulary procedure... Justinian
yu
retained the oath as part of the Cognitio procedure. As part of that
procedure, each party swore that the proceedings were genuine and not
collusive^. Evidence could not be produced in court unless the party
who wished to lead it first took the oath^. The nature of the oath
was such that it was a preventative check upon prospective litigants
and constituted along with the Cautio Juratoria the major method
whereby Roman litigants were protected against abuse of process. The
party swore that he was undertaking a given procedural step in good
faith. The oath could either be generale relating to the entire
process or speciale, relating to a specific step in the procedure^.
It was upon this civilian .basis that the canonists built remembering
at all times the motto ecclesia vivit jure Romano. (The Church lives
by the Roman Law). The oath as mentioned was generally administered
after litiscontestation although Naz^ states that it could be taken
at the beginning of the process. Gregory IX regulated its
administration in the Decretals.. An examination of the
y d
comprehensive content of the oath displays its purpose in the 
Roman-Civil-Canonical process. Naz describes five major topics which 
were sworn upon:-
1 . That the party believed his cause is just
2. That the party would not hide the truth
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3. That where the party was questioned he would not offer false 
proofs
4. That the party would not seek a re-trial by malicious design
5. That nothing would be given or promised to anyone involved in the 
cause unless the law permitted it, e.g. payment of an honorarium 
to an advocate.
It is obvious that the functions of the canonical oath in distinction 
to that of the Civil Law, i.e. preventing people from recoursing 
lightly to litigation, were much wider. It was designed to prevent 
the suborning of witnesses, bribery, unjust extensions of time limits 
and frivolous defences.
By the Decretals the oath need only be sworn in temporal causes, 
spiritual actions being exempt. Failure to swear the oath resulted in 
the dismissal of the cause or in the defender being held pro confesso. 
The oath was a requisite solemnity for the validity of any definitive 
judgement. Pope Boniface VIII amended Pope Gregory’s Decretal by 
allowing the oath to be taken at any time in the process, which in 
effect permitted the retrospective validation of otherwise invalid 
actions^.
The oath of calumny had a broader basis on Canon Law than it had in 
Roman Law. The Decretists and the Decretalists acknowledged that 
recourse could be had to the oath in many more circumstances than were 
allowed in the strict romanised procedure. As such the oath 
highlights an aspect of the principle of aequitas canonica in 
contradistinction to the districtio legum of the secular laws.
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Lord Mackenzie in the interesting case of Paul -v- Laingnr7 states they (
following, obiter "Our practice is borrowed from the Roman Law and 
there the oath was administered at the beginning of the cause the 
object being to prevent rash and vexatious litigation. It was an oath 
merely of credulity that the party had a good case and was altered by 
the Canonists who allowed it to be put at any stage of the case, a 
practice which neither the ecclesiastical or civil courts ever 
followed. By the Old Scots Act of 1429^q it was ordained "that 
advocates and forespeakers in the temporal courts and also the parties 
that pleade in them gif thai be present in all causes that thai 
pleade, in the beginning or gif they be heard in the cause he sail 
sweare that the cause he trowis is gude and leill; that he sail pleade 
and gif the principal partie be absent, the advocate sail sweare in 
the saule of him after as is contained in these metres
"illud juretur quod lis sibi justa videtur 
et si quaeretur verum non inficitur 
Nil promittetur nec falsa probatio datur 
Ut lis tardetur dilatio nulla petatur".
"He swears that the action seems to him right,
And if asked the truth he will not corrupt it.
That he has promised nothing nor will give a false proof 
He will seek to do nothing to delay the action".
There are some points to be noticed in Lord Mackenzie's dictum
1. The origin of the Oath in Scotland, and
2. The purpose of the Act of 1429.
38
1. The origin of the Oath of Calumny in Scotland
The oath clearly represents a Roman-Civil-Canonical survivance rather 
than a borrowing from Roman Law. Only in so far as the Roman Law was 
a source of the Canon Law could one say that the Oath as used in 
Scotland came from that Law. The Canon Law was the living part of the 
jus commune and the canonical courts were the great transmitters of 
legal doctrine and practice. It is not therefore * unreasonable to 
propose that the Canon Law was the true source of the Scots practice. 
There are good reasons for saying so. Firstly the rhyme quoted as 
part of the Act of 1429 bears more relation to the description of the 
oath given by Naz^g than that given by Justinian.
"Et actor quidem juret non calumniandi animo litem movisse sed 
existimando bonam causam habere".
"And the Pursuer swears that he has not begun the cause by thoughts of 
calumny but by the thought that he has a good cause, -jqq"
The oath of calumny was certainly in use in Scotland in the canonical 
courts, notwithstanding that there is no mention of the oath in the 
extant court records. These courts would have been under obligation 
to follow the general adjective law as stated in the Decretum, 
Decretals and Sext. There is mention of the oath in William Hay's 
lectures on M a r r i a g e ^ :-
"Licet iurare de Calumnia ut iurare in principio litis hoc est Credit 
suam causam esse justam quam nititur defendere et actor iurat quod 
credit suam esse justam quam prosequitur".
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11 It is lawful to swear the oath of calumny. This is the oath sworn 
before litigation by the defender that he believes his cause is just 
and by the pursuer that he believes his suit is just11.
2. The purpose of the Act of 1429
It is clear that during the 15th century the Crown was most conscious 
of the poor state of the administration of justice. It embarked early 
in the century upon a programme of statute law revision, amendment of 
earlier laws and the curing of injustices by legislation. For 
example, in 1424 the first provision of free legal advice was made^^* 
In 1425 a Commission was set up to "se and examyn the bukis of law of 
this realme and to mend the Lawis that need mendment". No matter how 
ineffective this last measure was, and its attempted successors show 
it to have been so it does display the attitude of the Three Estates 
towards the development of the Law.
Due to the proficiency of the canonical courts, the legal expertise 
exhibited therein, and the fairness and impartiality of the Courts it 
comes as little surprise that the secular courts would wish to emulate 
canonical practice and thereby perhaps attract some of the profitable 
business which hitherto had been referred to the canonical courts. Of 
course it would not be until 1532^^ with the establishment of the 
College of Justice that the secular powers would have a fixed 
judiciary capable of competing on an equal footing with the Courts 
Spiritual. No doubt the semi-ecclesiastical nature of the Court of 
Session bench facilitated the transfer of expertise, for example John 
Leslie, Bishop of Ross and sometime Official of A b e r d e e n and 
possibly also Commissary of Moray-jq  ^was Lord of Session from 1564-65.
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Henry Sinclair, Bishop of Ross and John Sinclair of Brechin were also 
Lord Presidents in 1558 and 1566. In addition to this the Court of 
Session was ordained at its inception to be staffed to the extent of 
half its number by clerics and to always have an Ecclesiastic as 
President. This system of court staffing is also shown in the half 
lay/half cleric composition of the Commissary Court.
Even after the Reformation, as Erskine r e c o u n t s a n d  as has been 
shown, Parsons, Rectors and other Churchmen were received as judges. 
Parochial Ministers were first disqualified for office in 1584^^ and 
in 1640 the prohibition was extended to all Churchmen^ 0 . Although 
the influence of the Canon Law was relatively minor by 1640 it is 
certain that from that point onwards it ceased to be a source which 
could be called upon with confidence by the Court where lacunae arose 
in the native Law. By then of course the Canon Law had been received 
or rather absorbed to saturation level into the municipal law of 
Scotland.j. However, one could point to legislation like that of 
1429 importing the oath of calumny into temporal procedure as part of 
a process of deliberate improvement and conscious development of the 
secular Courts and process upon ecclesiastical models. It is from the 
Act of 1429 that the secular Courts adopt the oath. The oath passed 
into usage in the Commissary Court after 1563 q an(* notwithstanding 
the Reformation was used in the Kirk Session^.
As part of the secular procedure it gave rise to a great deal of 
l i t i g a t i o n w h i c h  developed the concept farther eventually with the 
assistance of legislation to extinction^ and in the consistorial 
sphere eventually to abolition^
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Following upon the administration of the oath of calumny the 
peremptory exceptions were proposed and a term fixed for their 
disposal. Peremptory defences have already been touched upon but 
require some further investigation. Following the Roman Law, the 
canonical peremptory defences were perpetual in their validity, e.g. 
fraud, duress^ and res j u d i c a t a ^ T h e n  positiones or separate 
allegations of fact were lodged by the pursuer in court with copies 
which were passed to the defender. These were designed to fix the 
contentious points and sift the relevant matters from the superfluous. 
The defender answered in a curt form, yes or no, although failure to 
answer a position was counted as admission. Positions were acts of 
the parties and constituted part of the suit, however the judge also 
had a method whereby he could ascertain the substance of the case, the 
interrogationes in jure^g.
Upon the positions being formed the pursuer was asked to state that he 
believed in what was stated in his positions, by way of re-enforcing 
the oath of calumny and certifying that he was satisfied with the 
content of his case after the amendment and specification of the 
positional stage. The defender having made responsiones to the
positiones was asked by the judge, whether he believed in his answers.
The case then proceeded to the probatio or proof of the positiones and 
responsiones in issue, a term ad probandum was therefore fixed. The 
stages of allegation and proof merged without any distinct points of 
cessation and commencement.
The proof proceeded by the pursuer attempting to prove his positiones 
and the defender his responsiones or exceptiones. This required oral
arguments by the parties or their representatives by way of 
disputationes et allegationes, the matters of fact and law were 
clarified.
The pursuer’s pleadings or allegations were put first and the defender 
made reply thereto by way of exceptiones, these in turn could be 
replied to by way of replication. The defender could then return with 
a duplicandum and the pursuer with a triplicandum and so on until the 
case for both parties is set out as fully as possible. It was stated 
by the Statute of the Synod at Perth that the Judge had a great 
discretion to allow replies to false allegations. Fines were 
instituted by the same Synod of those who proposed frivolous defences, 
replicandum, or duplicandum.
The general rule in proof was that of the Roman Law, "onus probandi 
incumbit ei qui asserit, actore non probante reus absolvitur” . The 
onus of proof is upon him making the a l l e g a t i o n o n  the pursuer not 
proving then the defender should be absolved^. It is in the theory 
of proof and the means of proof that the Germanic influences course 
strongest in canonical p r o c e d u r e D u r a n d u s ,  the Speculator gives a 
list of means and grounds of proof. These are not all relevant for 
the present purposes. Those important for this topic are probationes 
per testes, per confessionem, per instrumenta, per evidentiam facti, 
per praesumptionem and per indicia indubitata.
By probatio per testes the Judge could be satisfied by the evidence of 
witnesses. Once the positiones were alleged, the pursuer would
announce his intention to prove them by witnesses. Following Roman 
Law direct evidence was the best evidence. Hearsay, for example was
frowned upon The Canonists also took from the Gospel of Matthew
that two or three witnesses provided full proof - plena probatio, a 
rule which now finds sway in Scottish Law by the requirement of
corroborative testimony^^.
"But if thy brother shall offend against thee, 
go, and rebuke him, between thee and him alone.
If he shall hear thee, thou shalt gain thy brother.
And if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more,
that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may s t a n d •
The requirement to show to the Judge what truly happened, leads to an 
acceptance of Roman concepts of the worthy witness and in conjunction 
with this to Lombard or Germanic ideas of oath - helpers or
cojuratores. Upon the naming of witnesses, objections would be heard 
against them, there were those witnesses who would be alleged as 
unconditionally credible, the so-called ’classici1, others who were 
suspecti or doubtful would be alleged as incompetent, thereafter the 
acceptable ones were summoned by the Judge and upon their appearance 
were sworn.
It was essential that litiscontestation had occurred otherwise the
evidence of the witnesses was null^g. was n°t necessary for
witnesses to be heard in non-contested cases, where evidence per
confessionem would suffice, however, where the case concerned 
carnal or spiritual marriage it was ordained that witnesses be heard 
whereupon a definitive sentence could be granted12 7 * Then the Pursuer 
made up interrogatories or questions on the basis of the positiones 
which were then termed articuli or intentiones, these interrogatories
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were lodged with the judge who transmitted copies thereof to the
defender. The defender framed objections or cross-interrogatories and 
the judge thereupon decided the admissibility or otherwise of the
questions.
Upon swearing de veritate, the witnesses were then examined without 
the parties being present. The examination normally was made by the 
judge. The examination had to be prudent and circumspect; cross 
examination was advised to be close and upon only those facts and
circumstances necessary and suitable for testing the bona fides of the 
witnesses •
If the Judge could not conduct the examination of the witnesses a 
Roman Notary was duly appointed to interrogate and to receive answers. 
However, this could only be done, for example, in the Archdiaconate of 
Lothian after the permission of the Official of Lothian or his 
commissary had been sought and obtained -j^  • In sees other than Saint 
Andrews the power of examination of witnesses was assigned to the
Ordinaries, Officials or Commissaries General of those sees 
exclusively. No deputies or substitutes were permitted to examine 
witnesses and no faith was put in the testimonies of witnesses 
examined in any other way^Q*
The tampering with witnesses was a great problem and much legislation 
was passed in an attempt to prevent the suborning of witnesses and the 
perverting of justice. In 1549, for example a Synodal Statute was 
passed punishing with excommunication anyone who "shall use 
persuasions to induce the parties or the witnesses to swear falsely or 
cause them to get out of the way by stealth or in order to create
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delay"131.
The Commission to proceed in the Divorce of J.A. de S and E.N. granted 
by Archbishop Forman states that if witnesses hide faithful testimony 
by reason of a bribe or for a favour they can be compelled, by the 
authority of the Archbishop and by a church censure (e.g. 
excommunication) to speak the truth in the cause^ 2 *
There were particular rules regulating the evidence of those witnesses 
in cases of divortium a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of nullity 
arising from impotentia, so it was that a husband was not to be 
believed, even if he swore on oath, that he had relations with his 
wife, if she proved to the contrary by the testimony of seven matrons, 
i.e. the testimonium septimae manus^^* In this one can see the 
Germanic influence emerge briefly on the surface of 
Roman-Civil-Canonical procedure, for the seven matrons giving evidence 
are little more than cojuratores or compurgators. They testify to 
character not events, in the main they are mere oath helpers, lending 
credibility to the claims which one party makes about events, in 
t°ro13l(.
In the three cases of impotency adjudicated upon in Scotland prior to 
the Reformation of which there are records, there is no indication 
that testimonium septimae manus was in use^ 5 * It was however known 
of by Hay who in speaking of the proof of impotence declares that 
where impotence could not be clearly shown "they (the parties) are 
bound to live together for three years ... doing their best ... to 
have intercourse and when the three years have elapsed they must swear 
with seven witnesses that they did all they could ... but without
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success’’ It survived the Reformation and is found in the cases of
Drummond -v- Murray (1691)^^, where physical impotence ad coitum 
omnino impotens is testified to by means of proof septimae manus.
Similarly, in the later case of Nicholson -v- MacGloss (1693).^o the
-----------------------------13o
parties utilised the testimony of relatives who spoke of both physical 
and psychological impotence. However, it seems that the mode of proof 
had ceased to be merely oath helping by that time. In the case of 
MacMalvak -v- MacGlashan (1693)^ ^ >  on physical impotence, the 
evidence of witnesses who had bedded the couple was taken. The 
witnesses testified that after the defender had essayed copulation, 
two witnesses, one one either side of the bed, asked the pursuer if 
the defender was active or not. The pursuer answered in the negative, 
the defender protested, whereupon the witnesses, to find the proof put 
their hands between the couple and found that the pursuer spoke the 
truth. This was indeed a change from compurgation to direct evidence. 
In that way one could state that Willock^Q in claiming that the 
allusions are bare is correct but it is submitted, incorrect in 
stating that Septimae Manus as strictly understood, had survived the 
Reformation. Just as the Canonists in their way were guilty of 
misconceiving Roman procedural and substantive law, similarly the 
Reformers were also at fault in their understanding of canonical 
process. Septimae Manus as it appears in Lord Hermands Consistorial 
Decisions appears to differ greatly from that form of proof described 
by the same name in the Corpus Juris Canonici. It appears as direct 
proof, not compurgation.
Proof of impediments could not be taken from those who suffered from 
the same impediments.^ • Witnesses’ statements were ordained by
Synodal Statute to be taken down by the seribae curiarum, the clerks 
of court and after they had been considered by the judge, were to be 
entered in the protocols
There were also regulations affecting instrumenta or documentary 
evidence. All documents were to be registered with the court lest 
they be lost or destroyed or lest they be substituted by other 
documents which had not been produced originally in court The
penalty of excommunication was decreed for those who tampered with 
instruments lodged in court or who altered the protocol books kept by 
the clerks of c o u r t S i m i l a r l y ,  the suppression of documents in an 
effort to hinder the execution of decrees was punishable
The other methods of proof including that by oath are dealt with more 
fully in the survey of Romano-Canonical procedure given in Naz, 
Dietionnaire Canonique ^ ^ .
Upon the proof being complete the Canon Law judge moved directly to 
the proclamation of the judgement which was the application of the law 
to the facts of the case^^. Following the Germanic custom, the Canon 
Law retained the division between the proof and the conclusio in 
causa. Similar to the Roman Law which admits of interlocutiones and 
praeiudicia, the Canon Law had decreets interlocutory and 
definitive^g. Sententiae interlocutoriae decided matters arising 
from the cause. Sententiae definitivae decided the cause itself and 
allowed the plea of res judicata to be proponed in relation to the 
cause. A judge who rendered the judgement definitiva could not recall 
it, the appropriate method of recall was on appeal to a higher court. 
The Sententia definitiva was thus a decree in foro; if made in absence
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it was not valid unless the absentee was contumacious. If he had a 
relevant excuse then he had to be allowed to submit an answer and to 
join i s s u e A  sententia in matrimonial causes was never subject to 
the doctrine of res 'judicata and could always be revoked if 
constituted in e r r o r S e n t e n t i a e  did not fall upon appeal unless 
the appeal was relevant. They could only be reduced by a higher 
authority and until then were valid and of full effect^.
The judgement was delivered orally^ in Court and thereafter 
confirmed in w r i t i n g n a r r a t i n g  the Judgement and of which an 
abstract which was later entered in the Protocol book of Court 
Actae^. The pursuer’s advocate craved the judge on bended knee for 
his decision which was always granted in open court
The definitive decision could then be enforced with what was described 
’’Canonical Coercion”, i.e. such power as was necessary to pass it into 
effect156.
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CHAPTER II
THE POST REFORMATION COURTS
The Post-Reformation Consistorial Jurisdiction and Procedure 
The Reformation
The period immediately following the Reformation^ is a clutter and 
confusion of many contesting jurisdictions. For roughly four years a 
struggle was pursued between the secular and spiritual powers. A 
contest which had been thought of as won by the Church in early Norman 
times in Scotland was re-opened and four hundred years of 
jurisdictional stability were thrown to the wind.
The turbulences of the Revolution and Reformation found expression and 
were magnified in the jurisdictional contest. The Court of Session, 
the Privy Council and Commissary Court, the Kirk Sessions, the 
Presbyteries and the General Assembly were all to put forward claims 
to exercise the consistorial jurisdiction. The essence of the
spiritual and secular conflict was born in the throes of Revolution, a
Revolution whose chief ecclesiastical effect was canvassed in the act 
of the ’’Reformation Parliament”^.
’’The three estatis then being present understanding that the 
jurisdiction and autoritie of the bishope of Rome callit the paip usit 
within this Realme in tymes bipast has bene verray hurtful and 
prejudiciall to our soveranis autoritie and commone weill of this
realme. Thairfoir hes statute and ordainit that the bishope of Rome
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haif na jurisdiction nor autoritie within this realme in tymes cuming. 
And that nane of oure saidis soveranis subjects of this realme sute or 
desire in ony tyme heireftir title or rycht be the said bishope of 
Rome or his sait to any thing within this realme under the panis of 
barratrye that is to say proscription banischement and nevir to bruke 
honour office nor dignitie within this realme. And the controvenaris 
heirof to be callit befoir the Justice or his duputis or befoir the 
Lordis of Sessioun and punist thairfor conforme to the lawis of this 
realme. And the furnissaris of thame with fynance of money and
purchessaris of thair title or rycht or mainteanaris or defendaris, of 
thame sail incur the same panis. And that na bischope nor uther
prelat of this realme use ony jurisdictioun in tymes to cum be the 
said bischope of Romeis autoritie under the pane foresaid".
The act also annulled all acts of previous Parliaments which 
legislated to an effect not "agreeing with Goddis Word" and which were 
contrary to the Confession of Faith of that Parliament. The Mass too, 
was proscribed and penalties ranging from confiscation of moveables to 
death in accordance with the number of faults were ordained.
There are many observations to be made regarding this most important
act. The primary observation is with reference to the validity of
this legislation. The act has a particularly interesting history. It 
was passed by the so-called "Reformation" Parliament, that meeting of 
the Three Estates held at Edinburgh in August 1560 which followed 
closely upon what P. Hume Brown termed "the central point of her 
(Scotland’s) h i s t o r y " t h e  Treaty of Edinburgh.
The power struggle between Mary, the Queen Regent, the Protestant
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Lords and Elizabeth, Queen of England, culminated in the Siege of the 
town of Leith which began on 6th April, 1560. Mary of Guise had taken 
refuge in Edinburgh Castle on 1st April and appeared adamant that the 
rebellious Lords and their English allies should not conquer. In the 
end a combination of events, none strictly military, forced the 
surrender of the city. Particularly one should note the political and 
religious opposition to the Family of Guise which prohibited attention 
from France together with difficult communications and the death of 
Mary, Queen Regent on 11th June.
The French Commissioners Monluc, Bishop of Valence, and Charles, Sieur 
de Rardan had already been discussing terms with Sir William Cecil and 
Dr Nicholas Watton and the Treaty of Edinburgh was concluded there on 
6th July, 1560. Perhaps as important as the treaty itself which 
provided for the cessation of hostilities between the English and 
French and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Scotland and for the 
renunciation of the use of English arms, thereby, by implication, 
acknowledging Elizabeth’s title to the English throne, were the 
concessions granted by the representatives of Mary and Francis, King 
of France to the Scottish subjects of the Queen of Scots at the same 
time as the treaty was concluded. The concessions authorised a 
Parliament to be held which met in August. By Article IX of the 
Concessions it was concluded that "it shall be lawful for those to be 
present at that meeting who are in use to be present". By implication 
this ordinance rendered illegal the presence of many lesser Barons who 
although entitled in strict law to attend Parliament were not so "in 
use". This significant change in attendants has importance because 
the Barons lent weight to the proposals which became enshrined in the 
Acts of the Reformation Parliament. More noteworthy perhaps was the
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proscription upon the discussion of matters of Religion at this 
Parliament.
’’There have been presented articles concerning religion and certain 
other points in which the Lords deputies would by no means meddle, as 
being of such importance that they judged them proper to be remitted 
to the King and Queen. Therefore the said nobles of Scotland have 
engaged that in the ensuing Convention of Estates some persons of 
quality shall be chosen for to repair to their majesties and 
remonstrate to them the state of their affairs, particularly those 
last mentioned’’^ .
It may be that the Commission referred to in this article, consisting 
of the persons of quality finds expression in the Commission of 1560 
of which Knox writes^, which consisted of John Winram, Sub prior of 
Saint Andrews, Master John Spottiswoode, John Willock Superintendent 
of Glasgow, John Douglas, Rector of Saint Andrews, Master John Row, 
former Agent in Rome, Papal Nuncio, and John Knoxg.
It is certain that following upon this article when Parliament met 
nearly one month after the granting of the Concession, the idea of a 
Commission to examine the state of Religion in Scotland was fresh in 
the minds of the members of the Three Estates.
It may be that the foundations of the ’’Good and Godly policy” of the 
Kirk, laid in the Book of Reformation were built upon by this 
Commission and thereby account for the interpolations which are to be 
found in the First Book of Discipline and which are dated by Cameron, 
in the autumn and early winter of 1560^.
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The effect of the Concessions is that a Parliament was held in August 
1560 without being summoned by the Queen and, that in express 
contradiction to the Concessions not only discussed "Religion and 
certain other points in which the Lord’s Deputies would by no means 
meddle” , but passed the legislation abrogating Papal Authority, 
forbidding Mass and accepting the reformed Confession of Faith^. 
These acts, not entirely surprisingly were never ratified by Queen 
Mary and at least until 1567 were legally invalid^.
The immediate effects of the Act 1560
The immediate effects of the Act were far-reaching and substantial. 
Those effects principally of a political and ecclesiastical nature are 
well documented^* The strictly legal effects are less well recorded. 
Inevitably the principal effect was that the authority of the Pope and 
of the structures of the Canon Law were of no effect in Scotland. The 
jurisdiction and authority of the Pope were abolished in Scotland for 
all time. Appeals and supplications on all matters could no longer be 
heard at the Court of Rome, the Cancellaria, the Rota, or the 
Penitentiaria. Also, no bishop or prelate was to hold any 
jurisdiction by the Pope’s authority.
However, as can be observed by an examination of the Act, there was no 
dismantling of the Catholic Church’s judicial system. Only the papal 
jurisdiction and jurisdictions and authority operated under papal 
authority were affected by the Act. The Church judicial structure was 
not directly affected by the abrogation of papal authority. However, 
the political and ecclesiastical effects soon overcame this exemption 
by omission and as the Reformation progressed the courts of the Church
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found it increasingly more difficult to work and the only course open 
was that which led to the absorption into the Reformed system. There 
are however some instances of the apparent survival of papal authority 
and jurisdiction, e.g. in 1577 when John, Archbishop of Saint Andrews, 
grants letters of dispensation to Robert Hamilton and Marjory 
Wotherspoon, he is named Papal Legate. This could be of significance 
as an indication of papal authority or could indicate merely, and 
probably more likely the natural conservatism of the notary who drew 
the letters of dispensation^. Similar hints of such survivance are 
indicated by Kirk^.
The rejection of papal authority placed the Reformers in a crisis of 
conscience and self doubt. This crisis was yet to be recognised and 
indeed would only become purged by the intellectual development 
contained in the Second Book of Discipline: the concept of the "two
kingdoms". The rejection of the (earthly) papal intermediary between 
the people of God and their divine Lord laid the foundations for the 
hoped for rejection of the (earthly) princely intermediary.
The first ground however where contest was found between the new 
religion and the state was not unexpectedly to spring from the ruins 
of the judicial system which, although not demolished by the Act of 
1560, was dealt a death blow from which it could not and did not 
recover.
The Juristic Vacuum and the Jurisdictional Contest
There were many conflicting claimants who entered the lists for the 
consistorial jurisdiction. Of these some were temporal in nature and
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others of the new spiritual order.
The New Ecclesiastical Courts
In tandem with the uneven development of the Reformed religion on an 
organisational and administrative basis, the judicial development was 
similarly piecemeal. Whilst the archbishop of Saint Andrews and the 
bishops of Dunkeld and Dunblane were leaning towards the Reformers 
they did not assent to the Confession of Faith. This reticence even 
in sympathetic sees, explains the impromptu fashion in which the 
essentially congregational church established Kirk Sessions, e.g. as 
in Saint Andrews. From mid-May 1559, Saint Andrews had been held by
the 1 insurgentsT, reinforced by the arrival there of the Protestant
Lords Argyle and James Stewart on 6th June. Knox proceeded with the 
Reformation of the town, a great psychological victory as such, 
striking at the heart of the Superior Metropolitans seat. The 
Dominican and Franciscan monasteries were destroyed and the Kirk 
Session of Saint Andrews was established, basking in the protected x 
medium of the newly reformed town. This gathering of the minister and 
elders of the congregation at Saint Andrews almost immediately began 
to adjudicate on various matters taking over effectively from the 
ancient but now overcome Court of the Official of Saint Andrews, and 
his Commissaries. That this convocation of the minister and elders
considered itself as a Court is clear from the Session Registers^.
It met in the Consistory House^ and appointed an Officer known as the 
scribe of the Consistory Court, with whom notifications of banns were 
to be lodged^.
Although the First Book of Discipline did not perhaps appear in its
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final form until January 1561 it is useful in displaying the ideas 
which the Reformers had about the Kirk Session, its form and its 
function. It should be remembered that it was merely a set of 
recommendations made to the Lords and was never passed into Law.
The Kirk Session was constituted by the elders or seniors of the
Church, based upon a Swiss Calvinistic model. It was an attempt to
establish a Reformed consistory^. The office of an elder of the kirk
was generally to assist the "ministers in all publike affaires of the
Kirk". This direction was specified by including the determination
and judging causes, admonishing licentious livers and having respect
to the "manners and conversation" of all men within the charge of the
kirk . There were other ecclesiastical officers canvassed as part of i y
the scheme of the reformed Church, e.g. Superintendents, Readers and 
Deacons. The offices of Reader and Deacon had no essential juridical 
function20.
The superintendent as an ecclesiastical office is one of exceeding 
interest. Many have claimed that the superintendent is merely a bad 
Latin translation of the Greek Episcopos, others that the difference 
of approach to the office stated in the First Book of Discipline, 
particularly the temporary nature of the office, denotes a specially 
presbyterian stance.
In many respects the superintendent was a bishop in other guise; he 
operated within a diocesan framework^ having jurisdiction over 
ministers22, kirks and the manners of the people as well as fulfilling 
evangelical roles in preaching and visitation^. Due however to the 
renunciation of the Apostolic succession, a rejection which was to
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cause grave doubts in the minds of many Scottish and English 
Protestants as the number of episcopally ordained priests decreased 
through natural wastage and which caused much theological and 
philosophical discourse, the superintendent ceased to have powers of 
ordination and confirmation.
It must also be stated that in being subject to the censure of the 
ministers and elders^ of his province, the superintendent showed that 
the office owed much to the German Lutheran Churches and Lascofs 
Church of the Foreigners in London^^* As Dr Ian Cowan rightly points 
out the question of the correlation of episcopacy with superintendence 
"breaks down in terms of spiritual authority"^.
The Jurisdictional Contest:
The Jurisdiction of the Kirk Session and the Commissary Court
Apart from the general indication of the Session1s jurisdiction given 
in the First Book of Discipline2 y there was no formal statement of the 
jurisdiction and it must be said, for example, that the Kirk Session 
of Saint Andrews, the first Session and the only one for which there 
are near-complete early records, exercised the jurisdiction of the 
Canonical Court as it were, by default. This unopposed assumption of 
jurisdiction was easily achieved because the Catholic Church had not 
been endowed with the jurisdiction to recognise cases by the Crown, 
consequently the Crown could have no legal objection to the assumption 
of a jurisdiction which was based upon ecclesiastical loyalty in times 
of ecclesiastical power or upon the convenience of parties in terms of 
ecclesiastical weakness.
64
Meetings of the Kirk Session of Saint Andrews or of any other 
congregation did not require, until the Black Acts, any royal licence. 
Indeed there is some slight evidence for suggesting that at least 
originally, royal policy was to allow the Kirk Sessions to meet and to 
use this ecclesiastical forum for the local administration of justice.
The case of Alexander Lothrisk,^ who resided in Kirkcaldy and was 
deserted by his wife who committed adultery is instructive. He sought 
divorce from his wife for this alleged cause. The minister and elders 
refused to take the cause without the orders of the Kirk Session of 
Saint Andrews. Lothrisk then proceeded to petition the Lords of 
Secret Council to order the Saint Andrews Kirk Session and to require 
the minister and elders to proceed and do justice in the cause. The 
citatio to the minister and elders of Kirkcaldy narrated the request 
by the Privy Council and stated that the Saint Andrews Kirk Session 
could not ’’proceed to any judicial act in this ... cause without true 
cognition” . The Session of Kirkcaldy was ordained to summon 
Lothrisk’s wife to appear in the consistory House of the 'Paroche Kirk 
of Saint Andrews’.
This co-operation between the secular Privy Council and the Kirk 
Session exhibits the pragmatism of the temporal authorities. In other 
parts of the country where the secular arm was not perhaps so weak, 
the Kirk Session seemed also to operate the consistorial jurisdiction, 
e.g. in Edinburgh the Kirk Session pronounced a divorce simpliciter 
between James Hamilton of Kincavil and Isabel Simpson^ *  In the years 
preceding the promulgation of the Second Book of Discipline in 1578 as 
a statement of the policy of the Kirk, the Crown’s opinion vacillated 
between approval of the Kirk Session and condemnation and revocation
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of Sessional decrees and judgement^q .
The decreet rendered by the Kirk Session in the above case of Hamilton 
-v- Simpson was revoked by the Commissaries in 1564. The General 
Assembly was determined to clarify this vacillatory and confusing 
state of affairs and in 1562 ordered that supplication be made to the 
"Secreit Counsal" to give up universally the judgement of divorce to 
the Kirk and their sessions or "els to establish men of good lives, 
knowledge and judgement to take the order thereof". This supplication 
will be examined later in connection with the Commissary Court. 
Suffice to say that the confusion was not ended thereby and the 
question of jurisdiction remained vexed and troublesome.
In 1560 the Court of Session, then, of course, still staffed to the 
extent of one half by clerics and with Henry Sinclair, Bishop of Ross 
as Lord President exercised a jurisdiction which Riddell^ attributes 
to the nobile officium, in a matter of adultery. The case from which 
this jurisdiction was exercised was Chalmers -v- Lumsden (1560) which 
Balfour^ quotes as authority for the proposition that the Lords of 
Counsel have power to cognosce and decide on spiritual causes if the 
'consistorie or ecclesiastical jurisdiction ceises or be stopt be 
civil wars or utherwayis'.
However it is submitted that this is not an exhibition of the Nobile 
Officium. There may have been ’na Consistories instant* and the 
spiritual jurisdiction may have been ineffective, but one must 
remember the Kirk Session of Edinburgh was hearing consistorial cases 
as was the Kirk Session of Saint Andrews, and if any doubt remained a 
commission could be sought from the Privy Council to order the Session
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to cognosce. It is contended that this was an attempt by the secular 
jurisdiction to impugn the growing reformed judicial establishment and 
gain control of a very important ecclesiastical function.
The Kirk Session continued to develop and re-emerge in the description 
of the ’particular1 eldership contained in the Second Book of 
Discipline^ in 1578 as part of the perfect policy of the Kirk, albeit 
more as a begrudged survivance than as a sanctioned and fostered 
organisation.
In the intervening period between 1562 and 1578 much happened which 
effectively deprived the ecclesiastical power of its privative 
jurisdiction in consistorial matters.
As has already been noted the General Assembly in 1562^ suggested a 
supplication to the Privy Council to either give up the divorce 
jurisdiction or to appoint men of good lives, knowledge and judgement 
to take up the jurisdiction, providing that the Privy Council made 
provision for the punishment of the wrong-doer. This suggestion was 
taken up by those making a supplication to the Queen and the Privy 
Council on behalf of the General Assembly but in some different terms; 
"That Judges be appointed to hear causes of divorcement for the Kirk 
can no longer sustain that burden"^, The real problem however 
related to the enforcement of decrees.
A supplication of this nature struck a chord in the ears of the Privy 
Council. It was well aware of the pleadings of litigants such as 
Chalmers and the action of the General Assembly in appraising an 
ordinance that "no minister or other officer of the Kirk is to
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cognosce or decide in Divorce except the Superintendents^ and their 
special commissioners and between special persons^" would perhaps put 
fear in the minds of the Privy Council that the Church was once again 
asserting a jurisdiction which the State could not politically admit.
The Privy Council was also quite aware that such supplications 
exhibited weakness on the part of the Assembly which situation was to 
be contrasted with times of relative ecclesiastical strength, e.g. in 
1570 when the Assembly once again sought the jurisdiction in 
matrimony^.
When the nineteen year old Queen Mary arrived from France and made 
landfall at Scotland on 19th August, 1561, her position was seen to be 
one of the utmost delicacy. This is all that could be expected of the 
position of a Catholic Queen in a country which had rejected the 
authority of the Pope.
The early years of her reign were dominated by two conflicts. 
Internally that between the Monarchy and the Church, and externally, 
that between Scotland and her allies and England. These two conflicts 
were aspects of essentially the same problem, that of sovereignty. 
She was fortunate in her two principal advisers at that time. 
Maitland of Lethington served her exceptionally in foreign affairs, 
whilst at home, James Stewart (later Earl of Moray) dealt with the 
problem of Huntly (1562)^^.
Campaigns like those against Huntly and the diplomatic discussions 
with Knox which resulted in the prosecution of Archbishop Hamilton of 
Saint Andrews and some forty-seven other clerics for saying Mass
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caused the stability required for a Convention of Parliament to be 
called and enabled the Queen to call a Parliament and obtain from it 
whatever she desired.
This equivocal policy was enforced by a confusion of conflicting 
signals which Mary sent the Reformers; upon her return to Scotland 
Mary issued a proclamation to her lieges that they "containe 
themselves in quietnes, keap peax and civile societie" and further 
that none of her subjects make any alteration or innovation of the 
state of religion or attempt anything against the form which she found 
existing upon her arrival^.
The confusion was not, in a sense inadvertent, as perhaps some^ would 
suggest in alluding to the non-papal Catholicism of Lorraine and the 
inauspicious match with Bothwell. Instead one could contend that it 
was deliberate Marian policy designed to lead the Reformers astray, to 
allay the fears of the powerful parties, including the secular Lords 
and Elizabeth and to ensure the retention of the Crown for the Queen 
on her own terms.
One can perceive a particular expression of this policy and an event 
of great juridical importance in the creation of the Commissary Court 
in 1564. On 28th December, 1563 the Privy Council professed some 
concern about the long delay in obtaining justice and how litigants 
were frustrated in obtaining relief for their causes and therefore Her 
Majesty with the advice of the Council, "thought good" that a 
jurisdiction be "erecit in sindrie pairts of this realme" in order to 
adjudicate on Consistorial Causes, and particular in those which 
Prelates had decided 'of befoir'.
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To this end a Commission consisting of Henry Sinclair, Bishop of Ross, 
Lord President of the Court of Session, Richard Maitland of 
Lethington, William Maitland, Maitland of Lethington’s son, Secretary 
of the Privy Council and the Queen’s diplomat, James McGill of Nether 
Rankelaur the Clerk of Register, Sir John Bellenden the Lord Justice 
Clerk, Lord Auchnoull and Sir John Spens the Queen’s advocate was 
established to ’sit down and devise’ an order for the Commissary Court 
and that the conclusions are to be put into articles (bills) which 
were to be subscribed by the Queen^.
The Commission duly reported to the Privy Council and on the 8th 
February, 1563 the following Charter of Constitution was issued from 
the Privy Council
Maria, Dei Gratia Regina Scotorum, omnibus probis hominibus suis, ad 
quos praesentes literae pervenerint salutem. Noveritis, quod uti 
palam constat ob cessationem seu absentiam ecclesiasticae 
jurisdictionis Officialium et Commissariorum intra hoc nostrum regnum 
omnes actiones et causae consistoriales cognoscendi et in consistoriis 
decidendi antea in usu fuerant per longam justitiae dilationem sic 
dampnificatae extiterunt magna una pars nostrorum subditorum, quod 
ipsi qui dictas actiones occurrentes habent mentisque existunt 
promptitudinem atque ad prosequendum habens multimode per carentiam 
ordinis eiusdem postpositi existunt. Et nos ingens gravamen aut
populi nostri laesionem per huiusmodi recepimus ac in dies recipimus 
volentes eos inde relevare, nec non per provisionis viam in huiusmodi 
locum vulgo Rowme bonum quendam ordinem stabilire sic quod justitiam 
illis exacte rationabiliter et cum omni diligentia in posterum 
ministrari seu fieri poterit: Quocirca cum avisamento Dominorum
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nostri secreti consilii, fecimus, constituimus et ordinavimus ac 
facimus, constituimus et ordinamus per praesentes dilectos nostros 
consiliarum consisum et clerioos Magistros Jacobum Balfour, Rectorem 
de Flisk, Edwardum Henryson in juribus seu legibus Doctorem, Clementem 
Litill, Advocatum, et Robertum Maitland ac quomque eorum conjunctim et 
divisim in modo sequenti nostros Commissarios Edinburghi in hac parte. 
Dando, concedendo et committendo illis, illorumque cuique conjunctim 
et divisim nostram plenam potestatem ac mandatum speciale intra burgum 
nostrum de Edinburgh in quacunque conveniente parte ejusdem sedendi et 
ullo diei tempore prout illis placuerit, coram eis omnes nostros 
ligeos infra bondas, vicecomitatuum nostrorum de Edinburgh principali, 
et intra constabulariam de Haddington, Peblis, Linlithgow et 
vicecomitatus nostri de Striveling, a Striveling orientaliter, in 
eisdem villanus et parochiam de Striveling comprehendendo atque omnes 
actiones concernentes decimas testata bona, injurias curatorum 
donationem, acto nostri parliamenti conformiter discutiendi, 
decernendi, et decidendi: nec non omnes alias actiones et causas 
intentatas seu intendandas coram illis per ullas personas intra bondas 
praedictas residentes aut contra ipsas per quascumque alias quae in 
consistorio perprius judicari et decidi solent. Una cum omnibus 
causis et actionibus beneficialibus, matrimonialibus, divortii et 
bastardiae, intentatis sive intentandis per quascumque personam seu 
personas infra ullas huius nostri regni partes vel loca commorantes 
aut materias matrimoniales inter partes procul residentes, quae ob 
paupertatem, longum placitum seu justitiam prosequi minime valent, 
qualificatis personis in patria, vel locis proximioribus locis quibus 
ipsii commorantur sive resident committendi pro quibus in causa ilia 
respondere tenebuntur. Omnibus quoque appellationibus interpositis 
seu dependentibus ab ullo alio Commissario, seu Commissariis, quoquore
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alio judice ecclesiastico hoc nostrum infra regnum retroactis 
temporibus; appellationes sive reductiones interponendas postea ab 
alio quocunque Commissario infra hoc nostrum regnum; Cum potestate 
praenominatus Magistris Jacobo, Edwardo. Clementi et Roberto ac 
ipsorum ulli conjunctim et divisim omnes alios judices incompetentes 
in illis causis seu casibus infra hoc nostrum regnum inhibendi ad 
procedendum in causis dictorum Commissariorum nostrorum jurisdictioni 
pertinentibus sive spectantibus; cum certificatione iis si in hoc 
succubuerint aut desecerint, sive processerint, quod cunque illis 
agere contigerit depost in se nullum nulliusque effectus declarabitur, 
cum omnibus quae desuper sequentur, ipsique pro eorum inobedientia 
punientur Omnimodos contractus obligationes a aliave scripta per 
partes vel notarios ad ipsorum mandata subscripta proportantes sive 
gerentes quod ipsae partes eosdem in dictorum Commissariorum libris 
registrari contentae sunt, cum literis ad eorum nostrum positionis seu 
nomationis desuper donandis, recipiendi atque in eorum libris 
supradictis registrari causandi; Praecepta pro testium summonitione 
ad comparendum fidele testimonium perhibere in omnibus causis motis 
movendisve coram illis. Sub similibus pecuniariis poenis ac si 
praelibatis nostris Commissariis secundum qualitatem causae expediens 
visum fuerit dirigendi; et si testes summoniti existentes minime 
comparuerint, eorum Officiarios namare, et dictos poenas 
instructionibus sibi desuper exhibitis applicandas fore causandi; 
Omnia deforciamenta per quascunque personam seu personas super eorum 
Officiariis praescriptis commissa vocandi discutiendi ac coram illis 
decernedi, quorum poenae adeo graves erunt ac si noster officiarius 
armorum in executione nostrarum literarum deforciatus extitisset; ex 
eo quod eorum Officiarii executores nostrae justitiae et respectu in 
hoc nostri Officiarii existunt; Testamenta quarumcumque personae vel
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personarum infra bondas suae partioularis jurisdictionis supradictas, 
cuius valoris et quantitatis cuiuscunque sint; Nec non omnia alia 
testamenta quarumcumque personarum infra ullam aliam partem huius 
nostri regni residentium aut commorantium, quorum pars defuncti summam 
quinquaginta librarum excedet confirmandi praefata testamenta in 
libris ipsorum Commissariorum registrari causandi; dativas si opus 
fuerit, in forma juris sub cautione dandi sive deliberandi Qui quidera 
processus ac quaecumque dicti Commissarii ullive ipsorum conjunctim 
aut divisim aut eorum Officiarii in actionibus et causis suprascriptis 
illorum nominibus agere seu perficere contigerint, cum omnibus 
incidentibus emergentibus, annexis, connexis et dependentis desuper 
adeo valide, legitime tantique grandis valoris, fortitudinis et 
effectus, veluti ullus processus seu sententiae, quae per quemcunque 
judicem aut judices consistoriales deductae, vel datae intra hoc 
nostrum regnum, quocumque elapso tempore fuerunt; Acta, decreta et 
sententias pronunciandi: Procuratores coram illis, pro prosecutione
defensioneque dictarum actionum admittendi; Ordinarios officiarios 
pro executione suarum directionum faciendi creandi et ordinandi; pro 
quibus respondere tenebuntur et generaliter omnia alia et singula 
faciendi exercendi et utendi quae in similibus officiis de jure seu 
consuentudine sunt aut ullo elapso tempore dignoscuntur pertinere; 
Ratum et gratum habentes et habituare totum et quicquid praenominati 
nostri Commissarii, aut eorum quiccumque suive officiarii et ministri 
im praemissis rite duxerit seu duxerint faciendum. Ac volumus quod 
praesens nostra commissio jurisdictioni collegii nostri justitiae 
Vicecomitum, Senescallorum, Balivorum regalium regalitatum Comittum, 
Dominorum, Baronum, et Liberetenentium, Praepositorum ac Balivorum seu 
ullius alius temporalis judicis cuiuscumque infra hoc nostrum regnum, 
in causis eorum jurisdictioni pertinentibus nequaquam praejudicabit
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neque derogationem faciet Quare, universis et singulis quorum 
interest, vel interesse poterit, stricte precipimus et mandamus 
quatenus supra specificatis nostris Commissarius aut eorum cuilibet 
conjunctim et divisim suisque officariis et ministriis in omnibus et 
singulis praemissa coneernentibus prompte respondent pareant et 
intendant, sub omni poena quae competere poterit in hac parte; 
Praesentibus, nostris bona voluntate et beneplacito, ac quo usque 
ulterior ordo in praemissis capiatur duraturis. Datum sub testimonio 
nostri magni sigilli apud Edinburgh octavo die mensis Februari, anno 
Domini Millesimo quingentesimo sextagesimo tertio et regni nostri 
vicesimo secundo. Per signaturam manu S.D.N.R. subscript^.
Mary, by the Grace of God, Queen of Scotland to all her subjects to 
whom these presents may come, greeting.
You are aware that because it publicly appears by the delayings and 
absence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Officials and 
Commissaries in this our realm where once all consistorial actions and 
causes were cognosced and decided in consistory, those who seek 
justice and relief experience delay. A great number of our subjects 
have no decisions because they had the same said actions current then 
and they exist now in deception only and that in any case without a 
proper order for consideration there are many actions stored up. And 
we, comprehending the extreme gravity and injury to our people which 
we receive hereby, wish to unveil the following scheme to them.
Not by provisions of going to the place called in the vulgar Rowme but 
rather to establish good order here, just because justice must be got 
for them so it can be got and administered reasonably and with all
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diligence in the future. Therefore with the advices of the Lords of 
our Secret (Privy) Council, we make, constitute and ordain and have 
made, constituted and ordained by these presents our chosen 
conciliares and clerks, Master James Balfour, Rector of Flisk, Edward 
Henryson, Doctor of both Laws, Clement Litill,- Advocate and Robert 
Maitland, who are now, whether sitting together or separately in the 
following way, our Commissaries of Edinburgh in that part.
We give, concede and commit to them either sitting together or 
separately our whole power and special mandate to sit in our burgh of 
Edinburgh or wherever it pleases them and at whatever time of the day 
pleases them. All our liegies within the boundaries of our Sheriffdom 
of Edinburgh in principal and also in the Constabulary of Haddington, 
Peebles, Linlithgow and our Sheriffdom of Stirling and to the east of 
Stirling and the town and parish thereeof can bring their cases before 
them and in particular to decide, decern and judge in conformity with 
our Acts of Parliament all actions concerning tithes, bequeathed 
goods, delict and the gift of curators, but not all other actions and 
causes of the kind intended or to be intended, which ought to be 
decided and adjudicated in consistory before them by persons residing 
within the said boundaries, or against them wherever else. Including 
however one and all causes and actions relating to benefice, 
matrimony, divorce and illegitimacy intended or so to be, by 
whomsoever person or persons staying in any part or place within our 
realm. Whether by poverty, as accords ancient opinion or to pursue 
the smallest justice the qualification of the persons joining issue is 
that they reside or have stayed in the country or in a place very 
close to the place where the person to be pursued stays. For which 
they are held to answer in those causes. Also all appeals placed or
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pending from any other commissary court or courts or from whatever 
other ecclesiastical jurisdiction in our realm invented through time. 
Appeals or even reductions can be interponed after decrees from any 
other Commissary in this our realm.
With power to the aforementioned Masters James, Edward, Clement, and 
Robert and any quorum of them sitting together or singly, to inhibit 
all other judges incompetent in these causes within our realm from 
proceeding in the said causes pertaining specially to our said 
Commissary. If others try to deceive or revolt or continue judging or 
permit causes they can under a certificate from the Commissary be 
declared of null effect and to be null in se. And on everything 
following on the above the Commissary can have them punished for 
disobedience. If parties wish they can register in the Books of the 
Commissariat all kinds of contracts, obligations, acts, writs of 
parties and notarial mandates, whether subscribed in part or totally. 
When they receive letters giving them our positiones and judgements 
they are to cause these to be registered in aforesaid books.
To prohibit in all causes the taking of witnesses before the summoning 
to compear with faithful evidence, with power to our said Commissaries 
to cause the witnesses to come before them under a penalty of a fine 
which shall vary with the expense and nature of the cause. And if the 
witnesses who are summoned are still alive and do not compear they are 
to name officers and the said instructions shown within are to be 
caused to be applied. For all deforcements by whomsoever person or 
persons on the above written officers, sent out on court business, the 
doer is to be called, judged and decerned and the punishments for 
which deforcements are to be grave and especially if our officers are
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deforced in the execution of our letters and that because the officers 
are executors of our justice and for that purpose they are our 
officers.
And the testaments of whomsoever person or persons within the 
boundaries of the above written jurisdiction are within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of whatsoever value or quantity. But they 
are not to confirm any other testaments of whomsoever persons living 
or dead in any other part of our realm of which the dead's part does 
not exceed fifty pounds. The said testaments are to be caused to be 
registered in the Books of the Commissaries. You are to give, if the 
work requires it, judgement in the form of law under caution. With 
which process and with all incidents, emerging matters collaborations 
and connected matters and items dependent thereon of equal validity 
and the legitimacy of such value, worth and effect whomsoever of the 
Commissaries any of them together or separately or their officers
acting in their name can in the actions written above, concern
themselves and any execution or dealing therewith. They are to 
confirm the testaments of whomsoever person or persons within the 
boundaries of the above written jurisdictions of whatsoever value or 
quantity but not any other wills of whatsoever person or persons
residing or dying together in any other part of the realm unless the 
dead's part exceeds fifty pounds. The said wills are to be caused to 
be registered in the Books of the Commissaries. You are to give
judgement or deliberate if the case requires it in the form of Law 
under caution. Which process with all incidents, emerging matters, 
collaborations and connected matters and items dependent thereon of 
equal validity and legitimacy of such value, worth and effect can be 
intromitted with by the Commissaries either together or separately or
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by an official acting in their name who can concern themselves with 
the execution and dealing of the process and this applies, if they 
wish, to any process or sentence given by any judge or judges in 
consistory and dated in our realm no matter what time has elapsed. 
They can pronounce acta, decreets and sententiae. They can admit 
procurators before them for the prosecution or defence of such 
actions. They can ordain, create and make Ordinary Officials for the 
execution of their directions for which they are held to answer and 
generally they can do all other and singular deeds, exercises and uses 
which are in use by custom in such offices, they will distinguish what 
pertains to them in the lapse of time.
It is agreeable and pleasing that those having or about to have 
actions should lead them before the above named Commissaries or some 
of them or before their officers or ministers and we wish that our 
College of Justice, our Sheriffs, Seneschals, Bailies of Baronies of 
Regality, Lords, Barons, freeholders, Provosts and Bailies and any 
other temporal jurisdiction within our realm will do nothing to 
derogate from or prejudice the causes pertaining to the jurisdiction 
of this our present Commission of jurisdiction. Whereby we strictly 
urge and ordain to all and sundry persons whose interest or potential 
interest they are bringing forth or intend, to send the matter in hand 
before our said Commissaries, either together or separately or to 
their officers or ministers who will answer swiftly that which 
concerns them and this under all punishments which can be used in this 
realm.
Let these presents sustain at our good wishes and pleasure no matter 
to whichever remote part of our realm they are taken.
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Given under the witness of our Great Seal at Edinburgh on the Eighth 
day of February in the year of our Lord 1563 and the 22nd year of our 
reign.
Signed by Her Majesty
One can raise many observations upon examination of the Charter. 
Firstly, it was a Royal Charter issued by the Queen in her Privy 
Council. It was not ratified by Parliament. Parliament did not make
objection to the constitution of the Court, doubtless due to the
influence which at that time Mary exercised over the Three Estates. 
Ratification came with a formal recognition of the jurisdiction and 
privileges of the Commissaries in 1592^^. The ratification noticed 
that the ’’jurisdiction ecclesiastical belonging to the officials of 
auld is and was devolvit in the Commissaries chosen and nominate".
There was great emphasis on the continuity of the jurisdiction and yet 
from the charter of constitution it is clear that the older courts had 
effectively ceased to function. Nevertheless, and it is in this that 
the tone of the constitution of the Court is set, notwithstanding that 
the old order was alluded to and the Officials and Commissaries’ 
courts and their customary powers mentioned, the possibility of 
referral to Rome was totally barred. There was also no doubt as to 
the origin of the Court. The Queen established the Commissary Court 
to provide for good order in consistorial and other matters and was 
supported in this seemingly laudable venture by the Privy Council.
Possibly the Court was constituted as a temporary expedient to clear
the many actions then pending. There are indications that this may 
have been one of the reasons which featured in the Privy Council’s 
deliberation. It may however be that the constitution was merely an
79
expedient, the Court was sustained at Her Majesty1s good wishes and 
pleasure it was not declared to be a permanent and irrevocable 
establishment; accordingly the maxim "unum quodque eodem modo 
dissolvitur quo colligatur" applied and the Queen could have, should 
she have seen fit, abolished the court by a prerogative act. The 
temporary nature of the Court was expressed by the Lord Morton in 1575 
when he attempted to revise the legal system in order to provide for 
the better disposal of cases. In his argument he stated with, as has 
been seen, some justification "The Commissarys constituted by the 
Queen for the decision of beneficiall and matrimoniall causis ... 
quhill a mair perfyct order micht be provided for and establishit"^.
It can also be remarked that the Ratification of 1592 states that by 
virtue of the Royal constitution, the Commissaries of Edinburgh and 
their predecessors with the other inferior Commissaries within the 
Kingdom have been in use and possession of the jurisdiction in 
spiritual causes, "and has faithfully and diligentlie dischargit thair 
dewties in the administration of justice to the liegies; Thairfor his 
Hienes and estaites ... ratifyes and appreives the said institution of 
the said Commissaries"^. One could construe that from terms of this 
ratification the Commissaries had in effect been on trial themselves 
and that the court would only attain permanent establishment upon 
proving itself as a reliable and acceptable provider of justice. The 
appointment of the Commissaries is also noteworthy, as it represents a 
facet of Marian policy which was to enable the establishment of a 
jurisdiction which would have power to render "all other judges 
incompetent in the said causes pertaining to our said Commissary". 
There was, as has already been noted, only one jurisdiction to which 
this clause could have any applicability that of the Kirk Session.
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The new court struck directly at the juristic pretensions of the new 
Church. The polity of the Reformed Church was so far undefined and 
the Kirk Session was as yet without formal ecclesiastical 
establishment^. These legalistic matters are important when taken in 
conjunction with the inferred circumstance from the rapidity of the 
reappearance of parishioners before the Session that indicates a 
certain contempt for its decreets. Perhaps Marian policy-makers 
perceived constitutional weakness combined with parochial apathy as 
providing the ebb point in the reforming juristic tide to which the 
Commissary Court could act as a dam. Undoubtedly if the other 
political and religious devices of Mary had been successful the 
Commissary Court would have featured largely in the pro-monarchical 
victory, as it was, instead of being the death knell of the 
ecclesiastical courts it was (and one hesitates to use the word) 
merely a decisive move which divested the Church of the greater part 
of her naturally assumed jurisdiction and brought into secular control 
those matters which affected the majority of the Queen*s subjects, 
matrimony, divorce, illegitimacy and the confirmation of testaments. 
Had secular control not been imposed at this time the Private law of 
Scotland would have developed along ways very much different from that 
which it did. One can only view the Commissary Court as a political 
establishment for the secular party not as such for the Catholic 
party. Whilst the Commission which established the order of the 
Commissary Court contained high ranking Catholics, e.g. Henry 
Sinclair, and whilst the Commissaries appointed were at least split in 
half between supporters of the new order and the old it is certain 
that politically speaking the broad spectrum of the middle way of 
Lethington had emerged as the overall tone of the Commissary Court. 
Certainly if the Court was designed to assert Royal influence and
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dominance the composition was correct. James Balfour^g who had been
Official of Lothian from 1554 until 1560 was coming to his ascendancy
under Mary. In 1561 he replaced the Abbot of Dunfermline as a
Spiritual Lord of the Court of Session, he sat on the Privy Council in
that year^g and became a more frequent member^ of that body when, as
McNeil notices it was a ’very catholic council' .
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He was to become one of Mary’s most trusted Statesmen. However in
later betraying her trust he showed that with Machiavelli he
recognised political expedient more than perhaps any other of his
generation; a generation which was not without its treason, plotting
and falsehood. It is clear that for as long as he was trusted by Mary
he fulfilled many functions and was of some use to her. He resigned
from office as Commissary in 1565, demitting office in favour of
Maister Alexander Sym.-0. In 1566 he took the office of Clerk
5^
Registrar from James McGill^ of Nether Rankelaur, who had sat on the 
Committee which formed the Commissary Court. In 1567 he returned this 
Office to McGill and in exchange obtained the Lord Presidency of the 
Court of Session from Lord Provand which office he held till at least 
1571 gn when the Lord Provand returned to the College of Justice^. 
Obviously an able lawyer, his services were great to his Queen.
However, it is also plain from the career of this ’manifest 
blasphemer* that he viewed his own profit above any cause. It is 
important that from the period in which he was Commissary his support 
for Mary and indeed later for the Marian party was great and he would 
have been a man upon whom the Queen could rely in her efforts to 
control the Country and Church. Certainly with men like Balfour with 
her Mary could perhaps have been confident enough to form a vision of 
the day when Catholicism would once again be the religion of the Scots
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and when Scotland would return to the fold of Rome.
Edward Henryson was a well known figure in the legal establishment of 
Scotland during the 16th Century. He was appointed lawyer for the 
poor in 1556 for a period of three years. His tenure of this office 
was later extended by a further three years^-g. He obtained his 
doctorate some time between 1556 and 1564 from the University of 
Bourges in France. His degree was significantly a doctorate utriusque 
juris, of both Canon and Civil Laws. He was almost certainly teaching 
in Edinburgh around 1556 in Law and Greek,-^. He was noted as 'unus 
Commissariorum1 when witnessing a Disposition and Charter confirming 
William Maitland and his wife to land near Stevenson^g. In 1569 he is 
also noted as jurisconsult, showing that whilst Commissary he had not 
given up his private legal practice in Edinburgh^.
Clement Litill was an advocate of some renown. He was educated at 
Louvain and Saint Andrews. His first important brief was the 
representation of Thomas Kennedy of Barganny before the Privy Council 
in 1561 regarding the holding of a French shipgg. Litill is the 
enigma among the Commissaries. He alone stands out as having strong 
links with the Reformed Church. He may have owed his position to his 
close connection with Henry Sinclair, Bishop of Ross. He was also a 
very able lawyer and these factors together with a desire to appease 
the Reformed party may have prompted the confirmation of his 
appointment as Commissary. In July 1563 he was listed amongst those 
commissioned by the General Assembly of the Reformed Church to take 
cognition in an appeal by Magnus Halcro and Margaret Sinclair from a 
decreet of the bishop of Orkney in a divorce action. This commission 
included the superintendent of Lothian, James McGill, the Clerk
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Register and Sir John Spens the Queen1 s Advocate^.
Later that year he was appointed by Edinburgh Town Council to plead
their cause before the General Counsale (Assembly) of the Kirk held in
Edinburgh. This appointment was renewed in 1568g£. 1572 he was
appointed as a member of the Committee of the General Assembly to
reason the divorce of Lord Argyle from his wife. The results of this
Committee were never made public due to the Earl's pre-emptive move in
Parliament which resulted in the Act 1573» permitting divorce for
desertionCo.
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In 1576 in his capacity as Procurator for the Kirk, an office which he 
held in conjunction with Alexander Sym the future Lord President -of 
the Court of Session, he was a member of the Lothian sub-committee of 
the Commission for the making of the overture of the "policie and 
jurisdiction" of the Kirk^. He was also appointed to the Glamis 
Committee of October 1576 charged with reviewing the draft articles of 
the earlier commission^. In 1576, like Henryson, evidence of his 
private practice comes to light as he was designed as advocate when he 
purchased land at Over-Libertoun in Edinburgh^. In that year he also 
bequeathed his library to the University of Edinburgh, an important 
gift to the nascent college^.
Of Robert Maitland, less is known. He was probably related to the 
Maitland of Lethington and could have been Dean of Aberdeen^. He was 
ordained to produce his seal with the other Commissaries in 1568^. 
In the Letter of Commission in 1563 he along with Henryson and Litill 
is paid 300 marks. Balfour, some would say characteristically, 
obtained 400 marks for his services.^*
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The complexion of the Commissary Court then made it an instrument for 
Marian policy. Balfour, at this time, was a staunch supporter of 
Mary, Henryson was also bound in many respects to the Monarchy. 
Maitland whilst perhaps not so ’catholic1 in outlook was at least in 
accord with the middle way of his relative Lethington’s policy. 
Litill alone was connected with the Kirk but even this conformed to 
the middle way policy and would indicate an appeasement of the 
Reformed party. Substantially the Court fulfilled its political 
function well. It removed the cognition of an important jurisdiction 
from the Kirk Session and also through the canonical training and 
inclination of its judges applied Roman-Civil-Canonical law and not 
the scriptural fundamentalist code of the Church as sketched in the 
First Book of Discipline.
The Court sat in Edinburgh apart from a brief period when it sat at 
Leith, during the plague^. In terms of area the sheriffdom of 
Edinburgh, Haddington, Peebles, Linlithgow and the sheriffdom of 
Stirling were within the jurisdiction of the Court. The remaining 
areas of the realm were serviced by inferior commissaries.
In terms of the subject matter of the jurisdiction, the local 
jurisdiction pertained to tithes, bequeathed goods and matters arising 
ex delicto. The universal and exclusive jurisdiction extended to 
questions of benefice, matrimony divorce and illegitimacy and 
confirmation of testaments. Occasionally the local Commissary Court 
would receive a commission to adjudicate in a matter usually within 
the Edinburgh Commissary’s exclusive competence, e.g. On 29 February 
1582 Mr James Pont Commissar of Stirling is recorded as having had 
jurisdiction conferred on him to grant a divorce in the case of Andro
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Wilson v. Jonet Crystesone,^. Indeed these delimitations portray the 
Commissary Court as successor in toto to the jurisdiction of the 
Officials and Commissary courts of the old order. The appellate
jurisdiction enabled the Edinburgh Commissaries to reduce the decreets 
of the other Commissary or any other ecclesiastical jurisdiction,^. 
Stair notices the superiority which the Commissaries of Edinburgh had 
over the inferior commissaries^^. Perhaps however even more important 
than the right to reduce decreets of other courts, the Court was given 
the power to inhibit "all other judges ... without our realm from
proceeding in the said causes pertaining to their commissary". This 
was effective power which would inevitably secularise such 
jurisdiction.
The Kirk Session 1564-1578
The First Book of Discipline had not been accepted by the secular 
authority. It had never passed into law principally because of its 
revolutionary financial provisions. Nevertheless the elderships had 
functioned as courts for the period of 14 years between the
establishment of the Commissary Court and the publication of the
Second Book of Discipline, which crystallised the church policy and 
the hierarchy of ecclesiastical courts and which went some way to 
delimiting the secular and spiritual jurisdictions. The Convention of 
Leith (1571) abandoned many points contained in the First Book of 
Discipline. The details of the search for the "perfyct polity of the 
kirk" are not within the scope of this work^.. Suffice to say that in 
1576, according to Spottiswoode, the Assembly, in answer to a question 
raised by James Patton, Bishop of Dunkeld nominated a committee to 
"with all diligence set down a constant form of church policy",^. The
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Committee consisted of Andrew Melville, Andrew Hay, David Cunninghame, 
George Hay, Alexander Arbuthnot, David Lindsay and many others 
including, as has already been mentioned, Clement Litill and Alexander 
Sym, by then brother Commissaries. Those trained in Canon or Civil 
Law included on the Committee in addition to Litill and Sym were 
Melville and Arbuthnot, Principal of King’s College, Aberdeen, John 
Row, Doctor utriusque juris, minister of Perth, former agent in Rome 
and Papal Nuncio,^ and Archbishop James Boyd of Glasgow.
The Second Book of Discipline deals, not with Kirk Sessions or 
Presbytries but rather with elderships. The definition over which 
much learned discussion has taken place, is that ’’Elderships or 
assemblies ar constitute commonlie of pasturis and sic as commounlie 
we call eldaris ...
Assemblies are of four sorties; for ather ar thay of particular 
Kirkis and congregationis ane or ma, ather of ane province, ather of 
ane haill nation, or of all and divers nationis professing ane Jesus 
Christ”yg.
Thus on the face of it the Second Book of Discipline then defines four 
Assemblies in the Church, The Church Universal, the Assembly of the 
Entire Nation (the General Assembly), the Assembly of the Province 
(the Provincial Synod) and the Assembly of the Particular Kirk.
The assembly of the particular kirk received farther definition being 
within a ’’particular congregation yet exercising the power authority 
and jurisdiction of the kirk’’^ ^. This broad statement is farther 
specified in so far as particular congregations are not meant as every
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particular parish kirk having its own eldership but rather especially 
in landward counties that every three or four may have a "commoune 
eldership to thame all to judge their ecclesiasticall causes"gg.
This scheme when read in conjuction with the later "special head of 
reformation", craved that "As to eldaris, their wald be sum to be
censuris of maneris of the peple, ane or ma in everie congregatioun 
bot not ane assemblie of elderis in every particular kirk, but only in 
the townes and famous places quhair resort of men of judgement and 
habilitie to that office may be had'^ and with the advice given by 
Beza to Lord Glamis shows a desire upon the part of the authors of the 
Book to have the Kirk Session suppressed in favour of the eldership of 
more than one parish; the Presbyteryg^.
The history of the establishment of Presbyteries is a long and 
complicated one. The administration of Lennox had provoked a 
Protestant reaction which culminated in the revolution which came to 
be known as the Ruthven Raid. The King, James VI was seized in August 
1582 and a pro-Reforming government was carried on by Lord Ruthven, 
the Earl of Gowrie and his associates. The General Assembly approved 
of the coup d'etat, in return for which support the revolutionary 
government encouraged the provisions of the Second Book of Discipline 
to be put into effect. In 1583 the King escaped from the Raiders and
as part of the policy of the reassertion of Royal power, the
administration of Annan passed the Black Acts in 1584. These Acts
amounted to a Royal answer to the Second Book of Disciplineg^.
Royal authority was re-established, spiritual and temporal 
jurisdictions were made subject to Royal approval, and convocations
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were prohibited unless called under Royal consent. Episcopal 
government in the Church was approved and for want of a better word, 
establishedg^.
For all the Black Acts were a stark reassertion of Royal power they 
were not fully enforced. It would simply not have been possible to 
prevent sessions or elderships from meeting, and if attempted would 
probably provoked a far worse and more popularly supported revolution 
than that of 1 5 8 3 .
Thus it was that in 1592 Parliament authorised a Presbyterian church 
government by an Act known as "The Golden Act". In particular the 
"presbiteries and particulare sessionis appointit be the said Kirk 
with the haill jurisdictioun and discipline of the same" were 
approvedgj..
There were several good reasons for this shift in pastoral 
organisation, (a) To root out the plurality of charges, (b) to phase 
out the use of readers, (c) to replace bishops and (d) to provide a 
more effective witness.
Unfortunately such a scheme could only work with a massive reduction 
in the number of parishes. Because of the failure on the part of the 
Church to achieve this reduction and with the slow nature of the 
establishment of Presbyteries, e.g. by 1581 there were only 15 model 
Presbyteries in the lowlands. Kirk Sessions by and large remained 
effective and operative having ordinary jurisdiction over parties in 
consistorial matters. Indeed the establishment of the Presbytery at 
Saint Andrews in 1582 seems to have caused little or no disturbance at
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all to the business of the local Kirk Session^ *
The Kirk Session: Jurisdiction and Procedure
The general scheme of the Session’s jurisdiction has already been 
examined.
With regard to specific content the subject matter of the jurisdiction 
compares well with that of the Official’s court of the old order. 
There are sessional cases dealing with the constitution of marriage, 
engagementgg with solemnities^ and impediments^. Relations stante 
matrimonio are discussed as are adherence^ and divorce^*
The Kirk’s exclusive jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters was 
recognised by Parliament in 1567 with the ratification of the Acts of 
the Reformation Parliament. Acts were passed acknowledging that 
’’there be na uther ecclesiasticall jurisdiction acknowledged in the 
realm uther than the trew Kirk"^ thereby ratifying the Reformed 
Church establishment.
Also in 1567, the General Assembly placed the jurisdiction for divorce 
in the hands of the superintendent alone or his commissioners
reiterating a similar act already mentioned^-.
9b
Whilst the Commissary Court did affect the Kirk Sessions’ jurisdiction 
and did on occasions reduce sessional decreets, it is obvious that in 
those areas where the Session was powerful cases strictly speaking 
within the Commissary Court’s exclusive jurisdiction continued to be 
cognosced by the Session.
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The Second Book of Discipline condemned the * dependencies * of the 
papal jurisdiction i.e. the Commissary Tso far as thay mell with 
ecclesiastical materis and have no commissioun of the kirk thereto’gy. 
This attack on the Commissaries followed a claim by the Assembly in 
1570 to take the cognition of divorces as truly belonging to the 
Church.
By then, of course, the superintendents court, i.e. the Kirk Session 
of the principal town in the province had ceased to effectively deal 
with matrimonial matters, e.g. adherence and adultery in any other 
capacity than disciplinary^. The truly decisive function clearly lay 
with the secular court. The ecclesiastical claims to jurisdiction in 
Scotland can be compared with the Catholic dogmatic assertions at the 
Council of Trent.
"If anyone says that matrimonial causes do not belong to 
ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema"g g .
The procedure of the Kirk Session displayed an astonishing dependence 
on the ancient canonical process. This is not entirely surprising and 
can be explained by reference to several factors.
Firstly, the Canon Law was not nullified by the acts of the 
Reformation Parliament. Certainly laws were passed annulling all 
laws, acts and constitutions, canon, civil and municipal which were 
contrary to the religion "now professit in the r e a l m " b u t  the bulk 
of Canon Law did not offend against the Reformed doctrine -j q 1 anc* 
procedure was an area relatively free of abhorrent passages. It must 
also be noted that the number of references to Rome had been declining
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steadily in the years immediately prior to the Reformation. Many 
explanations have been postulated for this decrease in use of the 
papal jurisdiction; expenses, the rise of Metropolitan jurisdictions 
and the appointment of Legates a Latere probably all played their 
part, however the net result was that when the papal jurisdiction was 
abolished the gap left in the legal system was not unbridgeable.
Secondly, the Canon Law which had been recognised by the King, the 
Three Estates and the litigants as a superior procedural system of 
great equity and justice had been emulated by the secular law and 
woven into the fabric of the municipal law. For example, Craig in his 
Jus Feudale states, "in Scotland, notwithstanding that we have thrown 
off the Papal yoke the authority of the Canon Law endures ... it 
prevails also in the departments of wills, marriages (both as to 
constitution and dissolution) and legitimacy” -jq2, anci even later 
Stair, writing from a stance of hostility towards Canon Law and at a 
time more than 120 years after the fall of the Roman tradition in 
Scotland states "so deep hath the Canon Law been rooted that even 
where the Pope’s authority is rejected, yet consideration must be had 
to these laws ... as containing many equitable and profitable 
laws’^ Q^* was Roman-Civil-Canonical jus Commune which was
being taught in the Universities and which had been imported into the 
municipal law by the University trained civil service and in 
particular had been imported in some measure by the ecclesiastical 
members of the Court of Session which as has already been noticed was 
constituted by clerics to the extent of one half.
Even in post Reformation Universities in Scotland Canon Law was taught 
alongside the Civil Law. Provision was made in the First Book of
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Discipline for the teaching of Roman Laws and Municipal Laws but 
after at least three centuries of ferment, from the Canonical 
references in Regiam Majestatem it would be a lawyer of great 
discernment who would have attempted to separate the Canon from the 
municipal laws.
It is against this background of Romano Canonical influence that one 
must now view the adjective and indeed the substantive post 
Reformation Law. The post Reformation procedure falls broadly into 
the broad pattern of the Canon Law. There are preparatory acta, the 
tryell and the decreet. One broad observation should be made. It 
appears that there is a greater reliance in the Kirk Session on a 
procedure analogous to the Denunciatio Evangelica^g of the Canon Law 
possibly because the Kirk was fulfilling a more active criminal 
jurisdiction, moulding the people into God's elect and receiving 
support from the Three Estates, (often the General Assembly wearing a 
different hat) , which made behaviour hitherto merely morally 
reprehensible or sinful into criminal activity the penalties for which 
were severe.
As in the canonical procedure the constitution of procurators or 
advocates constituted the first cognisable stage of court procedure of 
the Kirk Session. In Saint Andrews between 1562 and 1581 there were 
at least 19 advocates or procurators operating in the Courts. In 
addition to this expert legal representation there were also some 
seven notaries who at various stages acted in a representative 
capacity. Some of those appearing for example John Ro w ^q^, were 
advocates of European status, others, in particular David Meldrum10g 
were of a less high calibre. Regulations were made to govern the
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behaviour of legal representatives, in some respects similar to those 
of the old courts, for example, David Meldrum was repelled from 
representing his client because of his insulting behaviour
The most striking observation of the procedure in a matrimonial cause 
at the Kirk Session was that there was no strict formally regulated 
process. The procedure in contradistinction to the ordinary process 
was flexible and capable of adaptation to fit the instant case. The 
following therefore is a series of observations on the procedure and 
not a description of a fixed delimited procedure.
The pursuer or petitioner made up his petition,^, or supplication^^,
or if the action was being taken by the Procurator for the Kirk, his
accusatio^2. This document narrated the petitioners allegations of
fact and his crave or remedy s o u g h t r e q u e s t e d  the Kirk Session
to adjudicate and take probation.^. The document was also sometimes
termed a bill or lybil^^, names reminiscent of the canonical process.
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The Court agreed to adjudicate by granting warrants to the pursuer to 
cite the defender. The libelled citation was then delivered to the 
defender .j .j g . An alternative method of citation was by the 
superintendent’s letters
Service was executed thereon and endorsed, the libelled summons with 
the citation endorsed was delivered to the Court ^ g. An induciae of 
15 days followed upon the service to enable the defender to answer ^ g, 
sometimes a longer induciae was allowed e.g. 6 0 days^o*
The defender answered the petitio by appearing at the Kirk Session on
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the appointed day and either denying or admitting the averments as 
l i b e l l e d ^ . If admitted the superintendent and elders proceeded at 
once to the definitive s e n t e n c e ^ i f  denied the date was fixed for 
probation or tryell^^* if defender did not appear there were
various courses of action open to the pursuer or to the Court ex 
proprio motu. The defender could be noted as contumax and letters of 
inhibition granted against him.^. The letters of inhibition would 
prohibit cohabitation or solemnisation of marriage and show an early 
adaption of the interim interlocutor^^. A decree in absence could be 
granted against a contumax^g. There seems to be some reluctance on 
the part of the eldership to grant decreets in absence, in which case 
attendance was often ordained, reservice warranted,^ and the cause 
continued ex proporio motu to allow the defender to appear^g.
The defender upon compearance made his responsio^^ to the 
intention^Q of the petitioner. The use of these terms exhibits a 
clear dependence on the terminology of the Canonical process. He 
states his defences, which could be dilatory or peremptory^-j • 
However, if the word exceptio meant little to the Canonists who 
constructed the Roman-Civil-Canonical procedure so the distinction 
such as that of dilatory or peremptorary pleas meant even less to 
those conducting pleas at the eldership of Saint Andrews. The 
distinction means very little if there is no litiscontestation and 
there appears to have been no formal act of this nature in terms of 
canonical process. In fact one could submit that in answering the 
summons the defender was assenting to litiscontestation at that point. 
This would have the effect of rendering all defences peremptorary in 
the sense that they could only be proponed after litiscontestation. 
Therefore the defences were 'qualifiet in articulis' and the
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superintendent was able to be advised of every allegation and 
’peremptor exceptione proponit ’ ^ 2  * Tt was also open to the defender 
to make a counterclaim^^*
A term was fixed ad probandura for the proof of the pursuer’s 
allegations and the defenders counterclaim and defences. Caution 
would be taken from a defender to ensure compearance at the diet, a 
relatively high figure of £ 2 0  was set in one particular c a s e d u r i n g  
1560. Upon the setting of the term for proof superintendents’ letters 
were provided to the parties in order that they may summon witnesses. 
Witnesses who did not compear were marked as contumaces.^ and 
attracted the requisite penalties.
The procedure at proof was also similar to the second major step of 
the Roman-Civil-Canonical process.
The oath of calumny was in use and was sworn by both p e t i t i o n e r and 
defender^ 3 * The petitioner’s failure to swear the oath resulted in 
the renunciation of the claim. The defenders failure would result in 
being held as pro confesso. Were the oath taken the superintendent 
would admit the defences to probation and the proof would proceed. It 
thus seems that the taking of the oath represented a condition
precedent for the farther progress of the action. The oath occurs 
rarely, whether this exhibits the confidence of the ’godlie ministry’ 
in the lack of chicanery perpetrated by their flock or rather more 
likely, it represents a lack of appreciation of the oath as the
indicia of litiscontestation which by now, as a formal judicial act
had practically ceased to exist. This change in emphasis could be 
claimed to show a lack of legal sophistication on the part of the
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Reformers but one could argue that this is one more aspect of the 
Reformerfs contempt for empty symbolism, as litiscontestation was in 
later Roman-Civil-Canonical process and displayed a rejection of 
formalism and a leaning towards flexibility of procedure.
The principles of proof appear to have been the same as those of the 
canonical courts. Probation in particular was incumbent on the 
proponer. The methods of proof again indicate an acceptance of the 
Canonical pre-Reformation practice, with some simplification. Proof 
encompassed probation per testes, and per instrumenta. The other 
classes, per confessionem, per evidentiam facti, per indicia 
indubitata and per praesumptionem do not appear to be noticed by the 
eldership as separate and distinct types of proof. There is certainly 
no evidence of such categorisation in the extant Kirk Session 
registers. It is probable, however, that such matters were 
’understood’ by the ministers and kirk lawyers and therefore escaped 
the privilege of separate comment.
There is evidence of a variance in the practice of examination of 
witnesses. On the one hand one can state that witnesses could be 
heard in open court and in the presence of the parties This was
contrary to the canonical practice On the other hand there are
indications of the interrogation of witnesses outwith the presence of 
the parties. The examination of witnesses varied on a regional or 
even on a personal basis. In Saint Andrews the procurator John Row, 
for the pursuer examined witnesses, in Edinburgh the pursuer in the 
case of Brown -v- Wallis^  had the Kirk examine the witnesses whilst 
a similar practice was exercised in Saint Andrews in the case of 
Matison -v- Ayton^^,.
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Evidence from witnesses could be taken on c o m m i s s i o n anc* to lie in 
retentis, e.g. when witnesses were sick or when they were to depart 
furth of the realm^^ to lie ad futuram perpetuam rei memoriam^^. 
Certain classes of person were excluded from being witnesses, for 
example, the procurators in the cause. Women were however permitted 
to give e v i d e n c e a  surprisingly enlightened attitude for the 
times.
Documents could also be produced in court to aid probation. Often 
testimonials from other K i r k s c o u r t  processes from other courts, 
including pre-Reformation courts ^ g  and marriage contracts were 
produced.
Once the tryell or term of probation was complete the Kirk Session
moved to the definitive sentence. This could be announced immediately
or at a specific term ad pronounciandum^g. The decreet of the
definitive sentence was a formal act of court. It commenced with a
prayer and narrated the reasoning of the court based upon the
substantive facts as proved, the provisions of the Book of Reformation
(the First Book of Discipline) and the practicks of previous
decisions.--. This is most interesting as it shows the acceptance of 
i bu
the Kirk of the Book of Discipline in contradistinction to the secular 
authority and also displays an acceptance of precedent, though it is 
difficult to divine from the sources whether any binding precedent was 
in use.
The Commissary Courts: Jurisdiction and Procedure
The establishment of the Commissary Court represented at least, as has
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already been stated, the major secular intrusion upon the presumptive 
acquisition by the Kirk of the failed consistorial jurisdiction of the 
Officials.
The universal jurisdiction of the Commissary Court included the 
cognition of benefice matters, matrimony, divorce, illegitimacy and 
the confirmation of testaments above a certain v a l u e . The ability 
of the Court to commission inferior Commissary Courts in these 
functions has been noted.
The constitutive charter of the court provides the general framework 
within which the procedure of the court was to develop. The 
Commissaries were ordained to deliberate and decide the causes as 
required. They were to concern themselves with every aspect of an 
action and were also given the express power to consider the processes 
or sentences given by any judge or judges in consistory and dated in 
the realm no matter whatsoever time had e l a p s e d • It was on the
basis of this power that the Commissary Court was enabled to examine
records from both the Officials1 Courts and from the Kirk Session 
The other general prescriptions of the procedure will be adduced in 
the appropriate passages.
The second major guide to the procedure of the Commissary Court is 
James Balfour’s Practicks (c 15T9)15it written only some 15 years after 
the establishment of the Commissary Court. The Practicks therefore 
provide a unique, contemporary and almost complete record of the form 
of process in use in the new court.
The procedure of the Commissary Court as that of the Kirk Session is
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Roman-Civil-Canonical in origin, terminology and principle. There 
were however many differences from the Roman-Civil-Canonical process 
and from the Reformed procedure and whilst these differences are 
important of themselves the similarities are striking and just as 
important in many respects as the variations.
Like the proceedings of the Session but in contradistinction to those 
of the Official's Court the proceedings were conducted in the 
vulgar.__ tongue.
I DD
There were two methods of procedure in the Commissary Court. i. ad 
instantiam, or ii. per libellum. Proceedings ad instantiam were 
appropriate if the matter were urgent and of small or no great value, 
process per libellum being more fitting in serious causes or difficult 
matters where deeper investigation or involved proof was required. 
This distinction in the initial stages of action, stated in the 
instructions given to the Commissaries of Edinburgh of 1563 echoes 
roughly the canonical distinction of summary or ordinary actions. It 
is also interesting to note the use of the libelled summons as in the 
sessional procedure
In process ad instantium i.e. in rebus levibus et facilibus, the
process was proponed by the pursuer orally, in contradistinction to
the written libelled summons. The reply was made by the defender in a
similar fashion. The connection between the process ad instantiam and
summary causes is farther enforced when it is appreciated that all
causes of less than £40 worth were considered as such,rr7.
157
In processes by libelled summons the summons was executed by a
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Sufficient man1 before two witnesses and was returned to the Clerk of
Court duly e n d o r s e d T h e  form of libelled summons and execution is
given by Balfour 1crr,. In ad instantiam causes upon the answer of the i by
defender by ’grant, deny or exception*, a term was assigned to the 
parties to prove their cases and an act is made of their averments^gg. 
However, if the matter related to the defender*s death, another’s 
death, about ancient facts or where the nature of the matter requires 
amplification the defender could be allowed a farther term to answer 
the pursuer’s claim
In proceedings by libelled summons, i.e. grave and serious processes, 
the pursuer proponed his petition at once at the time of the
proceedings, and the judge assigned a term to the defender at once to 
answer the p e t i t i o n ^ g r a n t  denial or exception. If the defender 
was absent, the pursuer was assigned a term to prove his averments. 
It was permitted for the pursuer, at the first day of compearance to 
alter or amend his pleadings by adding to or subtracting from his 
averments, whereupon the defender could be assigned a term ad
r e s p o n d e n d u m ^ A t  the trial of the cause the Commissary used the 
process as in use before the Lords of Council and Session inclusive to 
the provision of a definitive sentence^g^.
The above prescriptions on the initial stages of the action before the 
Commissary Court in Edinburgh were given on 12 March, ^563^gg. The 
instructions were sufficiently successful as to be recommended with 
little variation to all Commissaries in 1610.^. Balfour describes 
the content of a libel in terms not dissimilar from the Canonist 
Hostensis^g^. it ”is ane petition made in writ be the persewar
contenand the namis of the judge, of the persewar and the defendar,
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the thing that is claimit, and the cause quhair foir the samin is 
claimit and askit", a formulation which compares well with "quis, 
quid, coram quo, quo jure petitur, et a quo"
We are led to understand from Balfour that the execution of the 
libelled summons is given to the defender in order that he may decide 
his subsequent course of action.
Stair too, speaking of ordinary actions speaks of libels as "larger 
summonses" which upon execution advertise the defenders to appear and 
answer thereto at the terms therein p r e s c r i b e d . The certification 
by the judge is important for Stair as the ’sting’ which gives a libel 
efficacy, as it was in canonical procedure.
The major judicial step in an action in the Canonical and Commissary 
procedure was litiscontestation. As part of the process of the Court 
of Session, litiscontestation was adopted by the Commissary Court. 
Stair stresses the Roman or Civilian origins of the concept in its
application in the Court of Session. However, the
Roman-Civil-Canonical influence in the adoption of the * judicial 
contract’ cannot be forgotten.
Balfour states that litiscontestation as "maid in ony actioun or 
cause, efter the proponing of ane peremptour exceptioun or quhen the 
summondis, or ony part thairof, or ane peremptour exceptioun or
alledgeance is admittit be the judge to the persewar’s or defendar’s
probatioun"1 .
The definition forwarded by Stair states that litiscontestation is ’a
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judicial contract, ... it is esteemed as a transaction whereby the
parties agree that the cause shall have its event according as the 
points contained in the act shall be proven or not proven* . He 
also states that litiscontestation signifies, *a taking a term to 
prove by the testimony of witnesses, writ or oath
Litiscontestation had several effects in the procedure of the Court of 
Session and therefore in the Commissary Court. Firstly only 
peremptory defences could be proponed after l i t i s c o n t e s t a t i o n t h e  
pursuer could not abandon his summons or renounce the instance 
contrary to the defenders will and pleasure and also the pursuer could 
not alter, correct or amend any substantial part of his libel
The defender could propone defences prior to litiscontestation; these 
were termed dilatory defences which according to Balfour ’’delay the 
actioun or clame to ane certaine time’ exceptions which are dilatory 
include objections to the judge and litis pendentis^,-.
Peremptory defences, on the other hand, were absolute defences which, 
’’for ever cuttis away the action” and were proponed after 
litiscontestation^^.
The cause then proceeded to the probationary term. There were 
opportunities for a contumacious defender appearing late to make 
d e f e n c e s A t  the probationary term the pursuer endeavoured to 
prove his libel and claim to be relevant, and the defender attempted 
to propone or allege any exception or defence against the libel or 
claim, which if found relevant by the judge should be proved by the 
defender^g.
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A decree of absolvitor could be granted to a defender upon a pursuer’s 
non-appearance, similarly a decree in absence could be granted to the 
pursuer upon the defender's disinterest^.
Balfour allows of probation by oath^gQ, by w r i t ^ ,  by witnesses.^ 
and by confession^- Stair admits oath, writ and witnesses^g^, but 
categorises confession along with notorious fact and presumption as
probation extraordinary^g,_.
With regard to oath there were as in the Canonical practice two oaths
in usage, the juramentum calumniae and the oath of verity. The
juramentum calumniae was in the Court of Session at least, the secular
oath of the act of 1429. o c  in the Commissary Court however, one would
1 oo
hazard that the oath was closer to its Roman-Civil-Canonical form. In 
the original charter of constitution the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
could prevent the pre-action interrogation of witnesses, they were 
also empowered to cite witnesses and require their attendance 'under 
such pecuniary pains as the judges shall think expedient'^g^. The 
judge and clerk were to be present at every examination of witnesses. 
In the advice to the Commissaries of 1610 the phrase 'excluding all 
others' follows the injuction that the clerk or judge examine the 
witnesses, this would indicate a similar procedure to that of the 
canonical court^ gg.
There were many exclusions from being a witness; one was excluded for 
example from being a witness "by any of his consanguinity or affinity 
to the party or ally within the feird degree inclusive"^g^.
Women were excluded subject of course to the well known exceptions
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falling within knowledge of motherhood, nurses and also those 
acquainted de septima manu were allowed. Adulterers also were 
excluded as being personae infamae.
With regard to instruments there were many detailed provisions, 
however in relation to matrimonial causes only one is of essential 
interest, viz, that a promise of tocher gude may be proved by witneses 
and it was not necessary to produce the contract of marriage ^ q .
The Definitive Sentence
The constitutive Charter empowered the Commissaries of Edinburgh to 
pronounce acta, decreets and sententiae. This was, as in 
Roman-Civil-Canonical procedure the final and important stage in an 
action. All dooms and sentences given by a judge were subject to the 
general prescriptions of legality of time, place, issuant judge and 
court, process^ and conformity with the libel^^* ^he decrees could 
be registered in the court books, extracted therefrom and execution 
done thereon.j
The decision of the inferior Commissaries could be appealed to the 
Commissary of Edinburgh. A reduction of the decision of the 
Commissary of Edinburgh in prima instantia or secunda instantia could 
be made by the Lords of Council and Session. Such appeals proceeded 
by libelled summons and prescribed within a year and a day from the 
date of the giving of the sentence
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CHAPTER III
The Constitution of Marriage under the Canon Law
The Sources of the Substantive Law of Husband and Wife
As in the majority of the branches of Scottish legal history and as in 
the case of the adjective Law the sources are disparate and difficult 
to pull together, they are woefully incomplete and, at best can only 
present a cross section of the law at a particular time.
For the pre Reformation era there is little problem. The sources of
the Canonist lus Novum (from Gratian to the Council of Trent) are well
known. The Decretum or Concordia discordantium canonum (c 1140), the 
Liber Extravagantium (1234), the Liber Sextus (1298), the Clementinae 
(pub 1317) and the Extravagantes communes (1294-1484) all display the 
general Canon Law of the West.
With regard to Scotland in particular there are the Synodal Statutes, 
the Liber Officialis Sancte Andree2 (which in its printed form 
provides most of the matrimonial cases heard in Scotland between 1518 
and 1558), Balfour’s Practicks^ and especially the Lectures on 
Marriage by William Hay^.
The lectures provide a complete exposition of the Canon Law relating 
to the formation of the constitution and dissolution of marriage from 
a contemporary, if at times theoretical viewpoint. Much reference 
will be made to these lectures in the ensuing pages.
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There are further sources, Morison’s Dictionary- provides some cases 
covering relations stante matrimonio but is more important as a post 
Reformation source. Notary Protocol Booksg and Rentals^ are also 
indicative of the life of the law during this period.
The post Reformation era provides more by the way of material. 
Balfour’s Practicks, Craig's Jus Feudaleg and similar works come into 
their own. Stair's Institutions^ provides a unique view of the law at 
the end of the period of Reformation. On the ecclesiastical theme are 
Kirk Session Records, Presbytery, Synod^Q and General Assembly 
Records^. The First Book of Discipline^ in some respects the Second 
Book in many respects provide interesting material.
The legislative activity in this area during the post Reformation era 
is partisan and changeable with astounding flexibility. However in 
the Commissary Court sufficient activity develops the law. There is 
also at this time a change in influencing factors. No longer do ideas 
and law emanate from Rome but the new philosophy comes from Geneva, 
NUrnberg and Holland. Writers such as Beza and Calvin had great 
influence on the Reformers and it is to these Continental influences 
that one must point for the philosophical bases for much development 
in the consistorial law of Scotland.
The Medieval Theory of Marriage
It is necessary to examine the theoretical context of marriage during 
the 16th Century as a theological concept before embarking on the 
juridical aspects which were to an extent governed by the theological 
and religious philosophy underlying the conjugal contract. This facet
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of matrimonial law may seem alien to the secular mind. It must be 
remembered that in both the pre and post Reformation eras in Scotland 
secularism was not as yet a significant factor in determining matters 
of status, duties, and rights. Indeed the juridical and legal 
relationship of the married status and its dissolubility or not were 
based upon the respective religious theories holding sway at any given 
time.
The Catholic theory of the sacramentality of marriage was dogmatically 
asserted during the Twenty fourth Session of the Council of Trent, 
celebrated on 11th November 1563.
Canon 1 states -
"If anyone states that marriage is not truly and properly one of the 
seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the 
Lord, but has been devised by men in the Church and does not confer 
grace, let him be anathema"^^.
In Catholic theology there had been assertion from the 13th century at 
least in the writings of the Fathers in conciliar declarations and in 
the interpretation of Scripture and developed theological argument 
that the institution of marriage was a sacrament, that is an 
efficacious sign of grace. It is, strictly speaking, outwith the 
scope of this work to examine in any great depth the theological 
concept of matrimonial sacramentality. However, some mention must be 
made of the matter because it is only from an understanding of the 
Catholic position in this regard that one can place in context the 
major difference between the Catholic and Protestant traditions in
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respect of marriage - namely the dissolubility of marriage and the 
counter proposition of indissolubility.
Esmein^ attributes to the principal of sacramentality of marriage two 
major consequences, 1. the concept of indissolubility, and 2. the 
exclusive competence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The latter 
has already received some examination^ the former requires some 
attention.
There is biblical reference to the concept of the matrimonial
sacrament. Paul in his letter to the Ephesians^, which is quoted in
the principium of the 24th Session of Trent^ states;
"For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother and shall 
cleave to his wife and they shall be two in one flesh.
This is a great sacrament but I speak in Christ and in the Church’’^ ,
The ’great sacrament’ is, within the Catholic interpretation of these 
verses, quite obviously the marriage between man and wife and the 
representative character of this marriage in relation to the union 
between Christ and the Church. Paul is here drawing the analogy
between the sanctification of the Church by the grace of Christ and 
the sanctification of man and wife by the grace brought in marriage.
This interpretation is pursued by Saint Augustine who links
sacramentality with indissolubility, although with at least one 
exception to the general rule.
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"Huius procul dubio sacramenti res est, ut mas et femina eonnubio 
copulati quam diu vivunt inseparabiliter perseverent, nec liceat 
excepta causa fornicationis a conjuge conjugem dirimi. Hoc enim 
custoditur in Christo et Ecclesia ut vivens cum vivente in aeternum 
nullo divortio separetur ... Ita manet inter viventes quoddam 
conjugale quod nec separatio nec cum altro copulatio passit auferre".
"Without any doubt the matter of the sacrament is, that a male and 
female are united for as long as they live and that they are not to be 
separated, and that it is not permitted, except for the cause of 
fornication for a husband to depart from his wife. For this is 
protected in Christ and the Church that spouses are to live together 
for ever, not separated by divorce. As long as they live there is 
conjugium which neither separation nor intercourse with another can 
remove"^.
The allusion to divorce for a wife’s fornication is to be understood 
in relation to certain passages in Matthew which will be discussed 
under the head of Adultery.
The other Fathers, e.g. Ambrose, Ignatius, and Innocent wrote similar 
works but only with Hincmar of Rheims in the ninth century is the 
sacrament linked to the concept of indissolubility. He developed the 
theory that marriage becomes truly indissoluble when, consummated by 
carnal copula, it represents the union of Christ and his Church.
The later theologians, Peter Lombard, and Saint Thomas Aquinas both 
follow the earlier theory of Hincmar. William Hay quotes extensively 
from Peter Lombard’s Sentences, and states -
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"Matrimony as instituted under the Law of grace is a Sacrament in this 
sense, for Matrimony is now an efficacious sign of grace for those 
properly disposed, those who do not put any obstacle in its way"2Q.
When read alongside the following passage from Peter Lombard the 
theory appears complete:
"Sacramentum vero ita inseparabiliter conjugio haervet legitimarum 
personarum ut sine illo conjugium non esse videtur quia semper manet 
inter viventes vinculum conjugale ut etiam interveniente divortio 
fornicationis causa conjugalis vinculi firmitas non solvatur".
"The sacrament indeed resides in the inseparable union of legitimate 
persons, and without the union is not to be seen, but is always where 
they live in conjugal union, and even an intervening separation for 
the cause of fornication cannot dissolve the stability of the marriage 
bond"21.
The Catholic Church therefore considered marriage to be a sacrament, 
which was instituted by God in Paradise before the Fall22. Marriage 
was regarded as excelling the other Sacraments, because of its perfect 
origins, because it is preventative of sin rather than the other 
sacraments which are remedies for sin, and also because of its 
symbolism, where the unity of Church and Christ are displayed in the 
unity of man and woman^.
The Reformed attitude to Sacramentality in Marriage
For the Reformers in Scotland marriage was "the blessed ordinance of
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God" • This conformed with Calvin1s view0_ of divine ordinance:
24 25
"The last of all is Marriage, which while all admit it to be an 
institution of God, no man ever saw it to be a sacrament until the 
time of Gregory ... It is a good and holy ordinance of God ...
For in a sacrament, the thing required is not only that it is a work 
of God but that it be an external ceremony appointed by God to confirm 
a promise. That there is nothing of the kind in marriage, even 
children can judge".
There were only two sacraments in the reformed theology of Calvin viz. 
baptism and the eucharist. It had been Luther who in 1520 in his 
"Babylonian Captivity of the Church" a treatise of theological weight 
principally designed to sway the Catholic clergy and provide the 
intellectual basis of his reforming beliefs, first presented his 
theory of the sacraments.
He reduced the seven Catholic sacraments to three, baptism, eucharist 
and penance. Later he withdrew the sacramental nature of penance and 
based his theory exclusively on the scriptural sacraments2 g • Tt was 
however the Calvinist theory which was established in Scotland by the 
Reformers; thus the First Book of Discipline reads
"To Christ Jesus his holy Gospell truely preached of necessity it is 
that his holy Sacraments be annexed and truely ministered as seales 
and visible confirmations of the spirituall promises contained in the 
work and they be only two, to wit Baptism and the Holy Supper of the 
Lord Jesus".
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This rejection of the sacramental nature of marriage did not, of 
course mean to the Reformers that marriage was not of importance to 
the Christian. It was, as has been stated, a blessed ordinance, it 
also was counted amongst the "Benefits of the Kirk’^ y  In 1564 at 
Saint Andrews an interdict was issued because it was alleged that one 
of the parties to the marriage could not ’receive any benefits of the 
Kirk’.
It is also stated in the Saint Andrews Register that as a penalty for 
crime ’al benefit of the Kirk is lost to wit mareage, baptism and 
communion’^ g. It is obvious that whilst matrimony was formally 
declared not to be a sacrament the importance spiritually as well as 
theologically was very much respected.
The importance had by no means decreased by the end of the following 
decade when the Kirk Session of Pertly ordained that those giving up 
their banns who are ignorant of the true causes of marriage were to 
compear before the reader to be instructed.
The special nature of the blessed ordinance led to great control being 
exercised by the ecclesiastical authorities in an effort both to 
emphasise the importance of the benefit and also to control the 
sometimes undesirable celebrations which were a concomitant feature of 
the social contract. Many such regulations strove to suppress the 
ever present danger of clandestine marriages and will be dealt with 
under that head. Others are less easy to understand unless it be that 
the withholding of the benefit of marriage came to be seen in the eyes 
of the ecclesiastics as a means of social control.
121
Thus the benefit could be lost for fornication with one's betrothed^ > 
for fleshing on a Sunday failing to obtain confirmation on the
er
testament of a defunct^ and f01" having 'pyperis and fidlayeris' play 
to the great dishonour of God^.
The ordinance therefore was of great importance to the Reformed 
Church. It is noticed as the 'Holy Band' in at least one Act of 
Parliament^ and was of immense spiritual value to the congregation of 
the faithful. The essential difficulty which the Reformers faced, in 
circumstances of alternating secular approbation and denigration, was 
in requiring in the words of the First Book of Discipline, 'that the 
law may be now and hereafter so established and execute that this 
ungodly impunity of sinne have no place within this Realme'. It was a 
difficulty which, as will be further illustrated, the Reformers failed 
to surmount.
The Role of Consent in Marriage
Consent was the keystone of the pre and post Reformation law of 
Marriage.
Hay defines marriage as "the outward sign in which a true consent to 
the mutual giving of the body for matrimonial acts is expressed"^.
Thus the three requirements for marriage were:-
(a) personal capacity
(b) mutual consent
(c) an 'outward sign' of consent.
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The first requirement will be discussed later. The latter two 
requirements are more entwined and their important nature demands that 
attention be now paid to them.
Mutual Consent
The doctrine of the Church had over the centuries swung between two
poles, on the one hand the supporters of the view that consent alone
was sufficient to create marriage on the other those who adhered to 
the copulatheoria.
The copulatheoria, revived in the Middle Ages by Hincmar of Rheims 
held that marriage was contracted by carnal copula, or if begun by 
consent was perfected by copula.
The concept of marriage by consent alone was based in the Roman Law 
where affectio maritalis was essential as expressed in the 
sponsiones^g, but not necessarily s°2 y  This rule had been adopted by 
the Church from the earlier times. Hay gives as his authority, St
John Chrysostom, "Matrimonium non facit coitus sed voluntas” .
Marriage is made by will not coitus.
Ambrose quoted from the Concordia of Gratian which is now fully given:
"From the moment that marriage is contracted, it truly bears the name 
marriage. It is not made by deflowering a virgin but rather the 
conjugal agreement, the marriage exists from the time of the union, 
not the time of carnal copula"
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Hay does not quote the Rescript of Nicholas I to the Bulgarians quoted 
in Esmein^g and De Smet^.
"Sufficiat secundum leges solus eorum consensus de quorum 
conjunctionibus agitur. Qui consensus si in nuptiis solus defuerit 
caetera omnia etiam cum ipso coitu, celebrata frustrantur".
"Let consent alone of those who seek to marry suffice, if it accords 
of Law. If consent alone is missing from a marriage the celebration 
is frustrated even though everything else including coitus is 
there"^.
This requirement of consent being the only one demanded of parties by 
the Church, led to the unrestricted acquisition of collateral 
formalities which will be examined later, but also allowed the 
Church1s regulations to slip easily into the barbaric practices of 
some nations in early Christendom.
As the consent-only theory was emerging in the developing Canon Law of 
Gratian’s Concordia, the opposing theory also arose. The opposing 
theory^ stated that carnal copula was an essential element of 
complete marriage. Consent alone was insufficient and only after 
carnal copula could the man and wife be considered as unitas carnis, 
one flesh, the true symbol of the unity of Christ and the Church, and 
thus establish the sacramental and thus indissoluble nature of the 
union.
Such a theory attacked the nature of marriage between Our Lady and 
Saint Joseph and as such was strongly criticised by Saint Augustine.
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The modern theory of copulatheoria emerges in the writings of 
Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims, the ninth century prelate, who headed 
the resistance of the Frankish Metropolitans against the Bishop of 
Rome^. According to Hincmar's theory marriage was contracted by 
carnal intercourse, or rather if it is begun by consent it is 
perfected by the copula. In this light the exchange of consent future 
or present is creative only of betrothal which is dissoluble, and 
marriage, is created only by the subsequent coitus which brings to the 
consent the symbolism of the sacrament and the consequent character of 
indissolubility.
The theory gained popularity in Bologna and Gratian (c 1140) supports 
it in the Concordia. In support of his conclusions in favour of the 
theory he quotes a rescript by Leo I to the Bishop of Narbonne which 
through the humanist efforts of Migne and Friedberg, the editor of 
the standard edition of the Corpus Juris Canonici, is shown actually 
to have a meaning completely the reverse of that which Gratian founded
on45 •
The intellectual attack on the theory was headed by Peter Lombard and 
the School of Paris. Peter Lombard distinguished the symbolism of 
marriage and vindicated the sacramental nature of the union. He spoke 
of corporeal and spiritual union and saw both these aspects in the 
union of Christ and the Church, he also attributed a spiritual union 
between husband and wife by exchange of consent along where there had, 
as yet, been no corporeal union.
It is in this effort to suppress the troublesome theory that one sees 
the origins of canonical desponsationes de futuro and de praesenti.
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To combat Gratian’s reasoning and to explain the circumstances where 
marriages of consent only had been dissolved Lombard attributed such 
dissolutions to desponsationes per verba de futuro but he denied 
dissolution for any cause in the case of desponsatio per verba de 
praesenti.
The argument was laid to rest by Alexander who as Roland
Bandinelli taught Canon Law and Theology at Bologna^ and who 
developed with the characteristic flair of one educated in the Sic et 
Non of Abelard, a via media.
The distinction between sponsalia per verba de futuro and desponsatio 
per verba de praesenti was admitted, as was the sacramental nature of 
marriage by consent alone without any copula. Absolute 
indissolubility was accorded only to marriage ratum et consummatum. 
Marriage ratum non consummatum was capable of being dissolved only by 
a solemn vow or papal dispensation.
It was therefore established that at the heart of the pre-Reformation 
practice, consent was the prime consideration. The consent had to be 
free not the result of force or fear^g. There are some four cases 
dealing with force and fear in the Liber Officialis Sancte Andree. 
The case of Creichtone and Hering^ in 1515-16 narrates that Elizabeth 
Creichtone widow of John Crawford of Bonytoun was abducted by force 
and violence by Edward Hering and forced to participate in sponsalia 
per verba de futuro upon which carnal copula followed. The Court held 
that the pretended sponsalia was null and invalid and celebrated 
contrary to the sacred canons. As a result of the impediment of force 
and fear, impediments listed as diriment and showing dissensus between
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the parties the Court separated the parties and divorced them (sic). 
The abductor was found liable in expenses.
The other cases will be dealt with under the head of diriment 
impediments.
Consents of others than the parties were not required under the Canon
Law. Hay however, does quote a rescript of Pope Evaristus which
indicates that permission to marry a woman should be sought from her
parents and those who have power over her, in a feudal society her
overlord, but that this is a matter of propriety only^Q . The later
law of the Catholic Church in this regard is shown by the XXIV Session
of the Council of Trento which condemns with anathema those who51
assert that marriages contracted by children without consent of the
parents are invalid. The chapter goes on to underline the Church1s
disapproval of such marriages.
The doctrine of the consent of parties as constitutive alone of
marriage was inhibited by the double edged nature of the affirmation 
of consent solo verba on the one hand, for to do anything else would 
as has been shown be theologically dangerous, and the desire to 
control, for equally obvious reasons on the other hand which led the 
church to the position of having to recognise as valid consensual 
relationships between parties whilst condemning any clandestinity 
which arose from the secrecy of the exchange of the consents.
The Council of Trent changed the law relating to clandestinity, by
rendering that circumstance a diriment impediment -
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"Those who shall attempt to contract marriage otherwise than in the 
presence of the parish priest or of another priest authorised by the 
parish priest or by the ordinary and in the presence of two or three 
witnesses the Holy Council renders absolutely incapable of thus 
contracting marriage and declares such contracts invalid and null as 
by the present decree it invalidates and annuls them"^*
In the post Reformation era there was some change of emphasis in 
relation to the question of consent as indeed there was in relation to 
the rest of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and juristic concepts.
For the Reformers the period immediately following the Reformation 
Parliament was one of consolidation. This consolidation culminated in 
the restatement of reformed ideals contained in the First Book of 
Discipline^.
In the specific regard of marriage, Cameron,-^ is correct in indicating 
that 'the authors of the Book of Discipline considered it necessary, 
as Calvin had done in his Ordinances of 1541, to set forth their 
judgements on this topic'.
It is the case that the section of the Ninth Head of the First Book of 
Discipline, "Concerning the Policie of the Kirk" represents the 
statement of the Reformers 'ideal' law for marriage in conformity with 
scripture and also in conformity with the conclusions in respect of 
marriage found by Calvin and Bucer^^.
It can be ventured that this section of head nine represents a code of 
marriage law which was approved by the "new Kirk" and used by the new
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courts, the superintendent's or Kirk Session in the decision of cases; 
The necessity of the Kirk providing a native and Reformed statement of 
marriage law indicates, one can believe that this section is of an 
earlier date rather than a later. Whilst Professor Cameron provides 
some evidence indicating an early date, he shies from dogmatism, 
considering that such legalistic details would not be forthcoming in 
such revolutionary times as Summer 1560. However the alternative 
hypothesis would leave the newly established Church Courts deciding 
either on the basis of their own intuition or on the only available 
appropriate law viz the Corpus Juris Canonici. These alternatives are 
unrealistic. On the one hand idiosyncratic matrimonial decisions, 
even in a state in uproar could not be tolerated, on the other the 
prospect would be so repulsive to the elders and ministers that it 
cannot be treated as a viable option. It should be noticed however 
that upon the establishment of the Commissary Court in 1564 it was 
this contemporary law which was exercised by the mingled 
jurisidiction.
The section shows quite clearly the Reformed attitude to consent 
between the parties
"The work of God we call when two hearts without filthinesse before 
committed are so joyned and both require and are content to live 
together in the holy band of Matrimony"
Consent appears to be paramount. The parties must be touched with the 
desire for marriage. They also must require and be content to cohabit 
in marriage. There was a prohibition attached to fornication with 
one's betrothed whereupon one lost the benefit of marriage^. There
was also, following the example of Bucer_0 and Calvin^- the
bo by
requirement of parental consent^.
In characteristically Roman legal terms children, or any one under the 
power of another requires parental counsel and assistance^. This 
requirement is clearly based upon civilian legal prescriptions, thus 
Justinian*s Institutes provide
"Dum tamen filiifamilias et consensum habeant parentum quorum in 
potestate sunt".
Provided that in the case of those who are dependent, they have the 
consent of the parent in whose power they lie^*
If however the parent was unreasonably withholding his consent the 
child could declare his intention to the minister or the civil 
magistrate. Under the Book of Discipline, the minister or magistrate 
was empowered to investigate the matter and if the parent did not 
comply they could "enter the place of parents and be consenting their 
just requests may admit them to marriage.
Parental consent or the lack of it features in ecclesiastical cases 
from the Reformation till the mid seventeeth century. It appears to 
be a purely ecclesiastical prescription. In the early case of Russell 
v. Kynnmouth^  lack of parental consent was seen as an indicium of 
clandestinity. The First Book of Discipline was referred to in the 
case of Ramsay v Smithy  where a father was questioned as to his 
consent to the son’s marriage. The son was advised to attempt to 
obtain his father’s consent or to use the liberty of the Kirk in
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obtaining eccesiastical or magisterial saotion. In the later case of
Walker v Stewart^, parental consent was required and was given ----------------- b5
retrospective effect following upon a clandestine exchange of consents 
with carnal copula. In the end the father would neither assent nor 
refuse the sons marriage on the grounds that his son was a spendthrift 
and disobedient prodigal.
The attitude of the Kirk seems to have been variable, ranging from 
continuations of cases in order to obtain consent as in Walker v 
Stewart, through satisfaction in penance being done^g, for proceeding 
without consent to nullity upon refusal^ to grant consent as in the 
late case (1605) of James Watson before the Kirk Session of Aberdeen^ 
where due to the child’s minority and apprenticeship he was found to 
be incapable of marrying without consent.
Stair however looks upon the requirement as a merely impedient 
impediment not a cause of the nullity of the contract. He statesgg 
"though by human constitution such marriages may be disallowed, and 
the issue repute as unlawful; but the marriage cannot be annulled". 
He quotes two passages from the Digest^ which suggest nullity as the 
pain for failure to obtain parental consent, this he discounts, "which 
human constitutions cannot reach".
However it must be recalled, that particularly amongst the propertied 
classes, lack of parental consent would leave a party unable to bring 
dos, donatio ante nuptias, dower or morning gift to the church door on 
the wedding day. Here in truth is parental consent an essential 
element for often such matters would be the cause of love between the 
parties, and their absence would prompt some mental reservation to say
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the least on the part of a prospective son in law or daughter in law.
The Constitution of Marriage:- the Form of Consent
Having discussed consent as the basis for marriage it is necessary to 
turn to the ways in which this consent was expressed. In the period 
before the Reformation there were three recognised ways in which 
consent between parties was expressed. By -
1. Matrimonium Initiatum, known variously as, sponsalia per verba
de futuro, betrothal, handfasting or affiancement^Q.
2. Matrimonium per verba de praesenti, ratum sed non consummatum.
3. Matrimonium per verba de praesenti ratum et consummatum.
Matrimonium Initiatum - Betrothal prior to the Reformation
Hay describes Matrimonium Initiatum as the "contract (of marriage) is 
made by words referring to the future, and means the same as 
betrothal",^.
Betrothal normally preceded marriage, it was a sponsio or promise of 
future marriage by exchange of present consents:
Sponsalia que futurarum sunt nuptiarum promissio,^*
It was in truth a contract and promise between parties, however it was 
not an indissoluble union nor strictly speaking a part of marriage nor
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a necessary antecedent thereto. This however does not mean that the 
institution was unimportant, it was an incomplete marriage and could 
form with copula a marriage by presumption of law.
As in marriage by exchange of present consents, matrimonium initiatum 
whether termed de futuro, handfasting or betrothal depended on the 
valid exchange of consents to future marriage by both parties, or as 
will be shown by their guardians.
The betrothal ceremony at which parties made their sponsalia per verba 
de futuro was variously described as simple betrothal, plighting one’s 
troth or handfasting.
Simple betrothal consisted of only a promise of future marriage, 
plighting one’s troth required the exchange of pledges, hankering back 
to the origin of Germanic beweddung^^* handfasting was simply 
betrothal where both parties having concluded the contract of future 
marriage clasped hands, as Anton points out ’’the ceremony of joining 
hands became so closely associated with betrothals in Medieval times 
that in Scotland ... the ordinary term for a betrothal was a 
handfasting”.
The essential of the betrothal ceremony was the contracting between 
the parties of a binding obligation to marry one another within a 
certain period of time^^ or with ’all reasonable haste’^ p-.
Failure to implement the contract wilfully was a mortal sin according 
to Hay76, quoting Acquinas, Hostiensis,^ and other noted Canonists.
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Betrothal in Canon Law like later Roman Law^g required no prescribed 
words in contradistinction to earlier civilian sponsiones forming 
sponsalia7 .(y
Antong0 describes a sponsal ceremony of July 1556 between Robert 
Lawder and Jane Hepburn where the following formula was used, "I, 
Robert Lawder tak thow Jane Hepburn to my spousit wyf as the Law of 
the Holy Kirk schaowis and thereto I plycht thow my trewth, and syklyk 
I the said Jane Hepburn takis you Robert Lawder to my spousit husband 
as the Law of the Holy Kirk schaowis and thereto I plycht to thow my 
trewth". The ceremony was completed by handfasting.
The sponsalia of David Boswale of Auchynflak and Janet Hamilton^ in 
1531 narrates that "the sponsus and sponsa" appeared before the Priest 
Dom Henry Louk, curate of Linlithgow and several eminent witnesses 
including the Earl of Arran, James Hamilton Sheriff of Linlithgow, and 
the Sheriff Clerk. David was asked by Father Louk if he resolved to 
take Janet as wife and to complete marriage with her in the form of 
the Church. He replied that he was ready to take her as wife pro 
perpetuo. She replied in a similar fashion whereupon the curate 
joined both their hands and betrothed them. The promise was enforced 
by an oath, which emphasised its contractual nature.
There is also the elucidating case of Johnstone v Elder before the 
Official of Saint Andrews in 1522g2 . In this case a validly 
solemnised marriage contracted in church and followed by copula was 
held to be null and invalid because of a prior sponsalia, described as 
’de futuro quam de presenti’, as much of the future as of the present 
contracted between the pursuer and Margaret Abirnethy in the following
13^
words:
"I promytt to zow Begis Abirnethy that I sail mary zow and that I sail 
nevere haiff ane uther wiff and thereto I giff zow my fayth”.
Margaret replied in similar terms whereupon copula followed and the 
parties cohabited in one , house at bed and board. Obviously the 
parties could exchange the sponsalia in the vulgar and any words 
expressive of the intention were sufficient.
Hay discusses this particular question and a formula which seems to 
cover all objectives is, ”1 shall not marry anyone but only you”gg.
The consent could be exchanged by the parties or by their guardians as 
shown in the case of Sir Alexander Olifant v Catherine Lesley^  (1550) 
where the marriage contract had been entered into between Lord George 
of Rothes and John Olifant de Kelly to the effect that when Alexander 
Olifant, then a pupil reached puberty he would contract marriage with 
the legitimate daughter of Lord Rothes and Margaret Chreichton, and 
have the marriage solemnised. Hay accepts the possibility of parental 
arrangements. It is difficult to imagine the Church opposing such 
practices in a feudal society, and imports mortal sin to those parents 
who break faith in the marriage contractg^ without good reason.
The distinguishing feature of plighting one’s troth was the traditio 
of arra sponsalica. This is found in the late Roman Lawgg though 
arra, a form of surety of future performance in emptio venditio is 
found as evidence of the conclusion of the contract in Gaiusgy and in 
unwritten contracts of sale in Justinianic lawftft. Following the
hiatus of unenforceability in the Classical law under Justinian 
betrothal attained once again legal recognition and provision was made 
for the twofold forfeit in the event of breach of promisegg'.
The gift of a ring given in respect of arrhis sibi sponsam sponsio per 
dignitatem fidei is found in Gratianfs Concordia^. There is mention 
of an "annulum aureum sponsalitium ... de tribus libris monete Scotie" 
given at the Church door in lieu of dowry, in the case of Agnes 
Anstruther v David Howieson (1542), this case also makes mention of
y i
1morning gift1.
Where the betrothal was unjustifiably broken, or where an impediment 
to betrothal or the subsequent marriage was found the arra was 
restorable at the instance of the judge hearing the case. Thus in the 
case of Halyday v Makesone^ (1534) before John Weddell, a licentiate 
of both Laws, Official of Lothian and Rector of Flisk^ and Thomas 
Melville, Commissary and Rector of Miltoune^ it was ordered that, 
where sponsalia per verba de futuro followed upon a valid matrimonium 
per verba de presenti, and was consequently null, "quicquid alier 
alieri dederit propter pretensa sponsalia dotis aut donationis causa 
fore”, that which the one gave to the other by way of dowry or gift on 
account of the pretended sponsalia is to be restituted. A similar 
order is found in the case of Buchanan v Knollis (1520) although the 
ground of reduction in that case was affinity due to the sponsalia 
being perfected by carnal copula.
Often the marriage contract entered into between parties or parties 
and their parents, provided amongst its stipulations some express 
statement as to liability in the event of non implement.
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One such case is that of John Quhitt v John Pitcairn of Drimgy^ 
(15U3) which appears to be the subject of an entry in the Protocol 
Book of Sir Alexander Gaw^g.
There appears to be much discrepancy between these accounts of the one 
contract^, but what is important to notice is the enduring principle 
of in effect damages for breach of contract.
In August 1541 John Pitcairn of Drimgy had Sir Alexander Gaw, Notary 
Public execute a minute to the effect that if one of his sons does not 
marry Mirabel Quhitt, daughter of John Quhitt of Lumboyne he or his 
sons will pay the sum of £40 to the said John. The £40 was declared 
to cover the skaiths and expenses of the contract. Subsequently in 
1543 John Pitcairn is cited before Martin Balfour^g to answer for his 
non implement of the contract, which is narrated in the sententia in 
the following terms
"That Henre Pitcairn sone to the said John sail marye and haiff to 
wiff Mirabill Quhitt dochter to the said John Quhitt and the said 
mareage to be completit sasone as beis seyn expedient be the said 
Johnne Pitcairne and his frendis and the saidis Maister Henie Quhitte 
and Johnne Quhitt and thair freindis to the parte falzeand to utherise 
suay that the mareagecum nocht to effect sail pay to the parte 
observand the sowme of one hundredth pundis usuale money of Scotland 
... etc" .
The contract was annulled and Johnne Quhitte underwent the supreme 
ecclesiastical sanction: excommunication^, and in addition to the
penalty of £100 imposed by the contract John was ordered to pay the
expenses of action as taxed at the decision of the court.
Obviously the penalties for non-compliance with a marriage contract, 
or for unreasonable or unjustfied repudiation could be severe, and in 
the case of Quhitt one sees a tendancy for penalties to be punitive 
rather than restitutive. In later law as Balfour^Q shows the 
character of arra and the restitution thereof and additional penalty 
payments take on more of the colour of damages for non implement. In 
the title on Marriage chapter III Balfour discusses the restitution 
of arra and "the pane of ane certaine sume of money" where a party, 
bound to complete the band of matrimony fails. Under the scheme shown 
by Balfour the party in breach of the obligations arising from the 
contract of marriage is to pay "the pane" to the King's Highness and 
to the other innocent party, "for the cost, skaith, damage and 
interest" sustained by virtue of the default. Apparently the 
defaulting party may also do any "uther gude deed" in name of pain, 
almost by way of penance^ 2 *
Balfour further advises that any part of tocher given before the 
marriage should be returned to the innocent party in the event of 
default. He does not, interestingly enough, state whether an innocent 
party may retain gifts given in anticipation of marriage although the 
buyer's right of retention of earnest given in sale was recognised-j.
Witnesses were advised by the Church to be present at the contracting 
of betrothals, as part of the general drive against clandestinity. 
Whilst their presence was required their absence did not nullify 
betrothal. They were purely evidential, as the early Constitutions of 
Bishop David (1242) show10i|* Such injunctions and local legislations
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were quite ineffective as is shown by their frequent re-enactment, for 
example the fourteenth century synodal statutes of Saint Andrews 
prescribe that ’’Espousal be not contracted without the presence of a 
priest and witnesses” . Banns and solemnisation were to follow the 
sponsalia ’as quickly as is conveniently possible’ . This local 
legislation is reinforced once again in the sixteenth century by yet 
further provision against clandestine marriage.
Promises of betrothal, handfastings or matrimonia initiata were 
enforceable in the Courts Christian. This was not seen in the 
canonists’ eyes to be contrary to consent being the basis of marriage 
as the Church would merely be insisting upon the implementation of a 
promise freely made-jQg.
Balfour supports this view, upon pre-Reformation authorities, and 
states ”gif ather of the parteis refusis or delayis the completying of 
the marriage he may be callit before the Judge Ordinar and chargit to 
solemnizat the said matrimonie within ane certane day’’.jQy He also 
narrates the penalties for non-implementation as the payment of a 
fine, to the King^g and the same amount as ’interesse conventum to
the partie quha is willing and reddie to obey and fulfill the said
contract and appointment for his part”.
The ways in which the contract could be broken off without sin or
incurring an order from the ecclesiastical forum to solemnise were 
where the parties agreed to bring the betrothal to an end or where a 
lawful impediment arose.
The contract of betrothal could be dissolved by the common consent of
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the parties, provided no copula had occurred between the parties 
metamorphosing the handfasting into matrimonium ratum et consummatum. 
Hay recognises this ground of dissolution, and observes that it is 
permitted only in betrothal, the human bond rather than matrimony, the 
divine bond^g. This is in general accord with the Liber Extra -
’’Sponsalia de futuro dissolvuntur si sponsi se dissolvuntur etiamsi 
fuerint iurata”
Sponsalia de futuro are dissolved if the parties dissolve them 
themselves even if they are sworn on them”^Q.
There are two recorded instances of such dissolutions.
The earliest, occurring in 1549, is recorded in the Protocol Book of 
Sir John Cristisone.j ^  where Duncan Davidson and Elizabeth Malcum 
appear before the Dean of Garioch with compurgators who on oath swear 
that no carnal intercourse had occurred between the parties thus 
certifying that this was the temporary contract of betrothal or 
affiancement and not the perpetual vinculum of marriage. The parties 
then exonerate one another of the contract and state that neither wish 
to complete the bond.
The later case (1555) is a discharge of a bond of handfasting by the 
female party alone, whereby Isabel Hamilton states that, of her own 
free will she renounces the bond with William Campbell
The lawful impediments which permitted the reduction of the sponsalia 
without sin were (1) fornication, (2) desertion, (3) expiry of time
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limit, (4) reception of sacred orders, (5) entry into religion, (6 ) 
serious illness or deformity subsequent to the sponsalia, (7 ) 
subsequent affinity, and (8 ) nonage.
Those impediments which allowed dissolution of the previous sponsalia 
but not without committing sin were, (1 ) subsequent marriage 
contracted per verba de presenti, (2 ) subsequent betrothal followed by 
carnal copula and (3 ) subsequent betrothal with a relative of the 
other p arty^.
1. Fornication This impediment had two aspects, physical and 
spiritual. Physical fornication which could engender fear of 
repetition in married life is obviously a breach of faith. 
However, spiritual fornication, i.e. heresy, is not so much a 
breach of faith with the other party but an offence against God 
and by implication against the C h u r c h I n  essence, therefore, 
as Hay^,. shows, the underlying concept behind this impediment is 
an ’ante1 marital offence as distinct from the post reformation 
concept of marital offence.
2. Desertion This formed a valid impediment to betrothal if one of
the parties stayed furth of the realm for a period of two
years..-. One could seek lawful dissolution on the basis of the 
lib
party's absence even if the period of desertion had not yet 
reached two years, but this was a matter at the discretion of the 
ecclesiastical judge. The Concordia does not mention any period 
of time but merely states the fact of desertion
"ex urbe egrediens trans marina petit".
141
"He travels out of the city, across the sea"^^
Expiry of Time Limit Time limits for completion of marriage were 
very often set in marriage contracts. As already shown these 
could be specific^ g or detail no particular date or event 
whatsoever. The time limit could resolve on a date«jy or a 
saint’s d a y y Q or within a period of a year and a d a y ^ ,  but, 
notwithstanding Hay’s opinion y 2 it could devolve upon a party’s 
idea of 'all gudely haist’ or ’alb sone as the lauch of Halykyrk 
showis without ony obstakyll or dolaye’’yg.
The parties had the duty of organising the wedding by the date 
concerned and failure to complete the band involved the party, 
whose obligation it was to organise the celebration, in sin, for 
breaking his word, for which he ought to undergo penance.
Reception of Sacred Orders This also constituted an impediment 
to betrothal. If a man entered Holy Orders the betrothal was 
annulled ipso jure, without the necessity of any declaratory^. 
The wider topic of clerical celibacy will be dealt with infra.
Entry into Religion In spirit similar to that expressed in the 
foregoing impediment of the reception of holy orders, as celibacy 
was seen as a more perfect state, the entry into religious life 
broke, again ipso jure the temporal bondy^.
Serious illness or subsequent Deformity The illness or deformity 
had to be of such a nature that the healthy party could not 
reasonably be expected to cohabit in marriage with the sick
partyyg. This provided a catchall clause which permitted the 
reduction of the sponsalia for several reasons. The truly 
dangerous diseases were for the medieval mind of course, madness, 
plague, bewitchment and leprosy. With some logical foresight Hay 
includes cruelty and illtreatment amongst such illnessesy^. 
This rationale for dissolving betrothal in Canon law is noticed 
by Stairyg.
Subsequent Affinity The seventh impediment to betrothal occurred 
by carnal copula being committed between a party to the betrothal 
and a relative of the other party. The problem of relationship 
which will be discussed in connection with the impediments to 
matrimonium consummatum et ratum. It could annul betrothal and 
could be proved by hearsay evidencey^.
Nonage If parties to the sponsalia were below the age of seven, 
the betrothal was annulledyg. However this rule could be 
circumvented by the tutor or parent making the contract on behalf 
of the impubes. This was often done as the proprietorial matters 
contained in any contract would in many instances be of greater 
importance to the clan or family than the individual match. Thus 
the Liber Extra provides y-j
"Pater pro filio impubere sponsalia contrahit"
"The father contracts sponsalia for his underage son".
It was obviously this provision upon which John Olifant was 
relying when he made the contract with Lord George of Rothes for
the marriage of Alexander Olifant.^.
Provided arnal copula had not occurred between the parties the 
parties could call off the betrothal, petition for dissolution 
and contract a new contract upon reaching puberty.
The method of constituting marriage by a sponsalia per verba de futuro 
followed by carnal copula was clandestine i.e. not being solemnly 
celebrated in church following upon Banns. The point at which the 
sponsalia changed to matrimonium perfecta was in lecto. Thus whilst 
frowned upon by the Church and inductive of sin sponsalia followed by 
copula was a valid and true marriage. Clandestinity and the effects 
thereof will be discussed further, but what is important to note is 
that by the Twenty-fourth Session of the Council of Trent (11 Nov, 
1 5 6 3 ) marriages not celebrated in accordance with the prescriptions of 
the Session were null and invalid. This of course included sponsalia 
per verba de futuro, matrimonium initiatum or whatever term one cares 
to use and effectively closed to Catholic Europe or at least to those 
parts of the Continent where the Decree was promulgated.
The Council of Trent, however, did not affect the law affecting 
betrothal in Scotland. By the time that the Twenty-fourth Session*s 
decreets and canons were promulgated Scotland had been divorced from 
the Roman tradition for some three years. Therefore, the Reformed 
church in Scotland became the inheritor of a theory of the 
constitution of marriage which in the respect of betrothal as in other 
matters still to be examined, was fraught with legal and theological 
difficulties and of which as soon as was practicably possible the 
Roman tradition divested itself. It may well be that the Session of
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the Council of Trent in its decision to invalidate clandestine 
marriages, an aim which the Reformers also strove though never 
achieved, forced the Reformers to retain sponsalia per verba de futuro 
as a means of constituting marriage from political reasons and against 
the Reformers1 better judgement.
Betrothal subsequent to the Reformation
The Reformers recognised that before marriage young men and women 
whose hearts were "touched with the desire of m a r r i a g e " s h o u l d  take 
the advice of their parents or tutors or curators. The provision for 
the eldership to fulfil this function has already been examined 
However whilst the First Book of Discipline provides the basic code of 
Reformed matrimonial Law it makes no mention of betrothal, sponsalia 
per verba de futuro, or handfasting. This may appear strange as this 
area of Canon law was most productive of clandestine marriage and 
fornication, both faults of which the Kirk was very aware and very 
anxious to stamp out, in an effort to create "the flock of Christ 
Jesus".
Efforts were made to control the making of contracts of marriage from 
the earliest days of the Reformed order. In Saint Andrews ’all Banns 
of those who contracted or have made marriage* were to be received by 
the scribe to the Session^ 5 * April 1560, the Session dealt with 
the case of Tweedale v Ramsay, ^  where Catherine Tweedale alleged that 
she gave her body to Walter Ramsay on the faith of his promise, "in 
the presence of God ... that he suld fulfill the bond of marriage in 
faice of the congregation of Holy Kirk ... by giving me his right 
hand". Walter was ordained to complete the marriage.
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Another case Millar v Adie^^,, the sententia of which is lost, 
consisted of a claim of impediment of ligamen (previous marriage) 
preventing a handfasting which had not yet been solemnised although 
the Banns had been called, from being completed. The General Assembly 
also saw the danger of slander to the Church at an early date and in 
1 5 6 0 ordained that in order to avoid fornication there should be 
public repentance for those who copulate between the promise of 
marriage and the solemnisation of marriage
The problem of parties contracting to marry and failing to solemnise 
the ’Holy bond’ grew to intolerable levels in the years immediately 
subsequent to the Reformation. Thus Aberdeen Kirk Session in 1562 
issued a decreet narrating that ’’many are handfast and made promise of
marriage as they call it a long space bygone, seven or six years syne
and as yet will nocht mary and compleit that honorabil bond nather for 
fear of God nor lyff of party” and ordered all such parties to 
complete the bond. Doubtless some of the parties to whom this decreet 
refers entered their handfastings in 1555 or at other times before the 
Reformation and thus whilst some marriages would form sponsalia per 
verba de futuro subsequente copula and therefore be valid if unlawful 
marriages at Canon law the Reformed Church could hardly be seen to be 
condoning even if by silence a situation which according to Reformed 
opinion represented "manifest fornication and whoredom"
If however the copula followed upon a promise of marriage the Kirk
would be obliged to accept the union as valid although sinful. Thus
in the case of Budge v. Jak a promise which had been followed by 
intercourse was sued upon, and an interdict obtained which prohibited 
the defender from marrying until it was decerned that he was free to
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marry140.
On other occasions if a promise had been made upon which the parties 
had set up home and cohabited as man and wife, the Kirk Session 
ordained satisfaction for fornication and ordinary banns to be read, 
thus ignoring any matrimonial quality in the promise and copula,^. 
The presence or absence of witnesses to the promise would apparently 
swing the balance and thus in 1563 the General Assembly issued an Act 
regarding this problem. The act provided that no contract of marriage 
alleged to be made secretly and followed by carnal copula, would be 
upheld until the parties had undergone punishment as breakers of good 
order and slanderers of the Kirk. Furthermore the promise would only 
be considered as marriage if either there were 1 famous and 
unsuspected1 witnesses or a confession from the parties. Failure of 
witnesses or confession caused the parties to be condemned as 
fornicators^212• This ambivalent attitude of the Church made for a 
confusing and bewildering state of affairs for couples intending 
marriage.
Gradually the pattern of consistently striving to solemn celebration
as the only acceptable method of marriage appears. Several decisions
on the point of promise followed by copula decern solemnisation as the
decision of the Session. Thus in the cases of Mokcills and Angus
(1 5 6 4 ) ^ 2  Lokaird v Tholland (1565) ^ 214 at Saint Andrews and Brown v.
Wallis (1565)„llP- at the Cannongait, solemnisation is sought as the 
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conclusion though in Edinburgh the pursuer was advised to seek her 
decision from "the competent judges" (the Commissary Court)
Such decisions were enforced by appropriate ecclesiastical legislation
both local and general. An example of local legislation is given by 
an act of the Kirk Session of Aberdeen, where in 1568 it was ordained 
that neither minister or reader be present at contracts of marriage 
making "as thai call thair handfastnis"^^.
The General Assembly provided the general legislation and recommended 
admonition or a decree from the competent judge ordering solemnisation 
for those who do not adhere to their promise, the pain for non 
compliance being excommunication^g.
In 1570 a method of ensuring completion of a promise was found and
given approval by the General Assembly. The act declared that only
promises of marriage per verba de futuro could be made in church
before solemnisation; the celebrant is advised to take caution for
performance which was of course forfeit upon non p e r f o r m a n c e . This
idea had been used in the Kirk of the Canongait in 1564 where one
Alexander Spot was required to find surety for his performance of
promise of marriage it is also found in Saint Andrews in 1576 ^ 5 -j,
and at Stirling in 1586 where the caution (£20) was lodged with the
local Commissary Court at Stirling „ .
1 z>d
In 1575, the Assembly was asked the following question, "Should the
Contract of Marriage formerly made before the proclamation of banns be
made by present words for example, I take thee to be my wife and I
take thee to be my husband or should there be no contract or promise
made before the solemnisation of the Marriage". The reply made, that
the parties should come before the local assembly and give in their
names in order that their banns made be read, and "no farther
(cermonies usit) should be here"...-.-, clarified the issue to some
i D D
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extent.
Local legislation of a similar kind was promulgated at Saint 
Andrews,^.
To say however, as Smout does, that "no ceremony was used to mark a
betrothal and that the notion of a "handfast" marriage passes into the
twilight of fokelore" is not entirely a c c u r a t e F o r  example, in
1577 a protocol is recorded noting that Thomas Glennay has bound
himself to handfast and marry Janet Ryle in face of Holykirk^g.
Again, in 1578 Henry Scot alias Kylman makes, before the seat "promise
of marriage to Agnes Messen by deliverance of his hand to Agnes and to
solemnise ... in a year and a day or sooner when required11 . Anton
notices at least one later usage^g. In any case people still made
promises of future marriage irrespective of whatever name by which
these promises were called and no matter what attendant ceremonies
were performed 1irn.
i by
That the practice of promising of future marriage continued is certain 
and that it opened the route for ’sinful abusis' is just as sure in 
the seventeenth century as in the sixteenth. Thus in 1622 the Kirk 
Session of Stirling issued an act reiterating the sixteenth century 
acts of the General Assembly that the parties who wish banns read 
consign £ 1 0 ad pios usos upon failure to complete the marriage in 40 
days<jgQ. There are also instances of actions for breach of promise, 
for example in Dingwall in 1663 the Presbytery requested investigation 
of such a mat t e r ^  #
The attitude of the Kirk then was substantially that of the pre
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Reformation Churoh. Sponsalia were to be tolerated as consents per 
verba de futuro. It was upon these consents de futuro having 
pretensions to marriage that the prospect of sin, scandal and 
clandestinity arose. The efforts of the Kirk were not to outlaw 
betrothals or espousals or handfastings. They were directed only at 
extending the control of the Kirk by requiring a solemn act in church 
expressing present consent.
It is upon this concept of present consent that the law of marriage 
turns and the Reformers could not reconcile it to mean only a de 
presenti declaration but were forced from historical reasons based, to 
a certain extent on flawed rationale to see in the copula, or in 
cohabitation the very essence of the consent or at least of a presumed 
consent. Consensus, non concubitus was just as much a criterion of 
the Reformers as it was of the Catholic legal theologians. The 
concubitus however led to a presumption of consent. Therefore, Stair, 
writing from an advanced stage of juristic development can state:
"So that the matter (marriage) itself consists not in the promise, but 
in the present consent, whereby they accept each other as husband and 
wife, whether that be by words expressly or tacitly by marital 
cohabitation ... or by natural commixtion ... espousals preceding ... 
is presumed a conjugal consent de presenti"
This is the only explanation for the attitude of the Church, for only 
in such circumstances i.e. admission of promise and copula as a valid 
if clandestine marriage could it prefer a marriage by promissio per 
verba de futuro subsequente copula to a prospective solemn marriage 
per verba de praesenti^^*
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Betrothal could be reduced, as in the Canon law upon incurring an 
impediment or upon agreement provided there was no copula had occurred 
between the parties The breaking of a marriage contract without
agreement or impediment could have unpleasant consequences. The 
ultimate sanction of excommunication was seldom used but did exist. 
More often the penalty was commuted to caution and the undergoing of 
discipline^,., "for slandering the Kirk". The impediments of the 
Canon law, reception of Holy Orders, entry into religion and 
subsequent affinity failed to be accepted by the Reformers because 
they represented the rules of a misguided ecclesiastical ruler, and 
because according to the Reformed opinion there was a lack of 
spiritual justification for such prescriptions.
A prior formal marriage prevented b e t r o t h a l a s  did a prior promise 
followed by c o p u l a F o r n i c a t i o n  unless purged by satisfaction or 
penance before the Kirk impeded marriage^g. Nonage operated as an 
impediment to marriage itself and there is no reason to hold that 
Stair in accepting dissensus by reason of impuberty does not represent 
the Reformed position.^. Indeed all forms of dissensus, vis, metus 
and insanity could be applied to betrothal as equally to marriage de 
praesenti due to the underlying rule that parties be habiles 
matrimonii
A question not authoritatively dealt with was whether error impeded 
betrothal. In the Saint Andrews case of Lokaird v Tholland (1565)^^, 
the defender claims that she should not be obliged to complete the 
contract with him because she had subsequently discovered him to be "a 
thief, and unclean in his body". So far as this objection constituted 
an error of condition the minister held it did not impede the
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marriage, however the Kirk felt that the error ran deeper and upheld
the objection and did not order banns.
Matrimonium Ratum and Matrimonium Ratum et Consummatum
Valid Marriage in the Pre Reformation Period
It has already been noticed that whilst many marriages were de facto . 
preceded by betrothal and indeed whilst this was as Hay^^ states, a 
normal practice, betrothal was by no means universal and was never a 
requirement of a valid marriage.
Valid marriage is described by Hay^^ as ’true marriage by words 
referring to the present which can exist without subsequent copula*. 
This is the matrimonium ratum which has already been described as part 
of the explanation of copulatheoria^^• The essential element here, 
as throughout the canonical theory of marriage, is lawful consent, 
thus, Hay can state, "Consent is sufficient for marriage which is 
expressed by verba de presenti and is not invalidated by any law"
Matrimonium ratum et consummatum represented the extreme Bolognist 
theory of copulatheoria whereby consent of itself was insufficient for 
marriage and required to be 'perfected* by carnal copula. Hay with 
the deftness of a theological lawyer admits to a certain extent that 
matrimonium ratum was developed to accommodate the marriage of the 
Blessed Virgin and Saint Joseph within the canonical theory of 
marriage, and whilst being careful not to proffer any criticism of the 
theory he appears to be at pains to dispel any heretical doubts which 
his pupils may acquire as the validity of the sacred union, by 
explaining some embarrassing statements of Augustine, who, it must be 
remembered, was writing some time before the via media of Alexander
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Ill relieved the uncertainty on this matter.
The consent whereby valid marriage was created should be as the 
meaning would betray, ’per verba de praesenti1 by words of the present 
tense, which Peter Lombard termed as the expression of the effective 
cause of marriage -
"Efficiens causa matrimonii est consensus, non quilibet sed per verba 
expressa, nec de futuro sed de presenti”
’’The efficient cause of marriage is consent, only through express 
words in present tense not the future" which so far as the forum 
externum is concerned creates a valid and binding marriage. 
Difficulties could possibly arise if persons consented for other 
motives, e.g. for the satisfaction of lust or as a result of force and 
fear. In such instances the question of proof is of a matter lying 
within the forum internum and only upon clear proof could the Church 
absolve a party from his sin, but his marriage would not be 
dissolved:- the only basis of dissolution a vinculo being the 
existence of a lawful impediment.
The expression of consent in words such as "I take you as my wife" and 
a similar reply amount to a consent as Hay puts it to "the conjugal 
acts, to the mutual giving of their bodies" .j ^ . In this a 
sociological view of marriage as providing controlled generation, a 
remedy for concupiscence and a vehicle for the education and 
upbringing of children is quite clear.
The consents could be exchanged by proxy if the parties were absent,
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the conditions of valid proxy being a special mandate subsisting at 
the time of contract. The matter of proxy consents, whilst based on 
the application of civilian principles of agency in consensual 
contracts, was approved in the Decretal of Innocent III "mediantibus 
internunciis" and by way of a nuncius^g. Later canonists were to 
insist upon formal procuratory.
The consents could also be subject to conditions. Hay deals to some 
extent with the matter of conditional consents, commenting to some 
extent on the Decretal 'De conditionibus adpositis in desponsationibus 
et in alis contractibus"^g. The element of civilian consensual 
contract in this area of Canon law is most marked. There were many 
conditions which were of no effect or so struck at the concept of 
Christian marriage that they rendered the consents null. Conditions 
could only relate to suspensive future events, neither certain nor 
necessary^gg.
In this respect canonical conditions are close in nature to modern 
conditions precedent and although there is some evidence of a 
misappreciation of the civilian distinction between condicio and dies 
i n c e r t u s ^ ^  the overwhelming impression given by Hay is that 
condicio in the strict Roman sense is the forerunner of the canonical 
condicio^g2« Many rules, of course, were introduced to take account 
of the particular canons applicable to marriage and betrothal. Thus 
the effect of carnal copula or consents de praesenti nullifying a 
condition^g^ are of canonical invention, as is also the requirement 
that a condition should not strike at the primary uses of marriage as 
sketched above^gi^. Rules of the inadmissibility and ineffective 
nature of illegal, immoral or impossible conditions are well known.
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In order that the condition be fulfilled the circumstances at the time 
of making the condition must still obtain, thus, one party could not 
found upon a conditional consent, if by the time the condition was 
purified the other party had concluded another unconditional marriage 
with a third party.
One exception existed to the prima facie rule of illegality of a 
condition striking at the essence of marriage namely the Josephesehe, 
or Joseph’s Marriage i.e. mutual consent subject to a mutual vow of 
chastity. The matrimonium was ratum but incapable of becoming 
consummatum by virtue of the vow of chastity^.
It is important to observe the proximity of the relationship between 
conditional marriage and betrothal, indeed some marriages initiata 
could be described as merely conditional upon the passage of the time 
stated in the marriage contract. Even more startling is the 
possibility of presumption of marriage de jure arising upon carnal 
copula occurring between the parties consenting per verba de futuro 
and those consenting per verba de praesenti sub conditione^gg*
The effect of consent is to produce that vision of Christian marriage 
drawn by Hay^^, quoting Peter Lombard^gg, viz:-
"Matrimonium est viri et mulieris maritalis conjunctio inter legitimas 
personas individuam vite consuetudinem retinens”.
’’Marriage is the marital union of man and woman, both lawfully 
capable, entailing their living together permanently”.
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This statement describes the primary requirements of a valid canonical 
marriage. The parties must be male and female, with full legal 
capacity. They must also consent to the indissoluble contract of 
marriage.
The capacity of parties to contract marriage is a corollary of the 
essential nature of consent in Canon Law marriage. The debilitating 
factors and circumstances which rendered this consensus nugatory are 
termed impediments. These impediments were subdivided into impedient 
or prohibitive impediments and diriment impediments. Of these more 
will be said. It suffices to state that impedient impediments 
rendered the marriage unlawful but maintained its validity, whereas 
diriment impediments, when incurred brought nullity to any union.
The history of the development of impediments is not entirely clear. 
Certainly those stated by Hay either as impedient or prohibitive were 
not always considered as such. Esmein^g^ links the development of the 
theory of impediments to the development of marriage as a sacrament. 
As the concept of marriage being a sacrament became clear, the Church 
could only pronounce as null those marriages contracted under diriment 
impediments so declared by the church. Ivo of Chartres found two 
impediments on the basis of scripture; bigamy and i n c e s t I t  is 
certain, however, as the mnemonic rhyme of Hostiensis shows, that by 
legislation the Church could create or define other impediments and 
thus, as will become clear, the Church could also dispense from those 
impediments of ecclesiastical invention.
As Esmein^^ shows, the distinction between impediments diriment or 
impedient was late in developing and was a subject of some discussion
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and disputation.
Thus the gloss of Decretum C.XXVII qu 1 rubric runs -
"Impedimenta matrimonii sunt XVI, scilicet votum, ordo habitus, dispar 
cultus, error personae, error conditionis, cognatio, ligatio publicae 
honestatis justitia, enormitas delicti, impossibilitas coeundi, tempus 
feriarum, interdictum Ecclesiae, coactio, aetas. Verum tamen quidam 
ex his impediunt contrahendum sed non contractum dirimunt".
"The impediments of marriage are 16 in number thus:- vow, order, 
character, other religion, error of person, error of condition,
relationship, prior marriage, the justice of public honesty, serious 
delict, impotence, ferial time, ecclesiastical prohibition, threats, 
age, madness. But even so some of these impede contracting marriage 
but do not annul the contract".
By the 13th century the content of diriment impediments became more
settled. Esmein^ 2  shows this by comparing the list of impediments
given by Bartolomaeus Bruixiensis ^ ^  (died 1258) with that of
Hostiensis„rtll, whose statement from his Summa is the basis of Hay's.
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treatment of the question. Bartholomew's list contains only two 
impedient impediments namely ferial time and interdict, in the other 
respects it is the same as that of Hostiensis -
"Error, conditio, votum, cognatio, crimen, Cultus disparitas, vis, 
ordo, ligamen, honestas, Si sis affinis si forte coire nequibis. Hec
socianda vetant connubia iuncta retractant"
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"Error, condition, vow, relationship, crime, disparity of worship, 
force, order, marriage bond, propriety, if there is affinity. If 
perchance you cannot come together these forbid marriage and make it 
void".
The diriment impediments, which will be examined in more depth, thus 
formed circumstances whereupon the parties were incapable of 
consenting to marriage or where the consent was defective. It is 
probably over complicated to maintain, as does Scanlan^g following 
Esmein^g^ that the diriment impediments can be conveniently classified 
according to (1 ) general incapacity, (2 ) defect of consent, and (3 ) 
relationship presupposing incapacity.
The third classification in particular is quite false and it can be 
contended, does not appreciate the psychology of the medieval mind nor 
indeed the attitude of the theologian-jurists who created many of the 
impediments. Dissensus is therefore the key to understanding the 
Roman-Civil-Canonical structure of impediments, as marriage was made 
by consensus, it was broken by dissensus.
This theory is plain in respect of the diriment impediments of vis or 
error. It may appear less so to the mind of the twentieth century 
that an impediment like cognatio spiritualis or spiritual relationship 
is of the same category as force or error.
Force and error if used to induce consent, obviously, in canonistic 
terms, contravene 'common and indemonstrable principles' of Natural 
law, viz consensus facit matrimonium. This theory of Natural law when 
adhered to, as Aquinas sketches in his Summa Theologica leads the
medieval canonists to conclusions, within their own scope, strictly
logical. Thus the impediment of spiritual relationship is a provision
of human law definitively stated by Boniface in his Sext^g. 
Aquinas states that the human law is a particular disposition 
derived by the application of reason from the common and 
indemonstrable principles of Natural laws, which is in itself the 
participation by rational creatures in the Eternal law of God. 
Clearly the medieval theologian jurist would see in spiritual 
relationship the ecclesiastical extension of the relationship of 
consanguinity, based on the scriptures of the revealed law, the 
revealed expression of the will of God, and therefore in keeping with 
the Natural and Eternal laws. In such circumstances no one could 
consent to the breach of such a law, by contracting marriage in spite 
of the prescription. Therefore at least in the forum externum, 
dissensus alone could provide a basis for understanding the 
impediment, by virtue of the inability of the parties to consent to 
such a marriage. And if there was no consensus there could be no 
marriage. Any marriage would be de facto only and not de jure, and 
therefore void from the beginning. This being the case the Church 
could separate the parties a vinculo matrimonii, from the bond of 
marriage, grant absolution from sin, and permit the lawful remarriage 
of the parties2 0 Q*
The impedient impediments represent as it were ecclesiastical 
penalties exacted for an offence against the Church or against the
community at large^Q^. In these respects the Church formed a policy
of social control for its own protection and for the protection of the 
faithful. Just as the Reformed Church was to withhold the benefit of 
marriage from offenders of specific general laws, the pre Reformation
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Church withheld marriage, in many respects to protect the institution 
of the Church. However it must be remembered that many of the 
impedient impediments were instituted over a long period of time, when 
dangers for the Church were very real, and when the ecclesiastical 
estate had to use every opportunity to protect its members against 
barbarism and untimely martyrdom.
The impedient impediments merely impeded marriage but did not 
invalidate any consent exchanged. If disregarded the parties were 
deemed to have sinned having disobeyed the Church’s laws. The 
marriage was valid but the parties required to obtain dispensation in 
order to cure the mischief and gain absolution and penance to restore 
their spiritual health.
The impedient impediments were again, according to a rhyme from 
Hostiensis, quoted in Hay -
"Incestus, raptus sponse, mors mulieris, susceptus proprie sobolis, 
mors prisbiteralis Vel si peniteat solemniter aut monialem accipiat 
Prohibent hec conjugium sociandum".
"Incest, abduction of a spouse, death of a woman, standing for one’s 
own child, death of a priest, being a penitent or marrying a nun, 
these impede the marriage bond’^ ^^.
Hay does not include in his list of impedient impediments parental 
consent, improper time, or interdict of the Church. In the general 
Canon law these were recognised as impedient impediments, at least at 
some stages of their development. Certainly by the time Hay was
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writing as has been shown^^ parental consent was not an impediment 
and indeed only became a requirement of the Church after the 
Reformation. It never passed into the secular law as an impediment 
although on a practical point as parents would often be providing the 
endowment of the daughter the upshot of the matter was that lack of 
parental consent led to a poor marriage which in many cases at least 
would cool the desire of parties for the connubial bond.
The Impedient Impediments
Incest
The incest is that occurring subsequent to the marriage2 Q]|, thus 
reflecting its origins as a diriment impediment^-.,.. As Hay states 
prior incest is a diriment impediment. It is envisaged by Hay that 
one who has intercourse with his wife’s relative cannot marry that 
relative even after his wife’s death. It also impedes the guilty 
party from seeking intercourse with his wife as it was considered a 
grave sin against marriage^Q^.
In quoting certain texts from the Decretum of Gratian, Hay shows the 
acceptance of the Canon law of the Western Church in Scotland, thus 
D.G.C.32, VII, 21 states:
’’Anyone who has intercourse with firstly his wife, then her daughters 
or with two sisters ... they are to be separated and we direct that 
they are not again to have carnal intercourse”.
The attitude of the church authorities is summed up in one brocard
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from a text of the Concordia. "Incestus est consanguinearum vel 
affinibuim abusus"2 Q^.
Raptus
In the violent, medieval society of the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th
centuries it is difficult to imagine that rules against abduction held 
any sway with those inclined to commit such acts. However, the Church 
acting in defence of innocents, Ratione personae, could not conscience 
the abduction of someone else’s wife or betrothed. Thus raptus, the 
illicitus coitus occurs in the following circumstances
"Raptus admittur cum puella a domo patris violenter ducitur ut 
connupta in uxorem habeatur".
"Abduction is committed when a girl is violently taken from her 
father’s home in order to live as a wife"2Qg«
The claim of abduction could be personally barred by a virgin or 
unmarried woman accepting the situation^^.
Mors Mulieris
Again an element of social control enters the reasoning of the Church 
in upholding the prohibition against a man from marrying upon killing 
his wife. However, any marriage of course is valid, this impediment 
being merely impedient. ^ ^ 2 1 0  ^uo^es a decreet from the Concordia:
"Conjugia penitus interdicantur his qui suas uxores occidunt".
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"Marriage is prohibited to those who kill their wives'^-j
If however the murder was committed in rixa following upon the husband 
finding his wife committing adultery there was no prohibition on his 
subsequent marriage^. On the other hand, if he killed her from 
hatred in order to contract an adulterous marriage then that marriage 
was null, as was, according to the Decretal De Divortiis, any other 
marriage of the adulterer’s paramour^
Susceptus proprie sobolis
To receive one’s own son from the baptismal font or from the Bishop 
upon confirmation creates a spiritual relationship or cognatio 
spiritualis which prohibited the act of intercourse between husband 
and wife. Thus if done in bad faith the taking of a child from these 
sacraments destroyed the basis of marriage.
Hay does not quote the Decretum dealing with the matter which is a 
fourth century decreet of the Carthaginian Council,^. Again the 
Church by its action is here attempting to fulfil a social role in 
regulating the occasions where a husband is attempting to create a 
legal bar to marital relations.
Mors Presbyteralis
Whilst there was a substantial proportion of clandestine marriages, at 
all epochs, evidenced by the repeated legislation against such 
activities, the priest always held a special position as the celebrant 
of the sacramento-.tr* Again as a matter of self protection the Church
163
used the sanction of withholding marriage from those of a sufficiently 
anti-clerical disposition to murder a priest, thus the Liber Extra 
declares
"Qui presbyterum, occidet ... absque spes conjugii maneat,M,Whoever 
kills a priest, ... remains without hope of marriage"^ g.
Peniteat solemniter
There had been, as Scanlan^^ states, in the early Church a general 
prohibition upon those who had undergone public penance, which 
prohibition subsisted for the whole of the penitents life. It became 
recognised however as Scanlan^g quoting Esraein,,^ notes that the 
severity of such a rule was unworkable. Esmein describes the history 
of the development of the impediment. Particularly it should be 
noticed that penance had figured as a diriment impediment and that 
certain decretists, especially Huguccio^Q (died 1 2 1 0 ), master of 
Innocent III, Bishop of Ferrara restricted the operation of the 
diriment aspect of the impediment to penance for uxoricide, raptus, 
and incestus2 2 *j • However as these grounds became recognised impedient 
impediments themselves the prohibitive nature of penance became 
apparent. The corollary of the independent grounds of impediment 
becoming settled was that public penance which could be incurred for 
relatively minor sins had a more stringent effect than serious sins or 
crimes. Gradually therefore it was seen to be an impedient impediment 
only and eventually to subsist only for as long as the penance existed 
and not subsisting for the penitant's whole life. Thus Hay introduces 
some more comment on the nature of the prohibition222.
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Monialem accipiat
Marrying a nun is the final impedient impediment which Hay22g 
recognises. Following the Concordia22ij those "who marry a nun or a 
religious” were to be penitent and thus were inhibited from 
contracting marriage on that ground22^. However this impediment, 
again as a matter of self protection attained independent status.
There are two impedient impediments which Hay does not deal with in 
the same section dealing with the other impediments noted above. 
These are, the impedient impediments of spiritual relationship and of 
ferial time.
Spiritual Relationship
This is linked quite clearly with the impedient impediment of
susceptus proprie sobolis where the spiritual relationship of
godfather is created in mala fides by a husband attempting to prevent
himself from asking the marriage debt and thereby removing the cause
of marriage. It is mentioned by Hay in his treatment of the diriment
impediment of cognatio spritualis and relates to the relationship of
persons in exorcism and catechising2 2 g . This was recognised so far as
catechism is concerned by Boniface VIII22^ and then suppressed at
Trent„„0. Hay states that the relationship arising between persons 
22o
involved in exorcism and catechism prevents the contracting of 
marriage but does not nullify the contract2 2 g.
Ferial Time
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The impediment of ferial time is not truly an impedient impediment and 
therefore it is clear why Hay does not deal with it in conjunction 
with the other impediments. In so far as it is an impedient 
impediment it restricts the solemnisation of marriage. In this way it 
can only relate to non clandestine marriages or those celebrated in 
facie ecclesiae. Hay does not however make this absolutely clear thus 
he says:
"Cur nuptie sunt prohibite quibusdam certis temporibus".
"Why it is prohibited to marry at certain times",^.
Clarification that the impediment relates to solemn marriages follows:
"Tria sunt tempora in quibus non licet solemnizare matrimonia. Tamen 
si solemnizata fuerunt ipsa tenent quamvis contrahentes peccant".
"There are three periods during which it is not lawful to solemnize 
marriage, but if it is solemnized then, it is valid, but the parties 
commit sin’^ i .
If, of course, the marriage is clandestine this impediment cannot 
apply.
Marriage was forbidden according to the Liber Extra, as quoted by Hay, 
from the first Sunday of Advent until the octave of the Epiphany, from 
Septuagesima2 g2 > (three weeks before Lent) until the octave of Easter, 
and from the Rogation days2 3 3  until the feast of the Trinity. The 
primary reason for this prohibition was to turn the attention of the
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faithful from carnal matters, in these holy times, to spiritual
°neS234-
The Diriment Impediments
Error
Hay defines error in Augustinian terms whereby error is a mistaken 
belief in that which appears to be true, as true but which is, in 
reality false^^. He identifies five species of error, namely, error 
personae, error conditionis, error fortunae, error qualitatis, and 
error dationis.
Three of these species impeded marriage and nullified the contract, 
error of person, error of condition which formed of itself a diriment 
impediment and error of consent which in representing general 
dissensus represents the underlying rationale of all diriment 
impediments. Error of fortune, i.e. thinking a prospective spouse was 
rich when in fact poor did not reduce the consent to marriage. 
Similarly error of quality where one believes the spouse to be noble 
when in reality she was lowborn, error fortunae et qualitatis conjugii 
consensum non excludit^g. It is interesting that Hay in 
distinguishing error dationis, error of consent draws a distinction 
not contained in the authors from whom he drew his major theory, Peter 
Lombard,,^ and Gratian^g perhaps as a matter of clarification. Error 
of person therefore constituted the ground of error by which one 
mistook the identity of the other party. As Esmein narrates there 
were difficulties as to the interpretation of error of person being 
understood as the error of identity of the person. Hay gives the
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biblical example of Jacob, Leah, and Rachel,,^.
Conditio
Particularly in the earlier times the Christian Church often had to 
compromise its position in particular when dealing with secular 
matters.
Thus whilst the New Testament showed clearly that the distinction of 
slave and free was not of relevance to the Christian,
"Non est Judaeus, neque Graecus, non est servus neque liber non est 
masculus neque femina, omnes enim vos unum estis in Christo Jesu".
"There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, nor man or 
woman for you are all one in Christ Jesus"2 ^Q‘
The Church had to accept that in the Roman world the slave was an 
essential element in the economic scheme. All that could be done 
initially was to convince the Emperors and this of course became 
easier from Constantine onwards, that legislation should be introduced 
to alienate the servile status^.
Whilst in Civil law the slave could not contract marriage because he 
did not have connubium, his alliances, perhaps contubernium, were 
monogamous and permanent and in the eyes of the Church could represent 
a valid marriage resting upon the exchange of consent. The history of 
servile marriages and their recognition is not relevant to the present 
work. However the examination of the problem by eminent jurists
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working on the decreets of early Synods and Councils in respect of the 
problem under consideration evolved into the following Law. If a free 
person married a slave knowing the status the marriage was valid. If 
however a free person who was ignorant of this condition married a 
slave the marriage was null. Nullity was subject of course to the 
following conditions:- that the parties were indeed of unequal 
status, that the one party was ignorant of the other's status, and 
that no carnal intercourse had followed upon the discovery of the 
disparity of status thereby perfecting the marriage2 ^2 *
Hay does not deal much with the question principally because slavery 
as such did not exist in Scotland during the sixteenth century. 
However there were some instances of quasi servile status during 
varying epochs e.g. necessary service of salters and colliers and 
tenants adscript! glebae.
Votum
The vow was in medieval society possibly the most important method 
whereby one acknowledged oneself to be bound to do or give something, 
to perform some deed or to abstain from doing something. The vow had 
many purposes, to lend ecclesiastical weight to obligations, to 
impress upon one the serious nature of an undertaking, to enter an 
order, and as in the present instance, to abstain from intercourse, to 
be chaste or continent.
It was a wholly voluntary way of incapacitating oneself from 
contracting marriage. As an impediment it had taken a long time to 
develop, as Esmein says it exercised Christianity 'from the earliest
times' 2 H 3 and was only rendered definitive in the Sext of Boniface 
VIII. The earliest decisions regarding vows did not bring marriages 
contracted in the face of vows to nullity, but tinged the union as 
being illicit^im*
Then upon the action of Gratian and Lombard a distinction arose as a 
means of explaining the Church’s attitude of disapproval yet 
coexistent validity, that of the difference of effect on a subsequent 
marriage of solemn vows and simple vows. As has been stated 
Boniface’s Sext definitively set the law:-
”Nos igitur attendentes quod voti solemnitas ex sola constitutione est 
inventa ... praesentis declarandum duximus; vincillo sanctionis, illud 
solum votum debere dici solemne quantum ad post contractum matrimonium 
dirimendum quod solemnizatum fuerit ... per professionem expressam vel 
tacitam factam alicui de religionibus per sedem apostolicam 
approbatis”.
”We therefore considering that the solemnity of vows is only a 
creation of law. We think that we are bound to declare by these 
effective presents that the vow alone when it is said to be solemn and 
diriment of marriage contracted hereafter, which is taken solemnly, by 
profession, express or tacit into one of the religious orders approved 
by the apostolic seat’^ j-.
The settled law therefore was that the solemn vow only was a diriment 
impediment is supported by H a y w h o  also states that simple vows, 
i.e. those made in private constitute only an impedient impediment.
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Cognatio
Cognatio or relationship formed such an important area of the law of 
the constitution of marriage that some commentators^^ have viewed it 
as representing a separate category of impediment distinct from those 
based on dissensus and incapacity. Fundamentally, the essential 
aspect of the diriment impediments is their character to render 
consent null, though this be attained by the way of several agencies. 
Any categorisation must recognise this basic and inherent nature in 
respect of impediments otherwise the pre-eminence of consent in 
forming marriage becomes diluted.
Hay devoted a large part of his lectures to the subject of 
relationship. This is not surprising when it is considered that the 
topic encompassed three separate yet entwined elements, viz 
consanguinity, legal relationship and spiritual relationship.
Consanguinity
The Church from the earliest times recognised a diriment impediment 
arising from the blood relationship of the parties. This was 
primarily based upon scriptural prescription in Leviticus and 
principally chapter 6 :-
"Omnis homo ad proximam sanguinis sui non accedet ut revelet 
turpitudinem eius, Dominus Sum"
"No man shall approach to her that is near of kin to uncover her 
nakedness, I am the Lord’^ g .
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Roman law had restrictions upon marrying relations by blood, though 
the scope of prohibited union was relatively narrow. If a marriage 
contravened the rules of relationship it was void and if the parties 
knew of the impediment it was deemed incestuous and punished as 
suoh249.
Justinianic law narrates prohibitions on marriage between parent and 
child, in the direct line, and between certain collateral relations, 
i.e. where persons were married one of whom was only one degree 
removed from the common ancesto^^Q. Development of the Roman law 
continued and the Codex Theodsianus contains some interesting 
provisions,^.
Adopting the Roman framework the Canon law developed along an 
independent line enlarging the prohibited degrees from six to seven. 
However, it was upon the adoption of the Teutonic rules of computation 
that the prohibition became fixed at the seventh degree^^. ^he 
provisions of the Lex Romana Visigothorum were in part influential 
upon Isidore of Seville0l_0 and also exercised the mind of Alexander
I]C254*
The law as applicable when Hay writes is that as revised by the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215) in a famous decree of Innocent III:-
"Prohibitio quoque copulae conjugalis quartura consanguinitatis et 
affinitatis gradum de caetero non excedet, quoniam in ulterioribus 
gradibus non iam potest absque gravi dispendio huiusmodi prohibitio 
generaliter observari".
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"The prohibition on matrimony shall not henceforth exceed the fourth 
degrees of consanguinity and affinity, since it is not now possible to 
observe the general prohibition on the more remote degrees without 
grave inconvenience’^ ^  •
It is probable that the grave inconveniences referred to in the Decree 
were those of certain noble families. Such influences were major 
factors in the development of this branch of the law in particular. 
The wide-ranging effects of this and the other aspects of the 
impediment of cognatio caused the now famous letter from the 
Archbishop of Saint Andrews to the Pope in 155^ whereby we learn that 
because of the relationship between noble families it was hardly 
possible to match men and women of equal status in such a way as to 
keep within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and hence people 
married promising to obtain a dispensation but did not and used this 
ground to reduce the marriage^^.
Similarly the pressure on the Pope to grant powers to a Legate a 
latere to dispense in cases of the third degrees of consanguinity and 
affinity was maintained by Mary the Queen Regent in 1556. In February 
of that year she wrote to the Holy Father and the Cardinal Promoter of 
Scottish Affairs, Cardinal Sermonete, and Cardinal a Caraffa with the 
aim of obtaining these powers
"Nam cum multa quotidie contrahantur inter consanguineos illicita et 
in gradibus prohibitis matrimonia ... cum maximo ecclesie scandalo et 
animarum suarum periculo".
"For since illicit marriage is contracted every day between those
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related by consanguinity and within the prohibited degrees ... with 
the greatest scandal to the church and danger to their souls"2,_^ .
The description of this aspect of cognatio as given by Hay represents 
the developed Canon law. Thus he defines consanguinity as unity of 
the blood, a bond formed by descent from a common ancestor or because 
of unity of blood^g.
Hay categorises consanguinity in terms of direct lines of ascendancy
and collateral and transversal degrees. It is noticeable that the
fundamental cause of cognatio is carnal connection forming a
relationship, this relationship is calculated by either the civilian
or canonical methodsOI_-.
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Degrees in the direct line were calculated by civilians and canonists 
in the same way. The difference however occurred when consideration 
is given to the collateral degrees. In collateral lines, because the 
canonical calculation is based on blood relationship, there are as 
many degrees as there are generations between a person and the common 
stock, whereas in Civil law each person constitutes a degree^Q* Hay 
goes on to examine the Aristotelian,^ basis of the argument for the 
existence of such an impediment and to cite the various sources of the 
Canon law of consanguinity drawing on the Bible2 g2 , and the Canons and 
Decreets culminating in the Decree of the Lateran Council^^*
The question of whether the Pope can dispense parties to contract 
within the second, third and fourth degrees is also considered. Hay 
concludes that it is possible for such dispensations to be granted 
particularly for altruistic reasons of peace and concord in the same
way as it is for dispensations to be granted for marriages governed by 
the chapters of Leviticus, provided those prohibitions are not of 
Natural law.
There is a wealth of extant case law to support the propositions of 
consanguinity as a diriment impediment and also many earlier Papal 
decisions dispensing the prohibition and permitting the marriageg^.
An example from the Liber Officialis is the case of Jonet Brown who 
was sued in the Court of the Official of Saint Andrews in 1551 before 
Abraham Chreiton, for divortium a vinculo matrimonii on the grounds of 
consanguinity.
"Sententia contra Brown.
... Chreichtoune in causa simplicis divorcii mota inter ... et Jonetam 
Brown eius sponsam putativam ream partibus ab altera. Decernimus 
pretensum matrimonium inter prefatos Edwardum et Jonetam contractum et 
solempnizatum de jure ab inicio nullum. Ex et pro eo quia tempore 
contractus et solempnizationis prefati pretensi matrimonii inter 
prefatos Edwardum et Jonetam ipsi invicem attingebant et prout de 
presenti attingunt in tercio et quarto gradibus consanguinitatis et eo 
pretextu prefatos Edwardum et Jonetam ab invicem divorciandos et 
simpliciter separandos fore prout ipsos divorciamus et separamus ac 
licenciam in domino alibi matrimonium contrahendi concedimus Et 
quiquid alter alteri dederit dotis aut donationis causa propter 
nuptias iterum restitutendum fore et proles inter prefatos Edwardum et 
Jonetam procreatas stante prefato pretenso matrimonio legitimas fore 
decernimus”.
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"Sentence ... against Brown.
... Chrichton in the cause of Divorce simpliciter moved between ... 
and Janet Brown his putative spouse as defender of the other part. We 
decern that the pretended marriage between the said Edward and Janet 
contracted and solemnised by Law was null from the beginning.
From and because of at the time of contracting and solemnising the 
said pretended marriage between the said Edward and Janet they were 
each related and even at the moment they are related in the third and 
fourth degrees of consanguinity and for this reason so that Edward and 
Janet are to be mutually divorced and separated, we hereby divorce and 
separate them with our permission to both to contract marriage in the 
Lord, And that which the one gave the other as dowry or gift on 
account of the marriage is to be restored and we decern that any 
children born of the said Edward and Janet in the course of the said 
pretended marriage to be legitimated^.
It should be noted that in conformity with the accepted Canonical 
position divorce a vinculo is not stated in this case. The marriage 
bond is certainly dissolved, but on the ground of nullity, through the 
incurring of a diriment impediment. It is interesting that this case 
is a marriage supposedly solemnised in Church, as in which case banns 
would have been read and yet the impediment which publication of banns
is designed to bring to light failed abysmally to avoid an unlawful
and null union from taking place. This, from the extant cases, was
the rule rather than the exception.
An example of dispensation from the rules of consanguinity at the same
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degree as the ease of Brown, is the petition of Douglas and Graham 
which occurred more than a century earlier in 1423.
"That for certain reasonable cases they desire to be joined in 
matrimony but as they are related in third degrees of consanguinity on 
one side and fourth degrees on the other side they are unable to 
fulfill desire without apostolic dispensation. Therefore said nobles 
petition that the Pope would dispense them that notwithstanding above 
degrees of consanguinity they may contract and freely remain in 
matrimony and declaring offspring to be legitimate"2 gg.
The interesting question is why did Edward and Janet Brown not take
the course sketched by the Douglas and his consort? Perhaps it is of
parties like those in Brown that Archbishop Hamilton writes that -
"propter itineris longinquitatem et difficultatem . . . propter 
pecuniarum inopiam"
"On account of the long and difficult journey ... and the lack of
money"267.
they do not take steps to obtain a dispensation. It is worth noticing 
that the parties obtaining the dispensation are described as 'nobles’. 
The characteristic of nobility and therefore the wealth of some
litigants recurs in those cases where the parties seek expensive and 
lengthy remedies, rather than taking a chance upon not being 
discovered and bringing scandal to the Church or imperilling their 
souls through sin in not complying with Canon law.
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The answer of course to such problems particularly for the poor was
the granting to the Legatus Natus, the power to dispense in such
cases. There had, of course, always been the possibility of obtaining 
ad hoc powers of dispensation as in the case of Brown v Chancellor 
where a dispensation was granted by the Archbishop of Glasgow 
following on letters obtained from the Penitentiary at Ron^gg.
Cognatio Legalis
The impediment of cognatio legalis or legal relationship arose only 
from adoption. Adoption was used by the canonist as in Roman law and, 
whilst it constituted part of the general jus commune of Europe it was
not effective as law in Scotland^. Hay notices this circumstance
yet for the sake of dealing with all aspects of the topic acknowledges 
the diriment impediment.
It appears to have been accepted as part of Canon law by Gratian^Q in 
his Concordia who in commenting on a Rescript of Nicholas I on 
cognatio spiritualis also extended the prohibition on marriage to 
those connected by the adoptive relationship.
Originally the canonists had attempted to extend the prohibition on 
marriage to those related by adoption to the seventh degree, however 
by the sixteenth century it was settled that marriage was prohibited 
only between the adopted person and the natural brothers and sisters, 
and the direct line2^ .
Hay's treatment speaks for a total acceptance of the general Canon law 
even though there is no native institution. It also speaks for a high
level of acquaintance with the Civil law with direct quotations from 
Justinian and an analysis of the civilian distinction between adoptio 
and adrogatio2 Y2 ^he corresponding Canon law distinction being 
imperfect and perfect adoption. This having been said it must also be 
noticed that the understanding of the distinction is defective, given 
that it lacks historical perspective and does not appreciate the 
original bases and methods of the distinction, e.g. the imperial and 
magisterial institution and the original effects of the change from 
the sui juris status of the adoptee to the new status of alieni juris.
It is interesting however that the later classical distinction or rule 
of adoptio naturam imitatur^^^ i-s mentioned by Hay in terms quite 
sirailar^yjj to the civilian provisions and it is probably in this 
observation of the canonical appreciation of Natural law that one 
finds the origin of the canonical assumption of this ineffective area 
of Civil law.
It should also be noticed that there were no cases on this matter 
before the Courts of the Officials at Saint Andrews.
Cognatio Spiritualis
Hay defines cognatio spiritualis as' a bond of love resulting from the 
fact that one has baptised confirmed or received another at baptism or 
confirmation.
As an extension of the prohibited degrees, it caused a multiplication 
of the occasions upon which a marriage could be annulled. It was 
purely an institution of the Church and arose only from the sacraments
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of baptism and confirmation. As has already been noted the 
prohibitive or impedient impediment of catechism was of a similar 
nature, but of course being only impedient could not vitiate consent 
and nullify the marriage but only impede marriage.
The development of the impediment was very restricted and fell to be
determined by fixed principles which did not allow scope for
extension^,,,-.
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The relationships which were productive of the impediment found their 
origin essentially in baptism, the spiritual birth of the soul, 
confirmation, as the consolidation of baptism naturally followed 
thereon. As Panormitanus in his Commentary on the Liber Extra 
states^
"Haec cognatio spiritualis imitatur naturalem seu carnalem cognationem 
quantum potest".
"Cognatio spiritualis imitates natural and carnal relationship as much 
as possible".
Mention is made in Justinian’s legislation of the relationship, where 
certain prohibitions were imposed2 yy.
The definitive statement of the impediment is made by Boniface VIII in 
the Sext:-
"Inter baptisatum et eum qui ilium suscepit de baptisrao ac inter 
eundem baptisatum et suscepientis filios et uxorem ante susceptionem
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carnaliter cognitam ab eodem ymmo etiam inter suscipientem parentem 
que baptisati et matnem eognationem spiritualem in baptismo contrahi 
iure constat".
"Between the baptised and the one who receives him from baptism and 
between the baptised and the receiver’s children and wife, if there is 
carnal intercourse between them before the baptism but also between 
the parents of the baptised and the receiver'^yg.
H a y 2 7 9 analYses relationship in terms of paternitas, compaternitas 
and fraternitas relating to the spiritual fatherhood of the baptiser 
and the relationship with his spiritual son; the relationship between 
godparents and the natural parents; and finally the relationship 
between the children of the sponsor and the baptised.
There is one reported case of cognatio spiritualis before the Court of 
the Official Principal of Saint Andrews in 1548, that of Forret v. 
Yngles before John Spittal2 gQ .
"Nos Joannes Spittall prepositus ecclesie collegiate dive virginis 
Marie de Campis prope Edinburgum in utroque jure licenciatus, almeque 
universitatis Sancti Andree rector, officialis Sancti Andree 
principalis, in quadam causa matrimoniali per honestam mulierem 
Marjoriam Forrett sponsam putativam probi viri Davidis Ynglis actricem 
ab una contra prefatum Davidem reum partibus ab altera nata et adhuc 
pendente indecisa. Decernimus matrimonium pretensum inter dictos 
Marjoriam et Davidem de facto et non de jure contractum ab inicio 
fuisse et esse nullum Ex eo quod Joannes Forrett de Fingask pater 
dicte Marjorie sponse putative dicti Davidis eundem Davidem de sacro
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sponte levarit. Stante igitur huiusmodi impedimento cognationis 
spiritualis inter dictos Marjoriam et Davidem huius modi pretensum 
matrimonium de faoto et non de jure contractum nullum et invalidum ... 
propterea eosdem Marjoriam et Davidem simpliciter divorciandos fore 
prout eosdem ab invicem divorciamus dantes utrique alibi in domino 
nubendi facultatem. Et quiquid alter ab altera causa donationis vel 
dotis receperit eidem restituendum fore decernimus".
"We, John Spittall, provost of the Collegiate Church of the Holy 
Virgin Mary in Edinburgh, licentiate in both laws and Rector of Saint 
Andrew’s University official principal of Saint Andrews, in the 
matrimonial cause by the honourable woman Marjory Forrett putative 
spouse of the noble David Inglis, pursuer of the one part against the 
said David defender of the other part, and awaiting undecided.
We decern that the pretended marriage betwen the said Margory and 
David was contracted only de facto and not de jure and was and is from 
the beginning null. From and because John Forrett of Fingask, father 
of the said Marjory putative spouse of the said David, carried the 
said David from the Holy fount. Therefore in this way there was an 
impediment of cognatio spiritualis between the said Marjory and David 
in this way was the pretended marriage contracted only de facto not de 
jure, null and invalid. On account of this Marjory and David are 
simply divorced and just so we divorce them, and grant the capability 
to both to marry in the lord. We decern that which the one received 
from the other as a gift or dowry to be restored^ ^ ".
Changes were in the air and the Church at the Council of Trent issued 
a decree concerning the question of cognatio spiritualis. The net
effect was to limit the effect of the prohibition, retaining only 
paternity and direct compaternity.
This was done by limiting the number of sponsors at baptism to one 
person or at least only one man and one woman and prescribing that the 
relationship will be contracted only between the baptised and the 
sponsors, and also between the baptiser , the baptised and the natural 
parents of the baptised.
The relationship arising from confirmation was to be similarly 
restricted to the confirmer, the confirmed, the mother and father of 
the confirmed and the sponsor.
Regulations were made to ensure that the fundamental reasons for the
incurring of the impediment namely ignorance of the nature of the
impediment and superficial acquaintance with the degrees of 
relationship were not farther incurred. Thus the parish priest was to 
enquire of the natural parents and the sponsors and would allow them 
to act only after having recorded their names and after having
instructed them in their relationship and duties2 g2 .
Crimen
The diriment impediment of crimen or qualified adultery nullified any 
contract of marriage between the adulterous spouse and the paramour.
Initially at least adultery alone was an impediment merely of the
impedient nature2gg* The diriment nature of qualified adultery was 
settled at the Council of T r i b u r ^  (895) quoted by Gratian where a
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diriment impediment occurred where an act of adultery was qualified 
with a promise of marriage. The other qualification was the 
arrangement of the murder of the wife or husband in conjunction with 
the adultery2 g(-.
Hay recognises these distinctions, the adultery which, depending upon 
whether only one or both parties are married is classified as simple 
or double, can be committed for lust or for the forming of an
agreement to contract marriage after the death of the other spouse or
spouses concerned2 gg.
The basic principle behind the impediment is that of social control
i.e. withdrawing the benefit of marriage from those who contrive
through fornication and murder to overturn their original match and
form a new marriage2 g^.
Thus Hay can state that a married person who contracted marriage with 
a married or unmarried person, and commits carnal copula could not 
contract marriage with the paramour even after their lawful partners 
are dead. Similarly if a man commits adultery, promising to marry 
after his spouse’s death, he cannot conclude the marriage
notwithstanding his spouse’s death2 gg.
Adultery alone had changed its character to the extent that it 
produced no impediment; diriment or impedient. Following Pierre de 
la Palu, Hay states that a promise and adultery creates an impediment 
this is to be understood as being complementary to the diriment 
impediment produced by adultery and the plot of conjugicide2 gg.
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There is no case of nullity for the diriment impediment of crimen 
extant in the existing court records of the Official's Court in Saint 
Andrews. The cases concerning adultery all relate to divortium a
mensa et thoro being a ground for repudiation for the matrimonial 
offence not divorce for inherent nullity, and will be farther 
discussed under the head of separation^gQ.
Cultus Disparitas
Hay writing for a country that was for the most part Catholic does not
dwell for long on the problem of disparity of worship. Disparity of
worship, that is where one party was a baptised Catholic and the other 
was an infidel formed a diriment impediment, both preventing and 
nullifying any marriage^.
Like cognatio spiritualis this impediment was of ecclesiastical 
institution yet unlike the other impediments was substantially based 
on customary canon law not on any decreet, rescript or constitution.
Gratian writes a little on the topic in the Concordia where he
clarifies that the marriages of Christian and infidel were to be
null^^. It for example, heresy to marry a jew or a gentile other 
than a Christian,-.,..
The requirements for the impediment were therefore that one party was 
a baptised Christian and the other an infidel. Infidel in this sense 
is a non Christian, therefore the reasons for the impediment become 
clear.
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As always the theory of sacramentality lies deep below the legislative 
prescriptions of marriage. The sacrament of marriage, like all others 
is an outward sign of inward grace and, unless one has received the 
initial grace of baptism the farther grace which is given in matrimony 
cannot be received and therefore the sacramental aspect is reduced.
Marriage between a Christian and a heretic or a Catholic and a 
Protestant was valid but unlawful for such a matter fell under the 
head of spiritual fornication which was an impedient impediment 2 ^ *
Vis
As has been mentioned before the essential element of consent was 
central to the canonical scheme of marriage. Perhaps no other 
diriment impediment displays so clearly dissensus as the root of 
nullity in marriage as vis or force. It is also to be observed that 
probably no other impediment was of such practical value as that of 
vis, particularly in the turbulent times of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.
Hay draws, in some respects finely the distinction between a slight 
and a grave fear. Only a just or grave fear would annul any consent 
exchanged, and examples are cited as death, ruin, bodily harm or some 
grave and appalling outrage2 g^.
A less pressing or slight fear is insufficient to affect the consents 
exchanged. Upon fear being alleged and proved the marriage could be 
annulled by the Ordinary
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"Si timetur inferri violentia puellae, de cuius matrimonio agitur 
debet judex sibi providere locum tutum et honestum donee causa 
terminetur".
"If a girl is afraid by the application of violence and marriage is 
made, the judge may allow himself a secure and honest ground that the 
cause be ended’^ gg.
There are some four extant cases of nullity or divortium a vinculo 
spanning the years 1515-1523 in the book of the Official of Saint 
Andrews. Two relate to forced sponsalia per verba de futuro2 gy and at 
least one of the remaining relates to a marriage per verba de 
praesenti^gg. All are cases where the female party is applying for 
the annulment on the grounds of vis.
The example of Boyis and Morton (1522) seems to contain all the 
relevant points
"Nos Willelmus Prestoune_QQ in causa mota inter Isabellam Boyis
d. y y
actricem ab una et Johannem Mortoune reum partibus ab altera. 
Decernimus pretensum matrimonium inter dictos Isabellam Boyis et 
Johannem Mortoune contractum ab inicio fuisse et esse nullum et 
invalidum nullumque de jure fortiri debere effectum ac contra 
constitutionem sacrorum canonum celebratum causante impedimento 
subscripto. Ex et pro eo quia dicta Isabella fuit rapta et per vim 
metum et violenciam qui possent cadere in constantem mulierem per 
dictum Johannem et suos complices armatos eandemque secum absulit 
secumque cohabitare matrimonium contrahere illudque carnali copula 
consummare coegit prout libellatur et probatur in processu coram nobis
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desuper deducto. Propterea dictos Isabellam Boyis et Johannem 
Mortoune abinicem divorciandos fore prout divorciamus dictamque 
Isabellam in integrum restituendam fore prout restituimus per 
presentes ac sibi licenciam in domino nubendi alibi licenciamus. Lata 
die prescripta.
"We William Preston, in the cause moved between Isabella Boyis the 
pursuer of the one part and John Morton the defender of the other part 
decern that the pretended marriage between the said Isabella Boyis and 
John Morton is and was since the contracting thereof null and invalid 
and to have even more so no effect by law and was celebrated contrary 
to the constitutions and holy canons causing the impediment 
underwritten. From and because the said Isabella was abducted and by 
such force fear and violence which could affect a strong minded woman 
executed by John and his armed accomplices and by the same she was 
carried away and forced to cohabit and to contract marriage and to 
consumate with carnal copula just as libelled and proved in the 
process before us as above. On account of this the said Isabella 
Boyis and John Morton initially divorced just as we divorce them and 
we restore the said Isabella as she was before and we permit her to 
marry again in the Lord. Given on the aforesaid day^QQ.
Two aspects of the above case reflect the law as stated in Hay and 
that contained in the Liber Extra.
On the one hand the fear which annuls consent is as grave and serious 
as to affect a strong minded woman
"Mulieri quae negat, se in matrimonium consensisse non creditur marito
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probantur contrarium, secus si probat se consensisse per metum qui 
potest cadere in constantem virum".
"Women who deny that they have consented to marriage are not to be 
believed, the husband proving the contrary, it be otherwise if it is 
proved that they have consented through a fear which could affect a 
strongminded man’^ Q-j*
The significant use of similar phraseology in the sententia as in the 
canon displays a concern for relevancy. By Hay’s time the inherent 
equality of status as recognised in Canon law between husband and wife 
allowed a strong minded woman also to be the standard of the person to 
be swayed by fear^^.
The other aspect which is reflected in this sententia is the 
restitution of the abducted party to the unmarried status with the 
right to raarry^.
This aspect of dissensus represents quite clearly a civilian concept 
of dolus dans causam contractui and in that respect betrays something 
of the basic origins of the Canon law of marriage.
Ordo
The reception of sacred orders constituted a diriment impediment. Hay 
examines the matter and referring to his lectures on order^^ where 
the distinction of sacred or major orders is more fully described. 
Only the sacred orders were prohibited from contracting marriage, 
namely the subdiaconate, the dioconate and the p r i e s t h o o d .
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The problem of married priests had beset the Church since the earliest 
days. As Hay narrates, it was once permitted to be both married and 
cleric. However, as Esmein recounts in the late ninth and early tenth 
centuries the Councils of the Church formulated the impediment and 
through Gratian and Lombard, Alexander III was able to issue the 
decretal which regulated the matter clearly^g.
The essential problem was that the Church viewed continence as of a 
greater worth than that of marriage, and whilst recognising this also 
saw marriage as a solution to sins to which some pastors were subject 
and thus it could not completely condemn such activities. The 
attitudes hardened however by the 16th Century and by then the rule of 
unmarried priests was settled.
As an impediment, being of purely ecclesiastical constitution it must 
appear as solely a matter for the Church. However, the activities of 
married or cohabiting priests affected the entire parish and brought 
scandal, to such an extent that numerous Scottish provincial councils 
issued decrees striking at this sin^Q^. Indeed one of the major 
effects of the Reformation was that the priest was released from the 
restriction on marriage. It was this fact which the peasantry was to 
notice as delimiting the new order and breaching with the old. No 
other action, for the poor majority would spell out the Revolution 
more thoroughly than the priest living with his wife.
Ligamen
Christian marriage was always monogamous, and a valid and subsisting 
marriage, which in Canon law was dissolved only by death, prevented
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either party from contracting a new marriage in the lifetime of the 
other spouse^Qg. Thus the status of being already married operated as 
a diriment impediment.
The Old Testament provides many instances of polygamy but this was 
explained by the Fathers of the Church as being before the New law of 
Christ and as Esmein^gg indicates that often such marriages were 
considered as a special dispensation from God by reason of the time 
and the needs.
A clear expression of the New Testament view upon which the Canon law 
was built under the similarly monogamous Roman ethos, was the passage, 
quoted in Hay^-jQ from Saint Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians:-
nA woman is bound by the Law as long as her husband liveth but if her
husband die she is at liberty; let her marry to whom she will, only in
the Lord"^.
Fundamentally Hay bases his thesis in this respect on the Natural law, 
applying reason to the conditions of monogamy and polygamy. Thus he 
speaks of the ability to procreate, the ability to chastise and of the
problems of a relationship between a man and several wives.
In 1551 Parliament took it upon itself to legislate on the matter 
against "persounis that ar maryit and ar oppin, manifest commoun and 
incorrigibill adulteraris".
It imposed the secular equivalent of excommunication on such 
unfortunates. They were denounced as rebels or outlaws and put to the
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horn, their moveable goods were seized and no appeal to the sentence 
was allowed. This is an extraordinary example of temporal and
ecclesiastical power working to extinguish a social evil with every 
means at their disposal^ 2 *
There were essentially six instances in which the impediment of 
ligamen could arise, namely
1 . a marriage per verba de praesenti solemnised in church voided a 
subsequent marriage per verba de praesenti in church.
2 . a marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula voided a 
subsequent marriage per verba de praesenti in church.
3 . a marriage per verba de praesenti solemnised in church voided a 
subsequent marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula.
4. an unsolemnised marriage per verba de praesenti voided a 
subsequent marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula.
5 . a marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula voided a later 
marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula.
6 . a marriage per verba de futuro subsequente copula voided an 
earlier marriage per verba de futuro without copula.
Each of these circumstances helps to demonstrate the wider theory of 
consent as the sole basis of marriage, as will be shown and also 
presents the litmus test of the validity of a union. If one union
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will bar a subsequent union it must be a valid and unobjectionable 
marriage. The fact circumstances can be illustrated by the following 
cases:
1. The case of Chreichtoune v. Lyntoun^ ^  provides an example of a
solemn prior marriage per verba de praesenti which voided a
subsequent marriage per verba de praesenti in church. In this 
case a declarator of nullity and divorce a vinculo matrimonii was 
granted by William Meldrum the Commissary of the Official 
(1547-1551), because:-
"dicta Joneta longe ante dictum pretensum matrimonium inter ipsam 
et dictum Jacobum contractum erat matrimonialiter conjuncta cum 
Johanne Young eius sponso et matrimonio inter eosdem solempnizato 
adhuc superstiste. Et propterea dictum pretensum posterius 
matrimonium inter dictam Jonetam et prefatum Jacobum contractum 
ab inicio nullum et invalidum".
"The said Janet, a long time before the said pretended marriage
contracted between herself and the said James, was matrimonially 
conjoined with John Young, the sponsalia and marriage solemnised 
between them subsisting till now. And on account of this the
pretended subsequent marriage contracted between the said Janet
and the said James was from the beginning null and invalid".
2. The case cited in support of proposition two states succinctly 
'the relationship between matrimonium initiatum followed by copula
and a subsequent de praesenti declaration. It is clear that when 
copula occurs between the parties this translates a simple
193
promise of future marriage into a firm and binding union thus in 
Nesbet v Hog^ ^  (1543) it was held that:-
"Ex et pro eo quoniam tempore contractus dicti pretensi 
matrimonii idem Gilbertus affidatus fuit cum quodam Joneta 
Duncane adhuc superstite et cum prefata Joneta idem Gilbertus 
longe ante dicti matrimonii contractum seu consummationem 
contraxit sponsalia per verba de futuro carnali copula subsecuta 
in signis cuius dicta Joneta Duncane eidem Gilberto peperit 
quandam prolem femineam post contractum dictorum sponsalium11.
"From and because at the time of contracting the said pretended 
marriage the same Gilbert had been betrothed with a certain Janet 
Duncan who was still alive and Gilbert had, a long time before 
the said marriage was contracted or consummated, contracted a 
betrothal by words of the future tense followed by copula, as 
evidence of which the said Janet Duncan presented the same 
Gilbert with a female child after contracting the said betrothal.
Consequently, as a result of the previous betrothal followed by 
copula, the marriage between Nesbet and Hog was rendered null. 
It had been solemnised in church and as such the impediment 
should have been detected by the declaring of banns. In this 
instance and in five other recorded instances spanning these 
years 1522-1543 the banns failed to show up the pre-existing 
marriage. However, as such marriages were often clandestine it 
would be difficult for them to be brought to the notice of the 
priest, although in the case of Nesbet the existence of a child 
would suggest that the earlier sponsalia should be known.
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That the marriage between Nesbet and Hog was truly annulled is 
proved by two other statements in the sententia namely (1 ) the 
freedom granted to Nesbet the pursuer to marry again and (2) the 
ordaining to the defender to adhere to the party Duncan with whom 
he had entered the sponsalia followed by copula.
3. The third fact circumstance shows that sponsalia per verba de 
futuro followed by copula was a true matrimonium initiatum. It 
requires a sententia to reduce it. It also shows that a prior 
solemn marriage created a diriment impediment which defeated any 
subsequent union.
In the case of Brewhouse v Bonar„„r (1536) John Weddell declared ----------------- olo
sponsalia null and invalid and contrary to the canons where the
j
defender, Bonar had:-
"Longe ante celebrationem dictorum pretensorum sponsalium inter 
ipsam et dictum Jacobum contraxit matrimonium in facie ecclesie 
celebratum cum quodam Willelmo Mowbray longe post celebrationem 
dictorum pretensorum sponsalium inter dictam Agnetam et prefatum 
Jacobum superstite".
"A long time before the celebration of the said pretended 
sponsalia between her and the said James, she contracted marriage 
celebrated in church with William Mowbray which subsisted for 
long after the said pretended sponsalia between the said Agnes 
and the said James".
4. The fourth circumstance displays the acute difference between
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words of the present tense and words of the future tense. As the 
central theme of consent is paramount this instance is perhaps 
the most clear expression of the theory.
The occurrence of de praesenti exchange in church or as shown 
here even outwith church whether followed or not by copula^^ 
created at the exchange a matrimonium ratum, sufficiently valid 
and lawful to defeat any subsequent exchange whether de praesenti 
or de futuro. Therefore it appears quite clear that even a 
clandestine marriage would be favoured and indeed upheld in face 
of a subsequent union.
The clearest instance in the Liber Officialis is the case of 
Halyday v Makesone (153^ ) 3 1 7  * There a sponsalia de facto per 
verba de futuro, apparently without subsequent copula was 
declared null due to a pre-existing exchange of consents per 
verba de praesenti, again unconsummated.
As a corollary of the fact situation under subhead four a 
sponsalia per verba de futuro followed by copula will present a 
diriment impediment of ligamen to a subsequent sponsalia per 
verba de futuro again followed by copula, and thereby render null 
the subsequent sponsalia.
In the case of Neilson v Broune^ ^  (1534) a sponsalia per verba 
de futuro which had been followed by copula, thus forming a 
matrimonium ratum et consummatum was dissolved, even though its 
solemnisation had been ordered by the Official of Lothian in 1534 
because the defender had previously entered into a sponsalia upon
which copula had followed with a third party who was still alive. 
Again the pursuer was allowed to marry another 'in the Lord'. 
However no order for adherence between the defender and the third 
party was made but the defender was found for expenses.
6. The final example of the operation of ligamen is also an example 
of the dissolution of matrimonium initiatum by virtue of the 
impediment of a subsequent matrimonium initiatum followed by 
copula, i.e. a matrimonium ratum et consummatum, this impediment 
necessarily involved sin on the part of those a party to the 
sponsalia and was not an excusive impediment.
It clarifies that the promise of future marriage when followed by 
copula formed a binding and valid marriage by presumption of law.
It also shows that a sponsalia without copula was merely a 
promise of future intent and constituted no binding arrangement, 
and that it could be disregarded certainly with sin in some cases 
but also, as has been shown, in other cases without sin.
In the only reported case in the Liber Officialis, Blak v. 
Robertsone (1516) a sponsalia per verba de futuro expressly 
nulla carnali copula subsecuta was dissolved by reason of 
preceding sponsalia which had been followed by copula. The party 
breaking her oath was obliged to undergo penance, and the second 
sponsalia was dissolved, the innocent party being absolved.
Publica Honestas
197
The diriment impediment of public propriety arose from betrothal and 
was closely linked in theological and canonical theory with the 
following impediment of affinity, to such an extent that it was, as 
Esmein terms it, ’quasi affinitas'^Q* Hay gives some indication of 
the connection between the two impediments^ ^ . Hay speaks of it as 
derived from true betrothal i.e. matrimonium initiatum, which impedes 
subsequent marriage and betrothal and nullifies same to the fourth 
degree .
Public propriety is a sort of affinity established only by an act of 
will, i.e. the exchange of future consent. Affinity properly so 
called is a result of copula, not so with propriety. The impediment 
is concerned with that which is becoming in society and not productive 
of scandal^g*
The impediment could operate in respect of marriages per verba de 
futuro or in respect of de praesenti marriages where no copula had 
occurred, in which case had copula occurred affinity would be the 
appropriate impediment.
There is no case in the extant records where public propriety has been 
pled in bar of a marriage in either pre or post Reformation cases and 
it appears that the impediment died in Scotland at the Reformation 
being part of the contaminating influence of the Catholic Church. It 
should be remembered that the diriment impediment of publica honestas 
was of statutory invention and had substantially no scriptural basis. 
The decretal of Boniface VIII provides the law which states that 
betrothal does not involve public decency except when absolute, 
determinate and in no way invalid through lack of consent
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It is obvious that public propriety cannot occur where the betrothal 
is conditional, nor where it has not been established as being between 
two certain persons. It is important to note that public decency or 
propriety cannot arise unless there is a valid exchange of consents. 
Hay^ 2 5 amplifies this by defining the consents as true or presumptive. 
If consents are exchanged then the basis of the impediment occurs no 
matter what other impedimental bases occur. In effect the basis for 
the impediment occurred in betrothment that was for any reason other 
than want of consent, invalid. This would appear to work against the 
unified theory of consent and impediment sketched supra, however, it 
is explainable on the grounds that public dcency or propriety must 
proceed on a public declaration of consent and cannot proceed on a 
public dissensus. The dissensus which is inherent in the other 
impediments is essentially, to borrow a canonical term, of the forum 
internum.
This view is borne out by the Decree of the Council of Trent’s (1563) 
twenty-fourth Session^g (1563) which removed the impediment of 
justice arising from public honesty where the betrothals are for any 
reason invalid. The impediment was also restricted from the fourth to 
the first degree of relationship.
In Scotland as has been said the impediment appeared to disappear but 
the idea of the unbecoming nature of marriage with certain persons 
persisted and was most clearly shown as will be explained^y* 
impediment of adultery. A certain confusion arose with the concept of 
adultery and public honestas, thus in an Act of 1592^28 relating to 
adultery Parliament enacted
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’the Marriage of Paramours was ... contrary to the Law of God and 
Public Honesty1.
This usage exhibits a debased understanding of the concept and it can 
be concluded that this is a fair example of the mistaken appropriation 
and usage of Canon law terms by legal administrators unschooled in the 
discipline or forgetful of laws which by then were of foreign 
application.
Affinitas
Related to publica honestas insofar as being a narrower basis of 
relationship, affinitas in Canon law bore quite a different meaning 
from that of the Roman law.
In the Civil law marriage was forbidden in the Classical law between 
the less extended degrees of direct ascendants and descendants^^ anci 
a party to the marriage. The later Empire saw an extension by the 
Codex Theodosianus to brothers in law and sisters in law^o* ■^lie 
Civil law included elements of public propriety but the essential 
difference between the two systems, certainly in the sense of the 
developed Canon law was that affinity in the Civil law was based on 
justa nuptia whereas affinitas in the Canon law was an impediment 
based on carnal copula.
H a y ^  can state quoting John Duns Scotus’g ^  commentary on the 
Sentences that 'affinity is a kind of bond between person and person 
produced by carnal copula with somebody related to the other person*.
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The copula can be lawful or not, i.e. either within marriage or as a 
result of fornication, or rape^g*
The canonical theory of affinity was in essence based on the 18th 
Chapter of Leviticus^^ where most prohibitions on the basis of 
relationship originated, as commented upon by Saint Augustine who in 
formulating his theory of unitas carnis arising from copula imported 
not only the conjunction of the flesh but also that of the 
personalities.
This conception of affinity had, as has been shown, the result that 
copula alone produced the relationship. However, it also, through the 
analogy with consanguinity rendered affinity subject to the same 
philosophy and legalism. Therefore affinity was considered as a 
diriment impediment and extended to the same degrees of relationship 
i.e. initially the seventh degree and, after the Fourth Lateran 
Council (1215) to the fourth degree^y
Affinity was calculated in reference to consanguinity. Thus if one 
was related to another in the second degree of consanguinity and that 
person had intercourse with a woman the woman became related in the 
second degree of affinity,^. Dispensation could be obtained from the 
Pope to permit marriage between collateral affines of the first 
degree, but not direct affines,^.
There are over sixty cases of nullity on the basis of affinity in the 
records of the Official of Saint Andrews^gg during the period 
1515-1551. As such it represents the ground of nullity most often 
pled in that court. This is probably again because the system of
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banns was inefficient in detecting impediments which were not 
notorious or instantly cognisable and also because of the nature of 
affinity in being based upon copula which was of itself a private and 
secret affair.
An example of affinity is the sententia of Robert Boswell v. Christine 
A w e r ^ ^  (1551):-
Nos Patricius Scott^^ vicarius de Carcarht Glasguensis diocesis ac 
officialis Santi Andree commissarius generalis in quodam causa 
divorcii per providum virum Robertum Bosuele actorem ab una contra et 
adversus providam etiam mulierem Christinam Awery eius sponsam 
putativam ream partibus ab altera. Decernimus pretensum matrimonium 
inter dictos Robertum Bosuele et prefatam Christinam Awery contractum 
et in facie ecclesie solemnizatum ab initio fuisse et esse nullum et 
invalidum nullumque de jure debuisse sortiri effectum. Ex eo quia 
ante huiusmodi pretensum matrimonium contractum dictus Robertus 
Bosuele carnaliter cognovit Christinam Ramsay sororem germanam Mariote 
Ramsay matris dicte Christine Awery prout ex deductis coram nobis 
legitime probatum existit et ea propter eosdem ab invicem simpliciter 
divorciandos fore prout divorciamus licenciamque et facultatem in 
dominie nubendi impertimur specialem ubi eiisdem placueret dotemque et 
donationes propter nuptias hincinde restituendas fore decernimus per 
presentes.
'We Patrick Scott, vicar of Cathcart in the Diocese of Glasgow and 
Commissary General of Saint Andrews in the cause of divorce between 
the honourable Robert Boswell pursuer of the one part against 
Christine Awery that honourable woman his putative spouse defender of
the other part. We decern the pretended matrimony between the said 
Robert Boswell and Christine Awery which was contracted and solemnised 
in church was from the beginning and is null and invalid and is even 
more so of no effect at law. From and because before the said
pretended marriage was contracted the said Robert Boswell carnally 
knew Christine Ramsay the full sister of Mariot Ramsay the mother of 
the said Christine Awery which was legitimately proved to have
occurred before us and on account of that they were from the beginning 
divorced, just as we now divorce them. Permission and ability to 
marry in the Lord whenever it is pleasing is prescribed and we decern 
that the dos and the donationes propter nuptias are restored whence 
they came1.
Impotentia Coeundi
Impotence as a diriment impediment was of fairly late definition in 
Canon Law.
Hay quotes Hostiensis and Petrus de la Palu, in the initial definition 
as a ’lack or defect, natural or accidental whereby one is prevented
from having carnal intercourse with another^.j1.
As preventing intercourse, impotence struck at the major reason for 
marriage, namely the procreation of children. The existence of this 
impediment does not mean that the ability for copula ruled the 
dissolubility or indissolubility of marriage. This had been well 
settled in the development of the copulatheoria of Hincmar of Rheims 
and the reply of Peter Lombard.
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There had been early indications in the Church that dissolubility may 
be the appropriate remedy^^* When studied by Hincmar, marriage was 
only a sacrament, and thus indissoluble, upon the occurrence of carnal 
copula. If carnal copula could not take place there could be no 
sacrament therefore the ’marriage1 could be dissolved. This was 
difficult to reconcile with the theory of Lombard where marriage came 
into sacramental and physical being with the exchange of consents and 
was then truly indissoluble^]^. In which case copula being incapable 
of occurring, the marriage could only be null on the ground of the 
impediment of impotence. In many respects the impediment was akin to 
an error of condition, and in such a way it should be analysed. The 
question to be asked in relation to a consent to a marriage with an 
impotent person should be, if one knew of the impotence in one’s 
partner would one have consented to marry? If the answer was no then 
there is a true defect of consent, and any consent given is nullified 
by the non-fulfilment of an essential condition of the contract, i.e. 
the ability to perform sexual intercourse.
The impotence in order to nullify the contract had to be incurable and 
perpetual. If the impotence was temporary, i.e. that it would pass 
with time or curable i.e. that surgery could restore potency, it was 
insufficient to render a marriage null^^.
The impotence also, in order to negate consent, had to be antecedent 
to the exchange of consents could arise from physical or psychological 
sources.
Thus the recognisable instances of impotency e.g. castration, 
frigidity, physical incapability, arcitudo, and vaginism are confused
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in the medieval treatment with other grounds which are clearly of the 
nature of dissensus thus madness^^* nonage^g and witchcraft^^ are 
also listed as bases of impotence.
In the respect of treating madness and nonage as branches of 
impotentia Hay departs from the treatment given by Hostiensis to these 
impediments and also that given by Bartholemeus Brixiensis. In 
Hostiensis there is found a particular impediment of dissensus listed 
and the work of Bartholemew lists 'aetas and habitum conjuge furori* 
as separate diriment impediments^g•
Hay then represents a rationalised theory recognising a fundamental 
connection between various forms of impediment and leaving the forms 
of impediment to be examined not as separate impediments but as 
different aspects of the one impediment.
It had been well settled that a furiosus could not exchange consents 
and therefore madness presented itself as a diriment impediment to any 
marriage contracted in face of the inability to consent^g. If 
however a person contracted during a lucid interval the jnarriage was 
valid, on the other hand a person contracting whilst mad could ratify 
his consent by subsequent actings upon his recovery^Q.
In examining impuberty or nonage the canonist is thrown back on the 
Civil law. Once again, ’ecclesia vivit jure Romano1 is the 
appropriate maxim.
In Roman law the matrimonial institution involved in many cases the 
acqusition of potestas thus Justinian states
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’qui secundum praecepta legum coeunt masculi quidem puberes feminae 
autem viripotentes’
"those who join together according to the requirements of law, the 
male being over puberty and the female capable of child bearing^.]"
The ages at which the male became over puberty was fourteen and the 
woman capable of child bearing twelve^^
The Canon law adopted these ages as is told by Hay not for their own 
sake "but also in relation to capacity for intercourse’’^ ^ * Again, 
the emergence of the impediment diriment of marriage is clouded by the 
Copulatheoria debate. Suffice it to say that under the theory nonage 
presented an opportunity for the dissolution of matrimonium initiatum, 
i.e. betrothal, whereas with the recognition of Lombard’s theory of de 
presenti consents, it could not be a ground of dissolution and could 
only be a ground of nullity^,^. There was of course the noted 
canonical exception of a marriage between impubes which was held valid 
where "malitia supplet aetatem" malice supplies age, i.e. that a 
person below 12 or 14 was presumed to have approached consent in full 
knowledge of the matter and making up for the lack of years in 
experience^^.
There are illustrations of the impediment of impotentia in the Liber 
Officialis both in the respect of sexual impotency and in that of 
nonage. The latest example of sexual impotence was that of Millar v 
Watson (1544)^^..
Nos Martinus Balfour^y in quodam causa matrimoniali per Elizabeth
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Millar sponsam putativam Davidis Watsoun contra eundem Davidem de 
facto et non de jure contractum ab inicio fuisse et esse nullum 
matrimonium. Ex et proce quia dictus David tempore dicti contractus 
matrimonii cum dicta Elizabeth propter impotentiam provenientem ex 
frigiditate nature ipsius Davidis adeo impotens fuit prout de presenti 
est quod omnino cum eadem Elizabeth coire nequiebat nec de presenti 
nequit nec ullam copulam carnalem cum ea habere potest quamvis sepe et 
diversis vicibus pro hiusmodi copula carnali inter ipsos habenda 
operam dantes solus cum sola nudus cum nuda in uno lecto iacuerunt 
post solemnizationem dicti pretensi matrimonii stante igitur huiusmodi 
impedimento impotentie et frigiditatis nature dicti Davidis huiusmodi 
pretensum matrimonium inter eosdem Elizabeth et Davidem cassamus et 
divorcamus ipsosque abinvicem separamus dantes dicte Elizabeth alibi 
in domino nubendi facultatem et quicquid alter ab altera causa 
donationis vel dotis seu ex quacumque alia causa receperit eidem 
restituendum fore decernimus.
•We Martin Balfour in this matrimonial cause between Elizabeth Millar 
putative spouse of David Watson against the same David. We decern 
that the pretended marriage between Elizabeth and David is contracted 
only de facto not de jure and is and was from the beginning a null 
marriage. From and because the said David was at the time of the said 
contract of marriage with the said Elizabeth, on account of an 
apparent impotence arising from a natural frigidity, impotent just as 
at the moment he is impotent with all persons and he was not able and 
is not able to copulate with the same Elizabeth and that he can not 
have any carnal copula with her because of separate and diverse 
failings in this way, working at carnal copula they have been alone 
and naked in the one bed after the solemnization during the currency
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of the marriage. In this way because of the impediment of natural 
impotency and frigidity between the said Elizabeth and David we split 
and divorce them and separate them from the beginning, giving to the 
said Elizabeth, the right to marry again in the Lord and that which 
the one received from the other as a gift or dowry we decern is to be 
returned*.
This case illustrates much of the law as shown above; the marriage is 
truly null. This is not dissolution of a valid marriage: the
marriage has never in law existed, although in fact it had been
solmenized. This is shown because both parties are permitted to 
remarry.
In Millar v. Watson the man suffered from frigidity. There are two 
other cases of sexual impotence heard before the Official of Saint 
Andrews which provide other examples of grounds for nullity. Both of 
these cases relate to female instances of impotence.
In the early case of Mailvail and Hepburne (1516-1520)^0 the
impotence arose from:- ’’arctitatem in membro secreto dicte Margarete" 
”a narrowness in the secret member of the said Margaret”. Similarly 
in the later case of Mvrton de Cambo v. Forsyth (1543)___  before
  31-, y
Andrew Trailing Capellanus of Saint Michael’s Church in Saint Andrews 
and Commissary of Martin Balfour, Official Principal of Saint Andrews, 
the impotency is on the part of the female party:-
"Margareta ... omino inhabilis et inidonea habens in interioribus 
partibus membri sui genitalis impedimentum ... et ad carnalem copulam 
provus inidonea”.
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"Margaret ... for all men is unable and unsuitable having an 
impediment in the internal parts of her genital organs ... and is 
certainly unsuitable for carnal intercourse".
It also narrates that the parties had attempted to consummate their 
union, indeed this is explained with an unambiguity of statement to 
say the least descriptive. In short, all the elements of the Canon 
law had been fulfilled and consequently there was no other decision 
which the Official could make but to grant the nullity.
A case based on madness is unfortunately not to be found in the Liber
Officialis. However there are three cases dealing with the impotency
arising from nonage. One case has already been examined in relation
to matrimonium initiatum.,-„. The other cases show clearly the
3b1
operation of the impediment
'Nos Joannes Spittall in causa divorcii per Alexandrum Ogistoune 
contra Jonetam Irrevyny suam sponsam putativam ab una et altera 
partibus Decernimus quoddam pretensum matrimonium inter dictos 
Alexandrum et Jonetam de facto et non de jure contractum ab inicio 
fuisse et esse nullum matrimonium. Ex es primo quod idem Alexander 
Ogistoune actor tempore contractus et celebrationis dicti matrimonii 
fuit impubes minime attingens decimum quartum sue etatis annum et sic 
minor minime potens de jure ad contrahendum matrimonium. Turn secundo 
quia iidem Alexander et Joneta mutuo attingebant et attingunt de 
presenti sibi invicem in tertio et quarto gradibus affinitatis prout 
de deductis coram nobis clare extat probatum huiusmodi pretensum 
matrimonium annullamus ipsosque Alexandrum et Jonetam dantes utrique 
alibi in domino nubendi facultatem omnimodam. Et quicquid alter ab
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altera causa donationis vel dotis recepierit eidem restituendum fore 
decernimus'.
'We John Spittal in the cause of divorce by Alexander Ogiston against 
Jonet Irving his putative spouse of the one part and of the other. We 
decern that the pretended marriage contracted between the said 
Alexander and Jonet is only de facto and not de jure and is and was 
from the beginning null. From on the first count because Alexander 
Ogiston the pursuer at the time of contracting and celebration of the 
said marriage was in impuberty being less than 14 years of age and as 
such younger than the youngest able by law to contract marriage. Then 
on the second count because both Alexander and Jonet were mutually 
related and are so related in the third and fourth degrees of affinity 
just as it appears clear to us from the proof led before us and so we 
divorce the said Alexander and Jonet from the conjugal bond and mutual 
servitude, giving both permission to marry again in the Lord and we 
decern that which the one or the other has received by way of gift or 
dowry is to be restituted'.
This case of Ogiston v Irving (^548)^ ^  is based upon two impediments 
disclosed in the course of the proof, i.e. nonage and affinity. Again 
nonage in the sense of being younger than fourteen is the criterion, 
as would be expected, for the nullity of the match. In the other case 
of nonage Leitht v Elphinston^ ^  occurring twentyfive years earlier in 
1523 centres around a young girl who was only ten years of age or 
thereabouts when the consents were exchanged
'in qua etate nullum prestare potuit consensum'
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’at which age no consent can be given1.
True nullity is the result of such a pretended marriage and both 
parties are released with the ability to remarry.
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CHAPTER IV
Valid Marriage in the Post Reformation Period
This chapter deals with the post Reformation equivalents of 
matrimonium ratum non consummatum and ratum et consummatum. Betrothal 
in the post Reformation epoch has already been dealt with for the 
convenience of comparison.
It is difficult to ascertain any 'reception1 of Canon law as a viable 
set of rules, by the Reformers, for the regulation of the relationship 
of husband and wife after the Reformation. This having been said does 
not mean necessarily that the thoughts of the Reformers were not 
turned to the question of whether some or all Canon law should be 
maintained after the abrogation of Papal authority and jurisdiction.
Certainly much of the previous law did not conform with "Goddis Word" 
but much did so conform and indeed as has been shown whilst some Canon 
law was of a self interested nature, much was concerned with social 
control and even more was firmly based on scriptural prescriptions 
which could not without fear of self contradiction be usefully denied 
by the Reformers.
Therefore rather than state those elements of Canon law which were 
deemed so pernicious to the Reformed cause the Reformers were content 
to single out certain limited causes of grievance and attack these in 
an attempt to define their policy. This expedient treatment accounts 
for the equivocal dealing of the Reformers with marriage in the ninth
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head of the First Book of Discipline. Desirous to keep marriage as a 
social institution and indeed to strengthen the Church’s control over 
the institution the Reformers were loath to condemn Canon law and 
therefore imprecise and deliberately conciliatory language is used in 
the First Book of Discipline. Thus the authors write
"Because the marriage, ... in this cursed Papistry, hath partly bene 
contemned and partly hath bene so infirmed that the parties ... could 
never be assured if the ... Prelates test to dissolve the same^."
The difficulty facing the Reformers was obviously how to separate 
wheat from chaff. Would it be possible to divide the law on matrimony 
into that which was contaminated and infirmed by Papal law and that 
which remained ’good' law i.e. consonant with Reformed opinion?
The success of the Reformers in this endeavour can only be measured by 
the extent to which innovations were introduced. Many innovations 
would indicate a high level of dissatisfaction with the earlier law. 
Few innovations would conversely show that the bulk of the earlier 
Canon law accorded with the broad conceptual framework of the emerging 
marriage law of the Reformed society.
Therefore it comes as little surprise that there is no Reformed 
restatement of the law and much must be understood as being subject to 
the earlier law without express import or statement.
To speak therefore of marriage per verba de praesenti is somewhat 
difficult as the phrase hardly enters into the Reformed vocabulary. 
However, there are enough references and indications which show that
the Reformers are dealing with the same mode of institution of
marriage.
It is clear from the First Book of Discipline that mutual exchange of 
consent in present words made as valid a marriage as was formed by 
this mode in the pre Reformation era, "both require and are content to 
live together in that Holy Bond of Matrimony’^ .
Consent is the keystone of the post Reformation law of marriage as it
was in the pre Reformation time, and there are several cases before
the Kirk Sessions to enforce the solemnisation of private mutual
contracts of marriage. Thus an act relating to banns stated that "all
who contracted or have made a promise (of future marriage)" should
give notice to the scribe of the consistorial court of the ministers
and elders of the city^. The requirement of a public ceremony^ did
not detract from the essential validity of a clandestine marriage. In
the case of Oliphant v. Morton (1562)- a couple who were accused of ------------------- o
living at bed and board but not being married answered that they had 
contracted marriage. They were ordained to solemnise same and it is 
shown from the Act that a distinction in the terminology of the 
Reformers had arisen corresponding closely to the canonical
distinction of matrimoniam initiatum or promise to marry and 
matrimonium ratum per verba de praesenti, valid marriage contracted by 
words of the present tense.
The terminology is however not always distinct and the difference
between ’promise’ and ’contract’ is often confused if indeed it was 
recognised by the user of the phrases.
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Canonical phrases had a certainty to which centuries of legal 
development had contributed. It comes as no surprise that the 
Reformed Church recognised this and thus in 1565 the General Assembly 
in considering a complaint against a minister, John Frude, hears that 
he told "lady Kilconquhar and John Weymes to contract per verba de 
praesenti”g.
Other examples are equally valid as examples of solemnly contracted 
marriages or by attempts to interdict subsequent marriages on the 
basis of a prior clandestine mutual exchange of consents^. It must be 
said however that most suits for the solemnisation of marriage follow 
upon promises to marry which in most cases are to be equated with the 
sponsalia per verba de futuro. It nevertheless remains the case that 
a solemn exchange de praesenti was a valid method of constituting
marriage and could defeat an earlier de futuro declaration not on the 
basis of inherent invalidity of the early future promise but rather 
because such promises were not of their nature made in church, 
although they could be before witnessesg. Thus for a woman wishing to 
protect her considered position as a ’wife’ under a future promise 
even if supported by subsequent copula, the best course to follow 
would be to inhibit the ’husband1 from any intervening marriage and 
obtain a decree of solemnisation, based upon the promise^. Thus in 
the process of Synton and Robertson (1561) the pursuer Thomas Syntoun 
sues the defender Margaret Robertson to solemnise the promise of
marriage between them, which had been made before the reader of 
Fergondyn and some ’famous1 witnesses. The promise was held by the
superintendent and elders to be lawfully made and solemnisation was
ordained.
I
228
This insufficiency of the promise of future marriage even with 
following copula is a phenomenon already noticed in the treatment of 
sponsalia per verba de futuro. The Kirk desired to control marriage 
even as did the Catholic Church. Thus whilst feeling itself unable to 
issue a decree ’Tametsi'^ instituting clandestinity as a diriment 
impediment, it tried to wean the faithful towards a solemn ceremony, 
and certainly away from the idea that a promise to marry in the future 
if followed by copula made a marriage^. Thus the copula even if 
following on a promise often was punished as fornication, adultery or 
whoredome, "sinnes most common in this realme"^ which the First Book 
of Discipline ordained should be punished as according to Leviticus;
"If any man commit adultery with the wife of another, and defile his 
neighbour’s wife, let them be put to death, both the adulterer and the 
adulteress^"
following upon the general injunction;
"But a widow or one that is divorced or defiled or a harlot he shall 
not take, but a maid of his own people^".
Even so neither the concepts of the validity of sponsalia followed by 
copula nor private mutual consents could truly be suppressed without
an abrogation of the maxim consensus non coitus facit matrimoniumi6* 
There remained a distinction between fornication and copula following 
on a promise or a private consensual contract. Although the General 
Assembly in 1563 attempted to withhold validity from sponsalia and 
copula until the parties had undergone punishment as 'breakers of good 
order' and slanderers of the Kirk. Faith could only be given to the
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promise if witnesses would speak to it^, failing proof of the promise 
the offenders were to be punished as fornicators. This re-inforced 
the earlier decreet of the Assembly which ordained the penalty of 
public repentance for those who commit copulation between the promise 
and solemnisation .jg. Yet with this decreet the copula was not equated 
with fornication, the distinction is significant. It does however 
appear that in Stirling in 1597 a couple were ordained to make public 
repentance for "fornication under promise of marriage" and that 
cohabitation was to cease lest the parties fall into fornication 
again. At such a point there is a departure from the canonical idea 
of valid marriage being created upon the presumed consent at copula 
following on a promise of future marriage^. The secular power was 
enlisted to control fornication and the Act of 1567 established a 
scale of penalties ranging in severity from the moderate fine of £40 
Scots or imprisonment for 8 days for a first offence to the rather 
harsh fine of £100 and 24 days imprisonment and a threefold ducking 
and banishment2q .
The terminology of Canon law, like the concept of consent, survived, 
therefore the distinction between per verba de futuro and per verba de 
praesenti sponsalia can be commented on by the General Assembly in 
1 5 7 0 ^ 1 and although the classic phraseology does not feature in other 
sources, it is retained in the Commissary Court, and Stair can 
acknowledge the distinction between espousals and consents exchanged 
per verba de praesenti, stating that it is "not every consent to the 
married state that makes matrimony but a consent de presenti and not a 
promise de futuro matrimonio^".
In the 1560 fs at least the basis of post Reformation marriage was
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clearly exactly the same as the canonical system, and whilst the 
theory may have undergone modification at the hands of inexpert or 
legally ignorant or untrained elders and ministers, when it came to 
rendering the law, Stair was forced back to the Canon law which as he 
himself acknowledged as containing many "equitable and profitable 
laws^'1 and was to quote from the Concordia in his principal 
proposition2ij.
The Impedient Impediments
That consensus was the efficient cause of marriage is also to be 
deduced from the impediments acknowledged by the Reformers as 
displaying either dissensus by way of inability to consent or by way 
of initiating the consent.
The general scheme of impediments as regulated by the Canon law 
survived the acts of the Reformation Parliament. That the concept of 
impediment survived and was well known is clear^. There is a case in 
1565 before the Kirk Session of Saint Andrews to discuss an 
'impediment proponed' but the impediments themselves if not the theory 
behind them, to prevent illegal, immoral or bad marriages, were 
subject to some revisal by the Reformers.
As has been described, the canonical system had two types of 
impediment; impedient impediments, which rendered a marriage unlawful 
but not null and diriment impediments which struck at the consent 
showing either dissensus or removing the ability to consent. Stair 
confirms the survival of the theory by quoting the canonistic dictum:
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'multa impediunt matrimonium contrahendum quae non dirimunt 
contractum1
’many things impede the contracting of marriage which do not nullify 
the contract^g’*
and whilst from the decided cases this distinction was operated in 
practice there is remarkably little recognition of so legalistic a 
conceptualisation by institutions like the Kirk Session which were 
operating as courts.
In the earlier section on impedient impediments in the Canon law it 
was shown that many of the impediments had been introduced as a method 
of firstly, social control and secondly, of protecting the Church and 
its ministers.
The impediments lost from the categories of impedient and diriment 
impediments are clear examples of how the Reformers considered the 
Canon law under the Popes to have contaminated marriage. Therefore, 
incest as an impedient impediment is forsaken as are wife murder, 
reception of one’s children from the font, priest murder, penitance 
and the marriage of a nun.
The impedient nature of incest appears to run contrary to the reformed 
interpretation of Leviticus,,^ which defined the degrees of propinquity 
for the Reformer and as there was little scriptural authority for the 
impediment, it disappeared. The impediments of wife murder, priest 
murder and penitance were each unsupported by scripture and ran to an 
extent contrary to at least some Reformed ideas, penance for example
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was rejected by the Reformers in Scotland who retained only two 
sacraments, namely eucharist and baptising* This was in 
contra-distinction to the Calvinist subordinate role for penance. The 
Reformers were in such instances prepared to withdraw specific 
benefits of the Kirk including marriage from recognised wrong-doersg^, 
however even in an anti-clerical age the removal of presbytericide is 
somewhat of a surprise.
More curious is the removal of any impedient, or for that matter 
diriment, impediment based on the spiritual relationship. Certainly 
confirmation was not a sacrament in the Reformed tradition but baptism 
was, and it could be that the only explanation behind the removal of 
the impediment was a gradual weakening of the concept of spiritual 
kinship. Thus the subordination of the godparent to the role of 
witness, whilst explaining to an extent the usage at the baptismal
ceremony whereby the natural father presents the child and holds him
at the font, does not take account of the effect of the removal of the 
legal rights and restrictions of cognatio spiritualis^Q*
Little can be said about the removal of the impediment relating to the 
marriage of a nun except that female religious communities were 
gradually dying out and from this and the evidence provided by Sir 
David Lindsay’s "Thrie Estatis” , i.e. the impediment was in any case 
ineffective.
Some impedient impediments were retained by the Reformers for example 
unlawful time, and at least one new impedient impediment was added, 
that of religious knowledge. Parental consent has already been
discussed as an impediment and whilst its character was similar to an
impediment it remained merely a counsel or precept and did not become 
a requirement of law^. It is also possible to classify clandestinity 
as an impedient impediment particularly in comparison to the diriment 
impediment introduced for Catholic Europe by the Decree of Tametsi at 
Trent in 1563g2•
Unlawful Time
The Reformers looked upon the Catholic ferial days as already 
described as contrary to the doctrine contained in Holy Scripture. By 
the First Book of Discipline the ’keeping of Holy days ... such as be 
all those that the Papists have invented^' were abolished.
The penitential periods of the Catholic Church, Advent, Lent, and the 
Rogation days were, at least formally swept away. Many attempts to 
expunge the Feast days were made but they survived in the common 
consciousness of the people, and the attempts of the General Assembly 
to abolish, for example, Christmas were doomed to failure^.
If however it was difficult to abolish a popular feast it was popular 
to abolish the restrictions appending the various times of preparation 
before the feasts. Permission to marry on any day was not a corollary 
of the abolition of the ferial times. Following the Calvinistic^ 
practice of Geneva, Sunday was ordained as the day for the celebration 
of marriage
"Sunday before noon we think most expedient for marriage and it be 
used no day else, without the consent of the whole ministrie^g"•
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This injunction survived without modification until 1569 when, 
following upon the case of Zwill and Ogilvy^  the marriage which was 
to be celebrated on a Sunday was permitted on a Wednesday because of 
illness on the part of the minister or parties.
The impediment of unlawful time was closely linked to the avoidance of 
clandestinity. In 1567 a minister, Patrick Craigh of Ratho was 
suspended for "marrying fornicators without banns on a ferial day^g"* 
Some two years later a decree of the General Assembly permitted 
marriage on "feriall days"^ this relaxation of the restriction which 
allowed marriage only on a Sunday led to a more liberal attitude.
In 1580 marriage was permitted on any Wednesday providing that the 
banns had been read on the three preceding Sundays, again the spectre 
of the clandestine haunts the Kirk Session^. In Perth in 1583 it was 
permitted by the Kirk Session that marriage could be celebrated on a 
Monday^ this was followed in Perth during the following year when 
both Thursday and Sundays were allowed^. An equally permissive 
arrangement was struck in Saint Andrews where the celebration was 
allowed in 1597 to be made on "a Wednesday and Friday before the 
Sermon^1*. case of emergencies the right was extended to the
remaining week days following the decision in Wod v. Englis,^.
Finally the impediment was removed in 1610 when the General Assembly 
permitted the marriage celebration on any day "when the samine shall 
be required"^. The development of the impediment of unlawful time 
from the canonistic ferial days through the early Reformation period 
of uncertainty and culminating in a release of restriction is 
interesting in itself and entirely logical as a progression, but can
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probably only be explained as an effort to contain clandestinity. It 
may be that the loosening of the restriction of permitted times is
merely indicative of the recognition of the failure of the rules
against clandestinity. It acknowledges, as was the case in 
clandestine declarations, that marriages could be made at any time, in 
any place, to attack this rule would probably appear to the Reformed 
legal theoretician to be an attack on the absolute validity of de 
praesenti exchange of consents and the replacement of restrictive 
canonical rules with mere imitations under a reformed guise.
Religious Knowledge
It was an avowed intention of the Kirk in its exercise of policy to
•bring the ignorant to knowledge and to reteine the Kirk in good
order1 ^  and many prescriptions were set out in the First Book of 
Discipline in an effort to attain these aims. Amongst them is the 
requirement that those seeking to communicate by taking the Lord’s 
Supper should know and be able to recite the ’Lord’s Prayer, the 
Articles of Beliefe^ and declare the summe of the Law^g*. This 
prescription whilst applicable in the Book of Discipline to 
communicants also appears in the Saint Andrews Kirk Session Register 
in relation to those wishing to be married. In 1570 for example the 
minister, elders, and deacons ordained that none were to be received 
for marriage unless they could recite the Our Father, the Creed, and 
the Ten Commandments^.
It is interesting that this requirement in marriage is the same as 
that in eucharist, certain equalities of treatment between the 
sacrament of eucharist and the ’Holy bond’ of matrimony have already
been noticed. Once again the similarity of treatment betrays, perhaps 
a similarity of concept in the minds of the Reformers.
The requirement of sufficient education in the faith is not productive
of a diriment impediment. Marriage was permitted if there was
ignorance, subject to a fine for example in the case of Broun v. Pryde
(1591),-n a fine of 30s was imposed for ignorance but the marriage was bu
permitted to be contracted, and not nullified. The marriage was valid 
and perhaps illegal but the fault or sin could be purged^ -j.
It is perhaps also indicative of the reliance on consent as the 
foundation of the relationship that the question of the ignorance or 
wisdom of the parties with regard to the married state arises. Thus 
in 1578 the Kirk Session in Perth ordains all who have put in their 
applications for banns to take instruction from the Readers, "in the 
true causes of marriage",^. The rationale is plain; one cannot 
consent to that which one does not understand. Of course the weakness 
in this and the preceding impedient impediment of unlawful time is 
that they can relate of their nature only to solemnly celebrated 
marriages in facie ecclesiae, and cannot have any relevance to 
clandestine contracts.
Thus whilst the impetus behind impedient impediments has swung from 
social control and ecclesiastical protection^ assurance of the
Godly Elect of the Church that the marriages amongst them do not 
offend God or slander his Kirk, the essential weakness in the Reformed 
scheme of impediments is that clandestinity itself is not a diriment 
impediment. This topic will be further discussed under the head of 
Formalities of Marriage.
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The Diriment Impediments
The canonical scheme of diriment impediments, those which render a 
marriage void consent also survived the Reformation though in a 
reduced number and extent. That essentially lack of consent should 
remain the basis of nullity follows logically from consent remaining 
the basis of validity. It is clear that consent was still the 
essential element as the First Book of Discipline shows
"The work of God we call when two hearts ... are so joyned and both 
require and are content to live together in that holy band of 
Matrimony^".
This tenet is underlined in a later passage
"Marriage ought not to be contracted amongst persons that have no 
election for lack of understanding^"
This last statement notwithstanding its conformity with the general 
principle also seems to introduce a departure from that principle in 
the sense of a compartmentalisation which betrays a rejection of some 
sound Thomist philosophy on the matter of the relationship between 
Eternal law, Human law and Natural law, philosophy^ which could be 
acceptable to the Reformers in many respects and which would have 
allowed the Reformers to retain an interconnected theory of impediment 
as an expression of dissensus rather than a theory of impediments each 
grounded on its own rationale.
But such philosophy buried as it was in more unacceptable bodies of
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dogma was difficult to sift from the ’contrary doctrines’ which the
Reformers found in the ’Lawes, counsells, or constitutions^’ imposed
by the Pope without scriptural authority upon the consciences of men.
Some of the canonical diriment impediments are expressly struck at by 
the First Book of Discipline e.g. vows of Chastity, and foreswearing 
of marriage by taking Holy Orders^g. These objections spring 
certainly from the Calvinist doctrine which viewed as absurd the
prohibition on clerical marriage arising from the diriment impediment 
of order
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Public propriety appears to have disappeared altogether as an 
impediment although as has already been indicated was not to lose all 
effect.
Substantially the scheme of impediments, apart from these already 
mentioned which had ceased effectively to be impediments, if not
through express revocation, then through desuetude, remained the same. 
To this proposition there was however the notable exception of 
relationship which although it remained as an impediment was, on the 
basis of scriptural authority, considerably reduced in scope.
The diriment impediments which remained as an expression of 
fundamental dissensus were error, relationship, adultery, force, prior 
marriage, affinity and impotence. Nonage emerged as a separate head 
of impediment.
Error
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Stair gives the definitive post Reformation view that error in 
substantials voids any consent to marriage between people unless 
future consent with full knowledge supervenes^. He, like Hay gives 
the biblical example of Jacob, Rachel and Leah^ in support of his 
proposition.
However Stair’s treatment of error is not based on Canon law, as the 
later passage^ on circumvention in contracts displays. He discusses 
the effect of dolus malus as the act of fraud inducing contract. 
Clearly, on the basis of the authorities quoted^, the fraudulent 
inducement must be the effective cause of the obligation, and there 
must be error in substantials nullifying the consent and rendering the 
obligation void. He proposes a hypothetical case of marrying one 
thinking her to be another, which is void, and he distinguishes error 
qualitatis e.g. of virginity, wealth, or good nature which is not of 
the essentials and which does not effect the validity of the union^.
The error of quality was a point of some contention in Saint Andrew’s 
in 1565, where in the Case of Lokaird v. Tholland^ where the woman 
Tholland was unwilling to solemnise the bond because she had 
discovered subsequent to the promise that her prospective husband was 
a thief and unclean in his body. The minister thought that an error 
in quality was no impediment but was overruled by the elders and 
deacons who were of a contrary opinion and who stopped any banns, 
effectively preventing the marriage. This decision was later 
overruled by the superintendent^  who ordered that the marriage be 
solemnised, notwithstanding the error of quality, within 40 days under 
pain of excommunication. Thus the canonical position was restored 
probably on the basis of Canon law not the Roman law.
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Stair however, certainly did not use the Canon law in his analysis but 
rather writing from the standpoint of ’received’ Roman law could 
confidently quarry the Civil law upon which to build his view of the 
Municipal law of Scotland.
Relationship
The canonical restrictions upon marriage within certain degrees of 
relationship were manifold being based upon consanguinity, affinity, 
legal and spiritual propinquity. As such it has been already noticed 
that relationship was much argued and contested as being unduly 
prohibitive, inductive of sin or of sham marriages, and whilst 
possibly ameliorated by dispensation was productive of discontent 
particularly amongst the nobility and landed classes and also of legal 
argument and reforming agitation amongst the lawyers and the creators 
of ecclesiastical policy^.
Calvin in his Institutes singled out the Canon law of relationship as 
confirmation of the Catholic Church’s tyranny, being 'laws partly 
impious toward God partly fraught with injustice toward niengg *• He 
complained further that no 'lawful marriages can be contracted between 
relations within the seventh degree and that such marriages if 
contracted should be dissolved. Moreover, they (the Canonists) frame 
degrees of kindred contrary to the laws of all nations ... that 
spiritual kindred cannot be joined in marriage^'.
In these objections apart from ignoring the provisions of the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215) which reduced the prohibited degrees from the 
seventh to the fourth in consanguinity and affinity, Calvin puts the
Reformers’ objections to the Canon law in this area fairly succinctly. 
It is curious however that the Scottish Reformers do not make mention 
of relationship in the First Book of Discipline. Allusions are only 
made to the fear which some married couples may have had in the time 
of ’Cursed Papistry’ regarding arbitary dissolution of marriages of 
the Bishops and Prelates if they so desired,^.
However, it may be that the authors of the First Book of Discipline 
felt that the supplication made by the General Assembly on December 
1560 to the Lords and Estatis to interpone authority to an act 
regarding relationship was sufficient to bring to the notice of the 
secular authority’s notice the views of the reformed religion on this 
important matter^. The act narrated that the Pope had prohibited the 
solemnisation of marriage between those related within the second and 
’uther degries of consanguinitie’ and that on the contrary, by the Law 
of God, marriage may be celebrated betwixt parties ’beard of second, 
third and ferd degries of affinitie or consanguinitie and wheris sick 
as are not prohibited expressly be the Word of God’.
This supplication went unheeded by secular authority until 1567 when 
Acts of Parliament were passed regarding incest, consanguinity and 
affinity^. In the meantime the ecclesiastical authority was not 
adverse to supplying the deficiencies of the law and providing 
regulations to fill the hiatus between the Canon law and the reformed 
secular rule.
An example of the Session overturning a sententia of the ’Old 
Regiemine’ is Cunninghame v. Wood^o (1561) at Saint Andrews where a 
case of adherence was defended by claiming that a decree of nullity
had been granted by the Official's Court. The Kirk Session having 
examined the judgement ordered adherence because, (1) the papistical 
jurisdiction had been abolished, (2) the divorce on the grounds of 
consanguinity or propinquity did not accord with the Law of God, and 
(3) in any case there had been a dispensation permitting the marriage.
Another case in Saint Andrews in 1564/65 shows something of the Kirk's 
uncertainty in regulating such marriages particularly without any firm 
legal pronouncement or promulgation to be used as a guide. The case 
of Ment v. Scot^^ arose from the marriage of brothers and sisters 
children, i.e. cousins. Without pronouncement on the legality of the 
union the Kirk Session separated the parties pending advice from the 
General Assembly.
In 1565 the Assembly directed that the marriage between a man and his 
former brother in law's daughter was null on the ground of affinity,^.
However a strict adherence to the Law of God as contained in Leviticus 
would not prove to be completely workable. Thus it is found that the 
General Assembly was called upon to decide on a cause of consanguinity 
arising from a man's relationship with his cousins. The Assembly 
noted that this relationship was not contrary to the Law of God, yet 
it could cause much inconvenience in the Country and so some law 
should be clarified in the near future. In the meantime apart from 
the ad hoc declaration of validity, all other similar marriages were 
prohibited,^.
The parliamentary answers to the supplication of 1560 and the 
subsequent one of 1565 were made in 1567 by two Acts regulating the
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crime of incest and the relationships of consanguinity and affinity. 
The confusion between the subject matter of the two Acts of 1567 has 
been often commented upon^^. A recent article on incest notices that 
in basing the law on incest and consanguinity on Chapter 18 of
Leviticus the Reformers were in danger of misinterpreting the Bible, 
’creating1 a specific crime of incest on the basis of a chapter which
is determining the scope of marriage within a family.
No mention is made however on the emergence of the Reformed law as a 
reaction to the extremely wide prohibitions of the Canon law. 
Certainly it cannot be doubted that the contracting of the degrees of 
propinquity as shown in the 18th Chapter of Leviticus to the narrow 
extent of within the second degree creates a nuclear family or ’core’ 
family in modern terminology, the ’patriarchal and submissive’ 
grouping appropriate to the warlike family system of sixteenth century 
Scotland,^.
The Act narrates anent the lawful marriage of the one blood and
prescribes that ’seconds in degrees of consanguinitie and affinitie 
and all degrees outwith the same contained in the Word of God and that 
are not repugnant to the said word micht and may lauchfullie marie at 
all tymes sen the viii day of March, zeir of God 1558 zeiris 
notwithstanding ony law, statute and constitution maid in the 
contrare’^ ^.
All marriages made in such terms since March 1558 were ratified and 
made lawful, furthermore all children born of such unions are declared 
to be lawful.
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The ’seconds in degrees of consanguinitie and affinitie’ were reckoned 
on the Canonical method of computation not that of the Roman Law.
’and all degrees outwith the same contained in the Word of God and 
that are not repugnant to the said word'.
The Word of God is Leviticus, Chapter 18qq which by this statute and 
the immediately preceding Act regarding Incestg.| was imported into 
Scots law by reference in order to clarify these Acts. In particular 
those degrees outwith the second degree which were contrary to Gods 
Word and thus necessitated this restriction were ascendants and 
descendants. Further the relationships of uncle and niece or aunt and 
nephew although within the second canonical degree were prohibited by 
Leviticusg2 .
’micht and may lauchfullie marie at all tymes sen the viii day of 
March, zeir of God 1558’.
The reference seems unclear. However, it can be ventured that this 
refers to the Provincial Council in Edinburgh held in 1558 where as 
Spottiswood records "the Clergy ... where professing to make 
reformation of abuses, they renewed some old Papist constitutionsgg". 
Needless to say events somewhat overtook such efforts.
One can only contend that the Reformers understood quite well the 
nature of consanguinity and affinity and were intent on two aims. 
Firstly, they wished the law then applicable to conform to the law of 
the Bible upon which their entire scheme was built, secondly, they 
designed to cure the mischief which the extended degrees of
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relationship of the Canon law had caused, by allowing more people the 
ability to marry without having to obtain dispensation, i.e. freeing 
them from the ’papistical tyranny’ and thereby extending the scope of 
marriagable persons which would lead to increased population, which 
itself would be of huge socio-economic importance. To say this 
however perhaps is to credit the Reformers with too much social
insight, but certainly the increase in families and the patriarchal 
society thereby engendered brought some desired benefits and suited 
well the vision of society held by the Reformers.
Yet for all the certainty which the Act of 1567 was designed to 
provide questions still arose as to the legality or otherwise of 
marriages between relations. In 1586 a question arose in Saint
Andrew’s regarding the marriage of a man with his former 
sister-in-law’s daughter which although not specifically mentioned in 
Leviticus was sufficiently inductive of slander to raise suspicion in 
the minds of the eldershipg^. Sometimes the questions were of course 
easily answered thus the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale in 1589g^
entertained an enquiry regarding the marriage of a man and his aunt, 
which was clearly declared to be contrary to God’s lawgg.
The problem of marriage with a sister in law’s daughter arose again 
before the Synod in 1648. The parties concerned there, had departed 
to England where such unions were legal but the Synod ordered that 
they be proceeded against as incestuous personsg^.
Activities against consanguinity and affinity continued, sometimes the 
broad and confusing label ’incestuous’ was used without express
reference to the crime of incest, thus an act of the Presbytery of
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Edinburgh in 1649 must relate to consanguinity or affinity as the 
crime of incest was a capital offence, whilst the provisions of this 
Act require only penance in sackclothg^. An injunction was made 
ordering the printing of a table of degrees which would give 
information at a glance relating to the various degrees of 
consanguinity and affinity and thus the prescription that requests for 
testimonials of no impediment of relationship could be complied with 
easilygg.
The religious law was thus enforced in many respects by secular 
sanction and in the Confession of Faith marriage was expressly 
prohibited ’within the degrees of consanguinity or affinity forbidden 
in the Word’g^.
Such a prescription echoing the biblical basis of the now secular law 
is shadowed by Stair who writes:
’’Marriage is also void and inconsistent when contracted within the 
degrees prescribed. Lev XVIII. Whereby the next degree collateral is 
only prohibited both in consanguinity and affinity: which makes those
joined in affinity in the same degree, as being by marriage one
f l e s h g g ” •
The other aspects of relationship, affinity, legal relationship and 
spiritual relationship underwent similar or more drastic changes. 
Affinity as will have been noticed was subject to the same variation 
as the relationships from consanguinity and many of the same 
considerations affected this branch of relationship as had affected 
those arising from blood relationship.
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Legal affinity which as Hay had already noted was somewhat of a legal 
anomaly in Scotland, springing as it did from adoption, an institution 
not in use in Scotland, and consequently it did not feature at all in 
the Reformed scheme. Stair indeed makes mention of the institution 
only once in a title of the book dealing with succession, and ends his 
comments with the following
"neither is adoption in use with us in any case^".
The decline of spiritual relationship has already been alluded to, 
godfathers and godmothers continued to be part of the ecclesiastical 
trappings. However godfathers seem to have featured more as the 
Reformed epoch progressed and often the office appears to have been 
filled by the natural father^. However, Calvin in his Institutes 
noticed that ’spiritual kindred cannot (under the Canon law system) be 
joined in marriage^" a law which he found to be somewhat contrary to 
the laws of all the Nations and even to the polity of Moses.
Stair put the matter a little more forcefully when he described the 
prohibitions on ’certain degrees of ecclesiastical affinity’ to be an 
unlawful device which put parties in the Popes power to approve or 
disapprove as his avarice or interest leads^'.
Adultery
That adultery formed a ground of divorce a vinculo matrimonii after 
the Reformation cannot be usefully doubted. This will be discussed at 
further length infra. However, the idea of adultery as being 
productive of a diriment impediment requires some examination here.
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From the beginning the Reformers were in two minds with regard to this 
matter, this ’so doubtsome a c a s e ^ ’. The First Book of Discipline 
reflects this uncertainty. In the first instance the Kirk would have 
adulterers executed by the civil sword but recognising that this fate 
might not always be forthcoming and also recognising that sinners can 
repent, it is loath to deny the penitent the ’benefites of the Kirk*.
With regard to the specific point of whether an offender after 
reconciliation may remarry, the Reformers seeming torn between 
compassion and biblical obedience, eventually conclude that the remedy 
for incontinence, namely wedlock, cannot be denied^. This would of 
course imply that if the adulterer could live continently, i.e. 
without engaging in fornication then remarriage was to be prohibited. 
The capacity for exploitation of this equivocal attitude was
restricted by the subsequent passage which broached the possibility 
that if there was an opportunity for the adulterer to marry the 
innocent then no other marriage should be allowed, except to the
innocent party.
This ambiguous passage is insufficiently clear to allow much comment 
on the Reformers attitude to the general principle of the remarriage 
of adulterers. Certainly, the overwhelming impression of the Reformed 
attitude to adultery is that of horror at what was viewed as a 
’sin-crime’, indeed the vocabulary of matrimonial offence, echoing the 
canonical crimen is much in evidence for example the use of the words 
offender and offended. Adultery was condemned by the Reformers as a 
’sin most commone in this realme^' .
In the end one is led to believe that the shadow of David and
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Bethsheba^g etched darker on the minds of the Reformers than at first 
it may have appeared. Therefore in the earliest cases of divorce a 
vinculo on the ground of adultery permission is given only to the 
innocent spouse to remarry in the Lord, which permission is withheld 
from the guilty spouse. Thus in Clark v. Scherez^^ (1560) where 
adultery was committed by a wife, the Session after taking probation 
awarded divorce and granted the right to remarry only to the pursuer.
Similarly in the case of Colland v. A l e x a n d e r held later during 
1560 the permission to remarry was granted to the pursuer. This 
result was echoed in the case of Theoar v. Morton (1561 )-|Q1 *
The minds of the secular authorities were exercised in relation to 
adultery and although in 1563 an Act was passed regulating the 
punishment for notour adultery, nothing however was forthcoming 
regarding the impedimental nature of the matrimonial offence. The 
Church however continued in the earlier attitude^q2, and in December 
1566 the General Assembly put in train the process for declaring 
marriages with paramours to be null, such a marriage was described as 
’illegal’ and ministers were warned against solemnising such upon pain 
of deposition from their charge,^.
The Commissary Court had to an extent anticipated the Kirk’s 
formalised attitude with the decision in Stevenson and Pollock 
(1565)^02| where Stevenson’s marriage with Pollock had followed upon 
the divorce for his adultery with her granted by the Session of 
Glasgow. The Assembly declared such unions to be unlawful in 1571
and this attitude may have had some influence in the Act of 1592 which 
narrated that:-
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"By occasion whereof the crime of Adultery dayly increased ... the 
marriage of Paramours is ... contrary to the Law of God and Public 
Honesty"1q6.
This legislation has already been discussed with reference to its 
unique mention of public honesty as a standard of post Reformation 
scandal. This secular declaration indeed went some way to striking at 
the root of the nuisance, particularly as it inhibited the rights of 
succession of spouses tainted by the maxim - *Nemo ducat earn quam 
prius polluit adulterio1 - *None marries she who he has previously 
soiled by adultery* . However the Act did not nullify such 
marriages
Echoes of the maxim are heard in the General Assembly*s prescription 
of 1595 declaring that two kinds of marriage are unlawful; when one 
marries another whom one has polluted in adultery and where the 
innocent party is happy to remain with the guilty, but the guilty 
deserts and takes another spouse^g. Later still, in 1600 the General 
Assembly resolved to make a supplication to the Convention of Estates 
that *one act to be made dischargeand all marriages of such persons as 
ar convict of adulterie*, which was to be ratified in the next 
Parliament This supplication resulted in the Act of 1600 which
enacted that:-
"all marriages contracted between persons, divorcit ... for the crime 
of adultery and the paramours are in all time coming null and 
unlawful"
Again this act was fenced by the penalty of disinheritance. Such
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legislation cleared up some of the ambiguities in the attitude of the 
Church and that of the secular authorities. In particular, all
marriages were rendered null and unlawful, not those of adulterers as 
distinct from adulteresses or vice versa, and the prohibition was 
expressly declared to be perpetual, and therefore it can only rest on 
the influence of crimen, not ligamen or the survival of the innocent 
spouse.
Notwithstanding these efforts adultery still continued to be a passion 
amongst the men and women of the realm much to the horror of the 
ecclesiastical and secular authorities. Thus in 1646, Parliament 
received overtures from the Commissioner of the General Assembly to 
revive and renew the acts against incest and adultery, because "these 
odious sins, yet so rife and growne to such a hight of abominatioun as 
is horrid to express"^ ^ .
Stair presents as ever the developed view of the law and draws a 
distinction between the paramour and other parties thus strictly 
interpreting the Act of 1600.
"But though positive law, as a penalty upon adulterers may hinder 
their marriage with the adulteress or otherwise declare such marriages 
as to succession and civil effects void, yet can it not simply annul 
it, and with any other person the adulterer may marry. With us 
marriage betwixt the two committers of adultery is declared null, and 
the issue inhabilitate to succeed to their parents Pari 1600, c.20. 
But otherwise even the person guilty may marry again"
Stair seems to recognised the character of impediment attaching to
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adultery in his use of the word hinder, and in the reference to 
matrimonial penalty. There seems however to be a certain equivocation 
not unlike that of the earlier Reformers in stating that marriages 
between adulterers and others are not simply annulled, vitiation 
relates by one construction only to succession and the civil effects. 
Certainly, Stair clarifies some of this ambiguity by restricting the 
ambit of the Act of 1600 to marriages between the adulterous spouse 
and the paramour, thereby implying a strict interpretation of the 
legislation which one may state is not entirely supported by the 
earlier decisions.
It is clear from this survey that some authors are incorrect in 
arguing that the prohibition on the marriage between adulterers and 
paramours existed at common law. Divorce for adultery did not exist 
in pre Reformation Scotland, it was prohibited by Canon Law and there 
is no example of a maverick or anomalous decision. It is however 
contended that the impediment of adultery is a post-Reformation 
adoption of the canonical crimen, a diriment impediment designed to 
prevent murder pacts between adulterers and paramours with the hope of 
marriage upon the death of the spouse and the concomitant dissolution 
of the marriage bond. Apart from the obvious analogy between the 
institutions the key to understanding the link is the concept of 
matrimonial offence, and the withholding of a ’benefit of the Kirk'^^ 
as punishment for a marital misdeed.
Force
Force in the post Reformation period seems to have fused the canonical 
impedient impediment of abduction and the diriment impediment of vis.
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The Reformers divined the essential lack of consent as the basis of
the impediment. Abduction is not mentioned after the Reformation as a
prohibition of marriage, in either the Book of Discipline.... or themb
Kirk Session Registers. However force is recognised as a cause of 
nullity, vitiating consent.
Thus in the early case of Beynston and Hepburn (1565)^^ the parties 
were called before the superintendent to explain why their promise of 
marriage had not been solemnised.
The woman, Joanna Hepburn averred that she should not be decerned to 
marry because she was constrained by a ’just fear and dread' of death 
by drowning at the hand of her brother. She was at the time of this 
threat 13 or 1^ years of age. For the other part the ’husband* 
alleged that he too had been forced to consent upon fear of being 
deprived of his inheritance.
Obviously the eldership were concerned at the prospect of collusion 
between the parties, conspiring to obtain a reduction of the marriage. 
In particular this case is notable for the use of the oath of calumny. 
However, after a lengthy proof, with the testimony of six witnesses 
and the parties the minister and elders were satisfied that the 
marriage was ’not free or lawful nor by willing consent but made 
through fear of threats'.
There is just detectable here a lowering of the standard of fear from 
the canonical one of affecting a person of 'constant mind'. The 
standard however did not fall much. It could be ventured that either 
the Eldership took cognisance only of the woman’s evidence in which
case the standard did not fall at all. If however it only took the 
man’s testimony into account the standard had certainly dropped 
considerably.
The later case of McKay and Read (157^)^^ represents that where 
compulsion to marry is alleged it must also be proved, otherwise as in 
this case reduction of the promise would be refused and the parties 
ordained to join in marriage.
Sometimes politics could cloud the issue. Thus in 1592 the Presbytery 
of Linlithgow placed a case before the Synod regarding the marriage of 
John Stewart and Dorothy Stewart ^ g  the daughter of Lord Mephen, where 
despite claims of ravishing and of collusion in abduction the marriage 
was merely stayed, not forbidden or declared null, until the Queen 
granted her consent.
The possibility of collusion seems to have exercised the energies of
the Kirk more than would at first have been thought. For example in
1668.. 1Q the Synod of Aberdeen enacted that young ladies who allow 
m  y
themselves to be ’carried away1 under the pretence to marry are if 
truly collusive to be punished for adultery.
Stair does not treat of force as diminishing consent in relation to 
marriage but does write at some length on the topic in relation to 
conventional obligations, sub voce "Extortion” which 'signifies the 
act of force or other mean of fear whereby a person is compelled to do 
that which of their proper inclination they would not have done'^Q.
Not surprisingly perhaps, canonical references are not to be found in
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this title as the Roman law is much more appropriate. The substance 
of the discussion devolves on the conclusion that by the Praetor's 
edict 121 and therefore by Scots Municipal Law and by 'the custom of 
this and other nations' such deeds and obligations made through force 
and fear, are utterly void.
On the standard of compulsion Stair does quote a familiar maxim - 
'quae cadit in virum constantem'
'which affects a strong minded man' ^ 2
noting however that the standard is not absolute and can vary with the 
instant situation.
The existence therefore and the character of post Reformation vis is 
clearly of a very compatible nature with that of the pre Reformation 
epoch, and once again underlines the essential nature of marriage as a 
consensual contract.
Pre existing Marriage
Christian marriage remained for the Reformers in Scotland a monogamous 
union. Certainly some continental Reformers examined polygamy e.g. 
Theodore Beza in 1567 composed a Tract on Polygamy which discussed the 
matter in some depth^^*
In marrying, parties became bound to one another. That this was
indeed the attitude is displayed by the use of the 'free' in
connection with dissolution^^.
Consequently it can be stated that a valid pre existing marriage which 
had not been terminated by death, dissolved on the grounds of nullity 
arising from an impediment vitiating consent nor dissolved by judicial 
declaration on the ground of adultery and subsequently desertion 
barred a subsequent marriage and therefore invalidated and nullified 
any subsequent marriage.
It appears that although the Act^ 5  condemning bigamy and punishing it 
as a form of perjury survived the Reformation it fell foul of the fate 
of most secular legislation namely desuetude and non-compliance. It 
appears that no actions were taken on the Act, certainly after the 
Reformation. The major reason for this inactivity is probably because 
the Kirk’s policy towards clandestine marriage and the publication of 
banns would tend to root out the instances where there was a pre 
existing marriage. However, such a method of detection only was of 
use in solemn marriages and was of no effect in irregular unions.
An example of banns not disclosing a possible pre existing marriage 
was that of Leslie v. Forest (1561)^2g where the petitioner Elizabeth 
Leslie brought a case of nullity before the Session at Saint Andrews 
to reduce her marriage with John Forest, on the basis that some time 
before his marriage to her he had promised marriage to another woman 
and followed that promise with copula and cohabitation. The defender 
entered no useful plea and upon proof being led for the petitioner the 
decree of nullity was granted showing that a promise followed by 
copula was considered by the Reformers as much as by the canonists as 
a valid marriage.
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A case which occurred the following year was Lindsay and Schewes 
(1562) -|2 7 w^ ck displays the Kirk's attitude and also sheds some light 
on the validity of pre Reformation Canon law before the reformed 
Church Courts. The facts of the case were that the parties wished to 
have their banns read and approached the minister. It was known 
however that the woman Christen Schewes had been married to a man 
called Lyell who was not dead. Christen claimed that they had been 
divorced by "the ordo"12g of the Catholic Church, by reason of his 
impotence.
Upon being called to satisfy the Kirk for the doubt of divorce the 
parties led the canonical process of divorce which had been heard 
before William Cranston^^. The process was examined and found by the 
Session to be according to Canon law, formally correct, and 
furthermore the lawful cause of impotence was proven and confessed. 
Therefore there was no pre existing marriage, it having been a nullity 
and the parties were free to marry.
How does this treatment of the Canon law decree display the attitude 
of the Reformers? Most clearly one believes when contrasted with the 
case of Cunninghame and Wood (1561 )-jgo alraady discussed under the 
head of consanguinity. The similarities are startling with regard to 
the treatment of the cases and betray the origins of the development 
of International Private law. The essential problem was the 
recognition of the decree of a foreign jurisdiction, in this 
recognition Canon law as lex causae was applied to the decree and then 
the result was tested against the lex fori, the law of the forum i.e. 
Reformed ecclesiastical law. Therefore in each case the decree is 
tested for validity in its canonical context, on the one hand in
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Lindsay’s case the validity was agreed on the other Cunninghame’s 
decree was declared to be null by the Reformed forum as it was 
promulgated in a private house and decided in face of a dispensation 
removing the ground of nullity of the marriage.
The validity or not of a decree led to its testing against the lex 
fori. If it was invalid at Canon law one would not think a second 
test was legally necessary. However, it must be remembered that 
technically the Court of the Superintendent did not have jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the validity of a canonical decree. It could only 
legally adjudicate with reference to the lex fori, and therefore to 
bolster the decision on Canon law the lex fori was also applied and 
the decree upheld or quashed against that legal prescription, thus the 
decision in Cunninghame declares that in any case, notwithstanding the 
invalidity of the canonical decree the decision was contrary to the 
new law and therefore null, the divorce was invalid and non adherence 
unlawful. Similarly in Lindsay the divorce was valid and upheld at 
Canon law and furthermore was in accord with the Reformed law which as 
will be seen on the matter of impotence did not differ much from the 
old Canon law, and therefore it was recognised and the new marriage 
was allowed.
The Kirk’s attitude towards prior marriage remained consistent with 
the Canon law. As already shown a promise followed by copula 
invalidated a subsequent union. It was also the case that a 
clandestine marriage even though unlawful rendered invalid a 
subsequent marriage to be celebrated in facie ecclesiae. Thus in the 
case of Beton v. Arnot131 (1566) where an inhibition on banns was 
ordered due to a promise followed by intercourse which rendered the
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defender ’guilty of fornication and to have taken her for his wife'.
Some later cases see a slight change in emphasis from a consideration 
of the second marriage to the unlawful fornicating union and the 
appropriate change in penalty therefore. There is the interesting 
case of Katherine Brown in Crawford in 1644 brought before the Synod 
of Lothian and Tweeddale by the Presbytery of E d i n b u r g h K a t h e r i n e  
Brown had been married to one William Scot who departed to Ireland. 
For some time nothing was heard and she did not know if he was still 
alive. She therefore married James Reid in Church before a minister, 
whereupon her first husband returned.
It was held by the Synod, who did not refer the case to the Commissary 
Court, that the only lawful marriage was that between Brown and Scot. 
Both Brown and Reid were adjudged adulterers and fornicators and 
'abusers of God's Ordinance'.
The change in emphasis from bigamy to adultery indicates a level of 
consciousness of sin-crime which is, in many respects, almost 
paranoic. In this case there is little evidence of matrimonial 
offence. Indeed the marriage between Brown and Reid only proceeded 
upon an order from the Bishop of Edinburgh, Bishop Lindsay. However 
as this case took place at a time when adultery and bigamy were 
increasing, e.g. in 1647 the Justice General and James Robertson and 
Alexander Colvill the Justice Deputes were ordained by Parliament to 
consider bigamy, adultery and the attendant crimes of concealing 
pregnancy and abortion It may be the case that this is evidence
of a moralistic backlash. After all it was worse in the Reformer's 
eye to be an adulteress than a bigamist.
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A slightly earlier case before the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale in 
1642 ^ also bears out this analysis where a woman who was discovered
to be married to two husbands was condemned for adultery against the 
first husband, and not for bigamy.
Stair does not treat of the matter in great depth stating only that 
marriage cannot exist where either party is married b e f o r e a l t h o u g h  
he notices that only the just causes of divorce for adultery or 
desertion free a party for valid remarriage
Impotence
Impotence, or the inability to perform sexual intercourse was looked 
upon by the Reformers as an impediment to marriage as much as in the 
Canon law.
However, the impediment fell subject to a minor reanalysis by the 
Reformers possibly following the continental influences of Bucer and 
Beza which resulted in the canonical concept of impotence which 
included not merely the sexual inability by reason of physical or 
psychological inhibition but also inability by nonage and by mental 
deficiency being restricted to the physical and psychological aspects, 
and possibly also mental deficiency. Nonage conversely becomes, in 
the eyes of the Reformers a distinct and independent diriment 
impediment.
The Reformed tradition recognised the importance of copula. As in the 
Canon law, the occurrence of copula following upon a promise to marry 
created a valid and subsisting marriage which, as has been noted,
could defeat a later solemn marriage. Copula was not necessary to 
create a valid de praesenti marriage. However, as the theory 
progressed it was recognised that capacity for intercourse was an 
implied essential contractual condition attaching to the contract of 
marriage. This analysis relates to a more rationalistic view and it 
is possible that at the time of the Reformation, marriage was still 
looked upon as having the 'purpose' of lawful and controlled 
procreation and that the inability to procreate simply subtracted from 
a union its Lebensgrund.
As the sixteenth century progressed the idea of impotence as an 
impediment became subject to the jurisprudential analysis which was to 
lead to the development of the theory of impotence as a resolutive 
condition which if incurred induced nullity. This is a result of the 
supposed knowledge of the parties at the time of marriage and whether 
one could found for nullity if it was known before the marriage that 
the other party could not engage in intercourse.
The leading post Reformation case is that of Gib v. Hillok (1562) -| 3 y • 
The pursuer alleged that she and her 'husband' had cohabited for two 
years without consummation. The Superintendent fearing collusion 
ordained a further period of 9 months ^ g  cohabitation. After such a 
period the evidence of parties and witnesses was heard. Both parties 
were advised to lie together naked in bed. However, this tactic 
similar to the description in the canonical case of Miller v. Watson 
(1 5 4 4 ) was of no avail and no intercourse occurred between the
1 jy
parties. The deposition of the defender stated that he was impotent 
only quoad his wife and in fact he desired another. The pursuer was 
equally adamant that there had been no sex and no stimulation in her
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husband’s part. As a consequence however of doubts arising in the 
evidence, the Superintendent found that there was no impotence, and 
refused the petition for nullity.
It appears that some litigants looked upon impotence as the perfect 
way out of a bad match, consequently the vigilance of the Courts was 
always heightened when impotence was in the offing and acceptance of 
the plea would only occur on the most explicit evidence of inability 
to engage in sexual relations.
Thus proof septima manu was often engaged as has been shown, and was 
generally preceded by a period of cohabitation which provided access 
and opportunity to the parties. Thus in the Commissary case of 
Stewart v. Stewart (1580-87) -j4 0 Physical examination and 
compurgatorial proof by seven witnesses were all viewed as valid 
proof. As alternative methods there were however evidentia signa 
impotentiae or the parties could cohabit and provide proof septima 
manu.
These exacting standards were, as already stated, designed to prevent 
or at least hinder collusion and any mere allegation unsupported by 
evidence would be repelled without much consideration, as in the later 
case of Tilliry v. Tailyeour in 1601^^.
Stair recognises the impediment and basing his analysis principally on 
Canon law tries to distinguish the essentially mental element of 
consent from the ability to complete the matrimonial act. This is one 
believes, executed successfully and the copulatheoria is not accepted 
by Stair although some imprecision of language is responsible for a
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little doubt as to what is stated by him.
"Yet the opinion of the Canon Law is true, consensus non coitus facit 
matrimonium. But this consent must specially relate to that 
conjunction of bodies as being in the consenter’s capacity; otherwise 
it is void. So the consent of persons naturally impotent ... doth not
make marriage" ^ 2 *
Any doubt in this passage which seems to imply that the consent must 
have an implied condition of capacity for intercourse is dispelled by 
the later statements, "it is not the consent to marriage as it 
relateth to the procreation of children, that is requisite;... but it 
is the consent whereby ariseth that conjugal society which may have 
the conjunction of bodies as well as minds’’.^.
Under Stair’s treatment of marriage which is essentially that of a 
later Natural lawyer, the consensual contract element, whilst 
expressly stated by him to be a'divine contract.^, is subject in 
Stair’s mind to the ’common essentials of consent’. In effect the 
Natural law which provides these common essentials of consent is the 
same Natural law which when the reason of man is applied thereto 
discloses the Divine Law by which the contract of Marriage is 
governed. The scheme of Natural law, Divine law and Human law which 
Stair was working in was much more fragmented than the essentially 
Thomist Natural law which produced the maxims of the Canon law with 
which Stair agrees, and to an extent a canonist looking at Stair would 
think his commentary on the essentials of consent slightly redundant.
The rationalist departure from the Thomist analysis is shown by the
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emergence of nonage as an independent diriment impediment on its own 
account, not considered as an aspect of impotence.
Nonage
The Canonical proscription on the marriage of children remained as 
part of the matrimonial law, notwithstanding the Reformation.
The ages of capacity for girls at twelve years and boys at fourteen 
display the similarity. The First Book of Discipline affirms the 
canonical concept on the basis that children "have no election for the 
lack of understanding"• Any promise made by children under such 
years was deemed by the Reformers to be, in God’s presence no promise 
at all - total nullity was the consequence - the ’promise’ was a 
non-promise. However, the possibility of ratifying the incohate 
promise remained, following upon cohabitation in majority, the 
so-called 'yeares of judgement’ .
The similarity between the Reformed attitude and the canonical has 
been noticed as the following passage from Peter Lombard’s ^ ^  
Sententiae displays:-
"Hoc etiam sciendum est quod pueri ante 14 annos et puellae ante 12 
annos secundum leges matrimonium inire nequeunt. Quod si ante 
praedicta tempora copulam inierint, separari possunt quamvis voluntate 
et assensu parentum juncti fuerint. Qui vero in pueritia copulati 
post annos pubertatis nolunt se delinquere sed in conjunctione 
permanere jam ex hoc efficuntur conjuges et deinceps nequeunt 
separari".
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’It is already known by law a boy under 14 and a girl under 1 2 cannot 
marry. Because if they copulate before the said years they can be 
separated howevermuch they were joined with the wishes and assent of 
their parents. Those who copulated in their youth and in the post 
pubescent years and do not wish to leave one another but wish now to 
remain in conjunction are to be man and wife in turn and are not to be 
separated
It is noticeable that in the First Book of Discipline the canonist 
maxim, Maltitia supplet aetatem does not appear. However as 
canonistic doctrine was being adopted in such a widespread fashion in 
this regard perhaps there is an oblique ’reception’.
Nonage is discussed in only one recorded case before the Kirk Session. 
In 1568 the case of Alexander v. Wishart (1569)^8 was ^rouSht before 
the Session where the marriage was inhibited by the Superintendent 
until the boy Robert Alexander, who was then 13» became 14.
There is also one case extant before the Commissary Court that of 
Gillespie and Marshall (1565) -| ^ 9  where the Pities had been forced 
into an impubertious engagement by their parents and remained thus 
engaged until the age of 15. However they had not accepted one 
another after puberty and as no coitus or cohabitation had occurred 
there was no ratification of the null marriage.
The next formal mention of the impediment was before the General 
Assembly in 1600 where it was complained that in this regard the Kirk 
had no law. This was remedied to the effect of entrenching the First 
Book of Discipline’s proscription and thus vicariously adopting the
Canon law^Q.
Stair enforces this view and also imports the oblique canonical
reference to intent supplying the defect of age, in more direct terms,
and goes on for as to say that in such cases where copula has occurred
between ’pupils or infants', ’regard must be had, whether the parties
be truly come to discretion and capacity, whereof the commixtion of
bodies is sufficient evidence' .
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CHAPTER V
The Formalities of Marriage 1516-1581
The question of consent and its expression was of the essence of the 
law of marriage. The Church was very concerned about the problem of 
the expression of this consent. Consequently a large body of Law 
built up around the formalities required for a valid marriage in both 
Roman and Reformed epochs.
The reasons for this concern are varied. Partially at least the 
concern was caused by the Gothic canonical superstructure which hedged 
the free exchange of consent with impediments of complexity and 
difficulty which were sufficiently incomprehensible as to dupe learned 
canonist theologians let alone the unschooled European peasant.
The principal evils which the canonist perceived in clandestine 
marriages were
1. the dissolution of valid marriages, by parties denying that 
consents had ever been exchanged,
2. the change of consents in face of valid impediments, resulting in 
illegitimacy and scandal^.
Papal policy had determined at an early date, c 1200, that the Church 
should exercise more control over the institution of marriage and,
particularly under the influence of Pope Innocent III the control 
became tighter
"Clandestina conjugia penitus inhibemus, prohibentes etiam, ne quis 
sacerdos talibus interesse praesumat".
”We prevent clandestine marriage even prohibiting the penitent unless 
he takes himself with such interest to the priest’’^ .
This displays the attitude of the Church and the Canon law; it 
condemned both the practice of clandestine marriages and (if there was 
one) the officiating cleric.
The nature of the Clandestine Marriage
What was a clandestine marriage? Hay^ describes a non-clandestine 
marriage in the terms of the Summa of Angelus de Clauasio^.
’’Matrimonium contractum secundum consuetudinem patrie et in facie 
ecclesie dicitur matrimonium non clandestinum. Matrimonium dicitur 
contrahi in facie ecclesia quando contrahitur coram aliqua multitudine 
testium. Nam ecclesia in proposito dicitur congregatio fidelium".
!IA marriage contracted according to the custom of the country and in 
the presence of the Church is called a non clandestine marriage. 
Marriage is said to be contracted in Church when it is contracted 
before a number of witnesses, for the Church is, in this context a 
gathering of the faithful”.
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It appears that the non clandestine marriage is contracted by 
compliance with the custom of the place or contracting marriage before 
witnesses. It has to be stated that in Catholic Europe prior to the 
Reformation the custom in respect of marriage was roughly the same, 
there were of course regional variations but the quintessence of 
marriage was uniform i.e. consent and in this can be perceived the 
origins of the theory of universality of status which has much effect 
on the modern Private International law^.
There are many examples of the Scottish formulation of this custom in 
the Synodal and other statutes promulgated in Scotland, each with the 
aim of avoiding clandestine marriage.
The medieval canonists noticed that clandestine marriage could be 
concluded in the following ways:-
1. Where there were no witnesses^-. The Decretal dealing with this 
aspect states that if a marriage is contracted in secret and 
there appears to be no legitimate proof, the Church will not 
compel adherence.
The Aberdeen Statutes require the presence of a priest and of 
three or four trustworthy witnesses summoned together for that 
express purpose^. Similar prescriptions appear in the 
Constitutions of Bishop David of Saint Andrews in 1242g showing a 
certain ineffectiveness in respect of the laws against 
clandestinity. A practical example of the use of witnesses 
occurs in the protocol book of Dom Thomas Johnson^ where at the 
marriage of David Boswell and Janet Hamilton, daughter of the
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Earl of Arran, a total of seven witnesses were in use.
2. Where there was no solemnity. The Decretum of Gratian sets out 
in some detail the solemnities which were required. Perhaps no 
area of matrimonial law has been more vexed than that relating to 
solemnities. It is indeed the point at which the most regional 
variation comes into play; the conjunction of custom and law, the 
essential difficulty being the expression of legally valid 
consent within the customary context of a wedding ceremony.
The Decretum^ lays down the minimum standards for a solemnly
celebrated marriage in force before the Council of Trent. A man 
was obliged to seek the society and custody of his bride from her 
parents and those who had power over her. He was also to seek 
the blessing of the priest to the union, and was obliged to
accept the woman as his wife.
3. Where there were no banns proclaimed. From the Fourth Lateran 
Council (1215)  ^^ the proclamation of banns had been prescribed as 
the primary method of publicising the forthcoming marriage and 
avoiding the possibility of incurring an impediment. Failure to 
have banns proclaimed on three successive occasions prior to the 
marriage rendered the marriage clandestine and unlawful.
The conciliar decreet was well known in Scotland and enforced by
local legislation. In the Aberdeen Statutes^ ^or example the
celebration of any marriage not preceded by banns was prohibited. 
Not only was a duty imposed on the faithful to disclose, upon the 
Banns being read, any known impediment but the priest was also
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obliged to investigate the position. The banns were to be read 
in the parish where the parties lived and if they lived in 
different parishes, in both parishes^.
Such attempts to prevent clandestine marriages seem to have been of 
limited effectiveness. In the 14th century the Synodal Statutes of 
Saint Andrews also prescribed banns, and prohibited priests from 
celebrating at weddings where no banns had been proclaimed because of 
"the great scandal which has arisen in the Church of God1'^. The same 
Synod denoted that Sundays and Festivals were appropriate days for the 
publication of banns, and also legislated that the nuptial blessing 
was not to be given in private chapels or at nighty.
The general ineffectiveness of such statutes is finally shown by, for 
example instances of marriage at dawn in private chapels in blatant 
contravention of the acts^g, the ratification and re-enactment of 
similar statutes at later provincial councils^ and the extant records 
of suits for the solemnisation of marriage arising from clandestine 
unions. The number and character of the cases show that clandestinity 
was a problem, when it came to having parties live up to their 
obligations. For example there are fourteen^ cases of suits for the 
solemnisation of marriage in the Liber Officialis between the years 
1516 and 1551. Of these five were initiated by the male party and 
five exhibited a disparity of status between the male and the female, 
where the man was of a higher social status than the woman. The vast 
majority (ten) resulted in a decernment to solemnise the marriage in 
facie ecclesiae, of the remaining four three of the promises were 
voided because of affinity, and one was solemnised before judicial 
determination.
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The overwhelming impression is therefore that some young noblemen or 
gentlemen of good family were not adverse to promising marriage in 
consideration of their lady friends’ favours, exhibiting a cynical 
view of the matrimonial law which permitted but which did not endorse 
clandestine exchange of consents.
A fairly typical example is the case of Ramsay v. Maoklayn (1539)^:-
”Nos Johannes Weddell in causa mota inter Margaretam Ramsay actricem 
ab una et Johannem Macklayn de Lochbaye suum sponsum affidatum reum 
partibus ab altera. Decernimus ex deductis coram nobis prefatum 
Johannem ad solempnizandum matrimonium in facie ecclesie cum praedicta 
Margareta Ramsay sua sponsa affidata carnali copula. Subsecuta 
compellendum fore pariterque compellimus”
”We John Weddell in the cause moved between Margaret Ramsay actrice on 
the one part and John McLean of Lochbaye her plighted spouse on the 
other part. We decern from that evidence led before us that the said 
John is to be compelled to solemnise marriage in Church with the said 
Margaret his spouse with whom he has had copula and we compel them 
equally”.
For all the prohibition on clandestine marriages, these unions were 
valid on the basis of simply being exchange of consents de praesenti. 
The parties to a clandestine marriage had sinned and were required to 
undergo penance2Q and the children of such a marriage where an 
impediment was discovered were illegitimate^. Indeed ratification 
of the union and ecclesiastical recognition could be obtained by the 
Decretals which provided that if contracting parties wished to declare
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the marriage, then unless there is an impediment the Church will 
receive and approve the marriage as if it had been originally 
contracted in conspectu ecclesiae2 2 * Punishments were also visited on 
the offending clergy who celebrated at such a marriage, to the extent 
of one year’s imprisonment on bread and water, and three years 
suspension from office.
Clandestine marriage could also arise where there was cohabitation
following upon the betrothal or de praesenti exchange2g, or where
there was impuberty^ or where the marriage was contracted during
ferial time0_. However it could be dispensed by the Ordinary where 
d o
the parties were notorious, although this was contrary to a local 
statute, where the parties were of great disparity of age and finally 
where there was likely to be unwanted intervention on the part of the 
parties’ families^g-
The clandestine marriage which occurred, following upon the betrothal 
or exchange of consent, by way of cohabitation became recognised as a 
route to patrimonial rights by the secular authority at a fairly early 
stage by the Act of 15032y *
This Act was essentially a method of providing a life partner of a 
deceased with an alimentary provision analogous to a wife. To 
institute such a right to a mere concubine would, of course, have 
resulted in a dilution of the marriage bond and, consequently, the 
only logical conclusion was to provide equality of status. The Act 
had important implications in respect of property and in an evidential 
presumption providing proof of entitlement to terce.
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The substance of the Act was that where a woman pursued a right to 
terce and it was argued that she was not a wife, she could obtain a 
right to the terce by proving that she was held by repute as his
lawful wife. Valid marriage must have been possible between the 
parties and there must have been no valid impediment between the
parties which would have prevent their marriage. Were it proved, by 
any interested party that no valid marriage were possible between the 
parties then the right to terce would be lost. The point of this Act 
was therefore not to declare marriage but to provide proof of 
entitlement to terce.
Hay makes no mention of marriage by 1 habit and repute*. However an 
indication of the canonist attitude is shown in the Liber Extra^g
which states that the proof of marriage is held by long cohabitation, 
and by repute (fama) of marriage and other supportive evidence to the 
contracting of marriage.
Three cases are shown by the Liber Extra, firstly, where a woman 
cohabited for ten years no marriage was found because the sponsalia 
were not witnessed. Secondly, where a man could show the transfer of 
nuptial gifts by a public instrument sufficient inference was made. 
The third case dwelt on the effect of the ’common bruit* of the
neighbourhood, a not insignificant factor in the largely rural village 
society of sixteenth century Scotland.
It is of some importance that this Decretal is contained in a book of 
principally procedural decretals. At which point the Act of 1503 
ceased to be treated as a procedural guideline under canonical 
influence and became a substantive provision is difficult to say but
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the problem will be examined in further depth.
After the Reformation the Reformed Kirk expended nearly as much energy 
as the Catholic Church in attempting to restrain clandestine marriages 
and exercise ecclesiastical control over marriage.
The Reformed attitude is clearly spelt out in the First Book of 
Discipline
"In a Reformed Church marriage ought not to be secretly used but in
open face and publyck audience of the Kirk, and for avoiding of
dangers expedient it is that the bond be publicly proclaimed 3 
Sondayes unlesse the persons be so knowne that no suspicion of danger 
may arise; and then may the time be shortened at the discretion of the
ministry. But no wayes can we admit marriage to be used secretly how
honourable soever the person be"2g.
There was a welter of legislation, both local and national by the 
particular elderships and the General Assembly, in an attempt to 
enforce this provision which was in effect a decree of the Fourth 
Lateran Council.
As if to emphasise the importance of the clandestine marriage question 
the eldership at Saint Andrews, in one of its first quasi legislative 
actSgQ ordained that all the banns of those who have contracted or 
made promise to be married were to be received by the scribes of the 
Consistorial Court. If the parties were parishioners of another Kirk 
a testimonial statement of no impediment had to be presented thereby 
certifying that the parties were free to wed.
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The General Assembly added its voice to the condemnation of the 
clandestine marriage. In 1563 it enacted that fno contract of 
marriage alleged to be made secretly ... shall have fayth in judgement 
in time cuming until ... the contractors suffer as breakers of good 
order and slanderers of the Kirk*. If witnesses could not be produced 
to the ’'marriage" or if the parties did not confess to the "ceremony" 
then they were to be held as fornicators^.
This legislation was swiftly followed in 1565 when the General 
Assembly required that no minister receive any party for marriage 
without a testimonial which certified that the banns had been read and 
that no impediment had been found^*
Old arguments regarding the patently ambiguous stance of the Church 
regarding the sufficiency of de praesenti consent yet requiring the 
solemnity of celebration in facie ecclesie vexed the councils of 
eldership and General Assembly alike. Thus a minister and parties 
were ordained to answer to the Assembly why a marriage had been 
celebrated without banns and parental c o n s e n t T h e  same minister 
was also guilty of advising parties to contract a de praesenti 
marriage notwithstanding a claim of prior marriage^-
Such difficulties as described in the foregoing required that 
eventually the General Assembly should require that parties deliver 
their names for banns and that no other prior ceremonies e.g. 
betrothal be used, thus leaving the field clear for solemnisation in 
facie ecclesie01_.
In some parts of the country at least the policy of the Kirk was
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working and there are comparatively few suits for the solemnisation of 
clandestine arrangements during the period 1570-1581 and in Perth in 
1579 the Kirk Session was confident enough to ordain that Monday 
should be the day used for the reception of bnns^g.
In 1581-82 there appears to be a small revival of the clandestine 
marriage, possibly linked to a lessening of presbyterian church 
control in certain areas and the attendant troubles, ecclesiastical, 
political and social concerned with the fall of Regent Lennox and the 
Ruthven Raid^y.
It comes therefore as little surprise that an act of the Perth 
Eldership narrates that because of great abuse and slander, fines were 
to be introduced for those who did not notify their contracts of 
marriage and solemnise the bond within forty days of the banns^g.
In Saint Andrews in 158U there was legislative activity which required 
parties to compear at the Council House and have their union 
registered in the band book^. Requirements were also made that 
parties and their parents verify the contract, notwithstanding the 
proclamation of banns^.
The General Assembly finally legislated in 1597 that no persons be 
lawfully coupled unless their banns were proclaimed thrice at their 
own parish church according to the consuetude of the realm. The 
penalties for non compliance with this prescription were deprivation 
of the Minister and public repentance for the parties ^ .
By 1597 of course much of Catholic Europe had experience of the
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diriment impediment of clandestinity established by the 24th Session 
of the Council of Trent (1563) which in its Decree 'Tametsi* declared, 
approving of the Fourth Lateran Council decree of Innocent » that
"those who shall attempt to contract marriage otherwise than in the 
presence of the parish priest or by the ordinary and in the presence 
of two or three witnesses, the holy council renders absolutely 
incapable of thus contracting marriage and declares such contracts 
invalid and null as by the present decree it invalidated and annuls 
them"^.
The Reformed Church never went so far as to declare clandestinity a 
diriment impediment. It did however frown upon the abusive and 
scandalous practice of clandestine marriage which was inductive of sin 
and creative of impediment. The following examination of the decided 
cases will show exactly the attitude of the Reformed Church and its 
measures against the problem of clandestine marriage and will show how 
the church tried to secure notoriety for marriage and enforce its 
nature in ecclesiastical thinking as a public act in which the 
community and church should share.
The Reformed Church took a dim view of clandestine promises, due to 
the dangers of scandal, uncertainty and sin. The case of Syntoun and 
Robertson ( 1 5 6 1 is a good example which displays the serious nature 
of the clandestine promise and the harsh attitude of the Church in 
regard to this problem.
In that case the parties had promised marriage in the presence of 
witnesses and before a reader, whereupon their banns were read. 
However, Margaret Robertson proved recalcitrant in solemnising the
union. After the proof which involved John Row, Minister of Perth, a 
learned canonist, the eldership found that a promise had been made and 
that the bond should be solemnised. The eldership also directed that 
the penalty for non implementation of the decree would be 
excommunication.
If parties had entered into a clandestine marriage and one party 
wished to marry a third party solemnly, the wronged spouse could 
obtain an interdict on any interim marriage pending determination of 
his suit for solemnisation^ which if breached could be enforced by a 
decree of separation on the ground of prior marriage.
Occasionally, as the case of Lokaird and Tholland (1565)^ shows, the 
Kirk Session could call upon parties and enquire as to their reason 
for failing to solemnise the contract, almost on an ex proprio motu 
motion. This appears as a demonstration of the Church1s concern 
arising from a denunciatio evangelica. It also appears that the 
Church was prepared to excommunicate the offender for this sin, a much 
harsher penalty than subsisted in the canonical epoch^y.
The banns were required to be called in the parish of each party and 
the place of the wedding ceremony was also determined by the parties’ 
domicile. However sometimes the Session would relent on such a rule 
and permit a marriage of parishioners outwith their native parish. In 
such cases the Session would grant a licence permitting such a 
ceremony^g, sometimes under payment of a pecunial pain^.
The penalties imposed upon parties to such a marriage were reflected 
in the punishment of celebrants at an irregular marriage. Thus Master
Andrew Kirkaldy was required to seek forgiveness for the ’great 
transgression’ of marrying a couple ’by all good order’ but without 
banns^Q. Ecclesiastical discipline would be exercised also against 
those performing ceremonies in private houses^ or using rites other 
than those prescribed by the Book of Common Order (1562) i.e. in 
papistical fashion,^.
The Kirk would at least during the sixteenth century accept penitance 
from a wrongdoer and a testimonial of satisfaction showing no 
impediment. Prior to issuing banns it would also sometimes require 
caution to be deposited with the Session pending solemnisation^^. 
Whilst it appears that the policy of the Kirk was effective in 
reducing the number of clandestine marriages, there being only some 
twenty recorded cases at Saint Andrews between 1560 and 1600, after 
1600 in some parts of the country at least there was a slight upsurge 
in clandestine marriages. Therefore in Stirling in 1615 the Session 
legislated regarding the many suits for completion of marriage^ and 
in 1622 enforced a requirement for caution of £10 in all applicants
for banns__ who reside in the parish with an obligation to complete
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the bond within 40 days.
These ecclesiastical activities were supported by the secular 
authorities which in 1649 legislated on the matter because it was 
’’necessary that there be no marriage without the Kirk’s laudable order 
and by authorised persons". The Act^g narrates the reasons why 
persons may choose to perform and participate in a clandestine 
marriage, through disaffections, through false marriage, with the 
desire of deceiving the census, to avoid parental interference and to 
be married according to the recusant rites of Jesuits and other
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catholic priests. The punishment for parties involved was three 
months imprisonment and a fine on sliding scale according to social 
status. For the celebrant banishment on pain of death was deemed to 
be a sufficient deterrent.
The problem of recusancy and hidden Catholicism increased during the 
seventeenth century, particularly with the appointment of William 
Ballantyne in 1653 as Prefect Apostolic which served to provide 
Scottish Catholicism with an ecclesiastical organisation. Scots 
Catholics were not subject to the Decree 'Tametsi' which was not 
promulgated for Scotland until the twentieth century. As the Catholic 
organisation began to be more established the problem of Clandestine 
and irregular marriages also increased. Therefore in 1661 the Act of 
1649 was substantially re-enacted with modifications in the fines 
which could be imposed. There was also a specific restriction upon 
the marriage of parties in England or Ireland without Banns
It is noticeable however that there is no indication that clandestine 
or irregular marriages could ever be considered as anything but valid. 
Illegal the marriage was but invalid it certainly was not. Stair 
endorses this view where he states that ’public solemnity is a matter 
of order:... but not essential to marriage*. He goes on to state that 
such marriages cannot be declared void or annulledj-g.
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CHAPTER VI
Relations Stante Matrimonio 1560-1690
The law which governed relations stante matrimonio, that is during the 
subsistence of the marriage was much more diverse than that which 
ruled the constitution and dissolution of the holy bond. The legal 
effects of marriage had great social implications, particularly with 
regard to the status of women, the creation and dissolution of 
property rights and obligations, and the inherent obligations between 
a man and woman which form a marriage, namely adherence and aliment. 
Consequently the importance of this area of the connubial relationship 
is clear for the feudalist, the civilian, the natural lawyer and of 
course the canonist. It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine 
the sociological effects of marriage but merely to view the legal 
matters which arise from marriage and from life in connubio.
The law governing such an area of socio-legal relations is diverse and 
varied. There is of course a substantial element of Canon Law though 
its effect is much more indirect. More important is the reliance 
placed upon the Civil law, even to the extent of direct adoption of 
Digest texts or senatusconsulta, and upon the body of customary 
European Law known as Feudal Law.
The Married Status
The independent status of a woman, if she were of full age 
substantially ceased, with a few exceptions upon her marriage. The
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personality of the wife was almost completely absorbed into that of 
her husband. If the canonists spoke of unitas carnis, the one flesh, 
that flesh was male.
There are many reasons for this socio-legal phenomenon which with very 
little variation was almost universal throughout Europe. Some reasons 
are connected with the Feudal System of land holding which with its
militaristic basis was productive of a male dominated and male
dominating society, even if by the sixteenth century this concept was 
beginning to be an anomaly. Nevertheless concepts such as
primogeniture and the superior's right of marriage owe much to the 
masculine elements of feudal theory. Other reasons are related to 
primitive understandings of the Civil law and concepts such as 
potestas and tutela perpetua. Mistaken interpretation of legislation 
such as the Senatusconsultum Vellaeanium served to cloud the issue. 
Whilst yet other reasons owe their existence to primeval ideas of 
Germanic male potestas, as the dignior persona, the better person.
With a few minor exceptions the woman lost all independent powers and 
became ’cled1 with the personality of her husband^. This attitude
towards women was of great antiquity. Regiam Majestatem, the early 
manual of substantive Feudal Law contains much which serves to 
enshrine this attitude and give it the rigidity of law. Craig, one 
can argue, points to the Feudal Law as being the prime source of the 
disability as he speaks of such a disability, in respect of vassalage, 
which he maintains could not be held by a woman due to the mil tar y 
element in reddendo, but explains that by his time women could hold 
land indiscriminately in feu due to a diminution in the importance of 
military holding2 *
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The overwhelming notion of a defined power which emerges with Regiam 
Majestatem is that of the husband*s potestas. The wife is spoken of 
being !,in potestate viri"^ in the husband’s power and under his 
authority, and was definitely regarded as being of an inferior 
personality
’’Habita quoque distinctione semper observata superius posita inter ... 
masculas et feminas".
’’Regard must always be had to the distinction above and to the 
preference of males to females”.
The potestas can be analysed in many ways. There are indications that 
the husband should be regarded as the curator or tutor of his wife. 
However there were important distinctions between the curatory or 
tutory of women in medieval Scotland and the tutela perpetua mulierum^ 
of the Roman law, for one thing the powers of a married woman in 
Scotland were much more restricted than those of a Roman woman. The 
husband’s purpose as tutor in Scotland was more than merely to
interpose authority to her acts. The Roman woman was not in the power
of her husband but in the power of her pater (who could of course be 
her husband) or was sui juris. Property belonging to the woman if sui 
juris remained her own, and the patrimonial rights were unaffected,
although she could transfer her non-dotal property to her husband's
custody and management,-. This is in contradistinction to the complete
D
assignation of moveable property from the wife to the husband saving 
some small exceptions which occurred upon marriage in Scotland which 
was known as the jus mariti.
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The husband’s power could also be looked upon as a species of 
universal mandatory^. However, this attitude could be explained in 
terms of exactly the opposite, by virtue of the husband being the 
principal and the wife a restricted agent. Thus Balfour can state 
that the husband is ’principall and heid1 of the wife .^, and one can 
point to the agency of necessityg and praepositura as examples of the 
agent’s powers.
In reality the analysis of Stair is closest to an accurate 
representation of the status of married women. He states that the
’’rights arising from marriage are the jus mariti or conjugal power of
the husband over the wife, her person and goods”. Further, he
distinguishes between two meanings of jus mariti firstly in the narrow 
sense of the power which a husband has over his wife’s goods and 
secondly in the wider sense of the power over her person "which stands 
in that economical power and authority, whereby the husband is Lord, 
head, and ruler over the wife" which power he attributes to biblical 
authority^.
This jus mariti is later stated by Stair to be "a legal assignation to 
the wife’s moveable rights needing no other intimation but the
marriage".
Admittedly this is in apparent relation to the narrow interpretation 
of jus mariti only but one can consider that it presents a 
satisfactory legal rationale for what happened to women at marriage. 
A woman who was of full age and unmarried had no restriction upon her 
rights of property or action, there was inherent in her all the 
capacity and power of a natural person, it is this personality and all
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that flows from it which the woman assigns to the husband. The 
personality in Stair’s analysis must exist de jure naturae being 
evident upon the application of reason to the nature of natural 
persons^. When this personality of woman is applied to the three 
first principles of equity to obey God, to be free and capable of 
disposing of herself and all her things and to restrain this freedom 
by engagement^ it is clear that the jus mariti as a right inherent in 
the woman is an attribute, being her personality as well as her
property and that she has the freedom to dispose of this and that she
has the power to engage herself accordingly in marriage.
Stair however does not accurately represent the matrimonial status by 
discussing it in terms of society and communion of goods and by 
stating that it is in effect through the husband’s economical power of 
government, that the administration of all the wife’s assets during 
the marriage lies with the husband a l o n e T h i s  would in effect 
reduce the analysis of the jus mariti to that of a relationship of 
truster and trustee, which the above plainly shows to be erroneous, 
the ownership of the husband is not that of a partner nor is it the 
mere administrative title of a trustee but rather is an absolute right 
of dominium. It is now the task to show the extent of this dominium 
and to examine any exceptions thereto.
The Property of Married Women
It is proposed to examine the effect of marriage on married woman’s 
property, heritable and moveable, and to investigate whether the
Reformation had any effect on this area of the law of husband and
wife.
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Heritable Property
The married woman could own heritable property, as this was not 
assigned by virtue of the marriage and was unaffected by jus mariti, 
in its narrow sense but subject to the wider power of the husband 
which was to become distinguished in this particular as the jus 
administrationis, or right of administration which required the 
husband’s consent to each disposition by the wife, a function of the 
husband’s curatory of the wife. It should be remembered that 
according to Balfour the husband could ’correct hir as ane bairn 
within age, be ressoun of hir ignorance, and doing without his 
counsall and advice”^.
Regiam Majestatem provides
”Quia cum mulier plene in potestate viri sui de jure sit non est mirum 
quod tam dos quam ceterae res omnes intelliguntur esse in dispositione 
viri eiusdem”.
’’Since the woman is in the power of her husband, it is not strange 
that her dos and everything also belonging to her should be at her 
husband’s disposal^”.
This right of the husband to be required to consent to validate any 
heritable deed of his wife extended to those proceeds from heritage 
and any acquirenda e.g. by virtue of succession. Therefore if a 
heritrix sold or disposed of her right, title or claim in any 
heritable property the disposition following upon such a sale was of 
no avail and was null if it was done without the consent of her
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husband,. 
15
The essential reasoning behind the difference in treatment between the 
heritable and moveable relates to the nature of marriage. As marriage 
is a institution of limited duration, i.e. by the lives of the parties 
or by the possibility of divorce, it was reasoned that it could not be 
permitted to affect perpetuities such as heritable rights. Thus a
wife's right of non entry decerned to be a tractum futuri temporis did 
not fall under her husband's jus mariti, whereas the profits of the 
future right did fall into the (misconceived) communion of goods
The wife was obliged to obtain her husband's consent for her 
intromissions with her heritable property. This requirement was of 
some ridiculous application, thus in the case of Melvill v. Dunbar 
(1566)^ a lady executed a renunciation which her husband subsequently 
ratified. This however was found to be insufficient and therefore the 
wife was required to execute a new renunciation which had been 
ratified prior to her granting.
But nevertheless the principle that heritable property adhered to the 
wife was enshrined by cases which exemplified that ferocious period of 
judicial activity during the mid-seventeenth century. Heritable
property as has already been shown extended to the ficticiously
heritable, therefore a bond of annual rent and obligation to infeft 
fell into heritage and did not become part of the property 
administered under the jus mariti .jg.
However, the distinction of capital and income when applied to
heritable and moveable property dictated that the current annual rents
of heritable subjects which fell due during marriage accresced to the 
husband jure marito^ in distinction to a bond bearing annual rent 
which did not come under jus mariti.
Stair,^ notices these distinctions and points to the Act 1661^  which 
provided that bonds bearing annual rent were heritable vis a vis the 
treasury and the widow, as the saving legislation. Similarly a 
heritable bond which was assigned to a woman was heritable in her 
succession and therefore unaffected by the husband's jus mariti^.
Very often a woman's major heritable estate would be that given to her 
as dos or dower. This ancient form of grant is examined in some 
detail in Regiam Majestatem and Balfour's Practicks. The dower 
represented the third part or terce of the husband's heritable 
property with which the husband endowed the wife at the wedding, in 
front of the church door, ad ostium ecclesie. Regiam Majestatem 
provides that the dowry given by the man to the woman, strictly 
speaking the dower, was required under both civil and canon laws2g*
The dower could be specified or not specified. If not specified it 
was deemed by law to be one third of the heritage which the husband 
accrued at marriage. For various complicated feudal policy questions 
it was impossible to dispose of more than one third of the heritage in 
this way - which was in effect to provide a liferent estate for the 
wife in her widowhood. The wife was incapable of disponing any of the 
dos during the husband's life, whereas the husband could so dispone by 
virtue of his headship arising in the jus mariti and its lesser 
sibling the jus administrationis.
The dower, often incorrectly termed dowry^ which was a totally 
different marriage gift coming from the wife's relations to the 
husband, was a provision of an alimentary nature to the wife at 
marriage which would provide an area of ground and thus a liferent 
income for the wife after death during the pre Reformation epoch and 
also after dissolution by divorce in the post Reformation time.
There are indications that the transfer habitually took place at the
church door. In the case of Anstruther and Beaton v. Howeson_ (1542)--------------------------------25
there is mention of endowment 'ad fores ecclesie in lie dowry'. Such 
activities were outside the church, literally and figuratively, the 
church took little to do with this matter which represents an inter 
vivos disposition from husband to wife, suspensive upon a certain 
event i.e. the husband's death but in other respects it is the same as 
a conveyance inter vivos only lacking in the trappings of formality of 
conveyances at that time.
Balfour records that a husband was obliged to give a reasonable dowrie 
(dower) and terce to her wife at the time of marriage. He defines the 
terce as a reasonable third of the fee and heritage in which he is 
vest at the time of the marriage. This is in accordance with an act 
of Alexander II ordaining that every widow shall have a third of her 
husband's lands as dower^g.
The alimentary nature takes a secondary position to Balfour's 
reasoning for this terce which he claims is to enable the widow obtain 
a new marriage; the fundamental concept of provision after death 
however remains2 y  The widow could also take possession of the terce 
and if necessary could have used the Brieve De Recto to protect her
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holding^.
According to Balfour the wife had no power to sell her terce during 
her husband’s lifetime, because it ’like with all uther things that 
may pertaine to hir’ is under the disposition of the husband, and 
farther unless the consent was forced she should consent to any 
dealing which her husband took with the terce2g.
A woman could lose her terce through several occurences, e.g. where 
the marriage was null by nonage; where the husband did not own the 
land where terce was granted, where she dies before him having a 
child, a subsequent wife can claim terce, where his lands were escheat 
and where there was dissolution or separation^ for adultery or 
desertion^ showing a post Reformation extension of a canonist idea.
The character of terce as a quasi liferent does not become totally 
clear until Craig in his Jus Feudale explains the right from the point 
of view of the Feudalist^. Craig, like the author of Regiam and 
Balfour, recognises its essentially alimentary character, saving a 
widow from destitution.
He also discusses, drawing the analogy for the first time, reflecting 
the increased knowledge of Civil law during his time, together with 
his own humanist tendancies, the relationship of terce to husband's 
property as a type of usufruct. Terce is considered fully by Craig as 
a jus in re aliena, a right in another’s property resting on the 
essentially perilous ground of a mere personal obligation, without 
infeftment^.
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Quite importantly Craig specifies that no terce is exigible if either 
spouse dies within the year, without issue^. It is also clear that 
terce only was exigible from feudal land. Burghal tenure gave none.,,-. 
Terce was important as an institution with regard to the constitution 
of marriage in a most unusual way.
By the Act 1503 c 77^g it was ordained that where a woman pursued a 
brieve of terce and it was proposed against her that she was not the 
lawful wife of the husband whose terce was sought, if she could prove 
that she was held by repute as his wife and that the marriage had not 
been challenged, she could have a right to the terce. Repute alone 
did not suffice of course to show undisputed right and it was further 
ordained that parties must have been capable of lawful solemn 
marriage, i.e. that there was no impediment.
It is an Act which purports only to permit proof of entitlement to 
terce and this was surely how it was viewed and interpreted by the 
Canonists in Scotland. For example, Hay makes no mention of the Act 
and Balfour discusses it only in the context of terce. However, it is 
clear that when combined with certain canonical tests the possibility 
of a marriage being constituted by habit and repute was very real.
It shows once again the equivocal position of both secular and 
spiritual authorites on the one hand both trying to encourage 
solemnisation in facie ecclesie as a means of control whilst on the 
other having to recognise the clandestine arrangements on the basis of 
de facto consent and further being incapable of excluding from terce 
those who believed themselves to be and in fact by Canon law were, man 
and wife, simply because of a lack of formality which would result in
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the poverty and destitution which a legal system, conscious of its 
obligations under natural law^y and the morality which flowed 
therefrom, could not abide.
Moveable Property
The broad rule of the jus mariti required as a result of the 
submergence of the womans personality in that of her husband that her 
rights of property in moveables should likewise be submerged.
Regiam Majestatem_0 in a passage already discussed spoke of the almost 3o
*usual1 consequence spoken of above that the wife’s ability to own and 
deal in moveables be restricted. There was no real communion of 
goods, the wife’s right in respect of the moveables was a shadowy 
reversionary right except for those petty personal items which were 
hers in toto.
Therefore in Regiam following upon the broad scheme, and because of 
those petty exceptions to the rule, there is a definitive statement of 
the property rights of a wife with regard to moveables.
’’Nulla femina virum habens potest sine licencia viri sui dare vel 
vendere aliquid de bonis suis ultra valentiam quatuor denariorum 
excepta elemosina moderate et caritative facienda et exceptis etiam 
vestibus suis in robas, scissis et formatis et omnibus parafernalibus 
sibi datis. Tamen ilia debent dari cum licencia viri sui au donatio 
nullius sit valoris”.
”No married woman may, without her husband’s consent give or sell any
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part of her goods of more than four pence value except moderate alms, 
apparel cut and fitted for her wear and her paraphernalia. Even these 
excepted items require the husbands consent or the gift is null^"
It was often the case that the marriage contract would provide the 
wife with a separate moveable estate. Thus in 1550 Thomas Orlie 
discharged a debtor of his contract stating that he had received ’on 
behalf of his spouse’ 3 ells of black cloth, some bolls of bear and 
some oatmeal. It is clear that even when the property was a donation 
to a wife in implement of an antecedent obligation the husbands jus 
mariti intervened^.
There would sometimes be an express traditio of the wife’s personal 
property contained in the contract, thus signifying the loss of her 
status sui juris and the absorption into the husband's dominium. 
Therefore in 1553 a daughter was bound to bring with her the bed and 
the comptir, (chest of drawers) in addition to the maritagium^^.
Whereas in 1563 a much less specific disposal of all 'goods and geir’ 
is made by the wife-to-be to her future husband^.
Balfour in his Practicks is quite clear as to the rule subsisting in
his day, where the jus mariti had undergone some refinement and a 
little more definition.
However, in a passage of Balfour one can perceive some evidence which 
explodes the ’communion of goods* theory. Balfour speaks of the 
wife's inability to sell or dispose of any of 'hir husband's geir' and 
from this he excepts only the following 'almons (alms) gevin
mesaurablie, and all hir claithis and abulzeamentis of hir bodie,
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togiddir with all giftis, gudis, geir or jewellis gevin unto hir (dona 
parapherna)’ which he explains may only be disposed of with the 
husband’s consent^.
Furthermore, if there was a communion of goods it was a very uneven 
communion for, according to Balfour the husband may dispose the wife’s 
moveables at any time. Further to put the lie to any idea of society, 
the wife is prohibited from objecting to such disposition^. A 
husband who intromitted with his wife’s goods was not in the status of 
a vitious intromitter^.
The jus mariti was to be avoided in the following ways (a) by the 
property falling within one of the recognised exceptions, (b) by the 
husband renouncing the jus mariti, (c) by an item of property changing 
its character from moveable to heritable.
(a) The recognised exceptions of matrimonial property from subjection 
to the jus mariti were the wife’s clothes, and all the gifts and 
jewels given to her by way of paraphernalia^. Thus in the case 
of the Mistress of Gray v The Master of Gray (1582)^ the wife's 
paraphernalia was held not to fall sub communione (sic). The 
later decision in Davidson v. MacCubun (1610)^ showed clearly 
that such items as were included in paraphernalia were 
unattachable by the husbands creditors.
Stair acknowledges this category of married woman's property and 
in this connection observes that ’’all her moveable goods and sums 
became his by the marriage except her paraphernalia^”
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(b) The husband could, of course, volunarily resign the jus mariti,
at least to an extent. In the case of Foulis v. Tennants of
Innertyle (l667)r-« it was held that a husband could renounce the 
 —
jus mariti so far as it affects the jus mariti but not to the 
extent of denying his position as paterfamilias. This was 
obviously a decision connected with social policy, limiting the 
retrocession of the jus mariti as an assigned right to that of 
which the husband could usefully dispose, yet leaving the 
residual potestas in the husband. Again this puts doubt on the 
partnership idea of marriage, because its logical conclusion 
would bring this doctrine to a recognition of some quality of 
paterfamilias in a husband notwithstanding that there were no 
goods owned by the married couple.
(c) Obviously the alteration in character from moveable to heritable 
property would effect a substantial change in the nature of the 
husband’s control bearing in mind that jus mariti related only to 
moveables, whereas the heritage was controlled by virtue of the 
jus administrationis. It must be borne in mind however that all 
transactions by the wife were subject to the overriding control 
exercised by her husband.
Donations between Husband and Wife
The area of the law of husband and wife dealing with gifts between 
spouses owed much to Roman law provisions.
There was a general prohibition on the gift of property from husband 
to wife and vice versa. This prohibition is shown by the passage in
Regiam Majestatem which struck at such donations because they might 
lead to a mutual impoverishment:-
"ne mutuo amore se spolient"
"lest mutual love cause mutual poverty"^
This rule had been derived from the Roman Law as did much of this area
of the law._0. Although almost certainly the source of that particular 
od
passage is to be found in the Summa of Azo^* However it was
recognised that, whilst the gifts between husband and wife may be 
invalid they were not null, and if they subsisted for the length of 
the marriage without revocation, they became final and irrevocable^.
Stair writes at some length on the point of revocation of donations 
between husband and wife. The basic rule was that donations inter 
virum et uxorem were revocable. There is fairly early authority for 
the view which conforms with the medieval concept^. The donation had 
to be stante matrimonio, a donation occuring between the marriage 
contract and the ceremony was irrevocable^. Stair examines several 
cases, mostly of the mid-seventeenth century an example of the
enormous judicial activity in this epoch^^. The majority concern the 
disposition to heirs or children subsequent to that to the wife, 
implying a revocation of the first donation. Some cases however do 
concern express de facto revocation^g
Stair cites the case of the Children of Wolmet v. the Countess of 
Wolmet (I662)j_g where a posterior gift to children defeated an earlier 
gift to a wife, and Kinloch v. Raith (1674)6q where, without express
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revocation, the creation of an annual rent from given lands, revoked 
the donation to the wife.
The right to revoke had to be thus expressly or impliedly exercised by
the husband. A donation to a wife was as much an absolute gift as if 
it were made to any other, and simply because it was to a wife did not 
mean that the gift reverted naturally to the husband by reason of the 
jus maritig^.
The grounds upon which the donations were irrevocable were a source of 
much contest and it is difficult to decern anything but the broadest 
principle of quasi contractual recompense. The categories of gifts 
which are irrevocable seem to be those which are truly a form of 
consideration in respect of benefits received or in implement of an 
obligation, or as a form of security.
Thus a donation was irrevocable where because there was no provision 
in a contract of marriage it was to be considered as the provision for 
terce^* Stair cites Lauriston v. Dunipace, in which case a liferent 
donation to a wife was held irrevocable as it was a remuneratory
donation in respect of the tocher brought by her to the marriage and
the non existence of any contract of marriage making provision^.
The provision for the wife representing a gift in consideration of 
aliment, had to be suitable for the parties, and any excess could be 
revoked^. Gifts were also irrevocable if they fell into the
Donations could be reduced and revoked on the grounds of
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ingratitude^ and fault on the part of the donor^. Thus in the case 
of Murray v. Livingstone (1575) the marriage was dissolved for 
adultery and the adulterous party was prohibited from revoking the 
gift. Similarly, if the marriage was dissolved within a year and a 
day of being instituted all items were restored hinc inde^g.
There were two essential exceptions to the rule against the donation 
of moveables and heritage between husband and wife; the tocher or 
maritagium and the donatio propter nuptias. There was also the minor 
exception of morning gift which does not seem to have truly been used 
in Scotland.
Balfour notices the exceptions of tocher and donatio and declares;
"All uther kind of donatiouns is forbidden be the law to be usit 
betwixt the husband and wife ... because gif ather of thame, desyrit 
ony gift of the uther and war refusit thairof, the samin refusal wer 
ane occasioun to stop and quenche mutuall love betwixt thame”
This obviously is quite a different state of affairs from those 
existing when Stair writes, or perhaps the same caution regarding the 
possibility of donations stante matrimonio being productive of 
matrimonial discord resulted in a more liberal interpretation of the 
grounds of revocation and a stricter limitation of the character of 
irrevocable gifts.
Tooher-gude or Maritagium
The institution of tocher-gude or maritagium was a contribution by or
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on behalf of the wife to the husband,^. There were many reasons for 
the gift, it served to compensate the husband for the donatio propter 
nuptias, it provided a sum from which the wife could be alimented, it 
could be used as a security for the good husbandship of the 
bridegroom, and could also help to cement the alliance between the 
family of the wife and that of her spouse.
The tocher was similar to the Civil law dos,^ and as in the Civil law 
was not an essential element in a marriage. It was, however, a usual 
and customary donation. Craig states that the barbarian conquerers 
knew nothing of the institution. The similarity between the Scottish 
and the Roman forms of donation is shown by Regiam Majestatem:-
"Dos id quod cum muliero datur viro, quod vulgariter dicitur 
maritagium"
"Dos is that which is given to the man with the woman which is called 
in the vulgar maritagium",^.
The terminology attached to the gift has produced more confusion than 
any other similar institution. The tocher is called as has been noted 
in the vulgar maritagium. In more learned circles, it was also known 
as dos,^* Craig, confusing the terminology but not the concept, calls 
it dower^^, and there is at least one case where it is referred to as 
a ’dot* reflecting perhaps the fundus dotalis of the Civil law or even 
more likely the pactum dotalium^^.
The most usual method which parties chose to arrange the nature, 
content and extent of any tocher was by marriage contract. This could
be drawn between the parties themselves if they were sui juris^g, or 
between the parties1 parents,^, or between a parent and one of the 
couple^g or between the guardians and one of the couple,^. A contract 
between a prospective mother-in-law and her son was capable of 
executiongg.
The subject of tocher could consist of heritage or of moveable goods 
or of money, or of a combination of all three elements.
Thus in the contract between Thomas Davidson and James Mill (1550)g^  
Robert Davidson Thomas' son was contracted to marry Katherine Mill, 
daughter of James, the tocher being rights to lands and feedings. 
Balfour notes that, "it is leasum (lawful) to ony havand landis to 
give a part thairof in name of tocher with his son, or his dochter or 
with ony uther woman"g^.
In the post Reformation contract between Bruss and Hamilton (1563)gg 
Janet Hamilton was to bring to the marriage all her goods and geir.
Money, of course, was very often the common currency of tocher as in
everything else. It comes as no surprise that the majority of
recorded marriage contracts are for a money consideration, 
particularly when one considers that the majority of these recorded 
contracts relate the arrangements of fairly wealthy families. 
However, the majority of arrangements have not been recorded and it is 
possible that if it was not worth having a notary record it, the
passage of tocher would either only involve a small amount of money or
money's worth.
309
Therefore many contracts contain amounts as low as 20 marksg^ or* as 
costly as 60 pounds (S c o t s ) S o m e t i m e s  the amount would be paid in 
instalmentSgg sometimes on the morning after the wedding. Fulfilling 
a security role, occasionally a cautious father would wait for a 
period of a year and a day before paying overg^.
Of course it would sometimes happen that a monetary tocher was 
insufficient and augmentation was necessary. Therefore it is possible 
to see all kinds of assets being passed including clothing, a spes 
successionisg^ part expenses of the weddingg^ or an obligation to pay 
the expenses of any possible action for dispensation i.e. an
indemnityQn.yu
Restitution of Tocher
The concept of restitution of tocher spanned both pre and post
Reformation epochs. It could occur upon two occurrences; death and 
solutio matrimonii.
(a) Death
Balfour quotes the case of William Gyle v. Henrie Cant (1517)^^
as his authority for the view that if a woman deceased within a
year and a day after the completion of the marriage, then all the 
tocher-gude paid by or on her behalf should be restored to the 
payer. Further any unpaid balance could not be recovered by 
action against the tocher-gude debtor.
This remained the broad state of the law throughout the post
310
Reformation epoch. In the case of Gordon v. InglisQr it was 
reiterated that a husband was obliged to repay the tocher of a 
wife who died within a year and a day of marriage, under 
deduction of funeral expenses. As it was in the mid-seventeenth 
century, so it was with Stair writing towards the end of the 
seventeenth century. Stair, commenting on the dissolution of 
marriage by death within a year and a day of the marriage, tells 
that fin this our custom agrees to the civil law’ and so the 
tocher returns back to the wife, or "those from whom it came"^. 
If however, children were born in this period they were entitled 
to their succession and tocher could not be returned^.
(b) Solutio Matrimonii
The Liber Extrart_ gave provision for the termination of marriage 
yb
in circumstances which have already been examined. It also 
provided for the devolution of dos or tocher to the wife or her 
family upon the marriage being declared null. The Decretal 
ordains the division of common goods, if any.
In accordance with Capitulum 1 of the Decretal^ where a 
sententia divortii was pronounced the d o S g j  had to be restored. 
Thus in many cases contained in the Liber Officialis Sancte 
Andree there is a clause in the sententia restoring the dos. An 
example is the case of Boswele v. Awery (1551)gg where the 
marriage was annulled for affinity
"dotemque et donationes propter nuptias hincinde restituendas 
fore decernimus".
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"And we decern that the dos and the donatio propter nuptias are 
to be restituted whence they came".
With modification of the grounds of dissolution which followed 
the Reformation so also the tocher was capable of restitution in 
circumstances other than that originally envisaged.
Therefore where divorce for adultery or desertion was granted the 
tocher was also returnable to the innocent wife, donation propter 
nuptias to the innocent husband. The theory here was that the 
innocent party should have the same benefits as if the delictual party 
were dead, as in Murray and Tennants v. Livingstone (1576)^ 
Similarly the case of Lord Innerwick against Lady Innerwick (^589)^qq 
brought the same reasoning that an heiress who was guilty of adultery 
loses the conjunct fee and tocher ... as if she were naturally dead.
Again in the earlier case of Auchinleck v. Stewart (1584) where a 
decree simpliciter of divorce for adultery was granted by the Judge 
Ordinar, the whole tocher gude reverted^.
Stair approves of the reversion to innocent parties upon the same 
basis of deemed natural death of the guilty party. This theory is 
quite important as it lies deep at the whole concept of Reformed 
divorce and this treatment of tocher exhibits a pragmatic, 
quasi-English propensity for legal fiction1Q2.
The Husband's right of Courtesy
Where the wife had terce as her primary alimentary provision from her
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deceased husband’s estate, the analogous provision for husband was 
courtesy.
Where a wife was infeft in land whilst married and children were born 
of the marriage, and the wife died, her husband had a right to possess 
and enjoy that land^^* The husband was however, not permitted to 
alienate the land. The right of courtesy was similar to a 
usufruct .jQjj. Indeed C r a i g a t t r i b u t e s  its origin as an institution 
to an imperial rescript dealing with usufruct, or to a liferent as the 
analogous English right of tenancy per legem anglicae or courtesy of 
England^.
The husband was only entitled to this liferent if he could prove by 
two witnesses that a child had been born of the marriage and that 
child had been heard to cry. There was no restriction on the 
witnesses; either men or women could give e v i d e n c e I t  is here 
possibly that the theory behind courtesy may be found as the provision 
of a fund from the wife’s heritage which would give her son or 
daughter aliment throughout their life and which their father could 
administer for their benefit. The father's holding is limited to that 
of a liferenter, and as a consequence of this the father was required 
to find caution to guarantee his holding
If however there were no children of the marriage the courtesy was not 
be exigible from the wife's heritage and it will devolve to the wife's 
heirs .j og.
By Craig's time the analogy, with English law was lessening because of 
the increased estrangement between English and Scottish Law.
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The wife's total heritage was due to provide courtesy, unlike the 
limited terce. Craig whilst recognising the similarities between 
English and Scottish law, is applying Scottish law as he makes quite 
c l e a r B a l f o u r  notes that a woman's second husband could obtain 
the benefit of courtesy which would accrue to her first husband -j -j ^ • 
This is supported by a later decision, that of Spens v. Lord Durie 
(1 6 1 0 ) ^ 2  where a husband who married a woman inf eft in heritage and 
procreated a child was held to be entitled to courtesy even though he 
was her second husband.
Stair notices mostly what Craig wrote on courtesy including the 
curiality which limits courtesy to the land into which wives succeed 
as heirs and not as purchasers
Courtesy, like terce was lost by the dissolution of the marriage by 
divorce for adultery and by desertion following the principal effect 
of the Reformation divortium a vinculo matrimonii, and generally by 
any atrocious crime on the part of the husband
The Husband's Donatio Propter Nuptias
The donatio propter nuptias was a gift given by the husband to the 
wife. Originally it was derived from the donatio ante nuptias of the 
Byzantine Empire.
Under Justinian the gift was allowed both before or after the 
marriage. By the Justinianic legislation, apart from the change of 
name from donatio ante to donatio propter nuptias, it was prescribed 
that it should be an equivalent of dos, and subject to similar rules.
It did however, whilst representing the converse of dos being a gift 
from husband to wife, remain under the jus mariti of the husband, a 
situation which obtained into the Scottish municipal law of the 
sixteenth century
The donatio propter nuptias was designed to recompense the wife for 
tocher and the other dotal outlays which may have been incurred. It 
also served to provide some restitution where the tocher failed to be 
returned following upon the nullity of the marriage.
The Regiam Majestatem^g brought the Liber Extra into Scots law with 
the already cited canon,
’’Sane soluto matrimonio sicut dos ad mulierem, sic et donatio propter 
nuptias redit and virum".
"Just as on dissolution of the marriage the tocher goes to the woman 
so the donatio goes to the man"^^.
Whilst the donatio as with the other elements of the wife’s moveable 
estates was subject to the jus mariti, it could not be alienated by 
the husband. Stair observes that a wife’s consent to a disposition 
of donatio by her husband was presumed null by virtue of fear and 
reverence of her husband^g.
However, it may be that Stair was overstating the position as there is 
a decision to the contrary in the case of Hepburn v. Naismith
(l6l3)«j<|g where the metus reverentialis of a wife for her husband was 
found insufficient for reduction of a deed, verus metus alone was
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sufficient. Balfour notices that if the donatio is in truth ante 
nuptias it may exceed the value of the tocher, if made after the 
marriage it may not.
Linked to the donatio propter nuptias was the conjunct fee, an element 
which is perhaps too deeply entrenched in the law of conveyancing for 
the present purposes. Suffice it to say that although a conjunct fee 
was given to a wife she had no warrant to intromit with it, which 
function pertained solely to the husband. If however the husband died 
within a year and a day of the marriage the conjunct fee would have to 
be restored by the wife if the tocher had not been paid-^o*
Restoration also was required of donatio in the circumstances of
dissolution of marriage otherwise than death. In the event of divorce 
for nullity or for any other reason in both the pre-Reformation^ or 
post-Reformation era r e s t o r a t i o n was required.
Morganatic Marriage - the Morgengabe
An institution which involved a gift from the husband to the wife, but 
which is insufficiently documented in Scotland is the morganatic 
marriage.
This was a legally valid marriage between parties of different social 
rank, whereby a wife did not require her husband’s status and her
children did not succeed to his status, dignity or property. The name
is of a 1 3th century origin and means a marriage on the morning gift 
being the present given to a wife on the morning after the marriage. 
It therefore probably represents a stylised bride price.
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An early sixteenth century act notes that "The ... sovreign Lord 
approved ... the gift of our sovreign Lady’s the Queen’s Dowry and 
mornwyngift." (A.P.S. II 1503, 240). As has already been noticed
there is one statement of morning gift and lie dowry in the Liber 
Officialis Sancte Andree.
Two later sixteenth century Acts (1592 c 46 III 565 and A.P.S. c 24 
IV.24) confirm the morrowing gift contained in the marriage contract 
between James VI and the King of Denmark. It should be noted that 
whilst morning gift, the essential indicia of morganatic marriage 
appears the actual phrase, matrimonium ad morganaticum does not.
Craig in his Jus Feudale notices the institution and relates it 
somehow to second wives and their children. It is clear however that 
the Germanic institution applied originally to all marriages 
contracted under the above conditions.
The last mention of morganatic gifts is the case of Craig v. Menteith 
(1684) Mor 6095 where "ornamenta morganatica" gifted during the 
marriage were not revocable by the husband’s will. They fell under 
paraphernalia and were thus unattachable.
It appears that the institution never really applied in Scotland. In 
the first instance because the Germanic influences were insufficiently 
strong and as the law developed native and other sources provided 
alternative institutions.
The Married Woman and the Law of Obligations
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It is intended to briefly describe the rights and duties of a married 
woman in relation to her obligations arising from contracts and from 
delicts.
1. Contracts
As in every other field of legal relationship the jus mariti had a 
severely limiting effect on the ability of women to oblige themselves 
and to contract with others. However, to the generally restrictive 
prescription there were some fairly important exceptions.
The primary rule is found in Regiam Majestatem thus:-
’’Nulla femina virum habens potest sine licencia viri sui dare vel 
vendere aliquid de bonis suis ultra valentiam quatuor denariorum 
excepta elemosina moderate et caritate facienda et exceptis etiam 
vestibus suis in robas, scissis et formatis et omnibus parafernalibus 
sibi datis. Tamen ilia debent dare cum licencia viri sui aut donatio 
nullius sit valoris”.
”No married woman may without her husband*s consent give away or sell 
any part of her goods above 4d value excepting moderate charitable 
gifts apparell cut and fitted for her wear and her paraphernalia. 
Even these excepted items require her husband's consent or the gift is 
null123».
Thus the wife’s ability to sell or donate her personal property was 
restricted to charitable gifts, her paraphernalia, and her clothes, 
remembering that her husband’s consent, by virtue of the jus mariti
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was always required. A disposition sine consensu could, according to 
Balfour be recalled and was ’of none a v a i l * w h i c h  one can interpret 
as voidable; it appears however from the Practicks that the fourpenny 
value of goods above which the husband*s consent was required had 
disappeared rendering all the wife’s goods subject to this rule, 
regardless of value.
Similarly no married woman could act as cautioner
"Nulla femina virum habens potest esse plegia de re aliqua data vel 
vendita nec prosequi querelam de aliqua ne nec defendere querelam viri 
sui nisi cum licencia et auctoritate viri sui. Et si quid factum 
fuerit in contrarium illud irritum fore volumus et irare. Vidua tamen 
potest esse plegia cuiuislibet ac libere facere et disponere de bonis 
suis quammodo cunque voluerit secundum quod justum fuerit sine 
licencia et impedimento alicujus".
"No married woman can act as a cautioner in respect of anything given 
or sold nor can she institute any action nor defend an action against 
her husband without his consent and authority. Anything done contrary 
to this rule we wish to be regarded as null and void. But a widow can 
act as cautioner for any debtor, and may freely act and dispose her 
property in any way she please according to the law without let or 
hindrance from any man^^"
As an extension of the jus mariti all the wife’s moveables fell under 
her husband’s potestas including the right to action. Thus Balfour 
states that the wife cannot ’persue or defend ony action, querrel or 
cause in j u d g e m e n t T h e  wife was immune from prosecution for
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spulzie which had been committed by her husband whilst he was alive 
and in which she had assisted him, by virtue of a rule which Balfour 
gives and which can only amount to respondeat superior, apparently in 
contravention of culpa tenet suas actores. The wife was also excepted 
from diligence taken on her husband’s property simply because of her 
status as praeposita negotiis mariti^y The reasoning behind such a 
sweeping immunity was apparently that the husband in having potestas 
was solely responsible for his wife’s deeds. Thus whilst the husband 
could obtain benefit from the jus mariti, the total assignation also 
included liabilities.
The wife was thus almost completely restricted in her contractual 
capacity. For example money lent by a wife was repayable to her 
husband Her personal bond was not binding The husband was
not liable for anything which his wife contracted for without his 
consent except for those items converted to his own use, items 
purchased by the wife in her capacity as an ordinary agent or an agent 
of necessity and finally, items purchased by the wife in exercise of 
her praepositura rebus domesticiis. Thus in the case of Eustacius 
Wise v. Lady Holyroodhouse (161 C O ^ q a bond was given by a wife whose 
husband did not subscribe. The action for recovery was sustained but 
the relief was obtainable from the husband or executors only to the 
extent that the items had been used by them.
The wife as an ordinary agent and an agent of necessity was not liable 
for items furnished to her, the liability for the expense of such 
items fell upon her husband. Thus in the case of Howison v. Lady 
Lauriston (1631) -j 3 -| where an action was raised against a widow for 
payment for supplies made to her whilst her husband was at court it
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was held that she was not burdened notwithstanding the alleged 
factory.
The agency was well recognised as falling firmly within a relatively 
well developed law of agency, at least that is by the latter half of 
the seventeenth century, when in the case of Wilson v. Deans (1675) ^ 2  
where a woman kept a shop and trafficked as a merchant. The husband 
being aware of this, was held liable for debts contracted by her on 
account of her business on the basis of an actio institoria.
The actio institoria has a most interesting history,^. In Civil law 
it was originally an action whereby one who had contracted with the 
manager of a business (the institor) could take action against the 
person who had granted the agency. This action helped to allow the 
law of partnership to develop and it may be that in choosing this 
action in the case of Wilson v. Deans the Court was cementing the myth 
of quasi-society which caused such confusion with the law of 
matrimonial property. The Court could have chosen some other basis of 
liability e.g. quasi contract, and thereby attach the husband.
If however the husband were dead and no executors were extant  ^or he 
were abroad^ 5  the action against a wife would be upheld. In such 
circumstances one can see something of a quasi-contractual equitable 
element in the ratio decidendi.
The wife had an agency of necessity which entitled her to oblige her 
husband for necessaries supplied to her in emergency, without his 
consent. Thus in the case of Acton v. L. Halkerton (1629)^6 the wife 
was found not to be liable for money which had been furnished for her
aliment in great necessity, though this had been advanced on her own 
credit. This could be attributed to a logical extension of the
obligation of aliment which was owed to a wife by her husband as well 
as upon the basis of quasi contract. Thus Balfour states that "The 
husband may be compellit to sustene his wife in ... necessaries"
The wife also had an implied agency arising from the cohabitation 
between her and her husband; the praepositura rebus, or negotiis 
domesticis. It is difficult to ascertain at which stage the 
praepositura *was recognisable as a distinct element in the wife's 
power of agency. It is not mentioned in Balfour or in Craig, however, 
it is recognised at least to some extent by 1520 where in the case of 
Kincaid v. Sanderson (1520) . ^ 3 the husband had inhibited his wife’s 
ability to pledge his credit.
The most clear statement of the praepositura is the case of Darling v. 
MacKenzie (l675)^q where it is defined in the following terms, that a 
wife may take, for the provision of her house what is necessary from a 
flesher or baker, and her husband is rendered liable. Further it is 
interesting to note that in that case it was determined that those who 
supply her are not obliged to inquire into her authority because her 
husband has the remedy of inhibition if he fears abuse
V
The praepositura was not a carte blanche permitting a prodigal wife to 
escape liability for contracts upon invocation. It was restricted in 
less drastic ways than inhibition, for example it did not cover items 
outwith the supply of ordinary household goods. Thus it covered only 
the extent of a wife's expense at home, not in London.^. A wife was 
not held to be acting as her husband’s agent in the discharge of terce
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without her husband's express c o n s e n t nor her uplifting of 
rent.^ or a bond^^ all deeds which required the husband's act as 
delectus persona.
The wife could not use the praepositura where she was contracting with 
her personal aliment or property, in such circumstances she was 
personally bound
The praepositura was also excluded where the wife was acting outwith 
her husband's authority, express or implied; e.g. where she had 
committed spulzie^g.
In much of Stairs' analysis the concept of agency does not figure 
largely, he mentions praepositura only twice^^ he maintains that much 
of this liability is imposed on the husband because;
"From this communion of goods it follows that there is a communion of 
debts, whereby it follows that the husband is liable for the wife's
debt, though it should exceed her and his moveables and the profits of
the wife's land or of her other heritable debts"^g.
However if the analysis of marriage as productive of a communion of
goods is in error and there is not quasi-partnership, then a 
'communion of debts' if there can be such a concept, is also in error. 
The only explanation for the circumstances of a husband becoming 
obliged and for a wife’s heritage being attachable by her husband's 
creditors is that of agency, constituted by the marriage and the 
implied nature of the praepositura.
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Obligations inter virum et uxorem
The obligations between husband and wife are recognised as twofold; 
adherence and aliment.
Adherence
The obligation of adherence between husband and wife is most 
conveniently, discussed under the heading of divorce for desertion.
Aliment
The obligation placed upon the husband to aliment his wife was second 
only to the obligation of adherence in its importance as one of the 
poles of conjugal relations. As a concept the alimentation of the 
wife lay fundamentally at the basis of terce and donatio propter 
nuptias. The chapters of Balfour make this quite clear. The terce 
was clearly a disposition, inter vivos providing for the day when the 
husband cannot sustain his wife and she must seek a new husband 
The donatio is expressly given that the wife may be ’sustenit and 
helpit1 with the gift^^.
In addition to these provisions for after death or dissolution, the 
obligation to aliment was primarily an obligation stante matriraonio of 
which the agency of necessity and praepositura rebus domesticis were 
merely the legalistic and conceptual manifestations.
Therefore according to Balfour quoting an early case, Hamilton v. 
Eglington (1561)-j5 -j the husband could be compelled to provide meat,
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clothes and other necessities, befitting her status as a wife, thus 
discouraging ladies with ideas above their station. This obligation 
to aliment subsisted for as long as the marriage notwithstanding 
estrangement even for cause, until reconciliation or divorce,^.
The husband was thus liable for goods purchased by his wife
notwithstanding an inhibition of her praepositura unless he could 
prove that she was provided for adequately.^. He was also found 
liable for clothes bought by her for her own use after their marriage 
as in Nelson v. Guthrie (1672)^^.
There is an interesting decision of Parliament sitting as a court in
1641, in causa Anna Inglis, Lady Aichet to William Cunninghame of
A i c h e t . The supplication had been promoted by Lady Aitchet155
desiring payment of her "bygone modification and ane constant
allowance in time coming from her husband" for her aliment. 
Parliament and the King decerned the husband to pay 200 marks to the 
supplicant, letters were granted to her to warn him at Paisley market
cross and the Kirk of Dunlop to answer her and to implement the
decreet.
Stair acknowledges the husband’s obligation, which he lists in 
speaking of the rights and obligements arising in marriage. The 
obligation of aliment is an outward obligation "of the husband to 
aliment and provide for the wife in all necessaries for her life, 
health and ornament, according to their means and quality"-jgg. He
considers it as a natural obligation and gives a biblical quotation to 
support his contention; surprisingly he does not make comment on the 
canonist concept of cohabitatio mensa et thoro. There are of course
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built-in restrictions; extravagance is not encouraged and the husband 
is bound only quoad potest. Stair does also point to carry the 
obligation beyond the grave rendering the husband liable for his 
wife's funeral expenses and mournings, a somewhat unwarranted 
extension of the obligation of aliment. One would contend that if 
anything this obligation is completely extraordinary and innominate.
Formal Marriage Contracts in Seventeeth Century Scotland
The general effects of both the jus mariti and the jus 
administrationis led to evasive measures which resulted in the ante 
and post nuptial marriage contracts.
These variations on the devolution of property and rights therein were 
well suited to the ecclesiastical framework of espousal followed by 
solemnised ceremony, and whilst almost exclusively dealing with the 
purely secular matter of matrimonial property again it must be noticed 
that the obligation to aliment in truth lies at the bottom of such 
provisions.
The late but useful compendium of styles by John Spottiswoode, "An 
Introduction to the Knowledge of the Stile of Writs" (1707) is able to 
provide a fairly complete picture of the type and style of documents 
used and the express terms thereof which elucidate the attitude of the 
mid to late seventeenth century legal mind to the question of 
matrimonial property.
The Spottiswoode collection of styles postdates that of Sir George 
Dallas of St Martin's but notwithstanding the outstanding success of
Dallas* "System of Stiles" (1697) the author believes Spottiswoode*s 
commentary to render his account more useful for the present purposes.
As will have been noticed both these books of styles are printed after 
1690. This however, does not invalidate these works as indications of 
the attitude and practice of lawyers and lay people alike during the 
seventeenth century. It is also clear from a comparison of these 
marriage contracts with those described in the notary protocol books 
as examined ultra that in the area of proprietorial matters marriage 
law was not greatly effected by the Reformation, except of course in 
the provision of hitherto unheard of grounds of solutio matrimonii 
which affected the patrimonial obligations of the parties.
The purpose of marriage contracts is described by Spottiswoode as a
l b  f
human provision which supercedes the provisions of law, *provisio 
hominis tollit provisionem legis1.
He goes on to state that such contracts express the conditions of 
marriage and he stresses the economic importance of such arrangements.
Spottiswoode indicates something of the attitude of lawyers to solemn 
marriages calling them the ’most honorable way of marrying*, and he 
favours what is known as the antenuptial marriage contract because 
this avoids the difficulties of provision in a postnuptial 
arrangement.
Spottiswoode only deals with contracts which do not concern land 
whereas Dallas provides examples of two contracts which do give form 
to agreements regarding heritage.
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In all these contracts the ordinary law applicable to the raising of 
actions by married women and against that class of person and 
concerning donation between spouses is observed. Therefore 
notwithstanding an inductive clause which generally narrates the names 
and designations of the parties to the contract and a dispositive or 
operative clause which sets out the essential terms of the agreement 
the contract is mostly subject to a clause which details the names of 
those at whose instance execution is to pass for implement of the 
obligations contained in the contract
The notes appended to Dallas’ treatment of marriage contracts testify 
to their infinite variety, being capable of great flexibility in view 
of the different types of proprietorial settlements which could occur 
on marriage including the creation of liferents, fees, tacks and 
investments as well as providing for direct donations, excambions, 
provisions for children, assignations of tocher and all the multitude 
of obligations between husband and wife which could possibly occur. 
This having been said the basis framework of a marriage contract was a 
provision by the husband in favour of his wife of either land or a sum 
of money invested in land with a provision for liferent in favour of 
he and his wife and fee for the children of the marriage which 
provision sometimes was in satisfaction of terce followed by the 
provision by the wife for the obligation concerning her tocher being a 
formal assignation by her or those providing the fund.
The following is a text of an ante nuptial contract from 
Spottiswoode*s Introduction:
A t _________ , &c. In Contemplation of the which Marriage, the said A.
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Binds and obliges him, his Heirs, Successors and Executors whatsoever, 
to provide and secure the said B. his promised Spouse in Liferent, 
during all the Days of her Lifetime, in all and whole an Annualrent or 
yearly Duty of 900 Merks Scots Money Yearly, free of all Burdens 
whatsoever, and that by employing Money upon well holden Land, or in 
the Hands of sufficient responsible Persons, and taking the Securities 
thereof to her in Liferent, at the Sight and by the Advice of C. And 
if the same shall be employed upon Land, to procure sufficient 
Confirmation by the Superior, upon his own Expences, for her Security 
thereanent; and if the Money employed to that Purpose shall happen to 
be uplifted, as oft to reimploy the same, by the Advice and to the 
Effect above mentioned. And for further Security, the said A. binds 
and obliges him and his foresaid, to make due and thankful Payment to 
the said B. of the foresaid Annualrent or Yearly Duty of 900 Merks 
free of all Burden, as said is, at two Terms in the Year, Whitsunday 
and Martinmas in Winter by equal Portions, beginning the first Term’s 
payment thereof at the first Whitsunday or Martinmas next, and 
immediately following the said A. his Decease, for the Half Year 
preceeding that Term, and so forth Termly thereafter during her 
lifetime, with 40 Lib. Money foresaid of liquidate Penalty for each 
Term’s failie, toties quoties. And also, it is agreed betwixt the 
said Parties, that if it shall happen the said B. to survive the said 
A. in that Case, he hereby dispones to her his whole Houshold 
plenishing and Moveables within his House, as well what now belongs to 
him, as what shall hereafter be iether acquired by himself, or what 
shall come by her, to be intromitted with, used and disposed upon by 
her at her Pleasure, free of all Debt and Burden; excepting only his 
Books and some Silver-plate, which shall be at his disposing, 
notwithstanding of this Disposition, whereof a particular Note is to
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be made and subscribed by both Parties. And likeways the said A. 
binds and obliges him, and his above specified, to make Payment to the 
Children, one or more to be procreate of this Marriage, of the Sum of 
10000 Lib. Scots Money, to be divided, if there be more than one, as 
the Father and Mother shall agree; and failing of any such Division, 
to be divided equally; allowing to the eldest, if a Son 2000 Merks 
more than to any of the rest; and if there be only Daughters, allowing 
as much to the eldest Daughter; and those Proportions to be payable to 
the said Children and their respective Ages of 16 Years complete. And 
in the mean Time, he binds and obliges him and his foresaid, to 
aliment, educate, and sustain the said Children, according to their 
Quality, in all Necessaries for Maintenance, Abuliments and Education, 
till their Portion be payable. And in like Manner, the said A. binds 
and obliges him and his foresaid, to provide the just and equal Half 
of all and whatsoever Lands, Tenements, Annualrents, Wadsets, 
Adjudications, Apprisings, and Sums of Money, both heritable and 
moveable, that shall be conquest or acquired by him, or which shall 
fall to him during the Lifetime of his said promised Spouse, to 
himself and her, the longest Liver of them two in Liferent, and the 
said whole Conquest to the Children to be procreated betwixt them, in 
Fie. And also, to provide all Sums of Money and others, that shall 
fall to his Wife during the Time of their Marriage, to him and her, 
the longest Liver of them two in Liferent, and to the Children to be 
procreate betwixt them; which failing, to his nearest Heirs 
whatsoever; except only her own Cabinet, with such Pearls, Diamonds 
and Jewels as now belong to her, which she has Power hereby reserved 
to dispose of in favours of any Person she pleases, without his 
Consent, in case there shall be no Children. And he obliges himself 
and his foresaid to ratify, and, if Need be, to renew any Right that
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shall be granted by her thereanent. Which Provisions above mentioned 
in favours of the said B. she, by these Presents, accepts in full 
Satisfaction of all Terce and Third of Lands, or Third or Half of 
Moveables that may fall to her by her Husband’s Death, or which her 
nearest in Kin can claim by her own Death, in case he survive her. 
And on the other Part, the said B. by these Presents, assigns and 
dispones to the said A. his Heirs or Assignies, (secluding his 
Executors) the Sum of 5000 Merks Scots Money of Principal, with 500 
Lib. of liquidate Expences, and the Annualrent of the said principal 
Sum, during the not Payment after Lammas in this instant Year,
contained in a Bond granted to her by ____  as Principal, and ____  as
Cautioner, conjunctly and severally, of the Day     with the
Bond it self, and all that has followed, or may follow thereupon: 
Surrogating and substituting the said A. in her full Right and Place 
of the same forever. Which Assignation she binds and obliges her, her 
Heirs and Executors, to warrant from all Facts and Deeds done, and to 
be done by her or her foresaids prejudicial hereto allenarly: Likeas,
she hath instantly delivered to him the Bond unregistred to be kept 
and used by him and his foresaid, as their own proper Evident at their 
Pleasure in Time coming. As likewise, she assigns to him and his 
foresaids, the Plea and Process depending, at her and the rest of her
Sisters and Brothers Instance, against ____    Merchant in
Rotterdam, for the Number of 8000 Rix Dollars, and that in so far as 
concerns her Part and Proportion thereof; and all Acts, Decreets, and 
Interlocutors past, or to be pronounced and past in her favours, and 
all Benefit that may redound to her thereby, be always bearing a 
proportional Part of the Expences debursed, or that shall be debursed 
in that Process. And further, she assigns to him and his foresaids 
her Part and Proportion of all other Means and Monies to which she has
Right from her said deceast Father, or umquhile _____ her Mother, and
to all Bonds and Securities granted to her by her deceast Father and 
Mother conform to the Law of Holland, in Manner mentioned in her
Mother’s Testament, and other Writs granted by her Father to her for
that Effect. And for Payment whereof, she may affect any Lands or
Estate belonging to her said Father; and all Writs and Rights made and
conceived, or which may be interpret in her Favours thereanent, 
dispensing with the Generality; and which she obliges her and her 
foresaids to warrant in Manner above written. Nevertheless, that what 
shall be recovered of her Proportion of the Debt due by the said 
and of any other Means to which she has Right from her Father or 
Mother, or wherewith she may affect her Father’s Estate, shall be 
secured by the said A. to the said B. in Liferent, during all the Days 
of her Lifetime, and the Fie thereof to the Children of this Marriage; 
which failing, to the said A. his Heirs and Assignies whatsoever, and 
that over and above the Provisions above specified. And lastly, it is 
agreed, that Execution shall pass on this Contract, at the Instance of 
the said C. for Implement thereof, in favours of the said B. and the 
Children of the said Marriage. Registration, &c.
NOTES
1 Balfour, 93 - a late example of this is Russell v. Paterson 
(1629) Mor. 5955
2 Craig, Jus Feudale 2.14, 1-3
3 A.P.S. II C 29; R.M. II, 16
4 G.1, 144, 190 et seqq
5 D. 23, 3, 9, 3
332
67
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
Balfour, 93 cl 
Balfour 94, CX 
See infra 
Stair 1, 4, 9 
Stair 1 , 1 , 4  
Stair 1, 1, 18 
Stair 1, 4, 9 
Balfour, 93 cl 
R.M. II, 16, 13 
Balfour, 95 cl
Pennycook v. Cockburn (1582) Mor. 5764 
Mor. 5993
Scrimgeour v. Murray (1663) Mor. 5775
Pitcairn v. Edgar (1665) Mor. 5775
Stair, 1, 4,17
A.P.S. vii 230: 244
Gordon v. Ogilvy (1684) Mor 5777
R.M. II, 16
Protocol Book of Sir John Cristisone, 203, where the word Dowry
is used quite incorrectly
Liber Officialis, 29
A.P.S. I, 401
Balfour, 105, c.1
Balfour 109, CXV
R.M., II, 17, Balfour, III, CXXIII
4, X, IV, 20
Balfour, 111-113
Jus Feudale, 1, 11, 7
2, 22, 25, 2, 22, 32
333
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
2, 22, 34
A v. B (1612) Mor. 15536
A.P.S. II, 243, c.23
Craig, Jus Feudale, 2, 22, 25
R.M. II, 16
R.M. IV, 32; Supp, 15
Protocol Book of Sir John Christison, 100
Protocol Book of Dom Thomas Johnson 720
Protocol Book of Dom Thomas Johnson 683
Balfour, 93 c.111 
Balfour, 9, C.IV
Allans Executor v. Lawder (1623) Mor. 5931
Para-pherne is Greek for outwith the dowry
(1582) Mor. 5802
(1610) Mor. 5802
Stair, 1, 4, 17
(1667) Mor, 5828
R.M. II, 15
D, 24, 1, 1, 2, 3, pr
Summa, 112, 119, 121
R.M. II, 15
Lady Hotterball v. Croustens (1631) Mor. 6151 
Gordon (1688) Mor. 6097 
Stair 1, 4, 18
Earl of Angus v. Countess of Angus, Hope’s Major Practicks Pr II, 
17, 35
(1662) Mor. 1730
(1674) Mor. 11345
Harvey v. Lumisden (1683) Mor. 6095
334
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
Stair, 1, 4, 18
Lauriston v. Dunipace (1635) Mor. 6132 
Short v. Murrays (1677) Mor. 6124 
Craig v. Monteith (1684) Mor. 6095 
Stair, 1, 4, 18
Murray v. Livingstone (1575) Mor. 6144
Maxwell v. Hairstanes (1634) Mor. 6160
Balfour, 101, C.1
Balfour, 99 C.1
D. 23, 3, 75
R.M. II, 18
Protocol Book of Dom Thomas Johnson, 378 
Craig Jus Feudale, 1, 15, 20
Protocol Book of Mark Carruthers 76, 23, 4, 6
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 357
Protocol Book of Sir Alexander Gaw, 63
Protocol Book of John Christison, 431
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 320
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 279
Protocol Book of John Cristison , 431
Balfour, 99, (:.1; 161, C.1
Protocol Book of Dom Thomas Johnson, 683
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 357
Protocol Book of Dom Thomas Johnson, 659
Protocol Book of Alexander Gaw, 189
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 320
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 357
Protocol Book of Gilbert Grote, 320
Protocol Book of Dom Thomas Johnson, 224
335
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
Balfour, 100 C.6
Mor. 5924
Stair, 1, 4, 19
Craig, Jus Feudale, 2, 22, 23
2, X, IV, 29
1, X, IV, 20
Roman Law usage
Liber Offioialis, 167
(1576) Mor.
(1589) Mor 
(1584) Mor 
Stair, 1, 4, 20 
Balfour, 100, C.IV
It is described as such in Balfour 100 C.V 
Craig; 2, 22, 40, et seq
J.H. Baker, Introduction to English Legal History 230 et seq 
Balfour 100, C.IV 
Craig; 2, 22, 44
Balfour 100, C.111, IV, V; Stewart v. Irving (1632) Mor. 3112
Craig, 2, 22, 41; 2, 22, 42
Balfour, 100, C.3
(1610) Mor. 3111
Stair II, 6, 19
Stair II, 6, 19
C. 5, 3, 19; Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law III 
R.M. II, 15
8, X, IV, 20; Balfour 101, c.1 
Stair, I, 17, 13 
(1613) Mor. 6075
336
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
Balfour 101-105 
Liber Officialis, 167 
Balfour 105, c. XV 
R.M., IV, 32 
Balfour, 93, C.III
R.M. IV, 33, cf. Senatusconsultum Vellaeanum, J.A.C. Thomas 
Textbook of Roman Law 243 
Balfour, 93, C.III 
Balfour, 94, C.X
Fenton v. Carnegy (1664) Mor. 5801
L. Ulysseshaven v. Lady Bonnington (1611) Mor. 5957
(1610) Mor. 5952
(1631) Mor. 5954
(1675) Mor. 6021
P. Stein, 'The mutual agency of Partners in the Civil Law1 Tulane 
L.R. 33, 595
Russell v. Paterson (1629) Mor 5955
Hay v. Corstophin (1630) Mor. 5956
(1629) Mor. 5952
Balfour, 95, C.XI
(1520) Mor. 6021
(1675) Mor. 6005
The Register of Inhibitions was established in 1581 
Allan v. Countess of Southesk (1677) Mor. 6005 
L. Boyd v. L. Airth (1582) Mor. 6013 
Pittarow v. Tenant (1587) Mor. 6014
McWatis v. Home (1622) Mor 6014; Nairn v. Buchanan (1680) Mor. 
6016
Robins v. Count of Southesk (1688) Mor 5955
337
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
Weill v. Banks (1628) Mor 6015 
Stair I, 4, 16; I, 4, 17 
Stair, I, 4, 17 
Balfour, 105, C.1 
Balfour, 101, C.1 
Balfour, 95, C.XI
Logan v. Wood; Balfour 95, CXI Mor. 5877 
Auchinloch v. Monteith (1675) Mor. 5879 
(1672) Mor. 5878 
A.P.S. 1641, V, C.55 
Stair, I, 4, 10
Spottiswoode, An Introduction to the Knowledge of the Stile of 
Writs (1707) (3rd edition), 343
Spottiswoode, op. cit. 346
Spottiswoode, op. cit. 246, Dallas, op. cit. 731
Spottiswoode, op. cit. 246.
338
CHAPTER VII
Divorce and Separation in Sixteenth Century Scotland
No topic in the consistorial law is more fraught with confusion and 
misconception than that of divorce and separation. The confusion
arises from the indiscriminate misuse of technical legal terms, from a 
misappreciation of ancient usage and from difficulties of 
interpretation. The misconception arises from a mistaken
understanding of the doctrinal similarities and differences between 
the universal and the Reformed traditions of the Christian religion.
For the purposes of clarity it is useful to set out the terminology in 
use when divorce is spoken of by Canonists and Reformers alike.
As has already been shown the Catholic concept of the sacramentality 
of marriage had as a direct consequence the theory of indissolubility 
of marriage. This theory found expression in law by (1) a prohibition 
on divorce, rendering the marriage dissoluble only on the ground of 
nullity by incurring a diriment impediment and (2) a restricted 
ability by the innocent spouse to be separated at law from his or her 
spouse upon the commission of certain specified matrimonial offence.
Indissolubility
Valid Christian marriage, ratum et consummatum was considered by the 
Canonists only to come to an end upon the natural death of one of the
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parties^.
This doctrine was claimed by the Canonists to be supported by 
scripture^:-
"Therefore they are not two but one flesh. What therefore God hath 
joined together let no man put asunder"^.
and farther:
"And he saith to them, whosoever shall put away his wife and marry
another committed adultery against her"^.
This scriptural authority is supported by similar passages in the
Gospel of Luke_ and the First Letter of Saint Paul to the
5
Corinthians^. Hay quotes them to some extent but largely without 
commentary^.
Dogmatically the Council of Trent defined the Catholic tradition thus:
"The perpetual and indissoluble bond of matrimony was expressed by the 
first parent of the human race, when, under the influence of the
Divine Spirit he said, This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my 
flesh, wherefore a man shall have father and mother and shall cleave 
to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh1 ... Christ the Lord 
taught more plainly when referring to those last words as having been 
spoken by God, He said "therefore now they are not two, but one flesh" 
and immediately notified the firmness of the bond so long ago 
proclaimed by Adam with these words, "What therefore God has joined
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together let no man put asunder”g.
This reiteration served to define the interpretation of scripture 
which had subsisted substantially unchanged from the foundation of the 
Church until the Reformation.
There was however some alleviation of the strident nature of this rule 
in the allowance particularly by Alexander III and later Innocent III 
of the dissolution of marriages ratum non consummatum e.g. where there 
was impotence, a vow or supervening affinity^.
However, apart from these rather exceptional grounds of dissolution 
which can be referred at least in respect of impotency to the 
existence of a diriment impediment, it is clear from the almost 
contemporary Catechism of Archbishop Hamilton that the "bond of 
matrimony ... may not be dissolved and loosed again by any divorcement 
or partising but only it is loosed by the death of the one of them; 
for truly the partising and divorcing, ... should be understood only 
of partising from bed and board and not from the bond of matrimony".
This separation from bed and board is the divortium a mensa et thoro 
mentioned in Hay thus:
"Divortium scilicet a mutua cohabitatione etiam nonobstante 
consummatione matrimonii"
"By divorce is meant divorce from cohabitation even in spite of the 
consummation of the marriage" <|q *
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It was also sometimes called separatio quoad thorum.
The circumstances in which this separation was granted by the 
Officials Court were fairly limited, adultery, spiritual fornication, 
or heresy, and danger to body or soul (saevitia).
Separation for Adultery
Hay looks at separation for adultery in some detail. He considers 
that the person who sins against marriage may be legitimately deprived 
of the benefit of marriage^.
Spiritual authority is provided by a passage from the New Testament 
which provided for the Reformers important ammunition in the struggle 
to allow divorce for adultery namely Matthew, Chapter 19:-
f,And I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be 
for fornication and shall marry another committeth adultery”
Importantly, it is pointed out that according to the Liber Extra the 
innocent party to a marriage whose spouse has committed adultery was 
obliged to seek a separation in order to avoid scandal i.e. an 
occasion of spiritual ruin, or opportunity for sin, the fault of 
course was brought to the notice of the Church by a denunciation. 
Reasons for the obligation are given as a quest for justice, the 
correction of the wrongdoer, the punishment of crimen and to certify 
the parentage of the children^* it has already been noticed that 
secular legislation outlawed adulterers^ •
3^2
There are several examples of the decree of separation in the Liber 
Officialis. Twelve cases arise between 1520 and 1550 a good example 
is the late case of Janete Trumbule against John Hay (1550)^:
"Nos Joannes Spittal officialis Sancte Andree principalis in quodam 
causa divorcii intentata per probam mulierem Jonetam Trumbule actricera 
ex una contra Johannem Hay burgensem in Kirkauldy eius sponsum 
putativum reum partibus ab altera. Decernimus dictos Jonetam Trumbule 
et Johannem Hay causante adulterio per dictum Johannem cum quodam 
Agnete Horne comraisso stante raatrimonio inter eosdem Jonetam et 
Johannem celebrato prout legitime coram nobis probatum existit a 
mensa, thoro, et mutua cohabitatione absque facultate alterutri 
convolandi ad secunda vota durante vita alterius divorciandas fore 
prout divorciamus in contrarium pro parte dicti Johannis allegatis non 
obstantibus dictumque Johannem in expensis in lite factis et flendis 
condempnantis quarum, taxatione nobis imposterum reservamus".
"We John Spittal Official Principal of Saint Andrews in this cause of 
separation brought by the good woman Janet Trumbele pursuer, on the 
one part against John Hay, burgess in Kirkauldy her putative spouse 
defender of the other part decern that the said Janet Trumbule and 
John Hay, because of the adultery committed by the said John with 
Agnes Horne, during the marriage of Janet and John, and proved before 
us by every lawful means, be separated from table, bed and mutual 
cohabitation, without the ability to either enter into second vows 
with others during the life of the other, for the part of the said 
John as alleged and the said John is found in expenses of the cause as 
taxed".
Separation for adultery could be obtained by both man^ and wife^ an 
example of extraordinarily equal treatment in an age noted for its 
preference of the male. Similarly the defences of recrimination^g> 
that one!s spouse had also committed adultery and lenocinium^ or 
whoremongering and condonation^Q or passive acceptance of the adultery 
were admitted under Canon law.
The significant factor in the decreet is not that the adulterer was 
found liable for expenses, as usually was the case these followed 
success, but that there was the prohibition against subsequent 
remarriage. The marriage still subsists, the parties are both subject 
to ligamen, they are merely separated, not divorced a vinculo.
Hay expresses the opinions of Middleton^ and De La P a l u 2 2 when he 
vacillates between approval of the idea of private separation in 
clandestine marriages, and strict adherence to the judicial 
declaration of separation^^*
Spiritual Fornication
Because of the theoretical similarity to adultery, heresy, idolatry
Judaism and the Gentile heresy were sufficient grounds in the Canon
law for separation^^. There were also similarities to the casus
apostoli, where a convert was permitted to forsake his infidel spouse
and contract a new marriage0_.
cO
However, the analogy was not entirely quadrate. Spiritual fornication 
differed from carnal fornication in many respects. A heretic could 
abdure and purge his sin removing the ground for separation. The
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faithful party’s continued cohabitation with the heretic was an act of 
charity and could be productive of the salvation of the lost soul and 
consequently was encouraged. Further a faithful party could be 
compelled to receive back a penitant heretic2 g.
Hay’s information that such a cause of separation was rarely invoked 
is borne out by the Liber Officialis which records no cases of this 
nature. However, there are indications from the records of the 
Franciscan Friars who converted some of the Western Isles during the 
late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that infidels were alive and 
thriving in the remoter islands. In terms of the Christian religion 
the Western Isles were no man’s land, neither Catholic or 
Presbyterian.
Danger to Body or Soul
The third class of circumstances which permitted separation for 
cohabitation was that of physical or spiritual danger. The spiritual 
danger could arise if one spouse were attempting to lead the other to 
sin^y. The physical danger could arise from a very large number of 
fact situations. Hay provides examples of leprosy or attempted murder 
as extreme heads of harm^g.
The Liber Extra provides the basis for the majority of cases of 
separation which are stated in the Liber Officialis under the broad 
denomination of saevitia. There are five cases of saevitia recorded 
in the Liber Officialis, four of which occurred within a period of 
five years, all of which, in respect of the claim of saevitia were 
pursued by the wife. There were sometimes severe disadvantages to
3^5
living in a male dominated society, even though none of the injuries 
seem to be so hurtful as those recorded by Helmholz^.
An interesting case from the Liber Officialis is that of Broune 
v. Broune (1546)^ not only from its sententia but also by virtue of 
it having been delivered by three delegated judges:
"Nos Patricius Scott vicarius de Cathcaytht, Valterius Fethy et 
Andreas Traill capellani commissarii deputati dominorum commissariarum 
generalium sedis Sancti Andree principalis cum ilia clausula "vobis 
omnibus aut duobus vestrum conjunctim" specialite constituti 
judicesque cause et partibus infrascripts pro tribunali sedentes in 
quodam causa sevitie ad divorcium tendente per providam mulierem 
Mariotam Broune sponsam Alexandri Broun actricem ab una contra dictum 
Alexandrum reum partibus ab altera, Decernimus dictos Mariotam et 
Alexandrum a mensa, thoro, et mutua cohabitatione divorciandos, prout 
eosdem divorciamus".
"We Patrick Scott, Vicar of Cathcart, Walter Fethy, and Andrew Traill, 
Capellanus, commissary deputes of our masters the commissaries General 
of the Principal Seat of Saint Andrews, specially constituted judges 
in the cause, by virtue of the clause, "before all of you or two of 
your number sitting together", and for the parties within written, 
sitting as the tribunal in the cause of separation for cruelty held by 
the good woman Mariot Broun wife of Alexander Broun pursuer on the one 
part against the said Alexander on the other part, defender. We 
decern the said Mariot and Alexander separated from table, bed and 
mutual cohabitation and accordingly we divorce them".
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The similarity of the wording of the Liber Extra to that used in some 
sententia displays a fairly close application of the law.
"Si tanta est viri sevitia ut muliere trepidanti non posset sufficiens 
securitas provideri non solum non habet illi restitui sed ab eo potius 
amoveri".
"If the man's cruelty is so bad that there can be no sufficient 
security given to the frightened woman, not only should she not be 
restored to him but instead she should be kept away from him"^*
Passive harm also provided an occasion for separation. Thus if one's 
spouse had leprosy, then thought to be contagious, a separation could 
be granted^.
Divorce a vinculo matrimonii - adultery
It is noteworthy that the word divorcium is used in the sententiae of 
the Official's court in respect of both separation a mensa et thoro 
and a vinculo matrimonii where marriage had been contracted in face of 
an invalidating impediment rendering the union only a de facto 
marriage not one constituted de jure. This unity of usage or 
indiscriminate usage persisted into the post-Reformation epoch. Thus 
Balfour in speaking of the restitution of property upon dissolution or 
separation employs the following terminology in respect of certain 
circumstances:-
"Quhen any man and his wife or simpliciter partit and divorcit be the 
authorite of the Judge Ordinar for adulterie or any other trespass
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committit be the man"^*
The use of the word ’divorcit’ is interesting as from the context it 
is in use when there is ’adultery or any other trespass’ and yet when 
Balfour wrote adultery and desertion alone would result in decrees of 
divorce a vinculo. Any other 'trespasses’ could only result in
separations a mensa et thoro.
This could mean that Balfour is using the word divorcit fully aware of 
its ambiguity as representing strands of two separate legal and 
theological traditions. It also points to the continued use of 
separation a mensa et thoro for non divorceable matrimonial offences, 
indicating that the post-Reformation jurists were capable of 
conceiving a two tier theory of separation.
This is made even more clear upon examination of Balfour’s statement 
and upon examination of his authority the case of Agnes Auchinleck v. 
James Stewart (1540)^ where the pursuer raised an action of removing 
against her husband from her jointure lands on the basis that ”of the 
common law, when any man and his spouse are divorced simpliciter or 
frae bed and bind thro adulterie ... the tocher gude ... ought to be 
restored". The phraseology "divorced simpliciter" is, one contends, 
merely an alternative for "frae bed and board". The case is in 
relation solely to pre Reformation law, and only by a blurring of the 
distinction between the meaning of ’divorce’ before and after the 
Reformation can Balfour attain the universality of application which 
he attempts.
One can submit that this is not a matter for which to criticise
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B a l f o u r i n  not distinguishing between divorce proper and separatio, 
because divorce could be applied in the sense of separation where 
applicable only, as it could where referable to divorce a vinculo 
only. There was in his analysis no room for confusion as the matter 
was perfectly clear from context, as for example in the various 
meanings of solatium in the modern Scots law of delict.
There was perhaps no ground for confusion in Balfour’s day because it 
may have been considered that only divorce a vinculo could be obtained 
for adultery or desertion and only divorce a mensa et thoro for the 
other matrimonial trespasses. However the possibility of confusion 
could arise if one could choose between divorce a vinculo and divorce 
a mensa et thoro on the ground of adultery, in such a circumstance 
confusion about the meaning of the word could conceivably arise.
Craig does not speak of separation a mensa et thoro in relation to 
Scots law but by inference he speaks in such a fashion to confirm that 
by his time the word divorce is in exclusive use in relation to 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii^g.
The confusion then swings in a different direction, possibly because 
there was no definitive legislative statement which related to 
divorce, although there were several noteworthy Acts which will be 
examined later in greater depth. Consequently, notwithstanding 
Stair’s^y clear and explicit examination of the topic, in 1697 at 
least some were under the impression that only divorce a vinculo 
matrimonii could be granted by the Commissaries for adultery. In the
case of the Duchess of Gordon against the Duke (1 6 9 7 )3 8 ’ on aPPeal the 
Court of Session clarified that as separation was the lesser remedy it
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was integral of divorce and consequently a court having the power to**’ 
grant the greater remedy it could choose to grant the lesser, as 
accords of logic, majori minus inest.
Marriage whilst not considered to be a sacrament in Reformed theology 
was as has already been discussed a holy ordinance and although not 
dissoluble at will was rendered by virtue of this subtle and 
Augustinianic distinction and by some astute scriptural interpretation 
more open as regards the possibility of disolution by divorce on the 
ground of adultery.
The First Book of Discipline testifies to this attitude
"Marriage once lawfully contracted may not be dissolved at man's 
pleasure as our Master Christ Jesus doth witness unlesse adulterie be 
committed which being sufficiently proved in presence of the civil 
magistrate, the innocent (if they so require) ought to be pronounced 
free and the offender ought to suffer death as God hath commandeth"^.
There are many points to notice in this passage which declare the 
theory behind the Reformed concept of divorce. Firstly it is to be 
noticed that the Reformers considered marriage to be a permanent and 
indissoluble contract almost as much as in Catholic times. The only 
possibility for divorce is provided by the matrimonial offence of 
adultery, which does not give an immediate right to dissolution and 
right to remarry, such matters are at the instance of the innocent 
party, thus separation a mensa et thoro could be retained and the 
matter had to be brought to court. Adultery was, in Stair* s^0
language a just occasion for dissolution.
350
The remedy is ex facie based upon the scriptural passage in Matthew 
19,9, which has already been examined. The Reformers in adopting this 
passage into their new matrimonial code appear to have ignored the 
parallel passage in the Gospel of Mark:-
2. And the Pharisees coming to him asked him, Is it lawful for a man 
to put away his wife? tempting him.
3. But he answering saith to them; What did Moses command you.
4. Who said Moses permitted to write a bill of divorce, and to put 
her away.
5. To whom Jesus answering said: Because of the hardness of your
hearts he wrote you that precept.
9. What therefore God hath joined together let not man put asunder.
10. And in the house again his disciples asked him concerning the same 
thing.
11. As he saith to them; Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry 
another committeth adultery against her.
12. And if the wife shall put away her husband and be married to 
another she committeth adultery^.
This attitude of reliance on Matthew and the rejection of Mark is 
indicative of Reformed thought throughout Europe. The primary
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continental influences upon the Scottish Reformation Beza, Bucer and 
Calvin all adopted this course. Calvin also adopted desertion as a 
ground of divorce which was also considered by Beza^.
The crowning interpretation in favour of Matthew was aided by the 
theory of presumed death arising from an interpretation of Leviticus 
which in ordaining death for adultery rendered any adulterer civilly 
dead^ when applied in Scotland. Thereby his wife was in the position 
of a widow and was free to wed again
"If any man commit adultery with the wife of a neighbour and defile 
his neighbour’s wife, let them be put to death both the adulterer and 
the adulteress”^ .
Of course these texts were available to the earlier canonists, and 
therefore it is useful to examine their view of the passage which 
founded the Reformer’s theory of divorce for adultery.
The question of the possibility of divorce is examined to some extent 
by Hay. t He displays the major attitudes to Mosaic divorce in the 
Pentateuch and eventually concludes that for certain specific reasons 
the Jewish code permitted divorce, particularly as the lesser of two 
evils, as prohibition would have resulted in wife murder.
Hay^ deals specifically with the passage in Matthew Chapter 19 which 
was the basis of the Reformers’ rationale. He finds the injunction 
that a husband who put away his wife when she has not committed 
fornication, committed adultery and that conversely if he put her away 
when she has committed adultery he committed no adultery was of the
352
new law and could be obeyed by Christians.
Hay concedes that this passage refers to a conversation which took 
place between Jesus and the Pharisees and the Jews who following 
Leviticus were accustomed to stoning adulterous wives and thereby 
freeing the husbands for remarriage. Hay points out that one could 
not contract a marriage whilst one’s spouse was still in life. Hay 
also notes that simply because this appears in the Gospel is not a 
sufficient reason for following it out as it could be merely a 
repetition from the Old Testament and was in any case not imperative.
The Reformers noticed in the First Book of Discipline that their ideal 
implementation of the rather literal interpretation of the Old 
Testament which would result in several executions for adultery each 
year was not likely to be made by the civil authorities, particularly 
the ambivalent Marian authority of the period. Thus the First Book 
provides that "If the civil sword foolishly spare the life of the
offender yet may not the Kirke be negligent in their office, which is 
to excommunicate the wicked and to repute them as dead members and to 
pronounce the innocent partie to be at freedome, be they never so 
honourable before the world”
Even before the theory was presented in this way Kirk Sessions were 
providing a remedy for adultery which was approximately presumptive 
death. It is the case that the introduction of divorce by the
Reformers was no mere "substitution of divorce a vinculo for divorce a
mensa et thoro"^.
Adultery as a social evil was viewed very seriously indeed by the
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Reformers. The Kirk, from the earliest times took a grim view of the 
marital offence. As has been observed, before 1560 adultery could 
result in penal restrictions, after the Reformation there was an 
increase in the punitive aspects of the matter, and notwithstanding 
the institution of the Commissary Court the Kirk Session retained some 
jurisdication ad vindictam publicam^g in addition to its penalties of 
excommunication and the attendant capital punishment for the crime.
The concern which the Reformed Church had in respect of adultery, a 
matter which was recognised as "so doubtsome a case", is exhibited by 
the early attempts to provide a remedy for the sin-crime, and by the 
attitude of the Church, which in its assumption of jurisdiction and 
its formation of remedies without secular involvement or legislative 
power, asserted itself ex proprio motu as the jurisdiction competent 
to grant a decree of divorce.
With the possible exception of the ability of ministers to marry,
probably no other single doctrinal alternation to the law by the
Reformers had as great an effect on the popular imagination as the
granting of divorce.
To lose papal authority was revolutionary, but to find a method of 
breaking the marriage bond was inspired law-making of praetorian 
proportions. Therefore it comes as little surprise that as early as 
1559, before the Reformation proper, those elderships which felt any 
permanence were granting decrees for the relief of their
congregations matrimonial problems.
One of the earliest examples of the new law is the case of Rantoun v.
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Geddes (1559)^^ where the husband William Rantoun gave in a petition 
for divorce on the basis of adultery committed by his wife Elizabeth 
Geddes. It was held however that no adultery was proved and therefore 
a decree of absolvitor was granted.
Subsequent to this action by her husband, Elizabeth Geddes raised^ a 
new action for divorce on the basis of his adultery. The adultery was 
proved and the sententia, granted by the minister and elders awarded 
divorce, and ordained that the civil authority execute the guilty 
party.
There were several cases heard before the Kirk Session at St Andrews 
during the period 1560-1563, before the institution of the Commissary 
Court. These are particularly informative because they represent the 
theologico-legal attitude of the Reformed Regieme before the more 
legalistic Roman-Civil-Canonical attitude of the Commissary Court 
interposed and set the mould of the consistorial law in Scotland until 
the considerable reforms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The interesting case of Alexander Lothrisk (1560)^^ represents the 
jurisdictional contest between secular and ecclesiastical courts and 
shows that whilst adultery did provide a lever by which the marriage 
could be dissolved, that dissolution could be granted in absence, and 
pronounced by public declaration. It also shows the significance of 
desertion as an adminicle of evidence and as an element to be taken 
into account in decerning guilt or innocence. It is worth noticing 
that the Session prescribed the death penalty to be executed by the 
Civil Power.
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Adultery could be admitted by the defender-- although this was, in
d c.
view of the (nominal) capital nature of the offence not perhaps a 
frequent occurrence, but was a possibility, bearing in mind, as the 
First Book of Discipline points out, "If the life be spared as it 
ought not to be, to the offenders, and if fruits of repentance of long 
time appeare in them and if they earnestly desire to be reconciled 
with the Kirk, we judge they may be received to the participation of 
the Sacraments.” Repentance was always possible and those absolved by 
penitance could be considered spiritually and morally rehabilitated^.
The case of Thecar v. Morton (1561)^ is interesting in so far as the 
alleged adultery was said to have taken place abroad, and witnesses1 
evidence was taken ad futuram perpetuam rei memoriam. Divorce was 
granted on the basis of this evidence. There is probably a little
significance to be placed on the usage of the Session of the words
"separated and divorced’ in the sententia. In this case as in the 
case of Scrymgear v. Dundas ( 1 5 6 1 ) the right to remarry was 
specifically granted thereby putting to rest any confusion which could 
arise from the mere use of ’divorced*.
During 1562 the pressure from the Church to have its prescription 
regarding the capital nature of adultery adopted by the secular 
authority increased.
As part of this pressure certain stages of adultery were looked upon
as being especially scandalous, particularly where a child was born as
a result of the adultery. Therefore in the case of Kay v. Duncan
(1562),-/- there was reference to the confession of adulterer and
5b
paramour, the inability of the parties to reconcile and the
’notourious’ nature of the crime. This appears as an echo of the 
’manifest and incorrigible’ adulterers of pre Reformation times, but 
is nevertheless a distinct usage and was to become the basis for 
several Acts of Parliament which attempted to placate the Church 
partly by providing paper evidence of the secular resolve to stamp out 
this socially destructive misdemeanour.
On the fourth of July 1562,.^  the General Assembly ordained that a 
supplication be made to the Queen to punish all, ’’vices commanded by 
the Law of God to be punished and yet not so commanded by law of 
Realme, viz ... Adulterie and fornication".
This accorded with the Reformed ideal. Calvin^g approved of such a 
harsh penalty. However the Genevan Commonwealth was not so longingly 
sought by the Civil Sword in Scotland.
In 1563 an Act was passed which, on paper at least gave the Reformers
everything they desired. Narrating that, "adulterie", was recognised
as an ’abominabile and filthy vice and crime’ which was perniciously
and wickedly used in the Realm, the Act ordains that "all notour and
manifest committaris of adulterie in any tyme to come after the dait
hereof sail be punit with all vigour unto the deid ... bothe man and
woman, after due monition to abstain’’ .
1 5 9
There appear to have been few executions for adultery under this act, 
in 1563 two executions are reported in Edinburgh and later farther 
executions were to take place.
In 1562 John GibsongQ was called before the Session of the Canongait
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he confessed to adultery and asked the mercy of God. The Kirk 
remitted him to the Civil Magistrate to be punished ’as accords of 
law’. Punishment for simple adultery in Edinburgh seems to have been 
a period of ’branketing for 6 hours at the Cross’ then being warded 
for open repentance before the Kirk’.
The opportunity for penitance could sometimes provide an escape from
the rigour of the ecclesiastical prescription and the stated civil 
penalty. Thus in 1566 John Miller who admitted adultery was remitted 
by the Kirk to the Civil Magistrate in Edinburgh who ordained that he 
remove himself from the Canongait and find surety till they be
satisfied, under pain of the Royal Act^^.
It is submitted however that this case of Miller exhibits the social 
control and quasi criminal jurisdiction exercised by the Session in 
contradistinction to the civil consistorial jurisdiction which was by 
now regulated by the Commissary Court.
This is borne out by the entry for the 9th April 1567gQ in the Buik of 
the Kirk of the Canongait where John Miller and his paramour Beatrix 
Morris are displayed at the cross and thereafter imprisoned in the 
Tollbooth.
This criminal jurisdiction became the main way in which the Session 
maintained a presence in such questions as adultery, the divorce of, 
the Commissary Court being painless and equivalent in respect of the 
ability to remarry^.
In 158lg2 Parliament perceived some difficulty in the interpretation
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of notour adultery and therefore an Act was passed specifically to 
explain the "Act touching adultery". The Act defined notour and 
manifest adultery as being where children are born between adulterers 
or where they keep bed together notoriously or where the adulterers 
give slander to the Kirk by suspicion and having been admonished are 
excommunicated for obstinacy. For clarification the act added 
succinctly that all such adulterers were to incur the penalty of 
death.
In 1592 Parliament commenced a programme of legislation to curb the 
occurrence of adultery, which was noticed in an act of that year to be 
a crime which ’dayly’ increased and for the same a great number of 
married persons have been divorced for adultery^* Each of the Acts 
which followed during the course of the century to the mid-seventeeth 
century exhibit a surprisingly ad hoc remedy to a problem which, by 
the harsh nature of the penalty, one would have thought, died out. 
These Acts testify to the complete ineffectiveness of the secular 
power to impose its will on the population.
These secular activities and session decreets were assisted by the 
National Church, which in the General Assembly of 1570 legislated on 
several aspects of adultery, particularly lenocinium, which it found 
to reduce the petitioners claim just as in the canon law. Those who 
knew of adultery and did nothing to bring the sin-crime to light were 
to be punished to the same extent as the perpetrators^. An example 
of this discipline is the case of John Ker before the Synod of Lothian 
and Tweeddale in April 1589.
It appears that the Kirk’s repressional arm came to play in a great
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many cases during the mid-seventeenth century. At the Synod of 
Lothian and Tweeddale for example very many cases of adultery came 
before the elders for scrutiny. Hardly any concerned the reduction of 
a subsisting marriage. Thus in 1644, the Synod ordained the 
Presbyteries to compile lists of the adulterous and incestuous in the 
parish and give these names to the solicitor of the Kirk for 
prosecution^. Repentance by sitting on the penitent stool for many 
Sundays, and standing at the Church door on a Sunday in sackcloth may 
have been severe in terms of pride and self esteem but were better 
than death. Perhaps the Church recognised that an adherence to the 
capital policy would have resulted in an embarrassing number of 
executions. In practice therefore, penitants were better than dead 
adulterers although that did not stop the enthusiastic Session of 
Perth in its zeal for the Old Testament Law executing an adulterer by 
the name of Gray and his paramour in 1590^^.
Penitance was by and large encouraged. It may be significant that 
there is only one Session on record as having carried out the ultimate 
penalty (that of Perth). No other case of adultery appears before the 
session during the period 1584-1587> whereas in more lenient session 
areas adultery is a recurrent offence. Adultery thus figures in the 
Records of the Session^ and Presbytery,^ of Aberdeen, the Presbytery 
of Inverness^ ^ and in the Records of the Synod of Lothian and 
Tweeddale,^.
All stages of process against adulterers are recorded, complaints 
could be made of adultery,^ testimonials could be received,^ 
commissions set up to examine the offence,^ penance ordained^g 
sentences of excommunication grantedyyi satisfaction of discipline
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acknowledged,^, scandal purged,^, caution acceptedgg, adultery 
triedg^, punishment administeredg^ and generally all the types of 
function which would enforce discipline and dispose of wrongdoers and 
’manifest sinnars’.
Occasionally glimpses of the old consistorial jurisdiction came to 
light. For example a decision can be made that the marriage of two 
husbands is considered adultery not bigamygg, but there is in a record 
such as that of the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale no decree of 
divorce on the ground of adultery although decrees on the basis of 
nullity may be grantedg^.
A Kirk Session would sometimes refer adulterers to a Presbytery for 
punishmentgj.. There appears however to have been no uniform 
punishment though the parading of the sinner clothed in sackcloth 
features widelygg as an expression of enforced.but contrite penitance.
A problem which exercised the minds of Church and State lawyers for 
some time was whether the adulterer was enabled to marry his paramour. 
This was obviously a fairly important policy matter, as the prospect 
of marriage to a paramour could be productive of collusion and wife 
murder.
The Church’s attitude in the earliest times was open to varied 
interpretation. The First Book of Discipline provided the basic 
principles upon which the policy of the Church was built, "If any 
demand whether that the offender after reconciliation with the Kirk 
may not marry againe. We answer that if they cannot live continently 
and if the necessity be such, as that they feare further offence of
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God, we cannot forbid them to use the remedy ordained of God. If the 
partie offended may be reconciled to the offender, then we judge that 
on no wayes it sail be lawfull to the offender to marry any other 
except the partie that before hath been offended and the solemnization 
of the latter marriage must be in the open face of the Kirk, like as 
the former, but without proclamation of bands’^ .
The general motivation of the Church in this question as in the pre 
Reformation times is to avoid scandal and the occasions of sin. If 
the guilty party could not live continently, i.e. without committing 
fornication then he was to be allowed the proper remedy for that sin, 
marriage. The precept could have been Pauline ’it is better to marry 
than to burn’. After all, of course, for the prevention of scandal, 
reconciliation was encouraged and marriage with one’s former spouse 
was permitted, although this should be de facto a clandestine marriage 
as notoriety would compromise the aim of avoiding scandal.
Much legislation sacred and secular was enacted to control this 
question. In December 1566 for example, the General Assembly 
considered a marriage by the adulterous offender to be ’illegal’ and 
decreed that ministers were to be warned away from marrying upon pain 
of removalgg.
In 1571 the question of a marriage between an absolved excommunicant 
adulterer and his paramour was deemed unlawful on the ground of 
affinitygg.
1592 saw the passing of the Act^g anent adultery to which reference 
has already been made. The marriage of paramours was deemed to be
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contrary to the Law of God901 and public honestyQ O  and as if to
y *
enforce this policy both paramour and her issue were disinherited; 
only the issue of the ’first lawful marriage’ were entitled to
succeed.
The Act is interesting on the basis of its reliance upon the pre 
Reformation species of affinity and publica honestas. The Law of God 
referred to could apply to the marriage of David and Bathsheba and to 
the passages of Mark which had been rejected for other purposes. This 
conclusion was based upon cases decided in the same way an interesting 
example of which is the case of Stevenson and Pollock (1565)«„ where a 
marriage betwen adulterer and paramour was declared null because 
Stevenson had been divorced in 1560 (by a church court) on the basis 
of his adultery with Pollock. The former spouse was still alive, 
thereby farther compounding the misdeed.
The later case of Duguid (1583) is, an anomaly, as the adulterer is
allowed to marry a woman other than his wife, by virtue of a Royal
dispensation^.
The pressure was maintained to bring secular law into conformity with
ecclesiastical pronouncement. In 1595 the Assembly defined its
attitude on ’unlawful’ marriages, being where one party marries the
paramour and where the guilty party takes another spouse
notwithstanding the aggrieved spouse’s willingness to adhere....yb
As a result of strenuous supplication by the General Assembly to have 
’ane act to be made dischargeand all mariages of such persons as are 
convict of adulterie and that the samin be ratified in the nixt
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Parliament"^, Parliament passed an act ordaining that ’All mariages 
contractit between persons ... divorcait ... for the crime of adultery 
and the paramours are in all time null and unlawfull"^. This Act 
seemed to create a new diriment impediment, in contradistinction to 
the Reformers' earlier zeal for a less human law in this field. In 
the fairly late case of Lyle and Douglas v. John Douglas (1670) the 
Act of 1666 was applied rendering a marriage unlawful between an 
adulterer and his paramour with whom the adultery had been 
committedgg. However it appears that the framework was left intact 
for even adulterous couples to contract de presenti marriage, 
therefore the real sanction was oblique - the prohibition on the 
inheritance of any children of such unions. Thus a multitude of 
doctrinal and legal problems could be avoided should some party care 
to challenge the nullity of a union on the above basis.
This legislation an echo of previous prescriptions, was put into play
in the case of Kennedy v. Ritchie (I601)^g where the marriage between 
Kennedy and Ritchie was annulled, Mrs Kennedy having been divorced
from her husband because of her adultery with Ritchie. The continued
cohabitation of Kennedy with her paramour was seen as a continuation 
of the adultery. The punishment in adultery was not the divorce, nor 
indeed any aliment payable by the guilty party, but was rather the 
prohibition on fulfilling one's sinful desires in carrying out 
'conversation' with the paramour.
The programme of legislation was resumed during the mid-seventeeth 
century. Adultery was rife as the many cases quoted from the various 
church courts signify and certain provisions were made in order to 
control and prosecute adultery more easily.
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In 1644 two acts were passed in an attempt to clarify this vexed area. 
The proof of adultery had been in the commissary court by evidence 
given per testes scientes et videntes but by the Act 1644 -j » this 
method of proof was permitted in addition to probation of bigamy, or 
that bairns were procreated or that persons under scandal of adultery 
kept frequent company and bed together.
During the same parliamentary session an Act was passed submitting all 
Acts on adultery and incest to the Justice Deputes for 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In 16^102 and the following year the pressure was 
maintained and adultery figured in the overtures from the Commissioner 
of the General Assembly to Parliament, that the Ordinary Judge may 
execute his judgement throughout the Kingdom. In 1647 the Justice 
General and two Justices Depute, James Robertson and Alexander 
Colvill, were ordained to consider amongst other crimes, adultery and 
bigamy1Q3.
Stair does not comment greatly on the subject of divorce on the 
basis of adultery. He notices that the problem of infidelity was 
presented to both the pre and post Reformation ecclesiastical 
authorities and that each had its different way of dealing with it. 
He makes no mention of the theory of presumed d e a t h u p o n  which the 
Reformed tradition constructed its concept. He does however obliquely 
recognise the conflict between the idea of de praesenti consent and 
the diriment impediment of adultery thus:-
"With us marriage betwixt the two committers of adultery is declared 
null, and the issue inhabilate to succeed to their parents, but 
otherwise even the person guilty may marry again
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The Confession of Faith (1690) section 5 is as definitive a statement 
of the ground of divorce as any earlier text.
”In the case of Adultery after marriage it is lawful to the innocent 
party to sue for a divorce and after the divorce to marry another as 
if the offending party were dead”.^.
At all times the nature of divorce for adultery was that was a common
law or quasi customary remedy for a grave social ill. It was a
compromise remedy sitting on the tightrope between a shaky scriptural 
foundation and a desire for social cohesion on the one hand and a
recognition of the intolerability of a marriage where a spouse was 
being unfaithful on the other.
Therefore divorce or dissolution was never an automatic result of 
adultery it always had to be sought by the innocent party. The party 
seeking divorce always had to obtain dissolution on the ground of the 
wife’s adultery. The so called defence of recrimination could thus 
come to play1Qg.
Of all the direct reforms which were made to the consistorial law the 
introduction of divorce for adultery was the most revolutionary and 
far reaching which had an effect much greater than that envisaged by 
the minister and elders of Saint Andrews when they granted the first 
such decree simply for the relief of what they perceived as a grave 
misjustice. It must be stated that the Reformers’ strict theory did 
not truly admit of divorce, but rather was a quasi dissolution on the 
ground of presumed death and as a result of this theory there is an 
argument for stating that it was only with the introduction of the
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secular Commissary Court with its apparent disregard of the 
theological rationale of the Reformers which moulded the law of 
divorce for adultery into the rules which covered this area of the law 
in Scotland from the mid-seventeeth century until the twentieth. It 
is in the Commissary Court one must contend that the divorce a vinculo 
was really introduced.
Divorce a vinculo matrimonii - Desertion
As a result of Reformed attitudes if not of the Reformation proper the 
second major innovation which occurred after the Reformation was the 
introduction of divorce for desertion.
The reason for stating that this alteration in the law was a result of 
Reformed attitude rather than the Reformation is that it appears that 
divorce for desertion did not enter the calculations of the Reformers 
at least in the formulation of the Policy of the Kirk in the First 
Book of Discipline.
On the Continent the prominent Reformers Theodore Beza and Jean Calvin 
were discussing desertion as a ground for divorce, particularly on the 
basis of Scriptural authority as contained in Paul's First Letter to 
the Corinthians.
14. "For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife 
and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband; 
otherwise your children should be unclean, but now they are holy.
15. But if the unbeliever depart, let him depart, for a brother or
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sister is not under servitude in such cases, but God hath called 
us in Peace"
However this was not the case in Scotland not because the Scots 
Reformers were prone to resting their reform on biblical authority but 
rather because of the personal inclination of John Knox.
Stair  and later commentators deduced a general rule from the
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passage of Corinthians quoted above based clearly on the concept of 
the Pauline privilege.
Innocent III had allowed a form of divorce where two unbaptized 
persons had contracted marriage and one of the parties embraced the 
Christian religion, the othere refusing to do such. This Pauline 
Privilege based as it was on a passage from Paul's Letter to the 
Corinthians was also called the Dispensation of the Apostle.
The Pauline privilege was viewed with suspicion by Knox who allowed 
only adultery as a valid ground for divorce in the First Book of 
Discipline^. The scriptural basis is admittedly weak if one is to 
attempt to extend the privilege to all married Christians. The 
theory appears to be that if desertion was good as a ground of divorce 
for pagans a fortiori it must be good for Christians who have had the 
benefit of the Word.
There would appear to be a conflict between Knox and the other authors 
of the First Book of Discipline, and the secular party in Parliament 
led at least during the early 1570's by James Stewart, Earl of Argyle 
and Chancellor of Scotland. This conflict and its fruits will be
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examined in early course.
Because for the early Reformers desertion was not a ground of divorce 
this does not mean that it was not a significant factor in determining 
the marital relationship. There are at least two cases recorded in 
the Kirk Session Register of Saint Andrews where the ground of divorce 
is stated to be adultery but where desertion is deemed a sufficiently 
important aspect to warrant separate and fairly prominent mention.
The early case of Thomson v. Philip^  (1562) where the pursuer 
Thomson sought divorce on her husband’s adultery is interesting as his 
desertion is featured and is admitted by him. It is significant 
probably not for the desertion itself but rather that the desertion 
provided the opportunity for adultery.
This view of desertion as an adminicle of evidence or even leading to
a rebuttable presumption of adultery is enforced by Ade v. Masoun
(1 5 9 0 ) which if it were warranted could have been brought under the 
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Act 1573 on the basis of desertion alone but is rather on the sought 
for ground of adultery.
There appear however to be no cases before any court in Scotland 
before the Act of 1573 where the possibility of divorce on the ground
of desertion simpliciter was introduced.
There is one exception to the general proposition set out above: that
is the process of the Earl of Argyle against his wife.
The discord between the Earl and his wife had subsisted from as early
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as 1 5 6 6 when an action of adherence had been raised against her.
Adherence had always been recognised as one of the primary
obligations stante matrimonio. In 1525 the Earl of A n g u s p r o t e s t e d
to Parliament that his wife, the Queen Mother should adhere to him as 
she was "bundin and obligit be the law of God and Holy Kirk", being as 
he was advised by men of religion that no one may desert without 
displeasing God and incurring sin.
Peter Lombard in his Sententiae emphasises the permanent cohabitation 
aspect when defining m a r r i a g e a n d  this essential element in 
matrimonial relations was not altered by the Reformation to which the 
action by the Earl of Argyle testifies as does Stair's statement that 
adherence or cohabitation was one of the obligations 1 naturally in the 
minds and affections of each to other1
The law as regards divorce for desertion was not certain in Scotland 
obviously the question was exercised in the minds of some clerics and 
lay people particularly by reason of an extension of the Pauline
privilege. Thus in 1566 the General Assembly was consulted as to 
whether a woman may marry again whose husband departed from her nine 
or ten years previous, which problem elicited the reply in strict 
conformity with adultery or death being the only methods of
dissolution, that she would be required to produce a testimonial of 
his death^^.
In 1571 the Earl began a process of divorce for his wife's desertion 
notwithstanding the attempts by John Knox to reconcile the estranged 
couple.
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The doubts as to the validity and relevance of such an action preyed
on the minds of the Commissaries who appointed Thomas Craig..0 author
11 o
of the Jus Feudale, who was already some eight years at the Bar, *to 
inform of the laws allegit that the cause libelled, est causa 
divorcii'.
This uncertainty in the ranks of the professional lawyers is echoed 
and amplified by the activities of the General Assembly during the 
following year. The Assembly with his Lordship*s concurrence 
appointed Robert Pont a Senator of the College of Justice, James 
Lawson of Edinburgh, David Lindsay of Leith, Clement Little Advocate 
and Commissary, Alexander Arbuthnot, John Row Minister of Perth, John 
Craig, and Robert Hamilton Minister of Saint Andrews or any five of 
them to reason the divorce between Lord Argyle and his wife^g. Upon 
the result of this Commission the Assembly would have given its 
definitive decision.
However the Commission, so far as can be ascertained never submitted 
its deliberations to the Assembly. In between this meeting and the 
subsequent Convocation in August 1573 Parliament had in a pre-emptive 
action passed the Act *anent them that divertis from utheris being 
joined of before in lawful marriage1
Much has been written on the origin of this Act. It has been
suggested that the Act bears some relation to a passage in Calvin*s 
’Projet d’ordannance sur les mariages’ and suggests that it was this 
Reformed legislation which was in the minds of the Parliament.^, in
effect discounting the theory of Riddell-|22 as discussed by Fraser^ 2 3  
that the act owes its existence to the influence of the Earl of
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Argyle. One must consider that the origin of the act lies somewhere 
in between these diverse theories.
The Genevan legislation is instructive and should be examined and then 
the Act of 1573 should be compared and contrasted with its so called 
continental progenitor. The Project was designed by Calvin in 1545 
and adopted in Geneva on 13 November 1561.
”Si ung homme estant alle en voiage pour quelque traficque de 
marchandise ou aultrement, sans estre desbauche ny aliene de sa femme, 
et qu’il ne retourne point de long temps et qu’on ne scache qu’il soit 
devenu, tellement que par coniectures vraysemblables on le tienne pour 
mort, toutesfois qu’il ne soit permis a sa femme de se remarier
iusques apres le terme de dix ans passez depuis le iour de son 
partement, synon qu’il y eust certains tesmoignages de la mort
d'iceluuy, lesquelz ouys on luy pourra donner conge, et encores que 
ladite permission de dix ans s’estende seulement iusques la, que si on 
avoit suspicon ou par nouvelles ou par indices que ledit homme fust 
detenu prisonnier ou qu’il fust empesche par quelque aultre 
inconvenient, que ladite femme demeurast en viduite.
Si ung homme par desbauchement ou par quelque mauvaise affection s’en 
va et abandonne le lieu de sa residence, que la femme face diligent 
inquisition pour debvoir ou il se sera retire, et que l'ayant sceu, 
elle vienne demander lettres de permission afin de le pouvoir evocquer 
ou aultrement contraindre a fair son debvoir, ou pour le moins luy 
notifier qu’il ayt a retourner en son mesnage sur poine qu’on
procedera contre luy en son absence. Cela faict, quand il n’y auroit
nul moyen de le contraindre a retourner, qu’on ne laisse pas de
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poursuyvre comme il luy aura este denonce: c ’est qu’on le proclame en 
l'esglise par trois dimenches distans de quinze iours, tellement que 
le terme soit de six sepmaines, et que le semblable se face par trois 
fois en la court du lieutenant, et qu’on le notifie a deux ou trois de 
ses plus prochains amys ou parens s’il y en a. S'il ne comparoist 
point, que a femme vienne au prochain consistoire apres, pour demander 
separation, et qu’on luy octroye, la renvoyant par devant Messieurs, 
pour en faire ordonnance iuridicque, et que celluy qui aura este ainsi 
rebelle soit banny a tousiours. S ’il comparoist, qu’on les reconcilie 
ensemble, leur faisant commandement de tenir mesnage commun en bon 
accord et en la crainte de Dieu.
Si quelqung faisoit mestier d ’ainsi abandonner sa femme pour vaguer 
par pays, qu’a la seconde fois il soit chastie par prison au pain et a 
l’eau et qu’on luy denonce avec grosses remonstrances qu’il n’ayt plus 
a fair le semblable. Pour la troiziesme fois qu’on use de plus grande 
rigueur envers luy. Et s’il n ’y avoit nul amendement, qu’on donne 
provision a la femme, qu’elle ne soit plus liee a ung tel homme qui ne 
luy tiendroit ne foy ne compaignie.
Si ung homme estant debauche, comme diet a este, abandonnant sa femme, 
sans que ladicte femme luy en eust donne occasion ou qu’elle en fust 
coulpable, et que cela fust deuement congneu par le tesmoignage des 
voisin et familiers et que la femme s'en vint plaindre, luy demandant 
remede: qu’on l ’admoneste d ’en faire diligente inquisition pour 
scavoir qu’il est devenu, et qu’on appelle ses plus prochains parens 
ou amys, s ’il en a, pour scavoir nouvelles d ’eulx. Cependant que la 
femme actende iusques au bout d’ung an si elle ne pouvoit scavoir ou 
il est, se recommandant a Dieu. L ’an passe, elle pourra venir au
373
Consistoire, et si on congnoit qu'elle ayt besoing de se marier, 
qufapres 1’avoir exhortee, qu’on la renvoye au Counsil pour l’adiurer 
par sement si elle ne scayt point ou il se seroit retire, et que le 
semblable se face aux plus prochains parens et amys de luy. Apres 
cela, qu'on procede a telles proclamations comme diet a este, pour 
donner liberte a ladicte femme de se pouvoir remarier. Que si 
l’abuseur retournoit apres, qu’il soit puny selon qu’on verra estre 
raisonnable.
Si une femme se depart d ’avec son mary et s'en aille en ung aultre 
lieu, et que le mary vienne demander d1estre separe d'elle et mis en 
liberte de se remarier, qu’on regarde si elle est en lieu dont on la 
puisse evocquer ou pour le moins luy notifier qu’elle ayt a 
comparoistre pour respondre a la demande de son mary, et qu’on ayde le 
mary de lettres et aultres adresses pour ce faire. Ce faict, qu’on 
use de telles proclamations comme diet a este cydessus, ayant 
premierement evocque les plus prochains parens ou amys d'icelle pour 
les admonester de la faire venir s’ilz peuvent. Si elle comparoist 
dedans le terme et que le mary refusast de la prendre pour la 
suspition qu’il auroit qu’elle se fust mal gouvernee de son corps et 
que c’est une chose trop scandaleuse a une femme d’ainsi abandonner 
son mary, qu’on tasche de les reduire en bonne unyon, exhortant le 
mary a luy pardonner sa faulte. Toutesfois s’il perseveroit a faire 
instance de cela, qu'on s'enquiere du lieu ou elle a este, quelles 
gens elle a hante et comment elle s'est gouvernee, et si on ne trouve 
point d'indices ou argument certain pour la convaincre d’avoir faulse 
la loyaulte de mariage, que le mary soit contrainct de se reconcilier 
avec elle. Que si on la trouve chargee de presumption fort vehement 
d'avoir paillarde, comme de s'estre retiree en mauvaise compaingie et
374
suspecte, et n ’avoir point mene honeste conversation et de femme de 
bien, que le mary soit ouy en sa demande et qu’on luy octroye ce que 
raison portera. Si elle ne comparoist point le terme escheu, on 
tienne la mesme procedure contre elle comme on feroit contre le mary 
en cas pareil. S ’il y avoit parens ou amys en la ville qui eussent 
ayde a tirer une femme ainsi hors et qu cela soit bien verifie, qu’on 
les appeelle et qu’on leur recommende de la ramener sur le lieu, afin 
qu’en la presence d'icelle la cause soit congneue.
Si ung homme apres que sa femma l ’aura abandonne n ’en faict nulle 
plaincte, mais qu’il s’en taise, ou que la femme ainssi delaissee de 
son mary dissimule sans en mot dire, et que cela vienne en 
congnoissance, que le Consistoire les face venir pour scavoir comment 
le cas va, et ce affin d’obvier a tous scandalles, pource qu’il y 
pourroit avoir colusion, laquelle ne seroit point a tollerer, ou mesme 
beaucoup pis, et que ayant congneu la chose on y pourvoie selon les 
moyens qu’on aura, tellement qu'il ne se face point de divorces 
voulontaires, c’est a dire au plaisir des parties sans authorite de 
iustice: et qu’on ne permecte point aux parties conioinctes d’habiter
a part l’ung de l’aultre. Toutesfois que la femme a la requeste du 
mary soit contrainct de le suyvre quant il vouldra changer 
d’habitation ou qu’il y seroit contrainct par necessite, moyennant que 
ne ce soit point ung homme desbauche qui la mene a le’esgaree et en 
pays incongnu, mais que ce soit ung homme raisonnable qui veuille 
faire sa residence en lieu honneste pour vivre en homme de bien et 
tenir bon mesnage.
Que toutes causes matrimonialles concernant la conioinction 
personnelle et non pas les biens soient traictees en premiere instance
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au Consistoire, et que la s'il se peult faire appointment amyable il 
se face au nom de Dieu.
S'il est requis de prononcer quelque sentence juridique que les partis 
soient renvoyees au Counseil avec declaration de l'advis du
consistoire pour la en donner sentence diffinitive.
'If a man has gone on a voyage to trade or for other reasons without
being debauched or separated from his wife and if he does not return 
for a long time and if one does not know what has become of him so 
that by plausible conjectures one believes him to be dead, it is not 
permitted in all times for his wife to remarry unless at least a term 
of ten years has passed since the day of his departure, if there are
no certain testimonies of his death or that he could have gone on
holiday, and yet the said permission of 10 years can be extended only 
where one has suspicion or news or other indication that the said man 
is detained as a prisoner or is prevented by some other cause, the 
said woman lives on as if in widowhood.
If a man by debauchery or by some evil desire goes and abandons his 
place of residence, his wife is to make diligent inquisition to find 
out where he will be, and once this is known she should come to
request letters of permission with the power to call or otherwise
compel him to do what he ought to, or at least to notify him that he
must return to his residence under pain of her proceeding against him 
in his absence. This being done when there is no way in which he can 
be constrained to return, one is not at this stage to pursue as he has 
first to be denounced
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It is when one proclaims in Church on three Sundays at a distance of 
15 days each so that the term is 6 weeks, and the same being done 3 
times in the Court of the Lieutenant and that this is notified to two 
or three of his nearest friends or his parents if he has any.
If he does not compear and the wife comes to the next consistory 
thereafter to request separation and this is granted to her, it being 
placed before the Council to grant a judgement and those who are rebel 
are banished for ever. If he compears and they are reconciled 
together, command is made to them to keep a common household in good 
order and belief in God.
If someone makes ready to abandon his wife by journeying through the 
country, for the second time let him be punished by prison on bread 
and water and let him be denounced with great remonstrance so that he 
will not do the same thing again. For the third desertion one should 
use the greatest rigours against him. And if he has no proposal which 
provides for his wife, she need not adhere to a man who holds neither 
faith nor company with her.
If a man, being debauched as he is said to be abandoning his wife 
without the said woman having given him an occasion where she was 
culpable and which is well-known by the evidence of neighbours and 
family and that the woman comes to plead and demand a remedy from him: 
One admonishes her to make diligent investigation to find out what has 
become of him and one should call the parents and nearest friends, if 
there are any, to discover news of him.
However, the pursuer if she cannot find out where he is at the end of
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one year is to recommend herself to God. This year having passed she 
can come to the Consistory and if one knows that she needs to remarry 
she should be exhorted to return to the Conseil to swear the oath that 
she does not know where he is or when he will return and that the same 
be done by his nearest parents and friends. After that one proceeds 
to such proclamations as there are said to be to give the said woman 
liberty to be able to remarry. Which if the abuser returns after that 
he will be punished in such a way as seems reasonable.
If a woman departs from her husband in flight or to another place and 
the husband comes to ask to be separated from her and put at liberty 
to remarry where one sees that she is in a place where one has
jurisdiction to call or at least power to notify her that she has to 
compear to answer the petition of her husband and where one helps the 
husband with letters or other addresses which he is to do. This being 
so when one uses the proclamations above after having called the 
nearest friends and parents and one can admonish them to make her come 
if they can.
If she compears in the term and the husband refuses to take her back 
for the suspicion which he has that she has given her body badly and 
that it is a thing too scandalous for a woman to abandon her husband 
one should try to bring them back together again, exhorting the
husband to forgive her her fault. In each case that the husband 
pursue to do instance on this matter, then one should enquire of the
place where she has been with which people she has kept company and
how she has used herself and if one does not find any indications or 
plausible arguments to convince one that she has betrayed her loyalty 
to the marriage then the husband is to be constrained to reconcile
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with her.
However where one finds her burdened with a very strong presumption to 
have been immoral, as to have fallen into bad or suspect company and 
to have had no honest contacts or to have known honest women then the 
husband is right in his demands and should get that which right
brings.
If she does not compear at the term fixed one uses the same procedure 
against her as one uses against the husband in the same case. If 
there are parents and friends in the town who have harboured the woman 
and this is well verified then one calls them and recommends to them 
to bring her back to the place, to the presence of those who know the 
cause.
If a man after his wife has abandoned him makes no plea, but keeps 
silent or a wife is left by her husband and says nothing and this 
comes to knowledge then the Consistory shall have them come in order 
to know how the case goes, with the end aim of avoiding scandals, 
because there could be collusion which is not to be tolerated or
something very much the same and having known the matter one can 
perceive the remedies which one has such that at the will of the
parties voluntary divorces are not granted without the authority of
justice, and that one does not permit married persons to live 
separated the one from the other.
On every occasion the woman is constrained to follow the husband, at 
his request when he wishes to change his residence, or when he is 
forced to do such by necessity, on the condition that it is no
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debauched man who leads her to (l'esgaree?) and an unknown country but 
rather a reasonable man who wishes to make his residence in an honest 
place, in order to live as a man of property and to keep a good 
household.
All matrimonial causes concerning the conjunction of man and wife and 
not with property are drawn in the first instance to the Consistory 
and if it can make an agreeable judgement it makes it in the Name of 
God.
If it is required to pronounce a juridical sentence, the parties are 
returned to the Council with a declaration of the advice of the 
Consistory for to give a definitive sentence".
There is much which is of note in this Project. It attempts to deal 
with desertion, and in doing so treats of presumed death, and innocent 
and malicious desertion with a surprising lack of cogent or rational 
treatment.
Therefore the first two passages try to provide an answer for the wife 
whose husband has 'disappeared1. And, provided the absence is for 10 
years and the contention of presumed death could be proved by parole 
evidence then a dissolution could be granted.
The ordinance also deals with the instance of malicious desertion. In 
such a circumstance the wife should attempt to locate the deserter and 
then seek a summons for adherence from the Council equivalent roughly 
to the Burgh Council and principally a secular court. If this was 
ineffective a denunciation followed which was somewhat equivalent to
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excommunication. Upon this denunciation a decree of separation could 
have been issued by the Council. The possibility of reconciliation is 
always borne in mind. The possibility however of subsequent desertion 
is also remembered and the penal consequences of the subsequent 
desertions points to the * social control* jurisdiction which is seen 
very often in Kirk Session cases.
The Ordinance then proceeds to examine the specific remedy allowable
to a wife who has been deserted namely; divorce a vinculo with the 
right to remarry. Firstly, it should be noticed that the pursuer must 
be innocent and that no occasion of culpability should have prompted 
the desertion.
Again attempts should be made to locate the deserter. This hiatus 
between the desertion and the commencement of proceedings should last 
for one year, during which further attempts to locate the party in
desertion should be made and which certifies that he is not merely on
holiday but truly in desertion.
Then the party deserted, upon the expiry of the year, swears on oath 
that she does not know where he is or when he will return. This is 
corroborated by his parents or friends and then following declarations 
in facie ecclesie, the woman is declared to be free to remarry.
The instance where the woman deserts is also examined and a similar 
procedure was exercised to discover if during the desertion there had 
been debauchery or adultery, and again desertion was penalised not 
only on the basis of being a matrimonial offence in itself but as 
representing an opportunity for further offences. If however no
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evidence of such activities was forthcoming and she compeared at the 
court she was then reconciled with her husband. But if the converse 
was the case and there was evidence of immorality then a divorce 
should be granted to the husband, this is not strictly speaking a 
divorce for desertion, only for adultery or similar scandalous 
behaviour the opportunity for which was provided by desertion. If no 
compearance was made the same procedure was used against the wife as 
was used against the husband. The idea of desertion providing an 
occasion for greater sins is supported by the passage relating to the 
instance where parties keep silent about their spouse’s desertion, 
which is looked upon as a form of collusion. The ordinance also takes 
the opportunity of commenting generally upon the husband’s right to 
fix the matrimonial domicile.
Finally an indication is given of the interplay of roles between the 
secular Court and the ecclesiastical Consistory which was particularly 
applicable to the Genevan establishment and somewhat out of place if 
applied to Scotland. The secular authorities in Scotland did not 
automatically sanction everything ordered by the Session. Although 
very often because members of the Session would also as local worthies 
be involved in political and legal convocations automatic 
implementation would indeed occur.
D. Baird Smith argues that this ordinance is in many respects the 
original version of the Scots Act on desertion. It is now appropriate 
to set out the act and examine it in the light of the ordinance.
”It is fundin and declarit be oure sourane Lord His Regents Grace, and 
Three Estatis and haill bodie of this present parliament that in all
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times bypast, sen the trew and Christian religioun was publictlie 
preichit avowit and establisht within this realme, namelie sen the
month of August the zier of God 1560, it hes bene, and in all tymes
cuming sail be lauchfull that quhatsumever persoun or persouns joinit 
in lauchfull, husband or wife, divertis fra utheris companie, without 
ane ressonabill cause alledgit or deducit befoir ane judge and remanis 
in thair malicious obstanacie be the space of four zeiris and in the 
mene time refusis all privie admonitionis the husband of the wife or 
the wife of the husband for dew adherence, that then the husband, or 
the wife sail call and persew the obstinat persoun offendar befoir the 
judge ordinar for adherence, And in cais na sufficient causis be 
alledgit quhairfoir na adherence sould be bot that the sentence
proceidis aganis the offendar, refusand to obey the samin, the husband
sail meane themselves to the ordinar judge, the superior magistrate 
viz the Lordis of Sessioun, and sail obtene letteris in the four 
formis conforme to the sentence of adherence. Quhilk change beand 
contemnit and thairfoir bearn denuncit rebell and put to the horne, 
then the husband or the wife to sute the spirituall jurisdiction and 
powar and require the lauchfull Archbishop Bishop or Superintendent of 
the cuntrie, quhair the offendar remanis to direct privie 
admonitiounis to the said offendar admonishing him, or hir, as befoir, 
for adherence, Quhilkis admonitiounis gif he or scho contemptuouslie 
disobeyis that Archbishop, Bishop or Superintendent to direct chargis 
to the minister of that parochin quhair the offendar remainis, or in 
cais thair be nane, or that the Minister will not execute the samin, 
to the Minister of the nixt adjacent Kirk thairto, quha sail proceid 
aganis the said offendar with publict admonitiounis, and gif thay be 
contemnit to the sentence of excommunication. Quhilk aris beand 
pronouncit the malicious and obstinat defectioun of the partie
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offendar to be ane sufficient cause of divorce, and the said partie 
offendar to tyne and lose thair tocher et donationes propter 
nuptiasn 1 2lj.
There is much to be noticed in the act. Firstly, it is expressly 
declared to be of retrospective effect, stretching back to the 
Reformation Parliament of August 1560. The question of the validity 
of such a piece of legislation would necessitate an in depth study of 
the Scottish Constitution during the 16th century were it to be 
answered with any certainty. However, it is possible to adduce that 
the Scots King or Regency Council were not absolute in power nor 
indeed were the Three Estates. Always the Church, Roman or Reformed 
could present a bar to the supremacy or sovereignty of the King or to 
that of the King and Parliament. The problem was essentially one of 
strength. Competing powers restricted the sovereignty of any party. 
Scotland never developed a theory of constitutional unity or, as 
expressed as the King in Parliament, a government by consensus. A 
strong King could carry Parliament with him, a strong Parliament or 
convention could unseat a King, e.g. James VII^ 5 * Retrospective 
legislation was not in such a context necessarily taboo because of 
these doubts regarding sovereignty. Sovereignty during the sixteenth 
century was not to be equated with absolute power because no party had 
absolute power. One can approach the concept as referring to a 
limited competence. One is sovereign until another, more powerful, 
challenges what one has done.
Indeed as an example of this legislative and constitutional pragmatism 
one could point to the questionable legality of the Reformation 
Parliament and to that of the charter establishing the Commissary
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Court. As these Acts were not effectively challenged they remained in 
effect - even without sovereign or royal or parliamentary approval. 
Acceptable declared custom might be the best way of describing such 
'legislation* it certainly did not arise from a consensual debate and 
vote. Similarly the Act of 1573 was declared to be in existence even 
though the General Assembly had not completed its deliberations and 
was also declared to be of retrospective effect. The empirical test 
of whether it was law or not simply rested upon the question whether 
people would avail themselves of the ability to dissolve their 
marriage or not - as they did the question of the validity of the act 
was never called into question.
Why is the Act retrospective? There are, one can argue, three aspects 
of divorce for desertion which the promoters of the Act whether they 
included the Earl of Argyle or not would have in mind in bringing the 
act into force with retrospective effect.
(1) It is of doubtful scriptural validity, (2) The fact that divorce 
for desertion is not mentioned in the First Book of Discipline and (3) 
the opposition of John Knox to the concept of divorce for any other 
reason than adultery.
There would be a natural desire upon the Three Estates and the Regent 
not to be seen to be sullying the purity of the Reformed stream and 
back dating to the date of the Reformation Parliament would at least 
ex facie allow the act to fit in with the Reformed programme.
It is probably the death of John Knox in 1572 which prompted the 
Regent and Estates to legislate. The loss of this powerful figure
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from the ecclesiastical scene stilled the conscience of the Church and 
at the very least removed the Church1s centre of gravity and the point 
from which the criticisms of such an Act would have emanated from. 
This factor combined with the General Assembly’s recess meant that 
concerted opposition to the Act was kept to a minimum.
Whilst not going as far as D. Baird Smith in attributing the Act’s 
origin to the Ordinance from Geneva one can point to the continental 
Reformers and their apparent acceptance of the concept and muse upon 
the influence which they may have had in certain circles among the 
Reformers here in Scotland. It is known that Theodore Beza was in 
contact with Lord Guthrie and that Calvin’s views were known to the 
’whole bodie of the Kirk’. To such an extent that it has been stated, 
”In no other country did Calvinism mould so forcibly the powers and 
the limitations of a people"1 2g. Surely the only explanation for the 
Calvinistic doctrine of divorce for desertion not being accepted by 
the Scots Reformers was the personal dislike of the doctrine of John 
Knox. The Act had to be composed following some consultation with the 
ecclesiastical establishment because of the involvement of the Session 
and Ministry in the execution of the Act. The likelihood is that 
there was a progressive element in Parliament substantially, lay yet 
including superior ecclesiastics like the Bishop of Dunkeld who was 
criticised by the Assembly for his complicity in the passing of the 
Act . j T h e r e b y  the Church in Scotland was brought into line with its 
Continental counterparts.
The Act is capable of application by virtue of desertion of husband or 
wife, like the Genevan Ordinance. The defence of reasonable cause is 
allowed under the act therefore where a woman leaves her husband
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because of saevitia she is excused this desertion.
The period of desertion which qualified the innocent party for an 
application for divorce was four years. Two recorded cases before the 
ecclesiastical courts contain longer periods of desertion in Thornton 
v. Allan (I604)^2g the period of desertion was years, in the later 
case of John Philpe ( 1 6 1 0 ) 2 4  years desertion annulled the 
marriage, both in contradistinction to the one year period required in 
Geneva. It is worth noticing that the desertion must have been wilful 
and not merely absence for commercial or other purposes. Thus absence 
for a very long period will not qualify for the purposes of the Act 
unless there was a wilful or malicious element in the desertion. 
Stair mentions this distinction and points to the jus mariti of the 
husband fixing the matrimonial domicile as supplying the answer to a 
vexatious wife^Q .
The desertion was required to be judicially declared following upon an 
action for adherence before the Judge Ordinar later said to be the 
Court of Session. The decree of adherence should be granted unless 
there was some reason for separation.
If the decree was granted and ignored the innocent party could obtain 
Letters in the four forms from the Court of Session compelling the 
defender to adhere. Letters in the four forms were a form of 
diligence possibly originating in the Literae formatae of the Canon 
law^-j which are discussed both by Craig and stairi3 3 *
By Stairfs time only two Letters remained in use, those of horning or 
outlawry and caption but during Craig’s era the first and second
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Letters of charge respectively without and with certification of
horning were competent.
The ecclesiastical power was involved firstly, by ’privie 
admonitiounis1 then by more direct measures in the event of 
contemptuous disobedience. The Superior ecclesiastics were empowered 
by the Act to direct charges to the minister of the offender’s parish 
or if it was vacant or the minister did not execute it, the charge 
could have been directed to neighbouring compliant ministers. This 
again enforces the theory that there were conservative elements in
the Church which did not approve of the Act. Public admonitions were 
then issued and completed by excommunication which reputed the 
offender as a dead member of the church, as in adultery^ 4 *
The consequence of this procedure is stated by the Act to allow a 
sufficient cause of divorce. However in strict ecclesiastical theory 
the innocent party was as in the cases of decrees in respect of 
adultery in the shoes of a widow or widower and thereby fit to marry.
The normal matrimonial consequences of dissolution were mentioned for 
the avoidance of doubt.
A point to notice in the jurisdiction used in the Act, the Judge
Ordinar is stated to be the person before whom the action for
adherence should be brought. This was despite the later indications 
in the Act later declared to be the inferior Commissary. The action 
for divorce, of course, remained competent only at the Commissary 
Court.
388
NOTES
1 Hay, 117
2 Hay, 39
3 Matt, 19, 6
4 Matt, 10, 11
5 Luke, 16,18
6 1, Cor, 7, 10
7 Hay, 39-45
8 Session 24, Pr, Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, 180
9 See farther De Smet 312-315; C7, X, III, 32
10 Hay, 61
11 Hay, 61
12 Matt, 19, 9
13 C.4, 5, X, 4, 19
14 A.P.S. 1551 II 486, c12
15 Liber Officialis, 164
16 Liber Officialis, 51, 107, 118, 140
17 Liber Officialis 1, 54, 93, 111, 128, 147, 148, 164
18 Hay, 61, C4, X, IV, 19
19 Hay, 63
20 Hay, 63 D.G. C.32, 1, 4, 5, et seq
21 In IV Sent D. 35, 1, 3
22 In IV Sent D. 33, 1, 4
23 Hay, 65
24 Hay, 81
25 C.7, X, IV, 19; Hay, 83
26 D.G. C.32, 1, 1, et sq
27 D.G. C.28, 1, 1
389
28 Hay, 69
29 Helmholz, Marriage litigation in Medieval England passim
30 Liber Officialis, 149
31 C.13, X, 1 1 , 13
32 C.1, X, IV, 18; Hay, 69
33 Balfour, 99, C. VII
34 Acts of the Lords of Council XIV fo 58
35 Balfour, li
36 Craig, Jus Feudale 2, 18, 18
37 Stair I, 4, 7
38 Commissary Court Records 8.6.1697
39 Cameron, 196
40 Stair 1, 4, 7
41 Mark, 10, 2-12
42 T. Beza, Tractatus de repudiis
43 Murray & Livingstone (1576) Mor
44 Leviticus 20, 10; Deut. 20, 22
45 Hay, 101-103
46 Cameron 197
47 D.B. Smith, "The Reformers & Divorce" S.H.R. 9, (1911) 101
48 This work is not concerned with the penal aspects
49 RStAKS, 18
50 RStAKS (Maitland) 237
51 RStAKS (Maitland) 248
52 Clerk v. Scherez RStAKS 60, (Maitland) 257
53 Cameron, 197
54 RStAKS i, 77; (Maitland) 270
55 RStAKS 139, (Maitland) 293
56 RStAKS 140, (Maitland) 294
390
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
B.U.K. 1, 4, 7, 1562 
J. Calvin, Institutes 4, 0, 37 
1563 II 539, C10
Buik of the Kirk of the Canongait (S.R.S.) 9
Buik of the Kirk of the Canongait (S.R.S.) 55
Buik of the Kirk of the Canongait (S.R.S.) 12
Kyd v. Christie, Kirk Session Records of Aberdeen 13, William
Seaton, Presbytery Records of Aberdeen, 164.
1581 II, 213, o . l  
1592 III 543, c11 
B.U.K. ii 5.6.1570
Synod of Lothian and Tweedddale (Stair Society) 11;165 
Kirk Session Register of Perth, 242
Kirk Session Register of Aberdeen 11, 13 
Presbytery Records of Aberdeen, 165
Presbytery Records of Inverness 330, 337
Synod Records of Lothian and Tweeddale, 2, 4, 5, 22, 24, 26 et 
seq
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 2
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 4
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 49
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 243
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 22
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 34
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 79
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 181
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 206
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 243
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 136
391
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
Synod of Lothian & Tweeddale, 97 
Kirk Session Register of Humbie, 444
Kirk Session Register of Humbie 444, Presbytery Register of
Glasgow, 56
Cameron, 197-8
B.U.K. i, 91
B.U.K. i, 98
1592 III 543 C.11
Mark 10, 11
See infra
Commissary Court Records 1, 7, 1565
Riddell, Peerage Law 390
B.U.K. i, 171
B.U.K. iii 953
1600, IV, 233, 0.29
(1670) Mor
Commissary Court Records 5.12.1601 
1644, VI pt 1 c.184, 194 
1644, VI pt 1, c .200, 199
1646, VI C 167, 54, 1552
1647, VI, c 341, 1763 
Stair, 1, 4, 7
Except in relation to property rights, I, 4, 20
Stair, I, 4, 7
1690, IX, C1, 117
Logan v. Wood (1561) Mor
1, Cor, 7, 10-15
Stair, 1, 4, 8
Cameron, 196
392
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
RStAKS, i, 150
RStAKS, ii, 684
1525, II, 2936
Lombard, IV, Sent D. 2 1 . 2
Stair, 1, 4, 10
B.U.K. 1.80
Who probably been exposed to such concepts during his time as a 
student in Paris 
B.U.K, ii, 262 
1573 II, 81 C.1
D.B. Smith 'A note on Divorce for Desertion' J.R. 255 
Riddell, I, 547
Fraser, Husband & Wife, I, 677 
1689 IX, 38-39
Dickens, Reformation and Society in 16th Century Europe, 174 
B.U.K. i, 270
Synod Records of Aberdeen, 26
Presbytery Records of Glasgow (Maitland) 417
Stair, 1, 4, 8
General Orders see Le Clerc, D.A.C.L.
Jus Feudale 3, 2, 4 
Stair, 4, 47, 2 
Cameron, 197
Instruction to Commissaries 1666, s2, Fergusson Consistorial Law, 
175, 392
393
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of the effects of the Reformation with regard 
to the law of Husband and Wife attempted to portray in as 
comprehensive a way as possible, the ways in which the events of the 
early 1560's altered the law and how the structures of the Law, 
Parliament and the Courts reacted to those changes.
Much could be written by way of linguistic disputation upon the use 
and meaning of the word Reformation1.
It has been argued that the Reformation in reality has its legal date 
as at the 7th March, 1559^- Other writers could argue that the 
efforts of the last Catholic Synod before the triumph of the 
Protestant party was itself a "Reformation"^.
On the other hand, the termination date of the Reformation could be 
equally vexatious. Was it accomplished with the Ratifications of 
1567^» Act authorising Presbyterian Government in 1592^ or only
with Establishment and the Confession of Faith in 1690,-?
The date of the Reformation as occurring during August 1560 is however 
convenient because the Acts of the Reformation Parliament display what 
the aspirations of the Reformers were. They did not have, any more 
than any other visionaries, a particularly accurate insight into the 
future and could not have been aware that their actions would, one 
day, attract retrospective validity. It is also the case that the
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reactions of the Queen, the Church and Parliament were all tailored to 
reply to the events of August 1560 and can only have logic if viewed 
in such a way.
There is however some difficulty in ascertaining the extent to which 
the Reformation as a declared and unitary event had influence on the 
law of husband and wife. It is probably the case that Reformed 
religion as a long term and continuing influence had an effect quite 
distinct from the Reformation itself. In other words the Reformation 
was causa causans in respect of some changes or amendments to the law 
whereas in respect of other changes it was a causa sine qua non.
At times the evaluation of the effect of the Reformation must be 
arbitrary, however, there are those amendments or changes in the law 
from which the Reformation was too distant or remote in causual terms 
to have had an effect.
The effects of the Reformation on the law of husband and wife, as has 
been noted were of both an adjective and substantive character.
The changes in the adjective Law were in some ways the most 
far-reaching, from certainty to flux, from order to confusion, from 
spiritual to secular. There was a fundamental restructuring of the 
judicial system.
The scheme of superintendents courts or kirk sessions and the interim 
measures of the Privy Council and Court of Session could only be, not 
expectedly, an attendant ill of a time of Reformation and Revolution. 
Litigants must have for some time been wary of proceeding to a court,
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particularly if that court was so linked to a religious or political 
framework as to fail to provide a fount of equity. The courts 
themselves must, have suffered a crisis of confidence, operating as 
they were without established secular or ecclesiastical authority, in 
a milieu which reeked of the old regieme even down to the procedure 
followed in these consistories.
The temporal creation, the Commissary Court was a judicial expression 
of the triumph not of Protestantism, but of secularism. It represents 
a final wresting from the grasp of the Church of a jurisdiction long 
sought by Royal authority.
Notwithstanding that the courts of the new ecclesiastical order being 
of a fundamentally different organisation and structure and that the 
Commissary Court was also a novel creation, it is noticeable that the 
procedure followed in both species of court was similar in many 
respects to that of the canonical court.
There are probably many reasons why the procedure stands out as the 
great lacuna in the Reformed scheme, and appears so resistant to 
change. Firstly, the innate conservatism of the lawyers who helped to 
create these new judicial structures, men like Henry Sinclair and John 
Row and that of the administrators appointed to work within the new 
scheme, James Balfour, Edward Henryson and Clement Little, was in no 
small part responsible for the survival of canonical procedure into 
the Reformed epoch.
Secondly, the procedural provisions of the Canon law offered rules of 
the least affront to those of the Reformed tradition, containing as
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they did little which was contentious. It was also patent to the 
Reformers that the canonical system of procedure was efficacious and 
had as its objective the discovery of truth, an end with which the 
Reformers could not find fault.
The major effects of the Reformation on the substantive law can by and 
large be recognised without grave difficulty. The primary effect was 
the removal of Papal authority and the consequent denial of some 
aspects of Catholic theology and the dependent Canon law. For example 
the sacramentality of marriage was denied as a consequence of Reformed 
doctrine and therefore the twin effects of dissolubility and secular 
jurisdiction found an opportunity to hold sway.
In being separated from the Catholic tradition and the reforms of the 
Council of Trent the Reformers could not take advantage of the decree 
’Tametsi* and accordingly had to struggle for some time with the 
problem of clandestinity eventually having to realise that the evil 
could not be abated without a similar legislation to that of Trent, 
and so the possibility of the creation of a valid marriage by the 
simple exchange of consents de praesenti survived in the civil law of 
Scotland along with the possibility of creating a valid marriage by 
promise subsequente copula, until 1 July, 19^0^. Indeed the problem 
of clandestinity was only laid to rest with the nineteenth century 
legislation on the topic^.
The essentials of marriage remained substantially unaltered by the 
Reformation. The consent of the parties, freely given was the 
keystone of both systems. There was some adjustment with regard to 
the scheme of impediments particularly those deemed to be merely of
ecclesiastical or human invention. The scriptural fundamentalism of 
the Reformers enabled them to re-define many impediments within their 
own sphere of reference as influenced by the Continental theoreticians 
Jean Calvin, Martin Bucer and Theodore Beza. The twofold scheme of 
impediments to valid marriage underwent some revision particularly the 
diriment impediments of relationship, or propinquity, spiritual 
relationship and adultery. Nonage emerged as a specific impediment 
and impotence retained its character as an impediment and as a 
condition precedent. Impotence only changed its character to that of 
a resolutive condition during the 20th Century.
The regulation of relations stante matrimonio remained substantially 
unaltered by the Reformation. The position of women and the attitude 
of a patriarchal society towards women did no.t change as a result of 
religious change. It was apparently more important for a woman to 
associate herself with her former clan, by retaining the use of her 
maiden surname than it was for her to adopt the relatively recent 
English heraldic import of taking her husband’s name. Marriage 
represented in both pre and post Reformation epochs the great 
exception to Maine’s theory of the progression from status to 
contract, it represented a regression from contract to status, which 
mutation was, for the woman at least, a species of capitis deminutio.
The scheme of property, the jus mariti and jus administrationis, the 
institutions of dower, dowry, terce, courtesy, donatio propter 
nuptias, dos and morrowing gift all remained unaffected by the 
Reformation except in so far as the new grounds of dissolution of 
marriage provided fresh occasions for the restitution of these forms 
of gift whence they came. Even this however fitted into the accepted
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pre-reformation scheme where return of gifts had always followed upon 
the nullity of a marriage. The Reformation seemingly also had little 
impact on the law of obligations of the husband and the wife either 
inter se or in relation to third parties.
The real apparent change which occurred in the law of husband and wife 
as a result of the Reformation was the apparent introduction of 
grounds for the dissolution of the marriage bond other than by death, 
or nullity and the diminution in the importance of divortium a mensa 
et thoro as the major relief for matrimonial distress.
The indissolubility of Christian marriage was a value, the importance 
and necessity of which both the Catholic and Reformed traditions 
recognised. It was clearly shown in the Catholic tradition that a 
marriage could only be dissolved upon a declaration that it had been 
contracted in face of a diriment impediment and was, consequently a 
non-marriage, a total nullity. Parties who obtained such a decree of 
nullity were entitled to remarry. If however no such inherent nullity 
existed and a match was for one reason or another unsatisfactory or 
dangerous to one or both parties then the appropriate remedy was 
divortium a mensa et thoro, separation from board and bed, the 
marriage bond however remained unaltered by such a decree and 
remarriage was not possible without incurring the diriment impediment 
of ligamen or prior marriage.
The Reformed attitude to marriage was, as has been noticed, in some 
fundamental respects very different to that of the Catholic tradition. 
The denial of sacramentality, coupled with a scriptural fundamentalism 
and a humanist outlook enabled the Reformers to contemplate upon
divortium a vinculo matrimonii for adultery and for desertion. In 
order, however, to reconcile such a concept with the received theory 
of indissolubility which was itself supported by the same scriptural 
fundamentalism resort was had to a legal fiction in order to produce 
the required logical synthesis. The legal fiction adopted was of 
course the civil and ecclesiastical death of the adulterer. This 
development of a concept of divorce did not of course occur all at 
once, or on the heels of the Reformation. It was if anything a staged 
acceptance of the concept. There is evidence that divorce for 
desertion was not envisaged by the Reformers nor even sought by them.
Whilst scriptural authority could be found for divorce for adultery, 
even if the interpretation of that authority was open to disputation, 
there was no scriptural authority for divorce for desertion. The 
concept is not mentioned in the First Book of Discipline and it may be 
that the personal opposition of John Knox delayed action being taken 
to bring divorce for desertion into law. It certainly appears that 
those powers who desired such legislation seem to have waited until 
death had silenced the great motivator of the Reformation in Scotland.
It is important to notice that the divorce proceedings only proceeded 
upon the civil and ecclesiastical death of the wrongdoer. This 
fiction enabled the Reformers to grant a divorce with permission to 
the innocent party to remarry almost as it were on the ground of 
presumed death.
In that sense until the position was regulated by statute in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries the concept of divorce was based 
upon a technicality which was difficult to appreciate and was, perhaps
only the payment of lip service to formg
The Reformation then affected most of the areas of the law of husband 
and wife. It permitted the secularisation of law in the long term by 
breaking the immediate influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Canon 
law, of course, survived and was used by reformed Consistories, the 
Court of Session and the Commissary Court. Its influence ran too deep 
and it was in many respects an equitable and useful system of norms. 
But no longer were the canons and decreets of Rome noticed and 
development continued apace at home drawing increasingly on.Roman Law 
and pre-tridentine Canon Law, and on other Continental influences from 
Holland and Nothern France. The net effect of the Reformation was to 
place jurisdiction and legislative power in the area of husband and 
wife in the possession of the Civil Sword.
Like all systems of moral norms the Canon law of the Catholic Church 
and the law of the Reformed Kirk could only in the final analysis 
appeal to the better senses of the congregation of the faithful. 
Without the sanctions of the municipal power these norms became 
matters of personal conscience. Canonical laws will provide a 
framework of precepts for a received and perceived version of a 
worthwhile Christian life but the onus is on the individual to follow 
these precepts.
For some time the Reformation caused the people and the institutions 
of the Church to seek a remedy and forgiveness for their faults. If 
nothing else the Reformation both Catholic and Protestant, in placing 
into the secular government’s hands the administration and regulation 
of matters which, whilst they were in the medieval and to a certain
extent are in the modern mind part of the law of husband and wife, but 
had and have in morality little to do with the development in a
Christian and moral sense of the relationship between husband and
wife, thus perhaps pointed the way to a truer understanding of this 
vitally important religious, moral and social institution.
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Vis See Marriage, Impediments
Vows See Marriage, Impediments
Wife Obligations of, 317-323 
Status of, 290-294 
Property of, 294-317
Witnesses
See process
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aberdeen Ecclesiastical Records: Selections from Ecclesiastical
Records of Aberdeen, ed. J. Stuart (Spalding Club) 1846, 
including Aberdeen Kirk Session Presbytery and Synod Records. 
Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer
Anderson, Rev J. ed Protocol Book of Gavin Ros (S.R.S.) 1908
Anderson, Rev J. ed Protocol Book of Sir Alexander Gaw (S.R.S.) 1910
Anderson, Rev J. ed Protocol Book of Sir William Corbet (S.R.S.) 1911
Angus, W. ed Protocol Book of Mr Gilbert Grote (S.R.S.) 1914
Anton, A.E. "Handfasting" in Scotland S.H.R. XXXVIII (1958) 89
A.P.S. Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland eds Thomson & Innes, 12 
vols (Edinburgh 1814-75)
Argyll, Essay on the Ecclesiastical History of Scotland (Edinburgh) 
1848
Bain & Rodgers ed Protocol Book of Cuthbert Simon contained in 
Diocesan Registers of Glasgow (London) 1875 
Baker, J.H. Introduction to English Legal History (London) 2 ed 1979 
Balfour, Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, Practicks or a system of 
the more Ancient Law of Scotland (Stair Society) 1962 ed P.J.B. 
McNeil.
Barraclough, G. The Medieval Papacy (London) 1968
Beveridge & Russell ed Protocol Books of Dom T. Johnsoun (S.R.S.) 1920 
Beza, Theodore, Treatise on Polygamy, 1568, Treatise on Divorce 1569 
Bisset, Habakkuk, Rolment of Courtis (S.T.S.)
Bucer, M. Martin Buceri Opera Latina Vol 15 ed, V. Wendel Butensloh 
1955
Buckland, T. Textbook of Roman Law (Cambridge)
B.U.K. The Booke of the Universall Kirk, Acts and Proceedings of the 
General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland 1560-1618, Bannatyne & 
Maitland Clubs (Edinburgh) 1839-45 
Calderwood, A.B. ed The Buik of the Kirk of the Canongait 1564-1567 
(S.R.S.) 1961
Calderwood, R. ed. Thomson The History of the Kirk of Scotland, 8 vols 
(Woodrow Society) 1842 
Cameron, J.K. The First Book of Discipline (Edinburgh) 1972 
Calvin, Institutes: McNeill, J.T. and F.L. Battles eds Calvin 
Institute of the Christian Religion (Library of Christian 
Classics, vols 20 and 21) (London) 1961 
The Catholic Encyclopaedia, 15 vols London 1907 
Claverhouse, Irregular Border Marriages (London) 1934 
Codex Juris Canonici Libreria Editrice Vaticana (1918; 1983)
Coing, H. The Denunciatio Evangelica and English Equity 71 L.Q.R. 
(1955) 223: The Roman Law as Ius Commune on the Continent 89
L.Q.R. (1973) 505 
Cooper, Lord Pres Select Scottish Cases of XIII Century 
Commissariat Records of Edinburgh 1658-1800 (S.R.S.) Vol 34 
Continental Legal History Series Vol III 
Corpus Juris Canonici ed Friedberg, Leipzig
Corpus Juris Civili: C. Code, D. Digest, Nor Newels Inst, Institute
Cowan, I.B. The Scottish Reformation (London) 1982
Craig, Sir Thomas Craig, Jus Feudale, Thomas L.P. Clyde 2 vols 1934
Dallas, Sir G. Dallas of St Martins; Styles of Writs 1774
Deanesly, Margaret, A History of the Medieval Church (Cambridge) 1981
Dickens, A.G. Reformation and Reform in 16th Century Europe (London) 
1966
Donaldson G. "The Church Courts" in An Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History (The Stair Society) vol XX (1958) 363-73 
Donaldson, G. ed St Andrew's Formulare 2 vols (Stair Society) 1944 
Donaldson, G. James V to James VII, The Edinburgh History of Scotland 
3 (Edinburgh) 1965 
Duby, G. Medieval Marriage 2 cases from 12th Century France 
Duke, J.A. History of the Church of Scotland to the Reformation 
(Edinburgh) 1937 
Durkan J. and Kirk J. The University of Glasgow (Glasgow) 1977 
Dunlop, Annie I. Calendar of Scottish Supplications to Rome, 1423-1428 
(S.H.S.) 1956
Dunlop, Annie I. and Cowan, I.B. Calendar of Scottish Supplications to 
Rome, 1428-1432 (S.H.S.) 1970 
Edinburgh Kirk Session Records, Maitland Club, Vol 25 
Esmein, A. Le Mariage en Droit Canonique, ed R. Genestral and J.
Dauvillier Paris 1929 
Extracts from the Kirk Session Register of Perth, The Spottiswoode 
Miscellany ii, 225-311 (Edinburgh) 1848 
Fergusson, Consistorial Law 
Fergusson, Consistorial Law and Reports 
Fleming, D.H. The Reformation in Scotland, London 1910 
Fraser, Treatise on Husband and Wife according to the Law of Scotland, 
2 vols (Edinburgh) 1878 
Gaius, ed. F. De Zulueta, Institutes of Gaius (Oxford) 1946 
Grub, Ecclesiastical History
Haddington Presbytery Records, Bannatyne Club Miscellany, Vol III 
Hay, M.V. The Blairs Papers (London and Edinburgh) 1929
Hay, W. Lectures on Marriage, ed Rt Rev Mgr J.C. Barry (Stair Society) 
1937
Hermond, Lord Consistorial Decision, 1684-1773, ed Walton (Stair 
Society) 1940
Helmholz, R.H. Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge) 
1974
Hope, Sir Thomas, Major Practicks (1608) 2 vols (Stair Society) 1937 
Inverness and Dingwall Presbytery Records (S.H.S.) vol 24 
Innes Cosmo, ed Liber Officialis Sancte Andree, Abbotsford Club 
Innes Cosmo, Scotland in the Middle Ages (Edinburgh) 1860 
Jolowicz, H.F. Historical Introduction to the study of Roman Law 
(Cambridge) 1972 
J.R. Juridical Review 1889 
Kaser, M. Roman Private Law (London) 1968
Kirk, J. Stirling Presbytery Records, 1581-1587 (S.H.S.) 1981 
Kirk, J. The Second Book of Discipline (Edinburgh) 1980 
Kirk, J. The Synod Records of Lothian and Tweeddale (Stair Society) 
1977
Knox History, ed Dickinson, W.C. J. Knox’s History of the Reformation 
in Scotland (Edinburgh) 1949 
Knox Works, ed. Laing D. Works of John Knox, 6 vols (Edinburgh) 1846 
Lindsay, E.R. and Camerson A. Calendar of Scottish Supplications to 
Rome, 1418-1422 (S.H.S.) 1934 
Lyndwood, William, Provinciale seu Constitutiones Anglicae (Oxford) 
1679
Maine, H. Ancient Law (London) 1927 
Merryman, J.H. The Civil Law Tradition
Milsom, S.T.C. Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London) 1969 
Morison, W.M. Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions, 22 vols
Mossman, G. Discipline and Method of Proceeding in Ecclesiastic 
Judicatures in the Church of Scotland, 1693 
Mortimer, Rt Rev R.G., Western Canon Law (London) 1953 
Moyle J.B., Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutionum (1955)
Naz, R. ed Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique, 7 vols, Paris 1935-1965 
Olivant, S. The Court of the Official (Stair Society) 1982 
Outhwaite R.B. Marriage and Society (London) 1981
Patrick, D. Statutes Patrick D. ed Statutes of the Scottish Church, 
1225-1559 (S.H.S.) 1907 
Perth Kirk Session Registers, Spottiswoode Society, Vol 3 II 
Plank, S. Formularium Instrumentorum ad usum Curiae Romanae, 1487 
Schoeffer, Formulare Advocatorum et Procuratorum Curie Romae, 1490 
Schroeder, O.P., Rev H.J. Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent 
(Illinois) 1979 
Scarisbrick, J.J. Henry VIII, (London) 1968 
Soave Rev I., History of the Council of Trent
Spalding Club Miscellany, Miscellany of the Spalding Club ii 
(Aberdeen) 1849 
Spottiswoode, History of the Church of Scotland, 1655 
S.H.R. Scottish Historical Review 
S.H.S. Scottish History Society 
S.R.S. Scottish Record Society 
S.T.S. Scottish Text Society
Smith, J.A. Clarence, Medieval Law Teachers and Writers, (Ottawa) 1975 
Smith D.B. "A note on Divorce for Desertion, J.R. 51 (1939) 154 
Smith D.B. "A note on Juramentum Calumniae, J.R. 7 
Smith D.B. "The Reformers and Divorce", S.H.R. 9, (1911) 10 
Spottiswood History of the Church of Scotland
Stair, Sir James Dalrymple Viscount Stair, Institutions of the Law of
Scotland, Tercentery ed. 1981 
Stair, Tercentenary Studies (Stair Society) 1981 
Stirling Kirk Session Records, Maitland Club Miscellany, Vol 25(a) 
Strathbogie Presbytery Records Spalding Club
Thomas, J.A.C. Institutes of Justinian (Amsterdam and Oxford) 1975 
Thomas, J.A.C. Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam, New York, Oxford) 
1976
Tierney, Brian, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (New Jersey) 
1964
Ullman, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (Cambridge) 1975 
Usher, R.G. Rise and Fall of the High Commission, 1535-1641 
Vinagradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (Oxford) 1968 
Walker & Walker, The Law of Evidence in Scotland
Watt, Fasti, Watt, D.E.R. Fasti Ecclesiae Scotticanae Medii Aevi ad 
annum 16 3 8 (S.R.S. 1969)
